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2026 FPR ECA 6 · https://firstprecedent.org/canons/presumption-against-retrospectivity
CA-0013Canons · Interpretation · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ECA 6
FPR Editors1 November 2026 · 4,561 words
The Presumption against Retrospectivity
A statute that affects substantive rights or imposes new burdens is presumed to operate only for the future unless the legislature has said otherwise expressly or by necessary implication, while a statute that merely changes procedure is presumed to apply to pending matters; but this is a presumption about what the legislature meant and not a limit on what it can do, and it gives way to clear words, subject to Article 20(1) and the rest of Part III.
Abstract
The presumption against retrospectivity is the rule that a statute speaks to the future unless a contrary intention appears. This entry sets out its rationale as the Constitution Bench explained it in CIT v. Vatika Township (2014), the distinction between substantive and procedural law as summarised in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (1994), and the treatment of the right of appeal in Garikapati Veeraya (1957). It records the Constitution's own prospective reading in Keshavan Madhava Menon (1951), and it separates the interpretive presumption from the hard constitutional limit in Article 20(1), which T. Barai (1982) shows does not stop an accused from taking the benefit of a reduced punishment. It then deals with declaratory and clarificatory statutes (Zile Singh, Shyam Sunder, Sedco Forex), validating Acts and the limit on overruling a judgment by legislation (Prithvi Cotton Mills), repeal and section 6 of the General Clauses Act (Mohar Singh), retrospective laws that fail under Part III (Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni), and the transition to the new criminal laws of 2023, where section 531 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita has displaced the default rule for pending matters and the High Courts have not spoken with one voice on what comes after.
I. The Canon
1An enactment is presumed to speak to the future. Unless the legislature shows a contrary intention, a statute governs facts and transactions that arise after it comes into force, and it does not change the legal character of what has already been done.
2The clearest modern statement in Indian law is that of A.K. Sikri J. for the Constitution Bench in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd.:
“Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow’s backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bed rock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit : law looks forward not backward.”Commissioner of Income Tax v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1, ¶ 31 (decided 15 September 2014).
3The next paragraph gives the reason: “The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of ‘fairness’, which must be the basis of every legal rule”.Vatika Township, ¶ 32. A person who acts in reliance on the law as it stands should not later find that the law has changed the consequences. Lon Fuller treated the same concern as one of the ways in which the enterprise of governing by rules can fail, and it is a recurring theme in the literature on the rule of law.Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, ch. II (rev. ed. 1969).
4The classic common law statement, which Indian courts continue to cite, is that of Wright J. in In re Athlumney:
“Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than thus - that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.”In re Athlumney, [1898] 2 QB 547, quoted in Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24.
A presumption, not a limit on power
5The canon is a rule of construction. It asks what the legislature meant. It does not limit what the legislature can do, and Vatika Township is careful on the point: “Dogmatically framed, the rule is no more than a presumption, and thus could be displaced by out weighing factors.”Vatika Township, ¶ 34. The Court’s fuller statement of the rule is that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation “unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication.”Vatika Township, ¶ 34.
6It follows that Indian legislatures, acting within their competence, can legislate retrospectively. The limits on that power are found elsewhere: in Article 20(1) for criminal punishment, and in the rest of Part III generally. Those limits are discussed in Part V. The rest of this entry is mainly about the interpretive question.
The benefit rule
7Vatika Township also states an asymmetry that is often overlooked. The presumption protects against burdens. “If a legislation confers a benefit on some persons but without inflicting a corresponding detriment on some other person or on the public generally, and where to confer such benefit appears to have been the legislators object, then the presumption would be that such a legislation, giving it a purposive construction, would warrant it to be given a retrospective effect. This exactly is the justification to treat procedural provisions as retrospective.”Vatika Township, ¶ 33.
II. Substantive and Procedural Law
8The usual working distinction is between statutes that affect rights and statutes that affect only the machinery for enforcing them. In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, which concerned amendments to the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, the Court set out five propositions which have been applied ever since:
“(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits. (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature. (iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law. (iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished. (v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication.”Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 : AIR 1994 SC 2623.
9Propositions (iv) and (v) do the most work. A provision does not escape the presumption by being called procedural if its effect is to impose a new burden. The label is the beginning of the enquiry and not its end.
