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2026 FPR ECA 1 · https://firstprecedent.org/canons/golden-rule

CA-0002Canons · Interpretation · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ECA 1

FPR Editors18 October 2026 · 6,323 words

The Golden Rule

The golden rule permits a court to depart from the grammatical and ordinary meaning of statutory words only when adhering to them leads to manifest absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, and authorizes modification only so far as is necessary to avert that result and no further.

Abstract

Formulated by Lord Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson (1857) and received into Indian law through Jugalkishore Saraf and Tirath Singh (1955), the golden rule occupies the middle ground between mechanical literalism and open-ended purposive reconstruction. This entry traces the origin of the canon in nineteenth-century English common law; examines its reception and evolution in Indian jurisprudence; defines the high threshold of legal absurdity as distinct from mere hardship, anomaly, or judicial disapproval; analyses the specific techniques of modification developed by the Supreme Court, including the transposition of conjunctions, the softening of mandatory terms, the restriction of general words, and the repair of drafting defects; and charts its relationship with modern purposive interpretation.


I. The canon

1The primary duty of a court construing an enactment is to give effect to the words chosen by the legislature in their natural, ordinary, and grammatical sense. Words, however, are imperfect instruments. When drafted with infelicity or applied to unanticipated contingencies, the literal text of a provision may yield an outcome that contradicts the internal logic of the statute, produces an unworkable procedural impasse, or results in a consequence so startlingly irrational that no reasonable legislature could have intended it.

2Faced with such an outcome, a court is not bound to enforce the letter of the text to the destruction of its sense. Under the golden rule of interpretation, where the ordinary grammatical construction leads to a manifest absurdity, an internal repugnance, or an inconsistency with the rest of the statute, the court may modify the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the words—and even the structure of the sentence—to avert that result.

3The canon consists of two limbs and an iron rider:

4First, grammatical adherence is the obligatory starting point; a court has no roving commission to depart from clear language merely because it considers the statutory consequence harsh, inconvenient, or contrary to abstract justice.

5Second, departure is permissible only when adhering to the literal text generates a genuine absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency within the statutory scheme.

6Third, the modification permitted is strictly limited: the words may be modified so far as is necessary to remove the absurdity or inconsistency, and no further.

7The golden rule is thus a corrective brake upon literalism. It does not license the judiciary to rewrite enactments or to supply legislative omissions out of a preference for an alternative policy; it is a surgical tool designed to rescue the text from self-defeat while preserving, to the greatest extent possible, the statutory grain.

II. The English origin

8The canon emerged in the English courts during the second quarter of the nineteenth century as an explicit reaction against the rigid mechanical literalism then prevailing in the common-law courts of Westminster Hall.

9The earliest judicial articulation came from the Irish Court of King’s Bench. In Warburton v. Loveland d. Ivie, Burton J. formulated the principle in terms that would later become standard:

I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes, that, in the first instance, the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention, or declared purpose of the statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further.Warburton v. Loveland d. Ivie, (1828) 1 Hud & B 623 at 648; affirmed in the House of Lords by Tindal CJ in Warburton v. Loveland, (1832) 2 D & Cl 480 at 489, 5 ER 499.

10Four years later, Baron Parke (later Lord Wensleydale) adopted this formulation in the Court of Exchequer in Becke v. Smith, observing that it is a “very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further.”Becke v. Smith, (1836) 2 M & W 191 at 195, 150 ER 724.

11The classical statement that fixed the doctrine permanently into the common-law canon was delivered by Lord Wensleydale in the House of Lords in Grey v. Pearson.Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 HLC 61 at 106, 10 ER 1216.

12The case concerned the construction of a will. The testator, Richard Watson, devised copyhold and freehold estates to trustees upon trust for his grandson, Robert Watson, and the heirs male of his body, with alternative contingent remainders to other family members “in case he shall die under the age of twenty-one years, and without issue”. Robert Watson survived the age of twenty-one, but died without leaving issue. The contingent remaindermen argued that the word “and” should be read disjunctively as “or”—so that the gift over would take effect either if Robert died under twenty-one or if he died without issue at any age. They contended that a literal reading defeated the obvious desire of the testator to keep the estates within the family line.

