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2026 FPR ECA 2 · https://firstprecedent.org/canons/ejusdem-generis

CA-0006Canons · Interpretation · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ECA 2

FPR Editors27 October 2026 · 4,350 words

Ejusdem Generis

Where general words follow an enumeration of particular things that form a distinct class, the general words may be read as limited to things of the same class; but the rule is a presumption about legislative intent, not a rule of law, and it does not apply unless the particular words disclose a genus of more than one species that they do not exhaust, and nothing in the statute points the other way.

Abstract

The ejusdem generis rule ("of the same kind") resolves the tension between a list of particular things and the general words that follow it. This entry states the rule and its rationale, traces its English origins (Casher v. Holmes, R. v. Cleworth, Evans v. Cross), and sets out the five conditions stated by a Constitution Bench in Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise (1972). It then examines the Supreme Court's leading decisions: Ali Gulshan (1955), requiring a genus of more than one species; Lilavati Bai (1957) and Kochuni (1960), on "or otherwise"; Jagdish Chander Gupta (1964), where the particular words disclosed no genus; Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal (1967), on "other authorities" in Article 12; and Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (1989), where the rule was applied to "any other process". It distinguishes noscitur a sociis (Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, Godfrey Phillips), considers the rule's treatment in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (P. Mohanraj), contracts and the review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1, and closes with the criticisms of the rule and the propositions that state the law today.


I. The canon

1Drafters often list particular things and then add general words: “copper, brass, pewter and tin, and all other metals”, “any tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer or other person whatsoever”, “bleaching, mercerising, dyeing ... or any other process”. The general words, read on their own, are very wide. But if they meant everything they could mean, the list before them would be pointless; the general words alone would have done. If they are read as adding nothing to the list, they are pointless instead.

2The ejusdem generis rule (literally, “of the same kind”) offers a middle course. Where particular words form a class, and general words follow them, the general words may be read as covering other things of the same class, rather than everything the words could describe. The list tells the reader what kind of thing the legislature had in mind; the general words catch other things of that kind that the list did not name.

3The rule rests on an inference about how people speak. Someone who mentions “horses, cattle, sheep and other animals” is usually understood to be talking about farm livestock, and the general words to be a precaution against leaving some out, not a reference to lions or cats. The rule gives legal effect to that inference.

A rule of construction, not of law

4In Indian law the rule is an aid to construction, used to resolve doubt about the reach of general words. It is not a rule of law, and it gives way whenever the statute shows that the general words were meant to have their full width. K. Subba Rao J. put it this way in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras:

The rule is that when general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature, the general words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. But it is clearly laid down by decided cases that the specific words must form a distinct genus or category. It is not an inviolable rule of law, but is only permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary.Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 1080, (1960) 3 SCR 887 (Subba Rao J.).

5The Supreme Court has more often refused to apply the rule than applied it. The reason is that general words are presumed to mean what they say, and the party who asks the court to cut them down must show why.

Comparative notes

6The rule is used throughout the common-law world. In the United States it is a familiar textualist canon: Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner state it as the principle that where general words follow an enumeration of two or more things, they apply only to persons or things of the same general kind or class specifically mentioned.Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (Thomson/West 2012) 199. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme Court of the United States read the exemption in section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act for “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” as confined, like the named classes, to transportation workers.Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). English courts have long treated the rule as a guide rather than a command; the House of Lords in Quazi v. Quazi refused to confine the words “judicial or other proceedings” in the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act, 1971 to proceedings of a judicial kind, since a single word could not form a genus.Quazi v. Quazi, [1980] AC 744 (H.L.).

7The Indian approach, developed from Ali Gulshan in 1955 to Siddeshwari Cotton Mills in 1989, is demanding. Before cutting general words down, the court asks whether the particular words really form a class, whether that class has members the list has not named, and whether anything in the statute shows that the general words were meant to be wide.

II. Origins and conditions

English origins

8The modern rule is usually traced to Casher v. Holmes (1831). A statute imposed duties on imported “copper, brass, pewter, and tin, and all other metals not enumerated”, and the question was whether gold and silver were caught by the general words. Lord Tenterden C.J. held that they were not: the metals named were base metals, and the general words were read as referring to other metals of that kind.Casher v. Holmes, (1831) 2 B & Ad 592, 109 ER 1263.

