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2026 FPR ECA 3 · https://firstprecedent.org/canons/harmonious-construction
CA-0005Canons · Interpretation · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ECA 3
FPR Editors27 October 2026 · 5,277 words
Harmonious Construction
Where two provisions of a statute, of two related statutes, or of the Constitution appear to conflict, the court must read them so that each has a field in which it operates, and may treat one as overriding the other only when, despite every effort, the two cannot be reconciled.
Abstract
Harmonious construction rests on the presumption that a legislature does not contradict itself or enact words to no purpose. This entry states the canon and the presumptions behind it, sets out the five principles stated in Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain (1996) and the Court's statement of the rule in Hindustan Bulk Carriers, and traces its early use in Raj Krushna Bose and Sirsilk. It then follows the canon through the Constitution: denominational rights and temple entry (Venkataramana Devaru), legislative privilege and free speech (Searchlight), fundamental rights and directive principles (from Champakam Dorairajan to Minerva Mills), the Governor's clemency power and the Supreme Court's power under Article 142 (Nanavati), and the legislative lists (Calcutta Gas). It examines the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant as an instrument of harmony (J.K. Cotton, LIC v. D.J. Bahadur, Binani Cement), the treatment of competing non obstante clauses (Solidaire) and the relationship between the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and other laws (Indus Biotech, Pioneer Urban Land), and ends with the limits of the canon and the presumption against implied repeal.
I. The canon
1A statute is read as a whole. Its provisions were enacted together, by one legislature, to serve a common design, and the law presumes that they are consistent with one another. When two provisions appear to pull in opposite directions, the court does not begin by deciding which of them wins. It first tries to read them together, so that each has work to do and neither is reduced to nothing. That is the canon of harmonious construction.
2The canon draws on three presumptions.
3The first is that a statute is internally coherent. The legislature is taken to have designed the enactment as a consistent whole, and a provision is read in the light of the provisions around it. The old maxim ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretatio expresses the idea: the best interpretation is drawn from what comes before and after.
4The second is that the legislature does not use words to no purpose. Every provision is presumed to have been enacted for some reason. An interpretation that leaves a provision with nothing to do offends the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat, that it is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void.
5The third is that the legislature does not silently undo what it has enacted. Where two provisions can both operate, the court presumes that the legislature meant them both to operate, each in its own field, and it treats one as displacing the other only when that is unavoidable.
6Comparable ideas appear in other common-law systems. Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner describe a “harmonious-reading canon”, under which the provisions of a text are to be interpreted so as to make them compatible, not contradictory.Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (Thomson/West 2012) 180. In India the canon has been developed by the Supreme Court into a set of working principles, and it has been used more widely than almost any other rule of construction, in ordinary statutes and in the Constitution.
7The canon is not a licence to rewrite. It allows the court to read a general provision as not extending to a matter dealt with by a special one, to confine words to the field in which they were meant to operate, and to work out how two procedures fit together. It does not allow the court to supply what the legislature left out, or to give clear words a meaning they cannot bear (Part VI).
II. The principles
Early applications
8The Supreme Court applied the canon from its first years. In Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo, section 105 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 declared the orders of election tribunals to be final and conclusive. The Court held that this did not affect its own power under Article 136 or that of the High Courts under Article 226:
It is sufficient to say that the powers conferred on us by article 136 of the Constitution and on the High Courts under article 226 cannot be taken away or whittled down by the legislature.Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202, (1954) SCR 913.
9The finality clause operated within the statutory scheme of election disputes; it did not reach the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts.
10In Sirsilk Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, the canon resolved a procedural deadlock in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.Sirsilk Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 160, (1964) 2 SCR 448. An industrial tribunal had sent its award to the State Government. Section 17(1) required the Government to publish an award within thirty days of receiving it, and once published it would bind the parties under section 18(3). Before publication, however, the employer and the workmen settled their dispute, and a settlement is binding under section 18(1). Publishing the award would have set it against a binding settlement; not publishing it seemed to disobey section 17(1), which uses the word “shall”.
