Skip to content

FPR · First Precedent Research
2026 FPR ETS 16 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/recall-of-a-witness

TS-0159Tests · Criminal · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 16

FPR Editors21 November 2026 · 3,681 words

Recall of a Witness

Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, now section 348 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, lets a criminal court summon, examine or recall any witness at any stage, and obliges it to do so when the evidence appears essential to the just decision of the case; the test is essentiality, so an application fails when it would only repair a weakness in a party's case, extend a trial by successive attempts, or reopen a cross-examination because a new lawyer would have conducted it differently.

Abstract

The power to summon or recall a witness was in section 540 of the old Code and is now in section 311 of the Code of 1973, re-enacted in the same words as section 348 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Mohanlal Shamji Soni (1991) read the section as having two parts, the first a discretion and the second a duty that arises when the evidence is essential to a just decision. This entry explains the purpose of the power and the distinction drawn in Rajendra Prasad (1999) between a lacuna in the prosecution case, which the court should not fill, and an oversight in its conduct, which may be corrected. It then sets out the principles collected in Rajaram Prasad Yadav (2013), the limits on late and repeated applications in Swapan Kumar Chatterjee (2019), the refusal in Shiv Kumar Yadav (2015) and Ram Mehar (2016) to treat a change of counsel as a ground for recall, the accused's side of the power in Natasha Singh (2013), the place of delay in Manju Devi (2019) and Varsha Garg (2022), and the bar on revision of an order under the section.


I. The Test

1Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 reads:

“311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present.—Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case.”Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 311, as set out in Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2019) 14 SCC 328.

2Section 348 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is in the same words, with “this Sanhita” in place of “this Code”.Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, s. 348, in force from 1 July 2024. The cases on section 311, and on section 540 of the Code of 1898 before it, therefore continue to state the law.

3The question a court asks is whether the evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case. If it does, the court must take it. If it does not, the court may still summon or recall the witness, but it then exercises a discretion, and the cases discussed below describe how that discretion is to be used. The power belongs to the court. It may be exercised on the application of the prosecution, of the accused, of the victim, or of the court’s own motion.

II. Two Parts of One Section

Mohanlal Shamji Soni

4The structure of the section was explained by S. Ratnavel Pandian J. in Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India. The first part, which uses “may”, is permissive and allows the court to act in any of three ways: to summon any person as a witness, to examine a person in attendance though not summoned, or to recall and re-examine a person already examined. The second part, which uses “shall”, is mandatory. On the width of the language the Court said that “the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary power should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code.”Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271 : AIR 1991 SC 1346. It continued:

“The second part of the Section does not allow for any discretion but it binds and compels the Court to take any of the aforementioned two steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case.”Mohanlal Shamji Soni.

5The Court gave the reason for the power. The section was enacted so that the court can find the truth, “because if judgments happen to be rendered on inchoate, inconclusive and speculative presentation of facts, the ends of justice would be defeated.”Mohanlal Shamji Soni.

6The Court also marked a limit. It is ordinarily for the parties, not the court, to decide which witnesses to call, and “the Court is not empowered under the provisions of the Code to compel either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular witness or witnesses on their sides.”Mohanlal Shamji Soni. What the court can do is call the witness itself under section 311, or draw an adverse inference against a party that withholds evidence it could have produced.

The earlier rule in Jamatraj

7The same reading had been given to section 540 of the old Code in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra. Once the court acts under the second part, Hidayatullah J. said, “the inquiry cannot be whether the accused has brought anything suddenly or unexpectedly but whether the court is right in thinking that the new evidence is needed by it for a just decision of the case.”Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 178, as quoted in Rajaram Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2013) 14 SCC 461. A court that summons a witness for that purpose acts within its jurisdiction even if the result helps one side.

8Section 311 has a companion in the law of evidence. Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, now section 168 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, allows the judge to ask any question of any witness and to order the production of any document, in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant facts. Mohanlal Shamji Soni read the two provisions as complementary.

III. Lacuna and Oversight

9The objection most often raised to an application under section 311 is that it would fill a lacuna in the prosecution case. Mohanlal Shamji Soni had said that the power should not be used for that purpose. In Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, two prosecution witnesses in a narcotics trial were recalled to prove documents after both sides had closed their evidence, and the accused argued that this filled gaps in the case. K.T. Thomas J. asked what a lacuna is, and answered:

“Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case. The advantage of it should normally go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an oversight in the management of the prosecution cannot be treated as irreparable lacuna. No party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors. If proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified. After all, function of the criminal court is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by the parties or to find out and declare who among the parties performed better.”Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6 SCC 110, as quoted in Varsha Garg v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 1021 of 2022, decided 8 August 2022.

