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2026 FPR ECN 3 · https://firstprecedent.org/concepts/mens-rea
CN-0015Concepts · Criminal · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ECN 3
FPR Editors27 October 2026 · 5,680 words
Mens Rea
Criminal liability ordinarily requires a guilty mind as well as a guilty act; in India the Penal Code (now the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) builds the required mental state into each offence and its general exceptions, while for offences created by other statutes the courts presume that mens rea is required unless the statute excludes it expressly or by necessary implication.
Abstract
The maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea states that an act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is guilty too. This entry explains the concept and its distinction from motive and civil fault; shows how the Indian Penal Code, and now the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, express the mental element through defined terms (voluntarily, dishonestly, fraudulently, reason to believe) and through the general exceptions (mistake of fact, accident, infancy, unsoundness of mind, intoxication); and examines the leading decisions on intention and knowledge (Jai Prakash), fraud (Dr. Vimla), rashness and negligence (Cherubin Gregory, Jacob Mathew), insanity (Dahyabhai) and intoxication (Basdev). It then turns to statutory offences: the presumption of mens rea in English law (Sherras v. De Rutzen, Sweet v. Parsley, Lim Chin Aik), its reception in India in State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George and Nathulal, strict liability in public welfare statutes (Sarjoo Prasad), statutory presumptions of a culpable mental state and their limits (Madan Lal, Noor Aga, Vijay Madanlal Choudhary), the distinction between offences and civil penalties (Shriram Mutual Fund), and the attribution of mens rea to companies (Standard Chartered, Iridium, Sunil Bharti Mittal).
I. The concept
The maxim
1The criminal law ordinarily requires two things before it punishes: a prohibited act or omission (actus reus) and a blameworthy state of mind (mens rea). The maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea expresses the principle: the act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is guilty too. An act done without a culpable mind may be a misfortune, or a civil wrong, but it does not ordinarily deserve the condemnation of a criminal conviction.
2The principle developed in English law over several centuries, as the early idea of liability for harm caused gave way to liability based on fault. By the eighteenth century Blackstone could state it as a general rule: to constitute a crime there must be both a vicious will and an unlawful act consequent upon it.William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV (1769), ch. 2. Its modern justifications are moral and practical. It is unjust to impose the stigma and punishment of a crime on a person who had no fair opportunity to avoid the conduct; and punishing a person who acted in innocent ignorance or by accident does little to deter anyone.See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press 1968).
A range of mental states
3Mens rea is not a single state of mind but a family of them. At the top are intention and knowledge, which depend on what the accused actually had in mind. Below them are rashness, where the accused is aware of a risk and runs it, and negligence, which is judged by an objective standard of what a reasonable person would have foreseen and done. Criminal law in India uses all of these, offence by offence.
Mens rea, motive and civil fault
4Mens rea must be distinguished from motive. Motive is the reason that leads a person to form an intention: greed, jealousy, revenge, or even compassion. It is not an ingredient of an offence. A good motive does not excuse an intentional crime, and the absence of a motive does not prevent a conviction if the required mental state is proved. Motive is relevant as evidence, under section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and now section 6 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, because it may make the inference of intention more or less likely.
5It must also be distinguished from civil fault. Civil liability may rest on slight negligence, or on no fault at all. Criminal liability ordinarily requires more. In Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court held that the negligence that makes a person criminally liable “has to be gross or of a very high degree”, because simple lack of care, which may found civil liability, is not enough for the criminal law.Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1, AIR 2005 SC 3180.
How the principle works in India
6In India the maxim is not a free-standing rule that permits judges to add or remove mental elements as they see fit. Every offence is created by statute. The maxim works in two ways. Within the Penal Code, the mental element of each offence is written into its definition and the general exceptions. Outside the Code, in the many statutes that create offences without mentioning a mental state, the maxim works as a presumption: the courts presume that the legislature intended mens rea to be required, unless the statute shows otherwise.
II. The Penal Code
Macaulay’s method
7The Indian Penal Code, 1860 grew from the draft prepared by Thomas Babington Macaulay and the first Law Commission in 1837. English criminal law then used broad and shifting expressions of fault, such as “malice aforethought” and “felonious intent”. The Code took a different course. It did not use the phrase mens rea or state a general rule that every offence requires a guilty mind. Instead it wrote the required mental state into each offence, using a defined vocabulary, and gathered the circumstances that negative a guilty mind into a chapter of general exceptions. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which replaced the Code, keeps the same structure and the same vocabulary.