13The House of Lords rejected the argument. Lord Wensleydale delivered the famous dictum:

I have been long impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted, at least in the Courts of Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 HLC 61 at 106, 10 ER 1216.

14The decision in Grey v. Pearson contains an instructive irony: while the case gave the golden rule its definitive formulation, the House of Lords applied the rule to refuse any departure from the grammatical text. Lord Wensleydale held that adhering to the literal conjunction “and” did not produce any legal absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument. The consequence might have been unforeseen or regretted by the testator, but it was not an absurdity in the sense required to empower a court to alter his language.

15The name “golden rule” was bestowed two decades later. In River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, Lord Blackburn observed:

I believe that it is not disputed, that what Lord Wensleydale used to call the golden rule is right, viz., that we are to take the whole statute together, and construe it all together, giving the words their ordinary signification, unless when so applied they produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the Court that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification, and to justify the Court in putting on them some other signification, though less proper, is one of which the words will bear.River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, (1877) 2 App Cas 743 at 764 (H.L.).

16Lord Blackburn’s observation served to answer the counter-argument that had been voiced by strict literalists such as Jervis CJ in Abley v. Dale.Abley v. Dale, (1851) 11 CB 378 at 392, 138 ER 519. Jervis CJ had warned that courts “assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning.” Lord Wensleydale’s formula met this objection by erecting an objective barrier: departure was prohibited where judges merely fancied an injustice, but was mandatory where the text suffered from an internal inconsistency or an unworkable absurdity that reduced statutory commands to nonsense.

17Lord Selborne LC restated the canon in identical terms in the House of Lords in Caledonian Railway Co. v. North British Railway Co.,Caledonian Railway Co. v. North British Railway Co., (1881) 6 App Cas 114 at 122 (H.L.). and Lord Bramwell confirmed its universal acceptance in Hill v. East and West India Dock Co.Hill v. East and West India Dock Co., (1884) 9 App Cas 448 at 464 (H.L.).

III. The classical trio: literal, golden, and mischief

18In traditional common-law analysis, statutory interpretation is governed by three primary canons: the literal rule, the golden rule, and the mischief rule. Understanding the golden rule requires situating it between its two companion doctrines.

19The literal rule asserts that where the language of an enactment is clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to that meaning regardless of consequences.Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907. It operates upon the constitutional premise that the legislature enacts text, not unexpressed intentions. Under pure literalism, if the words are plain, the judicial enquiry terminates; hardship, inconvenience, or legislative oversight are matters exclusively for statutory amendment.

20The mischief rule, formulated in Heydon’s Case and received in India in Bengal Immunity, adopts a functional and historical approach.Heydon’s Case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a, 76 ER 637; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661. It directs the court to discern the state of the law before the Act, the mischief or defect that the prior law failed to address, the remedy appointed by Parliament, and the reason of that remedy. The court is commanded to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. In classical theory, however, the mischief rule was invoked only when the statutory language was found to be ambiguous or capable of multiple constructions.

21The golden rule occupies the middle ground. It operates precisely where the literal rule and the mischief rule intersect and threaten to fail:

22The sequence is this. The court begins with the literal rule. If adhering to it would lead to manifest absurdity or repugnance, the golden rule intervenes and modifies the grammatical sense, “so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further”. Because the modification stops there, the court avoids judicial legislation and the scheme of the statute is preserved.

231. Unlike the literal rule, the golden rule acknowledges that unswerving fealty to grammatical syntax can produce results that subvert the statutory enterprise. It refuses to treat absurdity as a cost that must be borne in the name of textualism.

242. Unlike the mischief rule, the golden rule does not require a prior finding of ambiguity. Its gateway is not obscurity of phrase, but irrationality of result. Where a provision is grammatically clear yet functionally absurd, the golden rule empowers the court to modify the text.