9Later English decisions show both the reach and the limits of the rule. In R. v. Cleworth, the Sunday Observance Act, 1677 forbade any “tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer, or other person whatsoever” to work at his ordinary calling on a Sunday. The court held that a farmer was not within the Act, despite the word “whatsoever”, because the particular words described persons of a narrower kind.R. v. Cleworth, (1864) 4 B & S 927, 122 ER 707. In Evans v. Cross, a white line painted on a road was held not to be a “traffic sign” under a definition that listed “signals, warning sign posts, direction posts, signs, or other devices”, since the listed things were all physical objects placed on or beside the road.Evans v. Cross, [1938] 1 KB 694.

The five conditions: Amar Chandra Chakraborty (1972)

10The Supreme Court stated the conditions for the rule in Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise, a decision of a Constitution Bench of S.M. Sikri C.J., A.N. Ray, I.D. Dua, D.G. Palekar and M.H. Beg JJ., in a judgment written by Dua J.Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise, (1972) 2 SCC 442, AIR 1972 SC 1863, (1973) 1 SCR 533. He said:

The ejusdem generis rule strives to reconcile the incompatibility between specific and general words. This doctrine applies when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subjects of the enumeration constitute a class or category; (iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) the general term follows the enumeration; and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent.Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise, (1972) 2 SCC 442.

11Each condition does work. The first two require a list that discloses a class. The third prevents the rule from emptying the general words: if the list already names every member of the class, the general words must mean something beyond it. The fourth confines the rule to general words that follow the list. The fifth makes the rule subject to the statute as a whole. If any condition fails, the general words keep their ordinary meaning.

12The case itself concerned a licence for country liquor in Tripura under the Bengal Excise Act, 1909. Section 42 allowed a licence to be cancelled or suspended on certain grounds connected with the licensee’s conduct. Section 43 allowed the authority to withdraw a licence “for any cause other than those specified in section 42”, on remitting a sum equal to the licence fees for fifteen days. The licensee argued that the causes under section 43 must be read ejusdem generis with those in section 42. The Court rejected the argument. The words of section 43 referred to causes “other than” those in section 42; they were meant to cover a different field, and they could not be confined to causes like those they expressly excluded.

III. The Indian decisions

Ali Gulshan (1955): a genus needs more than one species

13In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, the Government of Bombay requisitioned a flat under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, which allowed requisition “for the purpose of the State or any other public purpose”, to house a member of the staff of a foreign consulate.State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, AIR 1955 SC 810, (1955) 2 SCR 867. The Bombay High Court held that housing consular staff was a purpose of the Union, not of the State, and that “any other public purpose” should be read ejusdem generis with “the purpose of the State”, so that the requisition was invalid.

14The Supreme Court reversed. N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., for the Court, held that there could be public purposes that were neither State nor Union purposes, and said of the High Court’s reasoning:

With great respect, we are constrained to say that the ejusdem generis rule of construction, which found favour in the court below for reaching the result that the words “any other public purpose” are restricted to a public purpose which is also a purpose of the State, has scarcely any application.State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, AIR 1955 SC 810 (Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.).

15He gave two reasons. The rule “must be confined within narrow limits, and general or comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment”; and “it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus, which must comprise more than one species, before the rule can be applied”. A single phrase, “the purpose of the State”, did not make a genus.

Lilavati Bai (1957) and Kochuni (1960): “or otherwise”

16The words “or otherwise” at the end of a list are a frequent occasion for the argument, and the Court has repeatedly refused to cut them down.

17In Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, a Constitution Bench, in a judgment written by B.P. Sinha J., considered a provision of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 deeming premises to be vacant when a tenant ceased to occupy them by reason of various events “or otherwise”.Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 521, (1957) SCR 721. It held that the words were used with a contrary intention, and said:

The rule of ejusdem generis is intended to be applied where general words have been used following particular and specific words of the same nature on the established rule of construction that the legislature presumed to use the general words in a restricted sense, that is to say, as belonging to the same genus as the particular and specific words. Such a restricted meaning has to be given to words of general import only where the context of the whole scheme of legislation requires it.Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 521.