The vocabulary of fault
8Intention and knowledge. The Code does not define “intention” or “knowledge”, but the Supreme Court has explained the difference. In Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration) it said:
it can thus be seen that the ‘knowledge’ as contrasted with ‘intention’ signify a state of mental realisation with the bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which human mind remains supine or inactive.Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration), (1991) 2 SCC 32.
9Intention, by contrast, is “a conscious state in which mental faculties are aroused into activity and summoned into action for the purpose of achieving a conceived end”. The difference matters most in homicide. Causing death with the intention of causing death is murder (section 300 of the Code, section 101 of the BNS); causing death with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death, but without such intention, may be culpable homicide not amounting to murder (sections 299 and 304, now sections 100 and 105). Intention is rarely proved directly. It is inferred from conduct and circumstances: the weapon used, the force applied, the part of the body struck, and what the accused said and did.
10Voluntarily. Section 39 of the Code (section 2(33) of the BNS) provides that a person causes an effect “voluntarily” when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing them, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it. The definition is wider than intention: it includes consequences the person knew or had reason to believe were likely. It governs offences such as voluntarily causing hurt and grievous hurt (sections 321 and 322, now sections 115 and 116).
11Dishonestly. Section 24 of the Code (section 2(7) of the BNS) defines “dishonestly” as doing anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another. Wrongful gain and wrongful loss are themselves defined in terms of property to which the person gaining is not, or the person losing is, legally entitled. “Dishonestly” in the Code is therefore narrower than dishonesty in ordinary speech: it is tied to property. It is the mental element of theft, extortion, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust and cheating.
12Fraudulently. Section 25 of the Code (section 2(9) of the BNS) provides that a person does a thing “fraudulently” if he does it with intent to defraud, “but not otherwise”. The meaning of “defraud” was settled in Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, decided by a Bench of four judges in a judgment of K. Subba Rao J.Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1572, (1963) Supp (2) SCR 585. The appellant had bought a car in the name of her minor daughter, Nalini, and later signed insurance claim papers in Nalini’s name. She was charged with forgery and cheating. Subba Rao J. held:
The expression ‘fraud’ involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss, that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable or of money and it will include and any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others.Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1572 (Subba Rao J.).
13He added that an advantage to the deceiver would ordinarily mean a corresponding loss to the deceived, and that a non-economic advantage to the deceiver or a non-economic loss to the deceived would suffice; both need not co-exist. On the facts, Dr. Vimla had practised deceit, but the deceit neither secured her any advantage nor caused the insurer any loss or injury, since the claims were genuine. She had not acted fraudulently, and her conviction was set aside.
14Reason to believe. Section 26 of the Code (section 2(29) of the BNS) provides that a person has “reason to believe” a thing if he has sufficient cause to believe it, “but not otherwise”. The standard lies between knowledge and suspicion: it asks whether the facts known to the accused gave sufficient cause for the belief.Joti Parshad v. State of Haryana, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 497, AIR 1993 SC 1167. It is the standard, for example, for dishonestly receiving stolen property (section 411 of the Code, now section 317 of the BNS).
15Rashness and negligence. The Code punishes causing death, hurt or danger by rash or negligent acts (sections 304A, 336, 337 and 338, now sections 106 and 125 of the BNS) without defining either word. The classic distinction comes from Straight J. in Empress v. Idu Beg and has been repeatedly approved:
Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adoptedEmpress v. Idu Beg, (1881) ILR 3 All 776; quoted in Girishbhai Maganlal Pandya v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court, 23 March 2015).
16In Cherubin Gregory v. State of Bihar, the accused had fixed a naked copper wire, carrying current from the electric wiring of his house, across the passage to his latrine to keep out a neighbour who had been using it. She touched the wire and died. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction under section 304A.Cherubin Gregory v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 205, (1964) 4 SCR 199.
17In Jacob Mathew, a Bench of three judges considered the criminal liability of doctors. It held that for negligence to be criminal “the degree of negligence required is that it should be gross”, and that neither a jury nor a court can make negligence of a lesser degree into gross negligence merely by calling it so. A professional may be held criminally liable for negligence only where the conduct shows gross lack of competence or inaction, or wanton indifference to the patient’s safety.
The general exceptions
18Chapter IV of the Code (Chapter III of the BNS) sets out the general exceptions. Many of them are, in substance, circumstances in which the accused lacked a guilty mind.