253. Unlike modern open-ended purposive interpretation, the golden rule does not permit a court to range freely across legislative debates or policy materials to fashion an optimal outcome. The golden rule remains anchored to the enacted words: it authorizes only the minimum linguistic surgery necessary to eliminate the absurdity, and then commands the court to stop.

26The golden rule is therefore not an independent philosophy of interpretation; it is a doctrine of necessity. It is the literal rule with a safety valve.

IV. Adoption and development in India

27The Supreme Court of India adopted the golden rule in its earliest years, invoking both Lord Wensleydale’s formulation in Grey v. Pearson and the restatement in Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes.

1. The early foundation: Jugalkishore Saraf and Tirath Singh

28The doctrine appeared in the Supreme Court in two judgments delivered in 1955.

29In Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., the Court had to construe Order XXI, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which governs the execution of a decree by an assignee.Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 376. The decree-holder had executed a document transferring its book debts to an assignee while a suit was pending, but before the decree was passed. When the assignee sought execution under Order XXI, Rule 16 as a “transferee of a decree”, the judgment-debtor objected that the text of the rule required a transfer of a decree that was already in existence.

30S.R. Das J., speaking for the Bench, laid down the relationship between literal meaning and absurdity:

The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case a literal construction of the rule leads to no apparent absurdity and, therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction.Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 376, para 6.

31Six months later, the Court delivered the ruling that remains the locus classicus on the golden rule in Indian law: Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh.Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 830, (1955) 2 SCR 457.

32Tirath Singh had been elected to the Legislative Assembly of the State of PEPSU from the Dhuri Constituency. An elector, Bachittar Singh, filed an election petition challenging the election on grounds of corrupt practices, specifically bribery. Tirath Singh was a party to the petition; he filed a written statement, cross-examined the petitioner’s witnesses, led his own evidence, and argued his case before the Election Tribunal. The Tribunal found him guilty of corrupt practices and declared his election void.

33Tirath Singh challenged the order under Section 99(1)(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 99 directed the Tribunal to name all persons proved to have been guilty of corrupt practices. Proviso (a) to Section 99(1) stipulated:

Provided that no person shall be named in the order under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) unless— (a) he has been given notice to appear before the Tribunal and to show cause why he should not be so named; and (b) if he appears in pursuance of the notice, he has been given an opportunity of cross-examining any witness who has already been examined by the Tribunal and has given evidence against him...

34Tirath Singh raised a purely textual objection: the statute used the phrase “no person”. Because he was a person, he argued that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to name him without first halting the proceedings, serving a fresh notice upon him under the proviso, and granting him a second opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who had already testified against him during the trial.

35The Supreme Court, speaking through T.L. Venkatarama Aiyar J., rejected the contention. Adhering to the literal meaning of “no person” would produce an intolerable procedural absurdity. An active party who had contested every stage of the trial would be granted a redundant, duplicative hearing, reducing the administration of justice to an empty charade:

But it is a well-settled rule of construction that when the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence.Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 830 at 833, citing Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, 10th ed., p. 229.

36Applying this principle, Venkatarama Aiyar J. modified the words “no person” by reading them contextually as “no person who is not already a party to the petition”. The proviso was designed to protect strangers to the litigation who might otherwise be condemned unheard; it had no application to a respondent candidate who had already enjoyed a full trial.

37Tirath Singh demonstrated the golden rule in action: the Court did not declare the section unconstitutional or strike down words; it modified the grammatical width of “any person” to prevent a manifest procedural absurdity, and carried the modification no further than was required to preserve common sense.

2. Subsequent Supreme Court applications

38In the decades that followed, the Supreme Court repeatedly resorted to the golden rule when literal construction threatened to fracture the operation of statutes.

39In Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, Vivian Bose J. observed that the construction of an Act must not be strained to create an absurdity:

The construction of an Act which leads to absurdity is to be avoided; where the grammatical construction leads to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, AIR 1952 SC 324 at 327.