18In Kochuni, the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 treated a sthanam as the property of the wider family where, among other things, members of the family had received maintenance from its properties “as of right or in pursuance of custom or otherwise”. It was argued that “otherwise” must be confined to things analogous to right or custom, such as a lost grant or immemorial user. Subba Rao J., for the majority, rejected the argument. “Otherwise”, he held, meant “whatever may be the origin of the receipt of maintenance”; a word of the widest amplitude had been used, probably to cover even maintenance paid out of charity or bounty.Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 1080. That width was one of the reasons the Court held the Act an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner’s property; S.J. Imam and A.K. Sarkar JJ. dissented on the validity of the Act.

Jagdish Chander Gupta (1964): no genus disclosed

19Section 69(3) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 bars an unregistered firm from enforcing “a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract”. In Jagdish Chander Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., a partner in an unregistered firm applied under section 8(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for the appointment of an arbitrator, and it was argued that “other proceeding” should be read with “claim of set-off” as referring only to proceedings of a similar defensive kind.Jagdish Chander Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 1882, (1964) 8 SCR 50.

20M. Hidayatullah J., for the Court, held that the rule had no application:

Before the general words can be so interpreted there must be a genus constituted or a category disclosed with reference to which the general words can and are intended to be restricted. Here the expression “claim of set-off” does not disclose a category or a genus. Set-offs are of two kinds-- legal and equitable-and both are already comprehended and it is difficult to think of any right “arising from a contract” which is of the same nature as a claim of set-off and can be raised by a defendant in a suit.Jagdish Chander Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 1882 (Hidayatullah J.).

21The passage shows two conditions failing at once. A single expression did not disclose a genus; and, to the extent it did, the genus was exhausted, since both kinds of set-off were already covered. The application was barred.

Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal (1967): Article 12

22Article 12 defines “the State” to include the Government and Parliament of India, the Government and Legislature of each State, and “all local or other authorities”. Some High Courts had read “other authorities” ejusdem generis with the bodies named, so as to include only authorities exercising governmental or sovereign functions. In Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, a Constitution Bench, in the majority judgment of V. Bhargava J., held that this was wrong:

In our opinion, the High Courts fell into an error in applying the principle of ejusdem generis when interpreting the expression “ other authorities” in Art. 12 of the Constitution, as they overlooked the basic principle of interpretation that, to invoke the application of ejusdem generis rule, there must be a distinct genus or category running through the bodies already named.Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857, (1967) 3 SCR 377 (Bhargava J.).

23The bodies named in Article 12, governments, legislatures and local authorities, had no common genus, and could not be placed in one category on any rational basis. “Other authorities” therefore had its ordinary meaning, and the Electricity Board, a body constituted under statute and invested with statutory powers, was within it. The decision cleared the way for the later expansion of Article 12 to statutory corporations and instrumentalities of the State.Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489.

Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (1989): the rule applied

24The rule is not always rejected. In Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, an exemption notification under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 covered “unprocessed” cotton fabrics.Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 458, AIR 1989 SC 1019. Section 2(f)(v) of the Act treated as manufacture, in relation to cotton fabrics, “bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing or any other process”. The appellant’s fabric had been calendered, that is, pressed between rollers to give it a finish, and the Appellate Tribunal held that calendering was a “process” that took the fabric out of the exemption.

25M.N. Venkatachaliah J., for the Court, explained the rule:

If a list or string or family of genus-describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping-up words, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words.Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 458 (Venkatachaliah J.).

26He then identified the genus:

In the present case the expressions ‘bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing’ which precedes the expression ‘or any other process’ contemplate processes which impart a change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise.Siddeshwari Cotton Mills, (1989) 2 SCC 458.

27“Any other process” therefore meant a process of that kind. The appellant’s case was that plain calendering added nothing to the fabric and gave only a temporary finish. Whether that was so was a question of fact the Tribunal had not examined, so the Court allowed the appeal and sent the matter back to the Tribunal to decide it on the correct construction.