The right of appeal
10The leading illustration is Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury. A suit was filed before the Constitution. By the time the High Court reversed the trial court’s decree, the Constitution had raised the valuation for an appeal as of right, and the High Court refused leave because the property was worth only Rs. 11,400, which fell short of Rs. 20,000. The applicant argued that he had a vested right of appeal under the law as it stood when the suit began. S.R. Das C.J., for the majority, agreed. The Court’s propositions begin with the point that “the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding”, and they continue that the right of appeal is a substantive right, that it vests when the lis commences, and that it can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment providing so expressly or by necessary intendment.Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, AIR 1957 SC 540 : 1957 SCR 488.
11Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh applies the point to a burden on the appeal. An amendment required the amount of tax to be deposited as a condition of admitting an appeal. The Court held that the right of appeal “is a matter of substantive right and not merely a matter of procedure”, and that the appellant’s right, which had vested when the assessment proceedings began, could not be subjected to the new condition.Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 221 : 1953 SCR 987.
12The distinction has a limit that is equally well established. A right of appeal may be substantive, but the procedure for exercising it is not. In Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India the Court said: “Right of appeal may be a substantive right but the procedure for filing the appeal including the period of limitation cannot be called a substantive right, and aggrieved person cannot claim any vested right claiming that he should be governed by the old provision pertaining to period of limitation.”Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 6 SCC 739 : AIR 2011 SC 1725, ¶ 14.
Procedural change in arbitration
13Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd., decided by R.F. Nariman and Navin Sinha JJ., shows the distinction in a modern setting. Under the original section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the mere filing of a petition under section 34 in effect stayed enforcement of the award. The 2015 amendment ended that. The question was whether the amended section applied where section 34 petitions had been filed earlier. Section 26 of the Amendment Act divided proceedings into two groups, and the Court read it with the principles in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur. It held that the amended section 36 applied to pending section 34 applications, as the High Court in one of the matters had done.Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 287 : AIR 2018 SC 1549. Parliament then enacted section 87 in 2019 to reverse that result. In Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, a three-judge Bench struck that provision down under Article 14.Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2020) 17 SCC 324 : AIR 2020 SC 122.
III. The Tax Case: Vatika Township
14Chapter XIV-B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provided for block assessment of undisclosed income found in a search. Section 113 prescribed the rate. It did not mention surcharge. The Finance Act, 2002 added a proviso, with effect from 1 June 2002, under which tax under that section was increased by a surcharge. The question was whether the proviso reached earlier searches. In CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, two judges had held that it was “clarificatory in nature”. Vatika Township came before the Constitution Bench of Lodha C.J. and Khehar, Chelameswar, Sikri and Nariman JJ.CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, (2008) 4 SCC 362; Vatika Township, (2015) 1 SCC 1.
15The Court’s analysis turned on the text and the legislative materials. The Notes on Clauses to the Finance Bill said in terms that the amendment “will take effect from 1st June, 2002”. The Court said these “become epigraphic words, when seen in contradistinction to other amendments specifically stating those to be clarificatory or retrospectively depicting clear intention of the legislature.”Vatika Township, (2015) 1 SCC 1. The same Finance Act made other amendments retrospective, so the legislature knew how to do so and had chosen not to do it here.
16The result was stated plainly: the approach in Suresh N. Gupta “treating the proviso as clarificatory and giving it retrospective effect is not a correct conclusion. Said judgment is accordingly overruled.”Vatika Township, ¶ 40. The assessees’ appeals succeeded, and surcharge was deleted for the block assessment relating to the period before 1 June 2002. The Income-tax Act, 1961 has since been replaced by the Income-tax Act, 2025, but the reasoning is about construction generally and does not depend on the old Act.
IV. Declaratory and Curative Statutes
17A truly declaratory statute falls outside the presumption, because it does not change the law. Zile Singh v. State of Haryana is the standard example. The Court, drawing on Justice G.P. Singh’s work, said: “The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes.”Zile Singh v. State of Haryana, (2004) 8 SCC 1 : AIR 2004 SC 5100. It added that “regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form”, and that an explanatory Act “is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act.”Zile Singh.