11K.N. Wanchoo J., for the Court, held that the case was exceptional and called for reconciliation of the two binding instruments, and that the only way to reconcile them was to withhold publication of the award, since a binding settlement had already come into force:
in such a situation we are of opinion that the Government ought not to publish the award under s. 17(1)Sirsilk Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 160.
12Section 17(1) remained mandatory in every ordinary case. It gave way only where a settlement had already resolved the very dispute the award dealt with, and both sections kept their work.
Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain (1996)
13The Court gathered its earlier decisions into five principles in Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain.Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 373, AIR 1997 SC 1006. The Bench was Kuldip Singh and S. Saghir Ahmad JJ., and Saghir Ahmad J. wrote the judgment.
14The appellant was the landlady of premises in Jaipur. Her suit for eviction ended in a compromise decree, under which the tenant was to vacate by a fixed date and pay rent until then. He did not vacate, and when she sought execution he objected under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. He said that he had in fact handed over possession to her attorney, who had then allowed him to stay on as a licensee, so that the decree had been satisfied. The landlady relied on Order XXI Rule 2, which provides that a payment or adjustment of a decree that has not been certified or recorded shall not be recognised by the court executing the decree.
15Section 47 gives the executing court jurisdiction to decide all questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Order XXI Rule 2 forbids it to recognise an uncertified adjustment. Having reviewed the authorities, the Court stated these principles:
(1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash between two Sections of the Act and to construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a manner as to harmonise them. (2) The provisions of one Section of a statute cannot be used to defeat the other provisions unless the court, in spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect reconciliation between them. (3) It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the time that when there are two conflicting provisions in an Act, which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is the essence of the rule of “harmonious construction”. (4) The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a “dead letter” or “useless lumber” is not harmonious construction. (5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose.Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 373, ¶ 12.
16Applying them, the Court found no real conflict. Section 47 states the power of the executing court; Order XXI Rule 2 lays down the procedure that court must follow in a limited class of cases, where a decree is said to have been paid or adjusted out of court. The Court also put the point in terms of the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant: the general power under section 47 is exercised subject to the restriction in the special rule. Each provision therefore had its own field. On the facts, the tenant’s own case was that he had been given a licence, which showed that no fresh tenancy had been created and that the decree had not been given up. The objections were dismissed and the executing court was directed to deliver possession.
CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2002)
17In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, Arijit Pasayat J. stated the principle in terms that the Court has often repeated since.CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57. The case concerned the relationship between the settlement provisions of Chapter XIX-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the provisions for interest on late returns and unpaid advance tax in sections 234A, 234B and 234C. The Court held that interest under those sections remained chargeable in a case before the Settlement Commission, up to the stage set out in the judgment, and that the settlement provisions could not be read so as to deprive the interest provisions of effect. On the method, Pasayat J. said:
A construction which reduces the statute to a futility has to be avoided. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereatCIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57.
18He added that the court must look at the entire statute, not merely the clause to be construed, and compare that clause with the rest of the law, because:
Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute.CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57.
19The Income-tax Act, 1961 has since been replaced by the Income-tax Act, 2025, from 1 April 2026; the case remains an authority on the method of construction.
III. Harmonious construction and the Constitution
20In ordinary legislation, a mistaken reading can be corrected by an amending Act. In the Constitution, a conflict between two provisions may set one institution against another or one right against another, and correction is far harder. The Supreme Court has therefore used harmonious construction as one of its principal tools of constitutional interpretation.
Temple entry and denominational rights: Venkataramana Devaru (1957)
21In Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, the trustees of a temple at Mulki in South Kanara challenged the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act, 1947, which threw Hindu temples of a public character open to all classes and sections of Hindus.Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255, (1958) SCR 895. They said the temple had been founded for the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community, and that Article 26(b), which guarantees every religious denomination the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, entitled them to exclude everyone else. The State relied on Article 25(2)(b), which saves laws “providing for ... the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus”.
22The two provisions appeared to be in conflict. Writing for a Constitution Bench, T.L. Venkatarama Aiyar J. said:
The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect could be given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction.Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.