40In State of Punjab v. Qaiser Jehan Begum, the Court had to interpret Section 18(2)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which required an application for reference to the civil court to be made within six months from “the date of the Collector’s award”.State of Punjab v. Qaiser Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604. The Collector made an award behind the backs of the landowners, without notice or pronouncement. If “the date of the award” were read literally as the date the Collector signed the paper in his office, the statutory period of limitation could expire before the affected owner even knew that an award had been made.

41Das Gupta J. held that the literal reading produced a patent absurdity: a person cannot challenge that of which he has no notice. The Court modified the phrase “date of the award” to mean the date when the award was communicated to the party or known by him, either actually or constructively. The literal rule was forced to yield to prevent a remedial right from being extinguished before it could be exercised.State of Punjab v. Qaiser Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604, following Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500.

42In K.P. Varghese v. ITO, the Supreme Court faced an apparent conflict between literal language and commercial reality under Section 52(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.K.P. Varghese v. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173. The sub-section provided that where the fair market value of a capital asset exceeded the declared consideration by 15% or more, the capital gains would be computed on the basis of the fair market value. Read literally, the provision applied to every bona fide transaction where the assessee sold property at less than market value, taxing him on capital gains that he had never received.

43P.N. Bhagwati J. rejected the literal construction as manifestly absurd and unjust:

The task of interpretation of a statutory enactment is not a mechanical task. It is more than a mere reading of mathematical formulae... It is a well-settled rule of construction that the court should as far as possible avoid that construction which attributes irrationality to the legislature. Where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result which could never have been intended by the legislature, the court may modify the language used by the legislature or even do some violence to it, so as to achieve the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a rational construction.K.P. Varghese v. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173, para 5.

44Bhagwati J. drew upon Lord Reid’s classical speech in the House of Lords in Luke v. IRC, where it was said that “to achieve the obvious intention and produce a reasonable result we must do some violence to the words” rather than produce a wholly unreasonable result.Luke v. IRC, [1963] AC 557 at 577 (H.L.). The Supreme Court read an unwritten condition into Section 52(2): the sub-section operated only where the consideration had in fact been understated by the assessee, and not to bona fide transactions at an undervalue.

45In Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, the Court applied the Tirath Singh principle to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440. Section 167(1) empowered a Magistrate to authorize detention of a person arrested and forwarded by “a police officer”. Persons arrested by customs officers under Section 104 of the Customs Act, 1962, or enforcement officers under Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA), are not arrested by police officers. Read literally, a Magistrate would have no jurisdiction under Section 167 to remand such persons to custody, creating the absurd dilemma that the arrestee must either be released unconditionally or detained unlawfully.

46S. Ratnavel Pandian J. reviewed Tirath Singh, Maxwell, and Lord Denning’s injunction to “iron out the creases”,Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 KB 481 at 499 (C.A.). holding that the words of Section 167 must be modified to apply to any arresting officer under special statutes to make the statutory machinery workable and avert a legal vacuum.

47In Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar and Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat, Arijit Pasayat J. restated Lord Wensleydale’s formulation in Grey v. Pearson as a foundational tenet of Indian law, emphasizing that departure from the literal rule remains strictly exceptional and requires a showing of true textual absurdity.Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar, (2003) 6 SCC 516; Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 6 SCC 672.

V. The threshold: what is an “absurdity”?

48The decisive inquiry in every golden rule dispute is what constitutes a legal “absurdity”. Because the canon permits a court to depart from the text, counsel frequently plead “absurdity” to escape the plain consequences of an unfavourable provision. The Supreme Court has therefore demarcated the boundary between true statutory absurdity and outcomes that are merely unpalatable.

1. What is not an absurdity

49Three categories of hardship or grievance do not constitute legal absurdity:

50Mere hardship, inconvenience, or severity. If the legislature enacts a harsh rule, the court must enforce it. The maxim dura lex sed lex (the law is hard, but it is the law) governs. A statute cannot be rewritten merely because its operation causes distress to an individual or appears rigorous in a particular case.Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529; Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N., (2002) 3 SCC 533.