10The distinction is between a case that is weak and a case that was badly presented. A prosecutor who forgot to tender a document, or to ask a witness a question, has made a mistake that the court may allow to be put right. A prosecution that has no evidence on a point, and finds a witness to supply it only after the defence has shown the gap, is asking the court to build a case it never had.

11The Court restated the point in Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli v. Fatehsinh Mohansinh Chauhan:

“Calling a witness or re-examining a witness already examined for the purpose of finding out the truth in order to enable the court to arrive at a just decision of the case cannot be dubbed as ‘filling in a lacuna in the prosecution case’ unless the facts and circumstances of the case make it apparent that the exercise of power by the court would result in causing serious prejudice to the accused resulting in miscarriage of justice.”Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli v. Fatehsinh Mohansinh Chauhan, (2006) 7 SCC 529, as quoted in Rajaram Prasad Yadav.

12In Varsha Garg v. State of Madhya Pradesh the Court went further and treated the objection as secondary. An advocate had been murdered outside his office in 2015, and the prosecution applied under sections 311 and 91 to produce the decoding registers of the cellular companies, which link a mobile number’s location to a tower. The trial court refused, and the High Court declined to interfere. D.Y. Chandrachud J. held that the registers were essential for the just decision of the case. As to the objection that the application would fill a lacuna, “even the said reason cannot be an absolute bar to allowing an application under Section 311.” Relying on Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, the Court said that “the resultant filling of loopholes on account of allowing an application under Section 311 is merely a subsidiary factor and the Court‘s determination of the application should only be based on the test of the essentiality of the evidence.”Varsha Garg. The appeal was allowed and the application granted.

13The Court also held in Varsha Garg that the appellant, the widow of the deceased, could pursue the proceedings. Section 301 of the Code, which places the conduct of the prosecution with the Public Prosecutor, did not bar her, because the application in the trial court had been made by the State itself.

IV. The Principles in Rajaram Prasad Yadav

The facts

14Rajaram Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar arose from a quarrel between brothers over a latrine. The complainant said that his brother’s son had shot him in the back. At the trial, which concerned offences under sections 307 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code, the complainant gave evidence as PW-9 and said that nobody had beaten him and no bullet had hit him; he had fallen into the latrine pit and been hurt by something lying in it. The prosecution closed its evidence in April 2007. Some months later, after a fresh fight between the families, the complainant applied under section 311 to be re-examined, and the Additional Public Prosecutor made a similar application. The trial court dismissed both in a reasoned order. The High Court allowed the complainant’s petition by a short order, without the accused having been heard.

The principles

15Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla J., for himself and T.S. Thakur J., reviewed the earlier decisions and set out fourteen principles that courts must bear in mind on an application under section 311 read with section 138 of the Evidence Act. They begin with the question whether the court is right in thinking that the new evidence is needed by it for a just decision, and end with the reminder that fair trial “entails the interest of the accused, the victim and the society”. Four of them bear directly on the questions discussed below.

16The first concerns the standard. “The Court arrives at the conclusion that additional evidence is necessary, not because it would be impossible to pronounce the judgment without it, but because there would be a failure of justice without such evidence being considered.”Rajaram Prasad Yadav.

17The second repeats Rajendra Prasad: “The Court should bear in mind that no party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors and that if proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the Court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified.”Rajaram Prasad Yadav.

18The third tilts the balance towards the accused. “In that parity of reasoning, it would be safe to err in favour of the accused getting an opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against possible prejudice at the cost of the accused.”Rajaram Prasad Yadav.

19The fourth guards against misuse. “The additional evidence must not be received as a disguise or to change the nature of the case against any of the party.”Rajaram Prasad Yadav. The power is to be used “for strong and valid reasons” and “with care, caution and circumspection”.

The result

20Applying these principles, the Court held that the High Court had ignored the object of the provision. The trial court had heard everyone and given reasons; the High Court had interfered with a cryptic order, behind the back of the accused, at the instance of a witness who wished to depart from the evidence he had given. The Court was “convinced that the order of the trial Court impugned before the High Court did not call for any interference in any event behind the back of the appellant herein.”Rajaram Prasad Yadav. The appeal succeeded and the trial court’s refusal was restored.

21The case is cited for its list, but its outcome is as instructive. Section 311 does not give a witness who has deposed one way a right to be recalled to depose the other way. Whether a recall is essential to the just decision of the case is for the court, and a reasoned refusal by the trial court is not lightly disturbed.