IV. The limits of the rule

No genus

28The first and most common reason for rejecting the rule is that the particular words do not form a class. A class cannot be invented by grouping unlike things; the particular words must share a recognisable common character. Where they do not, as with the bodies named in Article 12 in Mohan Lal, or the single expression “claim of set-off” in Jagdish Chander Gupta, the general words keep their full meaning.

A single species

29A single particular word does not ordinarily constitute a genus. Ali Gulshan states the requirement that the genus “must comprise more than one species”. Where general words follow one particular expression, the court will usually treat the two as separate categories, the second wider than the first.

Exhaustion

30If the particular words name every member of the class, the general words cannot be confined to that class without being emptied of meaning. The third condition in Amar Chandra Chakraborty exists to prevent that result. In Jagdish Chander Gupta, the two kinds of set-off were already comprehended in the words “claim of set-off”, and nothing of the same nature remained for “other proceeding” to cover; the words therefore had to mean something wider.

A contrary intention

31The rule gives way to any indication that the general words were meant to be wide. Such an indication may come from the words themselves, as where the legislature adds “whatsoever”, “without limitation” or “whether or not of the same kind”; though Cleworth shows that even “whatsoever” will not always prevail over a narrow class. It may come from the use of “or otherwise”, which in Lilavati Bai and Kochuni was read as a deliberate extension. It may come from the structure of the statute, as in Amar Chandra Chakraborty, where the general words referred to causes “other than” those listed. And it may come from the object of the statute, where cutting the general words down would defeat the purpose for which they were used (P. Mohanraj, Part V).

General words before particular words

32The rule applies to general words that follow a list. Where the general words come first, and particular words follow as examples, as in “any property, including land, buildings and machinery”, the particular words illustrate the general ones and do not limit them. The word “includes” in a definition is ordinarily a term of extension, enlarging the ordinary meaning of the defined word rather than confining it to the items listed.Regional Director, ESIC v. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldanha & Sons, (1991) 3 SCC 617, AIR 1992 SC 129.

V. Related rules and applications

Noscitur a sociis

33Ejusdem generis is often argued alongside noscitur a sociis, the principle that a word takes its meaning from the words around it. The two are related but distinct. Ejusdem generis has a fixed structure: a list forming a class, followed by general words, which are confined to that class. Noscitur a sociis is broader: it permits associated words to colour one another, in any order, without requiring a formal genus.

34Both are aids to resolving doubt, and both give way where the legislature has clearly chosen wide words. In State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, the State argued that the definition of “industry” in section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 should be confined by the words around it so as to exclude a hospital run by the State. P.B. Gajendragadkar J. rejected the argument: noscitur a sociis “is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider”.State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610, (1960) 2 SCR 866.

35The principle was applied in Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. v. State of U.P., where a Constitution Bench, in the majority judgment of Ruma Pal J., held that “luxuries” in Entry 62 of List II (“taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling”) did not permit a tax on goods. Reading the word with its companions, the Court concluded:

Hence on an application of general principles of interpretation, we would hold that the word ‘luxuries’ in Entry 62 of List II means the activity of enjoyment of or indulgence in that which is costly or which is generally recognized as being beyond the necessary requirements of an average member of society and not articles of luxury.Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2005) 2 SCC 515, AIR 2005 SC 1103.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code: P. Mohanraj (2021)

36In P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd., the question was whether the moratorium under section 14(1)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which prohibits “the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor”, covers a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against the corporate debtor.P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258, AIR 2021 SC 1308. It was argued that “proceedings” took its colour from “suits” and meant only civil proceedings.

37A Bench of R.F. Nariman, Navin Sinha and K.M. Joseph JJ., in a judgment written by Nariman J., held that the moratorium covered such a complaint against the corporate debtor. On the canons, he said:

A reading of these judgments would show that ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, being rules as to the construction of statutes, cannot be exalted to nullify the plain meaning of words used in a statute if they are designedly used in a wide sense.P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258, ¶ 22.

38The object of section 14 was to give the corporate debtor a breathing space during the insolvency resolution process, and a section 138 proceeding, though criminal in form, was in substance a means of recovering the debt. To read “proceedings” narrowly would have defeated that object.