18The facts show what a real correction looks like. An amendment to section 13A of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 disqualified members having more than two living children. Its proviso, as drafted, spoke of a person having more than two children “on or after the expiry of one year” of commencement, and read literally this made the disqualification vanish after a year. Within months the legislature substituted “upto” for “after”. R.C. Lahoti C.J. held: “In our opinion the Second Amendment is declaratory in nature. It alters the text of the First Amendment in such manner as to remove the obvious absurdity therefrom and brings it in conformity with what the Legislature had really intended to provide.”Zile Singh. It operated from the date of the First Amendment.
19The opposite situation arises when a provision is called declaratory or clarificatory but in fact changes the law. Labels do not decide the matter. In Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, a Constitution Bench considered Haryana’s substitution of section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, which took away rights of pre-emption from co-sharers. The Court accepted that “when an enactment declares the previous law, it requires to be given retroactive effect”, and that the function of a declaratory statute “is to supply an omission or explain previous statute”. But it also said that where a statute uses the word “declaratory”, “the words so used may not be sufficient to hold that the statute is a declaratory Act as words may be used in order to bring into effect new law.”Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24. It held that the amendment did not reach back to defeat the pre-emptor’s rights under a decree of the first court.
20Sedco Forex International Drill. Inc. v. CIT is the tax version. An Explanation to section 9(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, introduced in 1999 with the words “For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared”, gave a new meaning to salary “earned in India”, but it was enacted to take effect from a future date. The Court said: “When the Explanation seeks to give an artificial meaning ‘earned in India’ and bring about a change effectively in the existing law and in addition is stated to come into force with effect from a future date, there is no principle of interpretation which would justify reading the Explanation as operating retrospectively.”Sedco Forex International Drill. Inc. v. CIT, (2005) 12 SCC 717 : AIR 2006 SC 428.
21An Explanation that is expressly retrospective is different. In M.M. Aqua Technologies Ltd. v. CIT, Explanation 3C to section 43B had been inserted in 2006 with effect from 1 April 1989, and its retrospective force was not in dispute. The argument was over whether it applied to the facts, since it covered interest converted into a loan or borrowing. The case therefore shows that a retrospective clause reaches only as far as its terms, and it should not be cited for the idea that such a clause is ineffective.M.M. Aqua Technologies Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 2021 SC 3997.
Validating Acts
22A validating Act is openly retrospective, and it is judged by different rules. The governing statement is that of Hidayatullah C.J. in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality. After Patel Gordhandas held that a “rate” under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 could not be levied on capital value, Gujarat enacted a validating law. A Constitution Bench upheld it, and explained the limit:
“Granted legislative competence, it is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the legislature does not possess or exercise. A court’s decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances.”Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283 : AIR 1970 SC 192 : [1970] 1 SCR 388, 392–393.
23Validation may be done “only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable of being removed and are in fact removed”. The validity of such a law depends on whether the legislature has competence over the subject and whether it has removed the defect the courts found.Prithvi Cotton Mills. The legislature may change the law on which a judgment rested. It may not simply declare that the judgment will not bind.
V. Constitutional Limits
Article 20(1)
24In criminal law the Constitution itself draws a line that no legislature can cross. Article 20(1) has two limbs. No person shall be convicted of an offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the act charged, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the offence.
25Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh settles two points about its scope. “Law in force” means a law actually in existence at the time and does not include a law later deemed to have been in force. The prohibition reaches conviction and sentence, not procedure: “what is prohibited under article 20 is only conviction or sentence under an ex post facto law and not the trial thereof. Such trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence or by a court different from that which had competence at the time cannot ipso facto be held to be unconstitutional.”Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 : 1953 SCR 1188. In Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal, the Court applied the second limb, and held that the accused could not be subjected to a fine greater than the law in force at the time of the offence allowed, even though a later Act empowered the court to inflict it.Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 404 : [1954] SCR 30.
26Article 20(1) only protects. It does not stop the accused from receiving the benefit of a later, lighter law. In T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, the punishment under section 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was reduced by a central amendment from six years to three, with a new summary procedure. A.P. Sen J., for a three-judge Bench, held that the accused must be tried according to the new procedure and must also have the benefit of the reduced punishment. The Court was careful to limit this. So far as the amendment creates new offences or enhances punishment, no person can be convicted by such an ex post facto law, but so far as it reduces the punishment for an existing offence the rule of beneficial construction applies. The rule has no application where the essential ingredients of the two offences differ.T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, (1983) 1 SCC 177 : AIR 1983 SC 150 : [1983] 1 SCR 905.
