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2026 FPR ECA 4 · https://firstprecedent.org/canons/literal-rule
CA-0001Canons · Interpretation · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ECA 4
FPR Editors27 October 2026 · 6,400 words
The Literal Rule
Where the words of an enactment are clear and capable of one meaning only, a court must give them that meaning, in their ordinary and grammatical sense, whatever it thinks of the result; the policy of the Act, hardship and equity become relevant only when the words admit of more than one construction.
Abstract
The literal rule is the starting point of statutory interpretation in Indian law. This entry states the rule and the ideas it rests on, traces it to its English formulations (the Sussex Peerage Case, Abley v. Dale, Lord Esher in R. v. Judge of the City of London Court, and the exchange between Denning L.J. and the House of Lords in Magor and St. Mellons), and follows its reception in India through Pakala Narayana Swami, Jugalkishore Saraf and Kanai Lal Sur. It then examines how the Supreme Court has applied it: the Constitution Bench in Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta on a widow's right of eviction; B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal on law and equity; the rule against supplying a casus omissus in Padma Sundara Rao; and its strict form in taxing and penal statutes, including the Constitution Bench in Dilip Kumar. It closes with the rise of purposive interpretation, the seven-judge Bench in Abhiram Singh, and the propositions that state the law today.
I. The canon
1The legislature speaks through the words it enacts. Where those words are clear and bear one meaning only, the court’s task is to apply them. Under the literal rule, also called the plain meaning rule or the rule of grammatical construction, a court gives the words of a statute their natural, ordinary and grammatical sense, and it does so whether or not it thinks the result wise, convenient or fair.
2The rule has three parts. First, the words are the starting point: the intention of the legislature is to be found in what it has said, not in what a court supposes it meant to say. Second, where the words are capable of only one meaning, that meaning governs, and arguments from the object of the Act, from hardship or from equity cannot displace it. Third, only when the words are capable of two or more constructions does the court look beyond them, to the policy of the Act, the mischief it was passed to remedy, or the absurdity that one reading would produce.
3The rule is often expressed through old maxims of the common law. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget: a plain sentence needs no interpreter. A verbis legis non est recedendum: one must not depart from the words of the law. Judicis est jus dicere, non dare: the judge’s office is to declare the law, not to make it. Dura lex sed lex: the law is hard, but it is the law. The maxims are reminders rather than rules; what gives the literal rule its force in India is the line of decisions of the Supreme Court traced below.
The first rule, not the only one
4The literal rule is the first rule of construction, not the only one. It tells the court where to begin and when it must stop. If the words are clear, the inquiry ends with them. If they are not, the court moves on to the other rules: the golden rule, which permits a departure from the grammatical meaning to avoid absurdity, and the mischief rule and purposive interpretation, which choose between possible meanings by asking what the statute was for.
5The Supreme Court stated the order in which these questions arise in Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, in a passage that remains the standard statement of the rule in Indian law:
The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907, (1958) SCR 360.
6The passage fixes the sequence. The court does not first decide what the policy of the Act is and then read the words to fit it. It reads the words first. Only if they leave the matter open does the policy of the Act come in.
Ordinary meaning
7The instruction to read words in their “ordinary” sense needs some refinement, because words have more than one kind of ordinary meaning.
8Where a statute does not define a word and uses it in a general context, the word bears its popular sense, the meaning it has in everyday speech. In fiscal statutes this takes the form of the common parlance test: goods named in a schedule are understood as the people who deal in them understand them, not as a botanist or a dictionary would. In Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer the Supreme Court held that betel leaves were not “vegetables” within the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, because in common parlance the word does not include them, whatever their botanical character.Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola, AIR 1961 SC 1325, (1962) 1 SCR 279.
9Where the legislature uses a word that has a settled legal or technical meaning, the word bears that meaning. In State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. the Supreme Court held that “sale of goods” in Entry 48 of List II of the Government of India Act, 1935 had the meaning the expression bore in the law of sale of goods, so that a building contract, which involves no sale of goods as such, could not be taxed as one.State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 560, (1959) SCR 379.
10The ordinary meaning of general words is also not frozen at the date of enactment. A statute is taken to be “always speaking”, so that general words cover things the legislature could not have foreseen if those things fall within the words. In State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai the Supreme Court held that evidence recorded by video-conferencing satisfied the requirement of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that evidence be taken in the presence of the accused.State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai, (2003) 4 SCC 601. This is an application of the literal rule, not an exception to it: the court gives the words the full reach their ordinary meaning allows.