19Mistake of fact. Sections 76 and 79 of the Code (sections 14 and 17 of the BNS) protect a person who does an act believing in good faith, by reason of a mistake of fact and not of law, that he is bound or justified by law in doing it. The rule reflects the maxim ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat: ignorance of fact excuses, ignorance of law does not. “Good faith” is defined in section 52 of the Code (section 2(11) of the BNS) in negative terms: nothing is done in good faith which is done without due care and attention. A mistake that results from carelessness does not excuse.
20Accident. Section 80 of the Code (section 18 of the BNS) exempts an act done by accident or misfortune, without criminal intention or knowledge, in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution. Each condition must be met; an accident in the course of an unlawful act, or one caused by want of care, is not protected.
21Infancy. Under section 82 of the Code (section 20 of the BNS), nothing done by a child under seven is an offence. Under section 83 (section 21 of the BNS), a child above seven and under twelve is not liable if he has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion. Children in conflict with the law are now dealt with under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
22Unsoundness of mind. Section 84 of the Code (section 22 of the BNS) follows the rules in M’Naghten’s Case:M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 10 Cl & F 200, 8 ER 718 (H.L.). nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The test is legal, not medical: the question is whether the accused’s cognitive faculties were so impaired at the time that he did not know the nature of the act or that it was wrong. A personality disorder or an irresistible impulse, without such incapacity, does not suffice.Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand, (2011) 11 SCC 495, AIR 2011 SC 627.
23The burden of proof was explained in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat, in a judgment of K. Subba Rao J.Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563, (1964) 7 SCR 361. He said that “The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity may be stated in the following propositions”. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence with the required mens rea, and that burden never shifts. “There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime”, which the accused may rebut by evidence on a preponderance of probabilities. And even if the accused does not establish insanity conclusively, the evidence may raise a reasonable doubt about the mental element of the offence, in which case the prosecution has not discharged its burden and the accused is entitled to be acquitted.
24Intoxication. Section 85 of the Code (section 23 of the BNS) excuses an act done by a person who, because of intoxication caused without his knowledge or against his will, was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it was wrong. Section 86 (section 24 of the BNS) deals with voluntary intoxication: where an offence requires a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act while voluntarily intoxicated is to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated.
25In Basdev v. State of Pepsu, a retired military officer, drunk at a wedding, shot a boy who would not give up his seat.Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488, (1956) SCR 363. N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., for the Court, summarised the law:
So far as knowledge is concerned, we must attribute to the intoxicated man the same knowledge as if he was quite sober. But so far as intent or intention is concerned, we must gather it from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due regard to the degree of intoxication. Was the man beside his mind altogether for the time being?Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488 (Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.).
26If he was, it would not be possible to fix him with the required intention. On the facts, the accused had chosen his own seat and asked the boy to move, had tried to get away after the shooting, and on being caught realised what he had done and asked to be forgiven; he was not so drunk as to be incapable of forming the intention, and his conviction for murder stood.
Burden of proving an exception
27Under section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), the burden of proving the circumstances bringing a case within a general exception is on the accused, and the court is to presume their absence. The standard is the civil one, a preponderance of probabilities.K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605, (1962) Supp (1) SCR 567. And evidence that falls short of proving the exception may still raise a reasonable doubt about an ingredient of the offence, such as intention, which entitles the accused to an acquittal.Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P., (1990) 3 SCC 190, AIR 1990 SC 1459.
III. The presumption of mens rea in statutory offences
The English presumption
28Most offences today are created by statutes outside the Penal Code: on food, drugs, foreign exchange, customs, the environment and much else. These statutes often say simply “no person shall import” or “whoever contravenes any order”. The courts’ starting point, inherited from English law, is a presumption that mens rea is required.
29The classic statement is that of Wright J. in Sherras v. De Rutzen:
There is a presumption that mens rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the subject-matter with which it deals, and both must be consideredSherras v. De Rutzen, [1895] 1 QB 918; quoted in Addl. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Dargapandarinath Tuljayya & Co. (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 10 December 1975) (Chinnappa Reddy J.).
30In that case a publican had served liquor to a police constable on duty, who had removed the armlet that showed he was on duty. The publican’s conviction was quashed. In Brend v. Wood, Lord Goddard C.J. said:
It is of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that a court should always bear in mind that, unless a statute, either clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, the court should not find a man guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has a guilty mindBrend v. Wood, (1946) 175 LT 306; quoted in P.K. Varghese & Sons v. Sales Tax Officer, [1965] 16 STC 323 (Ker.) (K.K. Mathew J.).