23He then compared the two readings. If the trustees were right, Article 25(2)(b) would become “wholly nugatory in its application to denominational temples”, although its words included them. If the State was right:
full effect can be given to Art. 26(b) in all matters of religion, subject only to this that as regards one aspect of them, entry into a temple for worship, the rights declared under Art. 25(2)(b) will prevail. While, in the former case, Art. 25(2)(b) will be put wholly out of operation, in the latter, effect can be given to both that provision and Art. 26(b). We must accordingly hold that Art. 26(b) must be read subject to Art. 25(2)(b).Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.
24The Court did not stop there. The High Court had found that on certain ceremonies and occasions only members of the denomination were entitled to take part, and had reserved to the trustees the right to exclude the general public on those occasions. The Supreme Court upheld that part of the decree as relating to matters of religion. The public had a right of entry for worship; the denomination kept its right over its own ceremonies. Each Article had a field.
25The decision was revisited in the Sabarimala case, Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, where a majority of a Constitution Bench held the exclusion of women of menstruating age from the temple unconstitutional, and Indu Malhotra J., dissenting, relied on the protection of denominational practice.Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1. The relationship between Articles 25 and 26 remains contested; Venkataramana Devaru is the starting point for any account of it.
Legislative privilege and free speech: Searchlight (1958)
26In Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha, the editor of the newspaper Searchlight published parts of a speech in the Bihar Legislative Assembly that the Speaker had ordered to be expunged.Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395, (1959) Supp (1) SCR 806. When the Committee of Privileges called on him to show cause, he petitioned the Supreme Court under Article 32, relying on Article 19(1)(a). Article 194(3), as it then stood, gave the State Legislature the privileges of the House of Commons, which included the right to prohibit publication of its proceedings.
27The majority held that the privilege prevailed. In its judgment:
the principle of harmonious construction must be adopted and so construed, the provisions of Art. 19(1)(a), which are general, must yield to Art. 194(1) and the latter part of its cl. (3) which are special.M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395.
28K. Subba Rao J. dissented, holding that the privilege could not override the fundamental right. The case shows the canon working through the idea of the special and the general, and it shows how the choice of which provision is “special” can decide the outcome.
Fundamental rights and directive principles
29The relationship between Part III and Part IV of the Constitution is the most important application of the canon in Indian constitutional law.
30In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, decided in 1951, S.R. Das J., for the Court, put the directive principles firmly below the fundamental rights:
The directive principles of the State policy, which by article 37 are expressly made unenforceable by a Court, cannot override the provisions found in Part III which, notwithstanding other provisions, are expressly made enforceable by appropriate Writs, Orders or directions under article 32. The chapter of Fundamental Rights is sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by any Legislative or Executive Act or order, except to the extent provided in the appropriate article in Part III.State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226, (1951) SCR 525; as quoted in Sukhnandan Thakur v. State of Bihar, AIR 1957 Pat 617.
31Seven years later, in In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957, S.R. Das C.J. qualified that position:
in determining the scope and ambit of the fundamental rights relied on by or on behalf of any person or body the court may not entirely ignore these directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV of the Constitution but should adopt the principle of harmonious construction and should attempt to give effect to both as much as possible.In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956, (1959) SCR 995; as quoted in G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute, (2003) 4 SCC 225.
32In Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore, K.S. Hegde J. went further: “We see no conflict on the whole between the provisions contained in Part III and Part IV. They are complementary and supplementary to each other.”Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore, (1969) 3 SCC 84, AIR 1970 SC 2042.
33The decisive statement came in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India.Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625, AIR 1980 SC 1789. Section 4 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 had amended Article 31C so that a law giving effect to any of the directive principles could not be challenged as inconsistent with Article 14 or Article 19. The amendment would have made Part III subordinate to Part IV wherever the State invoked a directive principle. The Court struck it down. Y.V. Chandrachud C.J., drawing on Granville Austin’s account of the Constitution, said:
Parts III and IV are like two wheels of a chariot, one no less important than the other. You snap one and the other will lose its efficacy. They are like a twin formula for achieving the social revolution, which is the ideal which the visionary founders of the Constitution set before themselves. In other words, the Indian Constitution is founded on the bed-rock of the balance between Parts III and IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony and balance between fundamental rights and directive principles is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution.Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625.