Text and context
11The literal rule does not require a court to read a word on its own, as if with a dictionary in hand. Words take their meaning from the sentence, the section and the statute in which they appear. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., Chinnappa Reddy J. put it this way:
Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted.Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424.
12Reading words in context is part of finding their ordinary meaning. It is not a licence to depart from a meaning that, read in context, is clear.
II. The English formulations
13The modern rule was settled in the English courts in the nineteenth century, as the courts gave up the older idea that they could extend or confine a statute according to the “equity” of its purpose.
The Sussex Peerage Case (1844)
14The classic statement was given by Tindal C.J., advising the House of Lords in The Sussex Peerage Case. The question was whether the marriage of the Duke of Sussex, contracted in Rome without the consent required by the Royal Marriages Act, 1772, was valid; it was argued that the Act did not reach marriages celebrated abroad. The Lords held that it did, and Tindal C.J. said:
the only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver.The Sussex Peerage Case, (1844) 11 Cl & F 85, 8 ER 1034 (H.L.); the passage is quoted in Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47.
15The dictum does not set the words against the intention of Parliament. It says that where the words are precise, they are the best evidence of that intention, and nothing more is needed.
Abley v. Dale (1851)
16Jervis C.J. stated the consequence plainly in Abley v. Dale: a court must follow clear words even when it thinks the result unjust.
If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it do lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied, where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning.Abley v. Dale, (1851) 11 CB 378, 138 ER 519; quoted in Union of India v. Dharamendra Textile Processors, (2008) 13 SCC 369.
17The point of the passage is institutional. A judge who departs from clear words because the result seems wrong is not interpreting the statute but replacing it.
Lord Esher (1892)
18Lord Esher M.R. gave the rule its strictest form in R. v. Judge of the City of London Court:
If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the Legislature has committed an absurdity.R. v. Judge of the City of London Court, [1892] 1 QB 273 (C.A.); quoted in Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax v. Central Concrete and Allied Products, [1999] 236 ITR 595 (Cal.), and the passage that follows in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459.
19In the same judgment Lord Esher explained where the golden rule begins. If the words admit of two interpretations, they are not clear; and if one of those interpretations leads to an absurdity and the other does not, the court will conclude that the legislature did not intend the absurdity and will adopt the other. The literal rule and the golden rule are thus not in conflict. The golden rule operates only where the words are open to more than one reading; the literal rule governs where they are not.
Magor and St. Mellons (1950–1952)
20The limits of the judicial role were tested in Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation. In a reorganisation of local government, two rural district councils were merged into one and part of their area was transferred to the borough of Newport. The governing provisions gave compensation to councils that lost area and rateable value, but on their terms they did not reach the new council formed by the merger, which claimed it. In the Court of Appeal, Denning L.J. would have filled the gap:
We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of Ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis.Magor and St. Mellons RDC v. Newport Corporation, [1950] 2 All ER 1226 (C.A.); quoted in CIT v. K.S. Vaidyanathan (Madras High Court, 12 November 1982).
21The House of Lords rejected the approach. Lord Simonds said of Denning L.J.’s proposition:
It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation. ... If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act.Magor and St. Mellons RDC v. Newport Corporation, [1952] AC 189 (H.L.); quoted in Kalwa v. Vasakha Singh, AIR 1982 P&H 480.
22Between those two sentences Lord Simonds added that the usurpation was the less justifiable because it was guesswork: the court could not know what material the legislature would have filled the gap with, had it noticed it. That remains the principal objection to judicial gap-filling, and the Supreme Court of India has adopted it in the rule against supplying a casus omissus (Part IV).
Why the rule holds
23Three reasons are usually given for the rule.
24The first is democratic. The power to make law belongs to the legislature, which debates, amends and passes a particular text. When a court enforces a meaning the text does not bear, it substitutes its own choice for the legislature’s.
25The second is certainty. People arrange their affairs by the published text of the law. If clear words could be set aside whenever a court found the result unfair, no one could rely on them.
26The third is respect for compromise. A statute is often the product of competing interests, and its exceptions, conditions and limits are the terms on which it was passed. A court that extends the statute beyond its words to serve its “purpose” may undo the bargain that made it law.