31In Sweet v. Parsley, the House of Lords reaffirmed the presumption in the context of drug offences. Lord Reid said that whenever a section is silent as to mens rea, “there is a presumption that, in order to give effect to the will of Parliament, we must read in words appropriate to require mens rea”.Sweet v. Parsley, [1970] AC 132 (H.L.); quoted in M.Ct.M. Corporation Pvt. Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, AIR 1989 Mad 141.
32The Privy Council added a qualification in Lim Chin Aik v. The Queen. That a statute deals with a grave social evil does not by itself show that strict liability was intended:
It is not enough in their Lordships’ opinion merely to label the statute as one dealing with a grave social evil and from that to infer that strict liability was intended. It is pertinent also to inquire whether putting the defendant under strict liability will assist in the enforcement of the regulations.Lim Chin Aik v. The Queen, [1963] AC 160 (P.C.); quoted in State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722.
33That means, the Board explained, that there must be something the defendant can do, by supervision, inspection or otherwise, to promote observance of the regulations. Where there is nothing he can do, strict liability serves no purpose.
State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George (1964)
34The presumption was tested in India in State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George.State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722, (1965) 1 SCR 123. The respondent, a German national, was a transit passenger on a flight from Zurich to Manila that landed at Bombay. Customs officers searched him on the aircraft and found 34 kilograms of gold concealed on his person. He was charged under sections 8(1) and 23(1-A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, read with a notification of the Reserve Bank dated 8 November 1962 and published in the Gazette of India on 24 November 1962, which withdrew an earlier general permission for gold carried in transit and required such gold to be declared in the aircraft’s manifest. He said he did not know of the notification. The magistrate convicted him; the High Court acquitted him; the State appealed.
35The Bench was K. Subba Rao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and J.R. Mudholkar JJ. The majority, in a judgment of Ayyangar J., allowed the appeal. It held that the presumption of mens rea was displaced by the object and scheme of the Act, which was designed to conserve foreign exchange and prevent smuggling; that the notification took effect on publication; and that the respondent’s ignorance of it was ignorance of the law, which did not excuse him. His conviction was restored.
36Subba Rao J. dissented. He began from the presumption:
it is a well settled principle of common law that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence. Doubtless a statute can exclude that element, but it is a sound rule of construction adopted in England and also accepted in India to construe a statutory provision creating an offence in conformity with the common law rather than against it unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication excluded mens rea.State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722 (Subba Rao J., dissenting).
37He added that “the mere fact that the object of a statute is to promote welfare activities or to eradicate grave social evils is in itself not decisive of the question whether the element of guilty mind is excluded”, and that mens rea can be excluded by necessary implication only where it is absolutely clear that the object of the statute would otherwise be defeated. Applying Lim Chin Aik, he held that a person who had no means of knowing of a notification published while he was abroad could not have done anything to comply with it, so that convicting him would not advance the purpose of the Act.
Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1965)
38A year later, Subba Rao J. wrote for a unanimous Bench, with J.C. Shah and R.S. Bachawat JJ., in Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh.Nathulal v. State of M.P., AIR 1966 SC 43. The appellant, a grain dealer, had applied for a licence under the Madhya Pradesh Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958, deposited the fee, and believed that the licence would be granted. He bought and stored grain and sent returns of his stock to the authorities. His application had in fact been rejected, without the rejection being communicated to him, and he was prosecuted under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 for storing grain without a licence.
39The Court restated the presumption and added:
The nature of the mens rea that would be implied in a statute creating an offence depends on the object of the Act and the provisions thereof.Nathulal v. State of M.P., AIR 1966 SC 43 (Subba Rao J.).
40Having regard to the object of the Act, the Court held, “it cannot be said that the object of the Act would be defeated if mens rea is read as an ingredient of the offence”; and the legislature could not have intended to impose imprisonment and heavy fines on an innocent person who carried on business in the honest belief that he was acting lawfully. The appellant had not intentionally contravened the Order, and he was acquitted.
41Parliament responded in 1974 by inserting section 10C into the Essential Commodities Act. In any prosecution for an offence requiring a culpable mental state, the court is to presume the existence of that state, and it is a defence for the accused to prove that he had no such state. The section does not abolish mens rea; it shifts the burden of disproving it. The same technique has since been used in other statutes (Part IV).
When is the presumption displaced?