51Policy disagreements or perceived unfairness. A court cannot find absurdity simply because it disagrees with the legislative balance or believes a different policy would be wiser. In Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh, the Supreme Court held that the “spirit of the law” cannot be invoked to override plain statutory provisions.Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh, AIR 1954 SC 749. Similarly, in B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, Markandey Katju J. observed:

In our opinion, the literal rule of interpretation is not only the most elementary but also the normal rule of interpretation of statutes... An absurdity has to be an absurdity in the legal sense, not what the court thinks is socially or morally undesirable. If the words are clear, they must be applied, even if they cause hardship or seem inequitable.B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, (2011) 4 SCC 266, paras 9, 24.

52Omissions that leave an apparent lacuna. A gap in a statute (casus omissus) is not an absurdity that the golden rule allows a court to cure. In G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam, the election of a non-graduate to the Madras Legislative Council from the Graduates’ Constituency was challenged under Article 171(3)(a) of the Constitution.G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717. The High Court set aside the election on the footing that it was an “absurdity” for non-graduates to represent a constituency of graduates, and read an unwritten qualification into the Constitution. Overturning the High Court, M.H. Beg J. observed:

We think that the High Court erred in holding that an ‘absurdity’ was involved in a non-graduate representing the graduates’ constituency... A court cannot add to or amend statutory provisions merely because it sees, or fancies it sees, an anomaly. An omission by the legislature, whether deliberate or accidental, cannot be supplied by the courts under the guise of avoiding absurdity.G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717, paras 13, 19.

2. What constitutes legal absurdity

53True legal absurdity exists where literal adherence produces one of four structural failures:

54Internal contradiction and repugnance. Where reading a section according to grammar directly destroys another provision of the same statute, or renders two concurrent sections impossible to reconcile, the court must modify the grammar to restore harmony.

55Frustration of the statutory purpose from within. Where literal interpretation produces a result so contrary to the declared and evident object of the enactment that it reduces the statute to a self-nullifying exercise, the golden rule intervenes.

56Procedural impossibility or futility. The law does not compel the performance of useless or impossible acts (lex non cogit ad impossibilia). A literal construction that demands a redundant proceeding or an unachievable condition—such as the duplicate trial urged in Tirath Singh, or the expiry of limitation before knowledge of an award in Qaiser Jehan Begum—is legally absurd.

57Extreme irrationality. Where the literal meaning imposes a consequence so disproportionate and irrational that attributing it to Parliament would impute madness to the legislature, the court modifies the language. As Lord Reid expressed in Luke v. IRC, a court will not attribute to the legislature an intention to tax an employee on the cost of rebuilding a destroyed premises merely because the employer owned the property.Luke v. IRC, [1963] AC 557 at 577 (H.L.).

VI. Techniques of modification (“...and no further”)

58When the threshold of absurdity is crossed, how does the court modify the text? Judicial practice in India exhibits five distinct operational techniques, each strictly policed by the rider “...and no further.”

1. Reading conjunctions: “or” as “and”, and “and” as “or”

59The commonest modification is the transposition of conjunctions. Draftsmen frequently interchange “or” and “and”, creating clauses that, read literally, defeat the statutory purpose.

60The general rule is that “or” is disjunctive and “and” is conjunctive. But where a disjunctive reading creates an absurdity, “or” is read as “and” (or “nor”).

61In Ishwar Singh Bindra v. State of U.P., the Supreme Court had to interpret Section 3(b)(i) of the Drugs Act, 1940, which defined “drug” to include “medicines for internal or external use of human beings or animals and all substances intended to be used for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of diseases in human beings or animals”.Ishwar Singh Bindra v. State of U.P., AIR 1968 SC 1450. It was contended that any substance used in the diagnosis or treatment of disease was a drug only if it was also a medicine. The Court read the conjunction “and” disjunctively as “or” to avoid the absurdity of excluding diagnostic substances and basic chemicals from the regulatory ambit.