III. Reception in India
The Privy Council
27The rule came to India through the Privy Council’s construction of the colonial codes. In Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor, the question was whether section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which barred the use of statements made to the police in the course of an investigation, applied to a statement made by a person who was later accused. The Crown argued that it did not. The Board held that the words covered any person, including one later accused, and found no ground for reading in an exception. Lord Atkin said:
But in truth when the meaning of words is plain, it is not the duty of the Courts to busy themselves with supposed intentions.Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47, (1939) 66 IA 66.
28He went on to quote, with approval, Lord Wensleydale’s statement of the golden rule in Grey v. Pearson: that the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless it would lead to some absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument.
Jugalkishore Saraf (1955)
29After 1950 the Supreme Court adopted the same approach. In Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., S.R. Das J. said:
The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation.Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 376, (1955) 1 SCR 1369 (S.R. Das J.).
Kanai Lal Sur (1957)
30Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan is the leading Indian authority. The respondent landlord obtained a decree for ejectment against the appellant, a thika tenant of part of premises on R.G. Kar Road in Calcutta, on 16 March 1949. The decree was upheld on appeal and second appeal. On 22 May 1953 the landlord applied to the civil court to execute it. The tenant objected under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, that section 5(1) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, as amended in 1953, required a landlord wishing to eject a thika tenant to apply to the Controller, so that the civil court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree. The executing court, the District Judge and the High Court rejected the objection, and the tenant appealed by special leave.
31A Bench of P.B. Gajendragadkar, N.H. Bhagwati and S.K. Das JJ. dismissed the appeal. Section 5(1) applied to a landlord who wished to eject a thika tenant; it did not apply to a landlord who had already obtained a decree for ejectment, and the civil court therefore had jurisdiction to execute it. Counsel for the tenant argued that the Act was welfare legislation and should be construed in the tenants’ favour. Gajendragadkar J. accepted that the operative provisions of welfare legislation should receive a beneficent construction, but held that this did not permit the court to strain the words:
The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the Act purports to remedy and correct.Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907, (1958) SCR 360.
32The passage sets out the two steps that Indian courts still follow. The court first reads the words. If they bear one meaning, that is the end of it. Only if they bear two does the court choose between them by reference to the policy of the Act, and only then do the mischief and the remedy, in the sense of Heydon’s Case, become relevant.
Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (2005)
33The most important modern application is the Constitution Bench decision in Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta.Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271, AIR 2005 SC 648. The Bench was N. Santosh Hegde, S.N. Variava, B.P. Singh, H.K. Sema and S.B. Sinha JJ., and the judgment of the Court was delivered by B.P. Singh J.
34Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 gives a widow a summary right to recover immediate possession of “the premises let out by her, or by her husband” if she requires them for her own residence. The respondent was a widow who had acquired the tenanted premises by transfer; neither she nor her husband had let them out to the appellant tenant. The Additional Rent Controller refused the tenant leave to defend and ordered eviction, and the High Court upheld the order, holding that only two conditions had to be met: that the landlady was a widow, and that she needed the premises for her own residence.
35There was a conflict of authority between two three-judge Benches. Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India suggested that “let out” referred only to the creation of the tenancy, so that a transferee landlord could not use the summary procedure.S. Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 87. Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, construing the same words in section 14A, had read them to include a transferee landlord.Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814. The question was referred to five judges.
36The Constitution Bench preferred Surjit Singh Kalra. It began from the interpretive duty:
The interpretative function of the court is to discover the true legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences.Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271.
37It then held that the words of section 14D admitted of only one meaning. Had the legislature meant to give the right to every widow landlady, it would not have added the words “let out by her, or by her husband”:
We are obliged to read the provision as it is, and cannot give it a meaning by deleting an expression expressly employed by the legislature. The expression, “let out by her, or by her husband” is not an expression which permits of any ambiguity.Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271.
38The Bench added two supporting reasons. Section 14(6) of the Act bars a landlord who has acquired premises by transfer from evicting the tenant for five years from the date of purchase, and reading section 14D to cover a transferee widow would bring the two provisions into conflict. And the reading in Kanta Goel would make the words “let out by her, or by her husband” and “such premises” redundant, contrary to the principle that effect should be given to every word of a statute. The Court explained Kanta Goel as having been decided on another point, after a compromise between the parties. The appeal was allowed and the eviction petition dismissed: a widow who acquired tenanted premises by sale or transfer cannot use section 14D to evict a pre-existing tenant.
39The case shows the literal rule at work in beneficial legislation. Section 14D was enacted to help widows, and an argument from that purpose pointed towards helping all of them. But the words drew a narrower line, and the Court held that it could not erase it.