42From Sherras, Lim Chin Aik, Mayer Hans George and Nathulal, the courts consider several matters in deciding whether a statute has excluded mens rea. The first is the words of the provision, and whether the legislature has used words of mental state in some provisions of the Act but not in the one in question. The second is the subject-matter, and whether the offence is a traditional crime or a regulatory prohibition in the interest of public health, safety or revenue. The third is the severity of the penalty and the stigma of conviction: the more serious the consequence, the less likely it is that the legislature meant to dispense with fault. The fourth is whether strict liability would actually promote observance of the law, the question posed in Lim Chin Aik. The last is whether the statute provides a specific defence, which may indicate that the legislature intended liability to be strict subject only to that defence.
IV. Strict liability, statutory presumptions and civil penalties
Public welfare offences
43Some offences are held to impose strict liability. In Sarjoo Prasad v. State of U.P., a servant who sold adulterated oil on behalf of his employer argued that he could not be convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 without proof that he knew of the adulteration.Sarjoo Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 631, (1961) 3 SCR 324 (J.C. Shah J.). The Court rejected the argument. Section 7 of the Act enjoined everyone, employer or servant, not to sell adulterated food, and:
If the owner of a shop in which adulterated food is sold is without proof of mens rea liable to be punished for sale of adulterated food, we fail to appreciate why an agent or a servant of the owner is not liable to be punished for contravention of the same provision unless he is shown to have guilty knowledge.Sarjoo Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 631.
44The Act provided a specific defence, based on a written warranty from the supplier, and in Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel v. State of Maharashtra the Court held that a vendor who could not establish it was liable.Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1966 SC 128, (1965) 2 SCR 894. The Act has since been replaced by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, but the cases remain authorities on strict liability in public health statutes.
Statutory presumptions of a culpable mental state
45Many modern statutes, following section 10C of the Essential Commodities Act, presume a culpable mental state and require the accused to disprove it. Section 35 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) provides that in a prosecution for an offence requiring a culpable mental state, the court shall presume it, and that the accused may prove that he had no such state; it adds that a fact is proved only when the court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt. Section 54 raises a presumption from possession of illicit articles.
46Because these presumptions are triggered by possession, the courts have insisted that possession means conscious possession. In Madan Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the Court said:
Once possession is established the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it, because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of presumption available in law.Madan Lal v. State of H.P., (2003) 7 SCC 465, AIR 2003 SC 3642.
47The presumption operates only after the prosecution has established the foundational fact of possession. In Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, S.B. Sinha J. described the presumption of innocence as “a human right”, and held that while a reverse burden is not unconstitutional in itself, the prosecution must first prove the foundational facts, and the burden then cast on the accused is to be discharged on a preponderance of probability, whereas the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417.
48The same approach applies to section 24 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, the Court held that the legal presumption under section 24(b) “is attracted once the foundational fact of existence of proceeds of crime and the link of such person therewith in the process or activity is established by the prosecution”.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (Supreme Court, 27 July 2022) (Khanwilkar J.).
Offences and civil penalties
49A different rule applies to civil penalties. In Chairman, SEBI v. Shriram Mutual Fund, the Court held that the penalties under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and its regulations are civil:
Mens rea is not an essential ingredient for contravention of the provisions of a civil Act.Chairman, SEBI v. Shriram Mutual Fund, (2006) 5 SCC 361, AIR 2006 SC 2287.
50The penalty, it said, “is attracted as soon as the contravention of the statutory obligation as contemplated by the Act and the Regulation is established and hence the intention of the parties committing such violation becomes wholly irrelevant”. A Bench of three judges took a similar view of the mandatory penalty under section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 in Union of India v. Dharamendra Textile Processors, holding that it was a civil liability into which mens rea was not to be read.Union of India v. Dharamendra Textile Processors, (2008) 13 SCC 369.
V. Companies and mens rea
Can a company be prosecuted?
51The old objection to corporate criminal liability was that a company has, in a phrase usually attributed to Lord Thurlow, “no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked”. A second objection arose under statutes that prescribed a mandatory sentence of imprisonment together with a fine. In Assistant Commissioner v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd., a Bench of three judges held, by a majority, that a company could not be prosecuted for offences under the Income-tax Act, 1961 that required a mandatory term of imprisonment, because the court could not impose imprisonment on a company and had no power to impose only a fine.Assistant Commissioner v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd., (2003) 11 SCC 405, AIR 2004 SC 86 (Srikrishna J.).