62The principle received an authoritative restatement by a Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal.Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129. The Court had to interpret Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The section provided that land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act would lapse where an award had been made five years prior to the 2013 Act, but “physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid”.

63The literal word was “or”. Landowners contended that failure in either condition caused the acquisition to lapse. The State showed that in numerous cases, compensation had been deposited in the treasury because landowners refused to accept it, though physical possession had been taken and public infrastructure constructed decades ago.

64Arun Mishra J., delivering the judgment of the Constitution Bench, held that reading “or” disjunctively would produce an alarming absurdity: a recalcitrant landowner who deliberately refused compensation could nullify a completed public project. To avoid that absurd result and protect the statutory scheme, the Court read “or” conjunctively as “nor” or “and”:

The word ‘or’ in Section 24(2) has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. When we read Section 24(2) as a whole, it is apparent that lapsing of acquisition takes place only when both conditions are fulfilled, namely, neither physical possession has been taken nor compensation has been paid. Reading ‘or’ as disjunctive leads to an absurd and anomalous result, frustrating the very purpose of the Act.Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129, paras 99–103.

65The limit of this technique was recently underscored in Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax v. Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. Pvt. Ltd.Commr. of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax v. Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2023 INSC 885, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1330. A Bench comprising S. Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar Datta JJ. emphasized that “or” cannot be converted into “and” as a matter of routine course:

The golden rule of statutory interpretation is that words must be given their ordinary, natural, and grammatical meaning... The word ‘or’ is prima facie disjunctive. A court cannot read ‘or’ as ‘and’ unless being compelled to do so by the context, where a literal reading leads to an absurdity or renders the provision unworkable. In the absence of such compelling absurdity, the literal disjunctive meaning must prevail.Commr. of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax v. Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2023 INSC 885, paras 26–28.

2. Softening mandatory language: reading “shall” as “may”

66While the word “shall” ordinarily imports a mandatory duty, a court applying the golden rule will read “shall” as directory or permissive where an inflexible command leads to manifest injustice or constitutional invalidity.

67In State of M.P. v. Azad Bharat Finance Co., Section 11 of the Opium Act (as amended in Madhya Bharat) provided that any vehicle used in carrying contraband opium “shall be forfeited”.State of M.P. v. Azad Bharat Finance Co., AIR 1967 SC 276. Contraband was transported in a truck without the knowledge or connivance of the owner or the hire-purchase finance company. The High Court refused to confiscate the truck.

68On appeal, the State insisted on the word “shall”. J.C. Shah J. and S.M. Sikri J. held that an absolute mandate to confiscate property belonging to innocent third parties, who had no knowledge of the crime, was an unjust and absurd result that the legislature could never have intended. The Court read “shall be forfeited” as directory, conferring a judicial discretion to exempt an innocent owner:

It is well settled that the use of the word ‘shall’ does not always mean that the provision is mandatory... If a statute leads to absurdity or manifest injustice, the court must modify the language to achieve a rational result. It could not have been the intention of the legislature to confiscate the property of an innocent owner who had no knowledge that his vehicle was being put to an unlawful use.State of M.P. v. Azad Bharat Finance Co., AIR 1967 SC 276, paras 4–5.

3. Restricting wide or general words

69Where general words, read literally, cover situations that contradict the statute’s reason, the court restricts their meaning by reading in an implied exception.

70This was the exact technique applied in Tirath Singh, where the general words “no person” were read as “no person other than a party to the petition”.Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 830.

71It was likewise the technique in K.P. Varghese, where the general terms of Section 52(2) of the Income-tax Act—applying to all transfers where fair market value exceeded declared consideration—were restricted to cases where an actual understatement of consideration had occurred.K.P. Varghese v. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173. The Court did not delete words; it read down the general language to fit the constitutional and statutory grain.