B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011)
40In B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal a Bench of Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra JJ. restated the rule in its relation to equity.B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, (2011) 4 SCC 266. The dispute was over seniority as Block Development Officers in Kerala between general category candidates and Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates. Rule 27(c) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules provided that the seniority of a person appointed on the advice of the Public Service Commission was to be determined by the date of the first effective advice made for his appointment. The Commission advised the appellants first, in July 1992, and the respondents in April 1993, so that on the words of the rule the appellants were senior. The respondents’ rank list had been prepared in 1987, but their advice had been delayed by an administrative instruction for which they were not to blame. A learned Single Judge and a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court held for the respondents.
41The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It held that the High Court had relied on “equity, justice and good conscience, rather than law”, and said:
When there is a conflict between law and equity, it is the law which is to prevail. Equity can only supplement the law when there is a gap in it, but it cannot supplant the law.B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, (2011) 4 SCC 266.
42On the method of interpretation, the Court said:
the first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation ... other than the literal ruleB. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, (2011) 4 SCC 266.
43The passage is often quoted, and it is worth noticing its limits. It names three cases in which the court may look beyond the words: where they are ambiguous, where they lead to no intelligible result, and where read literally they would nullify the object of the statute. The third is a real qualification, and it is the point at which the literal rule meets the purposive approach discussed in Part V.
IV. Hardship, equity and the casus omissus
Hardship is not a ground for departure
44The commonest argument against a literal reading is that it causes hardship. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to treat hardship as a reason for departing from clear words. In Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta, a fresh valuation of the appellant’s premises had been ordered, but the time the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 allowed for it had expired. To prevent the Corporation losing its rates, the High Court remanded the case to the Court of Small Causes and directed that court to make the valuation itself, choosing, as it saw it, the lesser of two evils. A.K. Sarkar J., for the Supreme Court, rejected that reasoning:
A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. A statute must of course be given effect to whether a court likes the result or not.Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529, (1966) 1 SCR 543 (A.K. Sarkar J.).
45In Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P., K.S. Hegde J. described the order in which the rules are used:
All that we have to see at the very outset is what does that provision say? If the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision, the legislative intent is clear, we need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction of statutes are called into aid only when the legislative intention is not clear.Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 216.
46If a statute works hardship, the remedy is for the legislature to amend it.
The rule against supplying a casus omissus
47A casus omissus is a case the statute has not provided for. The rule is that a court cannot supply it.
48The leading authority is the Constitution Bench decision in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu.Padmasundara Rao v. State of T.N., (2002) 3 SCC 533, AIR 2002 SC 1334. The Bench was S.P. Bharucha C.J., R.C. Lahoti, N. Santosh Hegde, Ruma Pal and Arijit Pasayat JJ., and Pasayat J. wrote the judgment. The proviso to section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended in 1984, required the declaration under section 6 to be made within one year of the publication of the notification under section 4(1), and it excluded from that period any time during which proceedings were stayed by a court. The question was whether, when a High Court had quashed a declaration, the State could issue a fresh one after the year had run, with time counted from the High Court’s order. In N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka, a three-judge Bench had held that it could.N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka, (1996) 3 SCC 88.
49The Constitution Bench held that Narasimhaiah was wrong. It began:
It is well settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent.Padmasundara Rao v. State of T.N., (2002) 3 SCC 533.
50And it held:
The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah’s case (supra).Padmasundara Rao v. State of T.N., (2002) 3 SCC 533.
51The Bench pointed to the structure of the provision. The legislature had expressly excluded periods covered by a stay or injunction; it had not excluded the period after a declaration was quashed. “If the legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it.”Padmasundara Rao v. State of T.N., (2002) 3 SCC 533.
52The judgment also states the rule’s limits:
a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereofPadmasundara Rao v. State of T.N., (2002) 3 SCC 533; repeated in State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, (2005) 10 SCC 437, AIR 2005 SC 294, and in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, (2003) 6 SCC 659.
53The rule therefore has two sides. A court will not fill a gap the legislature has left. But before concluding that there is a gap, it must read the statute as a whole, because what looks like an omission in one provision may be covered by another.
54The same principle appears in Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, where the Court refused to read words into a provision on judges’ pensions:
It is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The Court cannot re-write, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323, AIR 1992 SC 96.
