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2026 FPR ETS 2 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/rarest-of-rare

TS-0011Tests · Criminal · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 2

FPR Editors27 October 2026 · 2,550 words

Rarest of Rare

For murder and other offences punishable with death, life imprisonment is the rule and death the exception; a court may impose death only in the rarest of rare cases, when the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed, after weighing the circumstances of the crime and of the criminal, giving the accused a real hearing on sentence and recording special reasons; the State must show that the accused cannot be reformed.

Abstract

The "rarest of rare" test was laid down by a Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980), which upheld the death penalty for murder while confining it narrowly. This entry sets out the statutory framework (section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, now section 393(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the history from Jagmohan Singh and Ediga Anamma to Rajendra Prasad, the test itself and the dissent of P.N. Bhagwati J., and the later departures from it in Machhi Singh (1983) and Ravji (1995). It then follows the correction of those departures in Swamy Shraddananda (2008), Santosh Kumar Bariyar (2009) and Sangeet (2012); the striking down of mandatory death sentences in Mithu (1983); the guidelines on mitigation in Manoj v. State of M.P. (2022) and the reference on sentencing hearings later that year; and the law on delay in execution (Shatrughan Chauhan). It closes with criticisms, including the Law Commission's 262nd Report, and the propositions that state the law today.


I. The test

1The “rarest of rare” test governs when a court in India may impose a sentence of death. It was stated by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab:

A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law’s instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, AIR 1980 SC 898 (Sarkaria J.).

2The test has two parts. The case must be exceptional in its circumstances; and the alternative of life imprisonment must be unquestionably foreclosed, which requires the court to consider the offender as well as the offence. Since Bachan Singh, the Supreme Court has repeatedly had to correct decisions that applied only the first part.

II. The statutory framework

3Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, now section 393(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, provides that when a person is convicted of an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, “and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence”. Section 235(2) of the Code, now section 258(2) of the Sanhita, requires the judge, after convicting an accused, to hear the accused on the question of sentence. A sentence of death passed by a Court of Session must be confirmed by the High Court before it can be executed.

4The structure reflects a change of policy. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as it stood before 1955, a court that did not impose death for an offence punishable with death had to give reasons for not doing so; death was, in effect, the normal sentence for murder. The amendment of 1955 removed that requirement, and the Code of 1973 reversed the position, requiring special reasons for death.

III. Before Bachan Singh

Jagmohan Singh (1972)

5In Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., a Constitution Bench upheld the death penalty against a challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 21, holding that the discretion given to judges in sentencing, exercised judicially and subject to appeal, was not unconstitutional.Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20, AIR 1973 SC 947. The case was decided under the Code of 1898, before the change to special reasons.

Ediga Anamma (1974) and Rajendra Prasad (1979)

6In Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, V.R. Krishna Iyer J. drew attention to the change in legislative policy and to the relevance of the offender’s circumstances, and commuted a death sentence imposed on a young woman.Ediga Anamma v. State of A.P., (1974) 4 SCC 443, AIR 1974 SC 799 (Krishna Iyer J.). In Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P., he went further, holding for the majority that the special reasons required by section 354(3) must relate to the criminal rather than the crime:

Special reasons necessary for imposing death penalty must relate not to the crime as such but to the criminal.Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P., (1979) 3 SCC 646, AIR 1979 SC 916 (Krishna Iyer J.).

7In his view, the death penalty could be justified only where the security of the State and society, public order, or the interests of the general public compelled it, as where the offender was a continuing menace. The decision was criticised as reading too much into the statute, and the questions it raised were referred to a Constitution Bench.

IV. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980)

The holding

8In Bachan Singh, a Constitution Bench considered both the constitutional validity of the death penalty for murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the procedure for imposing it. By four to one, it upheld the death penalty. R.S. Sarkaria J. wrote for the majority.

9The Court rejected Rajendra Prasad’s view that only the criminal matters. Both the crime and the criminal must be considered. But it accepted that the policy of the Code had changed:

for persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception.Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684.

Aggravating and mitigating circumstances

10The Court declined to lay down a closed list of the circumstances in which death would be appropriate, but it noted, with approval, lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances suggested by counsel. Among the mitigating circumstances were that the offence was committed under extreme mental or emotional disturbance; the age of the accused; the probability that the accused would not commit criminal acts of violence constituting a continuing threat to society; the probability that the accused can be reformed and rehabilitated; and that the accused believed himself morally justified or acted under the duress or domination of another. On the two circumstances concerning dangerousness and reform, the Court said that the State shall by evidence prove that the accused does not satisfy those conditions.

11The burden on reform is thus on the State. A court that imposes death must be satisfied, on evidence, that the accused cannot be reformed.