34In thirty years the Court moved from subordinating one Part to the other to treating the balance between them as part of the basic structure. Harmonious construction supplied the method.
The clemency power and Article 142: Nanavati (1960)
35In K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, the Bombay High Court convicted Commander Nanavati of murder and sentenced him to imprisonment for life.K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 112, (1961) 1 SCR 497. On the same day the Governor, acting under Article 161, suspended the sentence until his intended appeal to the Supreme Court was decided. The Supreme Court’s rules required a convicted petitioner to surrender before his petition for special leave was heard, and the question was whether the Governor’s order displaced that requirement. Article 161 gives the Governor power to suspend sentences; Article 142 gives the Supreme Court power to make any order necessary for doing complete justice in a matter before it. Neither is made subject to the other.
36B.P. Sinha C.J., for the majority, said that “The question that immediately arises is one of harmonious construction of two provisions of the Constitution, as one is not made subject to the other by specific words in the Constitution itself”. The Court held that, to avoid a conflict between two powers each absolute in its own field, Article 161 does not extend to the suspension of a sentence during the period in which the matter is before the Supreme Court and Article 142 is in operation. The Governor’s order could operate only until the matter came before the Court. J.L. Kapur J. dissented, holding that the clemency power was of the widest amplitude.
The legislative lists
37The entries in the three lists of the Seventh Schedule inevitably overlap. The Federal Court held in In re Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 that apparently conflicting entries must be read together, and the language of one interpreted, and where necessary modified, by the other, so that a general power is not read in a way that makes a particular power in the same instrument useless.In re Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, AIR 1939 FC 1, (1939) FCR 18. Only when reconciliation fails does the priority of Union legislation under Article 246 decide the matter.
38In Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, the West Bengal Legislature had passed the Oriental Gas Company Act, 1960, taking over the management of a gas company.Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044, (1962) Supp (3) SCR 1. The company argued that the State had no competence, because gas was an “industry” and Parliament had declared control of industries to be in the public interest under Entry 52 of List I, so that Entry 24 of List II, which covers industries subject to Entry 52, did not reach it. The State relied on Entry 25 of List II, which deals specifically with “gas and gas-works”.
39K. Subba Rao J., for the Court, held that the State’s reading gave each entry a field, while the company’s would empty Entry 25:
It is, therefore, clear that the scheme of harmonious construction suggested on behalf of the State gives full and effective scope of operation for both the entries in their respective fields, while that suggested by learned counsel for the appellant deprives entry 25 of all its content and even makes it redundant.Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044.
40Gas and gas-works were therefore within the exclusive field of the States, and the Act was valid. The same method is used in modern federal disputes over taxation and natural resources.State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201; Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India, 2024 INSC 551.
IV. Generalia specialibus non derogant
41When a general provision and a special provision appear to collide, the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant (general things do not derogate from special things) is the most common way of reconciling them. It is sometimes described as a rule for choosing a winner, but in Indian law it is better understood as an instrument of harmony: the special provision governs its own subject, the general provision governs everything else, and neither is destroyed.
J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills (1960)
42In J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., two clauses of an order made under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were in question.J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1170, (1961) 3 SCR 185. Clause 23 provided that no employer should discharge or dismiss a workman during the pendency of an inquiry except with the written permission of the Regional Conciliation Officer. While an inquiry was pending, the employer did not seek that permission; instead, the employers’ association applied under clause 5(a), a general provision for reference of disputes, for an award that the employer was entitled to dismiss the workmen. K.C. Das Gupta J., for the Court, explained the reason for the rule:
The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have effect.J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1170.
43He held that clause 5(a) had no application where the special provisions of clause 23 applied: the general provision governs only the cases the special provision does not cover.
LIC v. D.J. Bahadur (1980)
44Which of two statutes is “special” depends on the question before the court. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur, the question was whether a settlement on bonus between the Corporation and its employees, binding under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, could be displaced by action under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956.Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315, AIR 1980 SC 2181. The Corporation argued that the LIC Act, as the special law for the Corporation, prevailed. V.R. Krishna Iyer J. said:
In determining whether a statute is a special or a general one, the focus must be on the principal subject-matter plus the particular perspective.LIC of India v. D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315.