4. Interpreting “date of order” as “date of communication”

72Where limitation is tied to the “date of an order” or “date of an award”, reading the phrase literally enables an administrative officer to pass an order in secret, retain it on his file, and allow limitation to expire before the citizen becomes aware of it.

73To avert this injustice, the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra Raj Singh and Qaiser Jehan Begum applied the golden rule to hold that “date of order” must mean the date when the order is either communicated to the party or known by him, actual or constructive.Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500; State of Punjab v. Qaiser Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604. Literal adherence was modified because a right of appeal or reference cannot logically begin before the right-holder has knowledge of the adverse decision.

5. Repairing obvious drafting errors and supplying accidental omissions

74The strict rule of construction forbids supplying a casus omissus. But where it is obvious from the four corners of the Act that words were accidentally omitted or misplaced in the drafting office, and the alternative is to render the statute an absurdity or dead letter, the court may repair the text.

75In Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, the Amending Act of 1988 introduced Sections 14-B to 14-D into the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, creating a summary eviction procedure for classified landlords (such as retired defence personnel and widows).Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 87. The draftsman omitted to amend the corresponding procedural sub-sections of Section 25-B and the statutory summons forms. Tenants argued that this omission preserved their unhedged right to contest, nullifying the expedited summary scheme.

76K. Ramaswamy J., speaking for the Court, held that the court was empowered to supply words omitted by inadvertence:

True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but ‘where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meanings, it is permissible to supply the words’... An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute.Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 87, para 19.

77A more dramatic repair occurred in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd., concerning Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd., (2010) 8 SCC 24. Section 89 had been drafted by lifting provisions wholesale from the final stages of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and inserting them into the opening stage of a civil suit. Read literally, the section required a trial judge, before referring parties to alternative dispute resolution (ADR), to formulate the terms of a possible settlement, give them to the parties for observations, reformulate them, and only then make a reference. Furthermore, sub-section (2) interchanged the definitions of “mediation” and “judicial settlement”.

78R.V. Raveendran J., speaking for the Bench, described a literal reading of Section 89 as “a trial judge’s nightmare” that “put the cart before the horse”.Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd., (2010) 8 SCC 24, para 10. Rather than allowing poor drafting to destroy an important procedural reform, the Court modified and restructured the sequence of the section, transposing terms and correcting definitions to give the provision practical vitality.

VII. When the canon gives way: limits and dangers

79The power to modify words to avoid absurdity is inherently delicate. If expanded without restraint, it threatens judicial usurpation of the legislative power. The Supreme Court has therefore established rigorous limitations upon the canon.

1. The iron rider: “...and no further”

80The modification permitted by Grey v. Pearson is strictly curative. The judge is not an editor invited to improve upon parliamentary drafting. Once the text is adjusted sufficiently to remove the self-contradiction or absurdity, the court must resume grammatical adherence. Any further modification is illicit judicial legislation.

2. The boundary between interpretation and legislation

81The Court cannot rewrite a statute merely because it thinks Parliament should have enacted a different rule. In Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat, Arijit Pasayat J. restated the boundary:

The court cannot reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate... The golden rule of interpretation is that the words of the statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is only when such ordinary meaning leads to some absurdity or repugnance that the court can modify the words. But the court cannot read into an Act words which are not there, or supply a casus omissus, merely because it sees what it conceives to be an injustice.Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 6 SCC 672, paras 19–20.

3. Fiscal and penal statutes

82In fiscal and penal legislation, the golden rule operates with special circumspection.

83In a taxing statute, the subject is not to be taxed unless the words clearly reach him; there is no equity about a tax, and no presumption as to a tax.Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC, [1921] 1 KB 64. A court cannot invoke the golden rule to read a charging section expansively on the ground that exempting the taxpayer would create an economic anomaly or absurdity. In Commissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co., a Constitution Bench reaffirmed that taxing entries and exemption notifications are construed strictly; an apparent anomaly in tax incidence does not justify judicial modification of the text.Commr. of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co., (2018) 9 SCC 1.