V. Late and Repeated Applications

22The section may be used “at any stage”, and the closing of evidence does not end the power. In Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar, which had laid down time limits for the closing of prosecution evidence, the Court clarified that “even if the prosecution evidence is closed in compliance with the directions contained in the main judgment it is still open to the prosecution to invoke the powers of the court under Section 311 of the Code.”Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 604, as quoted in Rajaram Prasad Yadav.

23The stage of the trial and the history of the case are nevertheless relevant to the court’s discretion. Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. Central Bureau of Investigation concerned a case registered in 1983, in which twenty-nine prosecution witnesses had been examined. An application to examine one further witness had been allowed in 2004. The prosecution never produced him. Further applications were allowed. In 2011 the High Court gave the prosecution a last opportunity and directed the trial court to proceed without further adjournment if it failed. In 2014, on the day the accused was examined as a defence witness, the prosecution applied again, and the Magistrate allowed it. S. Abdul Nazeer J., for himself and A.K. Sikri J., quashed that order. The power “shall not be exercised if the court is of the view that the application has been filed as an abuse of the process of law”, and the Court added:

“Where the prosecution evidence has been closed long back and the reasons for non-examination of the witness earlier is not satisfactory, the summoning of the witness at belated stage would cause great prejudice to the accused and should not be allowed. Similarly, the court should not encourage the filing of successive applications for recall of a witness under this provision.”Swapan Kumar Chatterjee.

24Delay alone, however, does not defeat an application. In Manju Devi v. State of Rajasthan a woman had died in Nigeria, and her husband was tried for dowry death and murder. Her mother applied under section 311 to examine the Nigerian doctor who had conducted the first post-mortem, if necessary by commission or video-conferencing, because the medical board in India could give no definite opinion on the cause of death. The trial court refused, because the case had been pending for about eight years and a copy of the doctor’s report was already on record. Dinesh Maheshwari J. held that the refusal rested on irrelevant considerations:

“Though it is expected that the trial of a sessions case should proceed with reasonable expedition and pendency of such a matter for about 8-9 years is not desirable but then, the length/duration of a case cannot displace the basic requirement of ensuring the just decision after taking all the necessary and material evidence on record. In other words, the age of a case, by itself, cannot be decisive of the matter when a prayer is made for examination of a material witness.”Manju Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 6 SCC 203.

25The Court pointed to sections 284 and 285 of the Code, which allow evidence to be taken on commission, as a way to obtain the evidence without further delay, and allowed the application. Swapan Kumar Chatterjee and Manju Devi are consistent. In the first, the delay was the applicant’s own, repeated over a decade in defiance of a last opportunity. In the second, the witness was essential, the reason for not calling him earlier was plain, and the delay was not the applicant’s fault.

VI. A Change of Counsel

26Recall is most often sought by the defence for further cross-examination, on the ground that earlier counsel failed to put material questions. The leading earlier case was Hoffman Andreas v. Inspector of Customs, where defence counsel had died before the trial ended. The Court allowed the new counsel to recall witnesses, saying that the court could take a liberal view and that “After all the trial is basically for the prisoners and courts should afford the opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible”.Hoffman Andreas v. Inspector of Customs, (2000) 10 SCC 430, as quoted in State of Haryana v. Ram Mehar, (2016) 8 SCC 762.

27In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Kumar Yadav a cab driver was tried for raping a passenger. The prosecution evidence was taken and closed within a month, and the witnesses were cross-examined by counsel the accused had chosen. After his statement under section 313 had been recorded, he engaged another counsel, who applied to recall all twenty-eight prosecution witnesses. The trial court refused; the High Court allowed the recall. The Supreme Court set the High Court’s order aside, and read Hoffman Andreas as a case about the death of counsel, not a general rule:

“While advancement of justice remains the prime object of law, it cannot be understood that recall can be allowed for the asking or reasons related to mere convenience. It has normally to be presumed that the counsel conducting a case is competent particularly when a counsel is appointed by choice of a litigant. Taken to its logical end, the principle that a retrial must follow on every change of a counsel, can have serious consequences on conduct of trials and the criminal justice system.”State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Kumar Yadav, (2016) 2 SCC 402, as quoted in Ram Mehar.

28The Court added that witnesses, and in particular the victims of serious crimes, cannot be expected to appear in court again and again to face cross-examination.

29State of Haryana v. Ram Mehar applied that reasoning to a trial of 148 accused for violence at a factory, in which 102 prosecution witnesses had been examined and prosecution evidence had closed in March 2015. Months into the defence evidence, some of the accused applied to recall four witnesses for further cross-examination, saying that their earlier counsel had been ill and that the senior counsel now engaged had found questions that should have been put. The trial court refused: the witnesses had been cross-examined at length, the applicants had not shown what questions were left out, and the trial was under a direction to be decided expeditiously. The High Court allowed petitions under section 482, holding that inadvertent omissions in so large a trial deserved a magnanimous approach.