45For the purposes of industrial disputes, settlements and their binding force, the Industrial Disputes Act was the special law, and the LIC Act, which dealt with the business of insurance, was the general one. The settlement stood. R.S. Pathak J. agreed in the result in a separate judgment; A.D. Koshal J. dissented. The idea of relative specificity, that a statute may be special for one purpose and general for another, is the lasting contribution of the case.
Binani Cement (2014)
46In Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v. Binani Cement Ltd., a Bench of H.L. Dattu and S.A. Bobde JJ., in a judgment written by Dattu J., considered the relationship between general and special provisions in the Rajasthan sales tax incentive scheme.Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v. Binani Cement Ltd., (2014) 8 SCC 319, [2014] 3 SCR 1. The scheme contained general entries for new units of all industries and a separate entry confined to new cement units. The Court held that the cement entry, being special, governed cement units, and allowed the revenue’s appeal. The judgment surveys the maxim at length. It states that the principle “finds its origins in the latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant, i.e., general law yields to special law should they operate in the same field on same subject”, and explains its link with harmony:
It is well established that when a general law and a special law dealing with some aspect dealt with by the general law are in question, the rule adopted and applied is one of harmonious construction whereby the general law, to the extent dealt with by the special law, is impliedly repealed.Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v. Binani Cement Ltd., (2014) 8 SCC 319.
47The passage shows that the maxim and the canon are two descriptions of one operation. The special provision governs its subject, and the general provision continues to govern the rest.
V. Competing statutes
Two non obstante clauses
48A non obstante clause (“notwithstanding anything contained in any other law”) gives a provision overriding effect. When two statutes each contain one, they cannot both prevail. In Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., a Bench of B.N. Kirpal, Ruma Pal and Brijesh Kumar JJ. considered the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, both of which had such clauses.Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 71, AIR 2001 SC 958. The Court agreed with a decision of the Special Court, whose reasoning it quoted:
Where there are two special statutes which contain non-obstante clauses the later statute must prevail. This is because at the time of enactment of the later statute, the Legislature was aware of the earlier legislation and its non-obstante clause.Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 71, quoting Bhoruka Steel Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (1997) 89 Comp Cas 547 (Special Court).
49The rule is a fallback, not a starting point. Before applying it, the court examines the subject, purpose and scheme of both enactments to see whether they can operate in separate fields.Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala, (2009) 4 SCC 94.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
50Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 gives the Code effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any other law. The Supreme Court has nonetheless worked out its relationship with other statutes by reconciling their fields rather than treating the Code as obliterating them.
51In Indus Biotech Pvt. Ltd. v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund, a Bench of S.A. Bobde C.J., A.S. Bopanna and V. Ramasubramanian JJ. considered an application to refer a dispute to arbitration made while a petition by a financial creditor under section 7 of the Code was pending.Indus Biotech Pvt. Ltd. v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund, (2021) 6 SCC 436, AIR 2021 SC 1638. The Court held that the adjudicating authority must first decide whether there is a default. If it admits the petition, the insolvency process becomes a proceeding in rem:
In such event, it becomes a proceeding in rem on the date of admission and from that point onwards the matter would not be arbitrable. The only course to be followed thereafter is the resolution process under IB Code.Indus Biotech, (2021) 6 SCC 436.
52Until then, the petition has not assumed that character, and an arbitration remains possible if the petition is rejected. Each statute operates at its own stage.
53In Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, developers argued that homebuyers’ remedies lay under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, which also has a non obstante clause, and that treating homebuyers as financial creditors under the Code was inconsistent with it.Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416, AIR 2019 SC 4055. The Court, in a judgment of R.F. Nariman J., relied on section 88 of RERA, which provides that its provisions are in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law:
The fact that RERA is in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, also makes it clear that the remedies under RERA to allottees were intended to be additional and not exclusive remedies.Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416.
54The two statutes were thus concurrent: an allottee could pursue either.
Choosing among the techniques
55Harmonious construction, the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, express non obstante clauses and implied repeal are related but distinct.