84Similarly, in penal law, the rule of fair warning requires that a citizen cannot be punished unless his conduct falls squarely within the plain language of the prohibition.Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 496. The golden rule may be applied in penal law to protect an innocent party from an absurd penalty (as in Azad Bharat Finance), but it is never permitted to expand the scope of a criminal offence to cover an omitted case on the plea that leaving it out is absurd.

VIII. From golden rule to purposive construction

85The relationship between the golden rule and modern purposive construction reflects the evolution of twentieth-century statutory interpretation.

86In the nineteenth century, the common law divided interpretation into rigid compartments: the literal rule was the universal default; the golden rule was a narrow safety valve invoked only upon absurdity; and the mischief rule was reserved for ambiguity.

87During the late twentieth century, this formal separation began to dissolve. Courts recognized that words do not have an abstract “literal meaning” divorced from their context and purpose.

88In Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, A.K. Sikri J. documented this jurisprudential transition:

The rule of purposive construction has now come to be recognised as the predominant approach, particularly where a literal interpretation may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity. While earlier the ‘literal rule’ was regarded as the golden rule, the modern approach recognises that the court must identify the purpose behind the statute and attach that meaning which best serves that purpose.Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619, para 31.

89The modern purposive approach differs from the classic golden rule in its timing: Under the golden rule, the court begins with the grammatical text, encounters an absurdity, and steps outside the grammar to apply a narrow modification. Under modern purposive construction, the court considers the context, object, and scheme of the enactment from the very outset, choosing an interpretation that advances the purpose without requiring a preliminary demonstration of grammatical absurdity.Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424; Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill, (2012) 2 SCC 108.

90Yet the golden rule has not been swallowed by purposive interpretation. It retains a distinct and indispensable function in the judicial toolkit:

91When an interpretation requires the court not merely to choose between competing meanings of an ambiguous word, but to do violence to the text—to read “or” as “and”, to soften “shall” into “may”, to narrow “any person” into “any non-party”, or to reconstruct an unworkable procedural sequence—purposive rhetoric alone is insufficient. It is the doctrine of the golden rule, with its rigorous standard of absurdity and its limiting discipline of “...and no further”, that provides the constitutional warrant for that intervention.

IX. The position today

92The law governing the golden rule in the Supreme Court of India may be stated in six propositions:

931. Primacy of grammatical text. The words of a statute must in the first instance be given their ordinary, natural, and grammatical meaning. Every interpretation must begin with the text as enacted by Parliament.

942. The gateway of absurdity. A court is empowered to modify the grammatical sense of a statute only when adhering to it results in manifest absurdity, internal repugnance, or self-evident inconsistency with the rest of the enactment.

953. Absurdity is objective, not subjective. Legal absurdity is confined to internal contradictions, unworkable procedural requirements, frustration of the statutory scheme from within, or outcomes so irrational that the legislature could not conceivably have intended them. Hardship, individual severity, economic inconvenience, or judicial disagreement with legislative policy do not constitute legal absurdity.

964. Modification is strictly limited (“and no further”). Where departure from grammar is justified, the court is authorized to make only the minimum modification necessary to avert the absurdity and render the statute functional. It cannot rewrite provisions, insert novel policies, or alter the material framework of the Act.

975. A casus omissus cannot be supplied. The golden rule does not permit a court to supply an accidental or deliberate omission under the guise of removing an anomaly. Judicial repair of drafting defects is permissible only where the text within the four corners of the Act provides unmistakable evidence of the omitted matter and the alternative is the total collapse of the provision.

986. Circumspection in fiscal and penal statutes. The golden rule may be applied to prevent grotesque or unconstitutional penalties against innocent parties, but it cannot be deployed to extend the reach of a charging section in a tax statute or to expand the ingredients of a criminal offence.


History

  • Published · 18 October 2026
  • Correction · 1 November 2026A diagram in paragraph 22 displayed as raw characters. It is now set out in words, with its quotation matched to Grey v. Pearson as quoted earlier in the piece. The argument is unchanged.

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