Taxing statutes
55The rule applies with special strictness to taxing statutes. Rowlatt J. stated the classic position in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners:
In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC, [1921] 1 KB 64; quoted in Director of Inspection of Income Tax v. Pooran Mal & Sons, (1975) 4 SCC 568.
56J.C. Shah J. adopted it for the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd.:
In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place. Nor can taxing statutes be interpreted on any presumptions or assumptions. The court must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed: it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the statutes so as to supply any assumed deficiency.Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1047, (1961) 2 SCR 189.
57In Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company, a Constitution Bench of five judges, in a judgment written by N.V. Ramana J., settled how strict construction works on each side of a taxing statute. Every part of a taxing statute, including charging, computation and exemption provisions, is to be construed strictly; but where there is ambiguity, the benefit goes in different directions:
in case of ambiguity in a charging provisions, the benefit must necessarily go in favour of subject/assessee, but the same is not true for an exemption notification wherein the benefit of ambiguity must be strictly interpreted in favour of the Revenue/State.Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Co., (2018) 9 SCC 1, ¶ 41.
58The Bench answered the reference in three propositions: an exemption notification is to be interpreted strictly, and the burden is on the assessee to show that the case comes within it; where there is ambiguity in an exemption notification, the assessee cannot claim the benefit of it and it must be interpreted in favour of the revenue; and Sun Export Corporation, which had held the contrary, and the decisions following it, were overruled.Dilip Kumar, (2018) 9 SCC 1, ¶ 52.
Penal statutes
59Penal statutes are also construed strictly, because a person is entitled to know in advance what conduct the law punishes. In Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay, Mahajan C.J. said:
if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty.Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 496, (1955) 1 SCR 158.
60He added that it is not open to the court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the legislature in order to carry out what it supposes the legislature intended. The rule applies in the same way to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the other criminal codes of 2023: a court cannot create an offence the words do not describe, or cut down a safeguard the words provide.
V. The rise of purposive interpretation
The critique of literalism
61In the second half of the twentieth century the literal rule came under sustained criticism. H.L.A. Hart argued that legal language has an “open texture”: a word has a core of settled meaning and a penumbra of doubtful cases, and in the penumbra the words alone do not decide.H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press 1961) ch. VII. Lon Fuller replied that even the core cannot be identified without asking what a rule is for, and gave the example of a rule against vehicles in a park applied to a military truck mounted on a pedestal as a war memorial.Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart” (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630.
62In India, Krishna Iyer J. made the point in his own idiom in Chairman, Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee: “To be literal in meaning is to see the skin and miss the soul”.Chairman, Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee, (1977) 2 SCC 256. The concern was that mechanical attention to grammar could defeat the object of social welfare legislation.
The purposive approach
63By the 2010s the Supreme Court was saying that purposive interpretation had become the dominant approach. In Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, which concerned the appointment of a substitute arbitrator under section 15(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, R.F. Nariman J. wrote the main judgment and A.K. Sikri J. a concurring one.Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619. Sikri J. said:
Though literal rule of interpretation, till some time ago, was treated as the ‘golden rule’, it is now the doctrine of purposive interpretation which is predominant, particularly in those cases where literal interpretation may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity.Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619 (Sikri J., concurring).
64He drew on Aharon Barak’s account of purposive interpretation as resting on three components: language, which sets the range of meanings the words can bear; purpose, which identifies the meaning that best serves the statute; and discretion, which the judge exercises in choosing between them.Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press 2005).
65The passage is often read as displacing the literal rule. Read carefully, it does not. It describes the purposive approach as predominant in cases where a literal reading “may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity”, which are the cases in which the literal rule, on its own terms, has always given way. And Barak’s first component, language, is a limit: purpose chooses among the meanings the words can bear, and does not supply one they cannot.
Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017)
66The two approaches divided a seven-judge Bench in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen.Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, (2017) 2 SCC 629, AIR 2017 SC 401. Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 makes it a corrupt practice to appeal for votes “on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or language”. The question was whether “his” refers only to the religion of the candidate (or of a rival candidate), or also to the religion of the voter.
67By a majority of four to three, the Court held that “his” includes the religion of the voter, so that any appeal for votes on the ground of religion is a corrupt practice. Madan B. Lokur J. wrote for himself and L. Nageswara Rao J.; S.A. Bobde J. and T.S. Thakur C.J. agreed in separate opinions. The majority relied on the purpose of the provision, which was to keep religion, race, caste, community and language out of electoral appeals altogether.