56Harmonious construction is the primary canon. It presumes that the legislature did not contradict itself, and it reads both provisions so that neither is useless. Sultana Begum and Venkataramana Devaru are its leading authorities.
57Generalia specialibus non derogant is a technique within it. The special provision governs its subject and the general provision governs the rest. J.K. Cotton and Binani Cement illustrate it.
58An express non obstante clause is the legislature’s own instruction that one provision prevails over others to the extent of any inconsistency. Where two such clauses meet, the later statute ordinarily prevails (Solidaire), but only after the court has tried to find separate fields for them (Central Bank of India).
59Implied repeal is the last resort. It applies only where two enactments cannot stand together at all, and it is subject to a strong presumption against it (Municipal Council, Palai).
VI. The limits of the canon
60Harmonious construction is a duty to reconcile what can be reconciled. It is not a power to rewrite what cannot.
Harmony does not permit rewriting
61The court cannot, in the name of harmony, give plain words a meaning they cannot bear or supply a provision the legislature omitted. A Constitution Bench said in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu:
It is well settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent.Padmasundara Rao v. State of T.N., (2002) 3 SCC 533, ¶ 12.
62In Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, a Constitution Bench applied harmonious construction to read two provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 together, but it did so in order to give effect to the plain words “let out by her, or by her husband”, not to override them: “We are obliged to read the provision as it is, and cannot give it a meaning by deleting an expression expressly employed by the legislature.”Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271. Where the legislature has deliberately created an exception or an override, the court must respect it. To force an unnatural reading that strips a clear provision of its meaning is a misuse of the canon.
Implied repeal as the last resort
63Where two separate statutes appear to conflict, the canon operates as a guard against implied repeal. In Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph, J.R. Mudholkar J. said:
it is an equally well settled principle of law that there is a presumption against an implied repeal upon the assumption that the legislature enacts laws with a complete knowledge of all existing laws pertaining to the same subject and the failure to add a repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal existing legislation.Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 1561, (1964) 2 SCR 87.
64The presumption is rebutted only where the provisions of the later Act are so inconsistent with the earlier one that the two cannot stand together. Then, and only then, does the canon give way, and the later law displaces the earlier to the extent of the inconsistency.Harshad S. Mehta v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 257.
VII. The position today
65The law on harmonious construction in India may be stated in eight propositions.
661. A statute, a set of related statutes, or the Constitution is presumed to be consistent. Provisions that appear to conflict must be read so that each is effective; a construction that reduces a provision to futility is to be avoided (Hindustan Bulk Carriers).
672. The court must avoid a head-on clash. One provision cannot be used to defeat another unless the court, despite its efforts, finds reconciliation impossible (Sultana Begum, principles (1) and (2)).
683. An interpretation that reduces a provision to a “dead letter” or “useless lumber” is not harmonious construction. To harmonise is not to destroy (Sultana Begum, principles (4) and (5); Venkataramana Devaru).
694. Harmony is usually achieved by giving each provision its own field. A special provision governs its subject and a general provision governs the rest (J.K. Cotton; Sultana Begum; Binani Cement).
705. Whether a statute is special or general depends on the question before the court; a statute may be special for one purpose and general for another (LIC v. D.J. Bahadur). Where two statutes have non obstante clauses, the court first seeks separate fields; if none can be found, the later statute ordinarily prevails (Central Bank of India; Solidaire).
716. In constitutional interpretation, the canon prevents one provision from extinguishing another. Denominational rights are read subject to the throwing open of public temples, with the denomination keeping its own ceremonies (Venkataramana Devaru); the Governor’s clemency power is read as not operating while the Supreme Court is seized of the matter (Nanavati); legislative entries are read so that each has content (Calcutta Gas); and the balance between Parts III and IV is part of the basic structure (Minerva Mills).
727. The canon does not permit the court to rewrite clear words or supply an omission (Padma Sundara Rao; Nathi Devi).
738. Between different statutes, there is a strong presumption against implied repeal. One statute displaces another only where the two cannot stand together, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency (Municipal Council, Palai).
History
- Published · 27 October 2026
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