30Dipak Misra J., for himself and U.U. Lalit J., restored the trial court’s order. The Court accepted that fair trial is a facet of Article 21, but held that the concept cannot be stretched without limit, and that it protects more than the accused:

“Suffice it to say, a criminal trial does not singularly centres around the accused. In it there is involvement of the prosecution, the victim and the victim represents the collective.”Ram Mehar.

31The Court said that “when the concept of fair trial is limitlessly stretched, having no boundaries, the orders like the present one may fall in the arena of sanctuary of errors”, and it reiterated the need for balance.Ram Mehar. The appeals were allowed.

32The rule that emerges is not that the defence can never recall a witness after a change of counsel. It is that a change of counsel, or a new counsel’s view that the cross-examination could have been better, is not by itself a reason. The accused must show what material question was not put and why its absence would cause a failure of justice. The death or genuine incapacity of counsel in the middle of a trial, as in Hoffman Andreas, remains a ground on which the court may take a liberal view.

VII. The Accused’s Application

33The power serves the defence as well as the prosecution. In Natasha Singh v. CBI the FIR had been lodged in 1998 and the prosecution had examined fifty-two witnesses. After the appellant had closed her defence, a co-accused led his defence evidence, and the appellant then applied to examine three witnesses, including a handwriting expert to rebut the prosecution’s evidence on her signatures. The trial court refused, in part because the expert’s opinion would not be conclusive, and the High Court agreed.

34B.S. Chauhan J., for himself and Kalifulla J., held that the trial court had prejudged the evidence. That approach was “wholly misconceived, and is not tenable in law as the accused has every right to adduce evidence in rebuttal of the evidence brought on record by the prosecution.”Natasha Singh v. CBI (State), (2013) 5 SCC 741. The question was whether the evidence was relevant, and its weight could be judged only once it was on record. Allowing the application would not have taken much time; refusing it had caused delay. The application was allowed, with the prosecution free to cross-examine the witnesses.

VIII. Challenging the Order

35An order allowing or refusing an application under section 311 does not decide the case, and the Court has treated it as interlocutory. In Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam, a cheque case, the trial court rejected applications under section 91 for the production of documents and under section 311 for the recall of the complainant. The High Court allowed a revision against those orders without hearing the complainant. V.S. Sirpurkar J. set the High Court’s order aside on both counts. Both orders “were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable.”Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam, (2009) 5 SCC 153. The same bar now appears in section 438(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.

36A party aggrieved by such an order may still invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction, now preserved in section 528 of the Sanhita, as the parties did in Ram Mehar, Manju Devi and Varsha Garg. That jurisdiction is used sparingly, and Rajaram Prasad Yadav and Ram Mehar both turned on the High Court having interfered with a trial court’s reasoned exercise of discretion.

IX. The Position Today

37The court has a wide power, and in one class of case a duty, to summon, examine or recall a witness at any stage of an inquiry, trial or other proceeding. The duty arises when the evidence appears essential to the just decision of the case. Essentiality is the governing test. The closing of evidence does not end the power, and the age of a case does not by itself defeat a request to examine a material witness.

38The court will not use the power to supply evidence that a party never had, to let a witness retract evidence already given, or to give a party a second attempt at a case already presented. An oversight in the conduct of the case may be corrected; an inherent weakness may not. Belated and repeated applications by a party that has had its opportunity may be refused as an abuse of process. A change of counsel is not in itself a ground to recall witnesses for further cross-examination. Fair trial is weighed for the accused, the victim and the public together.

39Orders under the section are interlocutory and not open to revision, and a High Court will rarely interfere under its inherent powers with a trial court’s reasoned order. Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita the provisions are sections 348, 438(2) and 528, in substance the same as before.


History

  • Published · 21 November 2026

Nothing has been changed since publication. How FPR corrects a piece · Report an error


The editors wrote this draft to get the entry started. A student can claim the entry, rework the draft or start over, and the piece will then carry their name.

© 2026 First Precedent Research. Free to share and adapt with credit, for non-commercial use, under CC BY-NC 4.0. A published piece is changed only to correct an error, and each correction is listed under History. If the law changes, we add a linked afterword. Nothing on FPR is legal advice.

Found a mistake? Report an error, giving the paragraph number. If you are right, the text is corrected and the correction is recorded publicly.

SEEAlso in Criminal

Everything in Criminal

ELSEWHERECounterparts · the same question in other jurisdictions

No scholar has written on another country’s law here yet. Write a counterpart from your jurisdiction


Comments · 0

Sign in to comment. Comments are moderated.