Contracts and force majeure

39The rule is also applied to contracts, deeds and other instruments, and its most frequent commercial use is in force majeure clauses. A clause that excuses non-performance caused by “war, insurrection, act of God, earthquake, fire, flood, or any other cause beyond the reasonable control of the parties” lists extraordinary external events, and a court or tribunal may read the general words as limited to events of that kind. A rise in the cost of performance is not ordinarily such an event. In Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, the Supreme Court held that an unexpected rise in the price of imported coal did not make performance of power purchase agreements impossible or excuse it under their force majeure clauses.Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2017) 14 SCC 80. Drafters who want the general words to have their full width commonly say so, adding “whether or not similar to the causes listed above”, which displaces the rule.

Review: “any other sufficient reason”

40Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 permits review of a judgment on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence, on account of a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, “or for any other sufficient reason”. The last words have long been read in the light of the first two. In Chhajju Ram v. Neki, the Privy Council held that they mean a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule, and the Supreme Court approved that view in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius.Chhajju Ram v. Neki, (1922) 49 IA 144, AIR 1922 PC 112; Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526, (1955) 1 SCR 520. The Court restated the rule in 2022:

the words “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule” as was held in Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose AthanasiusS. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (Supreme Court, 18 August 2022) (Hima Kohli J.).

41Review is therefore not a rehearing of the merits.

VI. Criticisms

42The rule has been criticised on three grounds.

43The first is that the genus is a matter of choice. Any two things share many characteristics, and the court decides which one counts. “Apples, oranges and other articles” might describe citrus fruit (which excludes apples), fruit, food, or groceries. The statute gives the list and the general words; it does not name the genus. A court that wants a narrow result can choose a narrow genus, and a court that wants a wide one can choose a wide genus, or find none at all. Siddeshwari Cotton Mills, which found a genus of processes making a lasting change in the fabric, and Mohan Lal, which found no genus in the bodies named in Article 12, can both be read as examples of that choice.

44The second is that the rule may misdescribe how drafters work. It assumes a drafter who has a class in mind, names some of its members, and adds general words for the rest. Often the general words are added for a different reason: because the drafter cannot foresee every case and wants to cover what was not foreseen, whether or not it resembles what was listed. Applying the rule to such words may defeat the very caution that led to their inclusion.

45The third is a defence rather than a criticism. Whatever its linguistic merits, the rule serves a constitutional purpose when it is applied to powers conferred on the executive. A power to act on listed grounds “or for any other reason” would, read literally, permit action on any ground at all. Confining the general words to reasons of the same kind as those listed keeps the power within the limits the legislature evidently contemplated. In that setting the rule protects the citizen against open-ended discretion.

VII. The position today

46The law on ejusdem generis in India may be stated in eight propositions.

471. The rule is an aid to construction and a presumption about legislative intent. It is not a rule of law, and it cannot be used to defeat the plain meaning or the evident purpose of a statute (Kochuni; P. Mohanraj).

482. The rule applies only when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subjects of the enumeration constitute a class or category; (iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) the general term follows the enumeration; and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent (Amar Chandra Chakraborty).

493. The particular words must form a distinct genus. If they are disparate, no genus exists and the general words keep their ordinary meaning (Mohan Lal; Jagdish Chander Gupta).

504. The genus must comprise more than one species. General words following a single particular expression are ordinarily not confined by it (Ali Gulshan).

515. If the particular words exhaust the class, the general words must refer to something beyond it (Jagdish Chander Gupta).

526. The rule gives way to a contrary intention, whether shown by express words of extension, by the use of “or otherwise”, by the structure of the provision, or by the object of the statute (Lilavati Bai; Kochuni; Amar Chandra Chakraborty; P. Mohanraj).

537. Noscitur a sociis is a related but broader principle, by which associated words colour one another without the need for a formal genus. It too yields where wide words have been used deliberately (Hospital Mazdoor Sabha; Godfrey Phillips).

548. The rule applies to contracts and procedural provisions as well as statutes. In particular, “any other sufficient reason” in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure means a reason at least analogous to those specified in the rule (Chhajju Ram; Moran Mar Basselios).


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