Part III more generally
27Outside Article 20(1), a retrospective law may still fail if it offends another fundamental right. The test is not a separate rule against retrospectivity, and the cases should not be overstated.
28Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar upheld a Bihar tax on passengers and goods given retrospective effect from 1950 by an Act of 1961. Gajendragadkar J., for five judges, rejected the arguments that retrospectivity took the tax outside legislative competence and that it was unreasonable. “The test of the length of time covered by the retrospective operations cannot by itself be treated as a decisive test.”Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1667 : [1964] 1 SCR 897, headnote. The case therefore supports the power, and it also treats retrospectivity as something that may be examined under Article 19, without holding that length of time alone is enough.
29State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni shows a law failing. Gujarat’s 1978 amendment to the Panchayats Act took away, with retrospective effect, the status of government servants from certain employees, as a means of avoiding Articles 14 and 311. O. Chinnappa Reddy J., for a Constitution Bench, held:
“The legislature is undoubtedly competent to legislate with retrospective effect to take away or impair any vested right acquired under existing laws but since the laws are made under a written Constitution, and have to conform to the do’s and don’ts of the Constitution neither prospective nor retrospective laws can be made so as to contravene Fundamental Rights. The law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of the parties today.”State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni, (1983) 2 SCC 33 : AIR 1984 SC 161 : [1983] 2 SCR 287, 319–320.
30He added: “We are concerned with today’s rights and not yesterday’s.”Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni.
The Constitution’s own temporal reach
31In the first year of the Republic, the Court applied the canon to the Constitution. In Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, the petitioner was prosecuted for publishing a pamphlet in 1949 without the authority required by section 15(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, and he argued that the case could not continue after 26 January 1950 because the Act had become void under Article 13(1). The majority (Kania C.J., Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan, Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.) rejected this. S.R. Das J. wrote: “Every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implications made to have retrospective operation. There is no reason why this rule of interpretation should not be applied for the purpose of interpreting our Constitution.”Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128 : 1951 SCR 228. Article 13(1) “is entirely prospective in its operation”, and so it did not affect a liability incurred earlier.Keshavan Madhava Menon.
32Fazl Ali and Mukherjea JJ. dissented. Fazl Ali J. observed that the argument that a past act remains punishable could equally be made for offences under a repealed Act or an expired temporary Act, and that “such an argument has never succeeded”. The majority’s prospective reading of Article 13(1) is the part of the decision that has lasted.
VI. Repeal and Section 6
33Repeal is the setting in which the presumption has a statutory form. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that unless a different intention appears, a repeal does not affect the previous operation of the repealed law, rights and liabilities acquired or incurred under it, or legal proceedings in respect of them. At common law the effect was the reverse, and Tindal C.J. in Kay v. Goodwin said a repealed statute must be considered “as a law that never existed except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst it was an existing law.”Kay v. Goodwin, (1830) 6 Bing 576, quoted in Keshavan Madhava Menon, AIR 1951 SC 128.
34In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, a three-judge Bench (Mukherjea, Bose and Jagannadhadas JJ.) considered what happens when a repeal is followed by a new law on the same subject:
“Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them.”State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84 : [1955] 1 SCR 893, 899–900.
VII. The New Criminal Laws
35The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) came into force on 1 July 2024. Each raises the temporal question in a different form.
The BNS
36The BNS is substantive. Article 20(1) applies directly, so a new offence or a heavier punishment cannot be applied to earlier conduct, and new provisions such as section 103(2), on murder by a group of five or more acting in concert on specified grounds, can reach only acts done after commencement. Section 358 repeals the Indian Penal Code and saves its previous operation, and it preserves the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Whether a milder BNS provision should benefit an accused for earlier conduct is a question to be answered under T. Barai, including its limit that the offence must be the same in substance.
The BNSS
37For procedure, the default rule would apply the new Code to pending cases. Parliament displaced it. Section 531(2)(a) provides that if, immediately before the BNSS comes into force, there is any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending, it shall be disposed of, continued, held or made under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as if the BNSS had not come into force.