52A Constitution Bench overruled Velliappa Textiles in Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement. By a majority, in a judgment of K.G. Balakrishnan J., it held that a company could be prosecuted for such offences and, where imprisonment could not be imposed, punished with a fine. The holding has been quoted many times since:
there is no immunity to the companies from prosecution merely because the prosecution is in respect of offences for which the punishment prescribed is mandatory imprisonmentStandard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530; quoted in Meera Goyal v. State of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, 26 April 2021).
Attribution: Iridium
53A company can act and think only through people. In Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., a Bench of B. Sudershan Reddy and S.S. Nijjar JJ., in a judgment written by Nijjar J., held that a company may be prosecuted for offences requiring mens rea, including cheating.Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74, AIR 2011 SC 20. Drawing on Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, the Court said that “a corporation is virtually in the same position as any individual and may be convicted of common law as well as statutory offences including those requiring mens rea”. The criminal intent of the “alter ego” of the company, the person or group of persons who guide its business, is imputed to the company.Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] AC 153 (H.L.).
No attribution in reverse: Sunil Bharti Mittal
54The converse does not follow. In Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, a Special Judge had summoned the chairman and managing directors of telecom companies as accused, on the reasoning that they were the alter egos of their companies and the companies’ acts could be attributed to them.Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609, AIR 2015 SC 923. A Bench of H.L. Dattu C.J., Madan B. Lokur and A.K. Sikri JJ., in a judgment written by Sikri J., set the summons aside. The Court said:
Here also, the principle of “alter ego”, was applied only in one direction namely where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company.Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609 (Sikri J.).
55Where the legislature wants directors and officers to answer for a company’s offence, it says so expressly, as section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 does. Without such a provision, a person cannot be made an accused merely because of the office he holds.
VI. Criticisms
56Three criticisms of the present law deserve mention.
57The first concerns strict liability. Mayer Hans George has been criticised for convicting a person who could not have known of the law he broke. Subba Rao J.’s dissent, and his judgment for the Court a year later in Nathulal, are generally regarded as the better statement of principle, and later decisions have tended to follow them.
58The second concerns reverse burdens. Statutes such as the NDPS Act and the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act presume the mental element and leave the accused to disprove it. The courts have softened these provisions by insisting on proof of foundational facts and by applying the civil standard to the accused’s rebuttal, as in Noor Aga. But the presumptions remain a significant departure from the ordinary rule that the prosecution proves every ingredient of the offence.
59The third concerns codification. The BNS has carried forward the Penal Code’s vocabulary almost unchanged. Rashness and negligence remain undefined, and the line between criminal and civil negligence continues to be drawn by the courts, as in Jacob Mathew.
VII. The position today
60The law on mens rea in India may be stated in eight propositions.
611. A crime ordinarily requires both a prohibited act and a blameworthy state of mind. Mens rea is distinct from motive, which is not an ingredient of an offence, and from civil fault, which is ordinarily insufficient for criminal liability (Jacob Mathew).
622. Under the Penal Code and the BNS, the mental element of each offence is defined in the offence itself, using terms such as intention, knowledge, “voluntarily”, “dishonestly”, “fraudulently” and “reason to believe”, and is negatived by the general exceptions (Jai Prakash; Dr. Vimla).
633. Criminal negligence must be gross or of a very high degree (Jacob Mathew; Cherubin Gregory).
644. The accused bears the burden of proving a general exception, on a preponderance of probabilities; but evidence that falls short may still raise a reasonable doubt about the mental element (Dahyabhai; Vijayee Singh). Voluntary intoxication does not displace the knowledge of a sober person, but intention must be found from the circumstances (Basdev).
655. For offences created by other statutes, there is a presumption that mens rea is required, which may be displaced by the words of the statute or by necessary implication from its subject-matter; the fact that a statute addresses a grave social evil does not by itself displace it (Mayer Hans George, Subba Rao J. dissenting; Nathulal; Lim Chin Aik).
666. Some public welfare offences impose strict liability, subject to any statutory defence (Sarjoo Prasad; Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel). Statutory presumptions of a culpable mental state operate only after the prosecution has proved the foundational facts, and the accused may rebut them on a preponderance of probability (Madan Lal; Noor Aga; Vijay Madanlal Choudhary).
677. Civil penalties for breach of regulatory statutes do not ordinarily require mens rea (Shriram Mutual Fund; Dharamendra Textile Processors).
688. A company may be prosecuted and fined even for offences carrying mandatory imprisonment (Standard Chartered Bank). The mental state of those who direct it may be attributed to the company (Iridium), but the company’s acts are not attributed to its directors without a specific act on their part or an express statutory provision (Sunil Bharti Mittal).
History
- Published · 27 October 2026
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