68D.Y. Chandrachud J. dissented, with A.K. Goel and U.U. Lalit JJ. The dissent read the words closely. The provision is expressed in the singular, and “his” qualifies what precedes it: the candidate for whom votes are sought, or the candidate against whom an appeal is made. “The ground” means that the appeal must be made on the basis of that candidate’s religion. The dissent noted that Parliament had amended the Act many times without changing the settled reading of section 123(3), and concluded:
No form of government is perfect. The actual unfolding of democracy and the working of a democratic constitution may suffer from imperfections. But these imperfections cannot be attended to by an exercise of judicial redrafting of a legislative provision.Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, (2017) 2 SCC 629 (Chandrachud J., dissenting).
69The case is a reminder that the choice between the literal and the purposive approach can decide a case, and that the Supreme Court has not settled it in favour of either for all purposes.
The literal, golden and mischief rules compared
70The three classical rules are best understood as answering different questions.
71The literal rule asks what the words mean in their ordinary sense. It applies wherever the words are clear, and it permits no modification of them. Its leading Indian authorities are Kanai Lal Sur, Nathi Devi and B. Premanand. Its weakness is that it can enforce poor drafting and produce hardship.
72The golden rule asks whether the ordinary meaning leads to an absurdity, repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the statute. It applies only where it does, and it permits the court to modify the words so far as is necessary to avoid that result, and no further. Its Indian authorities include Jugalkishore Saraf and Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh. Its weakness is the difficulty of telling real absurdity from a result the court dislikes.
73The mischief rule asks what defect in the earlier law the statute was passed to cure. It applies where the words are open to more than one construction, and it directs the court to the construction that suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy. Its leading Indian authority is Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar. Its weakness is that it can become a licence for judicial policy-making.
The limit of purposive interpretation
74The modern reconciliation of the literal and purposive approaches rests on one distinction: purpose helps the court choose between the meanings the words can bear; it does not authorise a meaning they cannot bear.
75The House of Lords stated the narrow exception in Inco Europe Ltd. v. First Choice Distribution. A court may read words into a statute to correct an obvious drafting error only if it is sure of three things: the intended purpose of the provision; that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose; and the substance of the provision Parliament would have made had the error been noticed.Inco Europe Ltd. v. First Choice Distribution, [2000] 1 WLR 586 (H.L.); the three conditions are set out in Great Offshore Ltd. v. Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction Co., (2008) 14 SCC 240. The conditions are demanding because the court must be able to say, not guess, what Parliament would have done. Where it cannot, the rule in Magor and St. Mellons and Padma Sundara Rao applies, and the remedy is for the legislature.
VI. The position today
76The law on the literal rule in India may be stated in eight propositions.
771. The literal rule is the first rule of interpretation. A court begins with the ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning of the words, read in the context of the statute as a whole.
782. If the words are capable of one construction only, the court must adopt it. It cannot adopt another construction on the ground that it is more consistent with the object or policy of the Act. The policy of the Act becomes relevant only when the words are capable of two constructions (Kanai Lal Sur).
793. A court cannot delete words the legislature has used or read in words it has not. Where the legislature has drawn a line, as in “let out by her, or by her husband”, the court must respect it even in beneficial legislation (Nathi Devi).
804. A court cannot supply a casus omissus. It may do so only in a case of clear necessity, where the reason for it is found within the four corners of the statute; and it must not readily infer an omission without reading the statute as a whole (Padma Sundara Rao).
815. Hardship, inconvenience and equity are not grounds for departing from clear words. Equity may supplement the law where there is a gap, but it cannot supplant it (Martin Burn; B. Premanand).
826. Taxing statutes are construed strictly. An ambiguity in a charging provision is resolved in favour of the assessee; an ambiguity in an exemption notification is resolved in favour of the revenue, and the assessee must show that the case comes within the exemption (Dilip Kumar).
837. Penal statutes are construed strictly. Where a penal provision is open to two reasonable constructions, the court adopts the one that exempts the subject from penalty (Tolaram Relumal).
848. Purposive interpretation is now the predominant approach where a literal reading would not serve the purpose of the statute or would lead to absurdity (Shailesh Dhairyawan). But it chooses between meanings the words can bear; it does not permit the court to rewrite them, and where the court disagrees with the result of clear words, the remedy lies with the legislature (Abhiram Singh, dissent; Magor and St. Mellons).
History
- Published · 27 October 2026
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