38The Supreme Court applied that clause in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ramesh Chander Diwan, in the course of a judgment about something else. Asked for liberty to seek sanction under section 218 of the BNSS, which introduced deemed sanction, Dipankar Datta and Manmohan JJ. answered: “In view of the provisions of Section 531 of the BNSS, the Cr. PC stands repealed; yet, pending proceedings are to be continued under the repealed law. We, therefore, decline Mr. Raju’s prayer.”Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ramesh Chander Diwan, 2025 INSC 539, ¶ 30. That is a short application of the clause and not a general treatment of it.
39The harder question concerns proceedings begun after 1 July 2024 in old cases. The High Courts in the first weeks of the new law did not all approach it alike. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mandeep Singh v. Kulwinder Singh kept a revision and its condonation application under the Code where they were pending on the cut-off date, and in Abhishek Jain v. State of UT Chandigarh held that a fresh petition filed under the Code after that date was not maintainable. The Kerala High Court in Abdul Khader v. State of Kerala held that an appeal filed on or after 1 July 2024 was governed by the BNSS, whenever the conviction, and also took a different view on defective filings. The Rajasthan High Court in Krishan Joshi v. State of Rajasthan treated an investigation on an earlier FIR as pending. The Delhi High Court in S. Rabban Alam v. CBI noted the possible reading that only appeals pending before commencement are saved, and left the point open, and in Prince v. State of NCT of Delhi it held that a bail application filed after commencement should have been brought under the BNSS.These decisions, all of July 2024, are taken from practitioner reports and not from the judgments themselves: BNSS or CrPC: A Vexed Question, Bar & Bench; In a First, Punjab & Haryana High Court Interprets Provision of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, LiveLaw (Mandeep Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (PH) 236). Readers should check the orders.
40The direction of these decisions is broadly that “pending” means pending immediately before commencement and that fresh filings go under the new law, but the reasoning varies. At the time of this entry we have not found a Supreme Court decision that settles the matter. Garikapati Veeraya preserves the substantive right of appeal and does not, on its reasoning, preserve the procedure by which an appeal is filed; whether this fully answers the question has yet to be decided at the highest level.
The BSA
41The BSA replaces the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and section 170 contains the repeal and savings provision. The law of evidence is ordinarily treated as procedural, so the general presumption would apply it to later hearings. Where that would change rights that have already crystallised, propositions (iv) and (v) in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur remain the relevant test. We are not aware of a settled line of authority on the transition, and we do not offer one.
VIII. Applying the Canon
42Five questions organise most disputes in this area.
43The first is whether the statute states its temporal reach. If so, that ends the interpretive question, and the only question left is one of constitutional validity. A date of commencement in the future counts against retrospectivity, as Sedco Forex and Vatika Township show.
44The second, if the statute is silent, is what kind of provision it is. A provision affecting rights is presumed prospective. A provision affecting only procedure is presumed to apply to pending matters, unless it would impose a new disability or obligation in respect of a completed transaction.
45The third is whether the provision is truly declaratory. Zile Singh and Shyam Sunder show that the court looks at what the provision does. Its label does not decide the matter.
46The fourth, if the statute is a validating law, is whether it removes the basis of the judgment or merely refuses to obey it, the distinction drawn in Prithvi Cotton Mills.
47The fifth is the constitutional check. Article 20(1) is absolute for new offences and greater penalties. Other retrospective laws are tested under the rights they affect, as Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni did and Rai Ramkrishna declined to do on its facts.
48Limitation deserves a separate word. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur treats limitation as procedural, and Thirumalai Chemicals denies any vested right in an old period. These cases do not stand for the proposition that a period can be changed to revive a claim already barred or to destroy one instantly, and those points need to be argued from the authorities directly in point. The canon’s own reason, fairness to those who relied on the law as it stood, is where any such argument begins.
History
- Published · 1 November 2026
© 2026 First Precedent Research. Free to share and adapt with credit, for non-commercial use, under CC BY-NC 4.0. A published piece is changed only to correct an error, and each correction is listed under History. If the law changes, we add a linked afterword. Nothing on FPR is legal advice.