Bhagwati J.’s dissent

12P.N. Bhagwati J. dissented, in a judgment delivered later.Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 24 (Bhagwati J., dissenting). He held that the death penalty for murder violated Articles 14 and 21. The guidance in the majority judgment was not, he argued, a standard capable of consistent application; whether a convict lived or died depended on the composition of the Bench; and the burden of the death penalty fell disproportionately on the poor and the disadvantaged, who could not afford effective representation.

V. Departures

Machhi Singh (1983)

13Three years later, in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, a Bench of three judges, in a judgment of M.P. Thakkar J., sought to give the test practical content.Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470, AIR 1983 SC 957 (Thakkar J.). It said that the community may sanction the death penalty, though not in every case:

it may do so in rarest of rare cases when its collective conscience is so shocked that it will expect the holders of the judicial power centre to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty.Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470.

14It then described five categories of case in which this might arise, by reference to the manner of commission of the murder, the motive, the anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime, its magnitude, and the personality of the victim. And it directed courts to draw up a “balance-sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances”, giving full weightage to the mitigating circumstances, before deciding.

15Machhi Singh introduced two ideas absent from Bachan Singh: the “collective conscience” of the community as a guide, and categories defined almost entirely by the nature of the crime. Both tended to shift attention from the criminal to the crime.

Ravji (1995)

16The shift went furthest in Ravji v. State of Rajasthan, where a Bench of two judges said:

It is the nature and gravity of the crime but not the criminal, which are germane for consideration of appropriate punishment in a criminal trial.Ravji v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 2 SCC 175, AIR 1996 SC 787.

17That statement was inconsistent with Bachan Singh, which had required both the crime and the criminal to be considered. It was nonetheless followed in a number of later cases in which death sentences were confirmed.

VI. Correction

Swamy Shraddananda (2008)

18In Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, a Bench of three judges, in a judgment of Aftab Alam J., confronted the difficulty that the choice in practice was between death and a sentence of life imprisonment that, through remission, might end after fourteen years.Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767, AIR 2008 SC 3040 (Aftab Alam J.). It held that there was:

a very strong case to make a special category for the very few cases where the death penalty might be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term in excess of fourteen years and to put that category beyond the application of remission.Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767.

19The Court substituted a sentence of life imprisonment without remission for the rest of the appellant’s life. A Constitution Bench upheld the power to impose such fixed-term or whole-life sentences in Union of India v. V. Sriharan.Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1. The intermediate sentence reduces the pressure on courts to choose death because life imprisonment seems inadequate.

Santosh Kumar Bariyar (2009)

20In Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, a Bench of S.B. Sinha and Cyriac Joseph JJ., in a judgment of Sinha J., held that Ravji was inconsistent with Bachan Singh:Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498 (Sinha J.).

We are not oblivious that this case has been followed in at least 6 decisions of this court in which death punishment has been awarded in last 9 years, but, in our opinion, it was rendered per incuriam.Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498.

21The Court reaffirmed that the sentencing court must consider the offender as well as the offence, that the burden is on the State to show that the offender cannot be reformed, and that the requirement that life imprisonment be “unquestionably foreclosed” must be applied with rigour.

Sangeet (2012)

22In Sangeet v. State of Haryana, a Bench of K.S. Radhakrishnan and Madan B. Lokur JJ., in a judgment of Lokur J., criticised the balance-sheet approach of Machhi Singh.Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452, AIR 2013 SC 447 (Lokur J.). Aggravating circumstances relate to the crime and mitigating circumstances to the criminal, so that:

A balance sheet cannot be drawn up for comparing the two. The considerations for both are distinct and unrelated.Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452.

23The Court added that in capital cases sentencing had become “judge-centric”, and that the sentencing process had not been taken as seriously as it should.

VII. Mandatory death sentences: Mithu (1983)

24Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code prescribed a mandatory sentence of death for murder committed by a person already under a sentence of life imprisonment. In Mithu v. State of Punjab, a Constitution Bench, in a judgment of Y.V. Chandrachud C.J., struck it down:

A provision of law which deprives the court of the use of its wise and beneficent discretion in a matter of life and death, without regard to the circumstances in which the offence was committed and therefore without regard to the gravity of the offence, cannot but be regarded as harsh, unjust and unfair.Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 277, AIR 1983 SC 473 (Chandrachud C.J.).

25The principle that a court must have discretion in imposing death, and must exercise it in the light of the circumstances of each case, was applied again in State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh, which struck down the mandatory death sentence in section 27(3) of the Arms Act, 1959.State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 346.

VIII. Mitigation and the sentencing hearing

Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2022)

26In Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh, a Bench of U.U. Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Bela M. Trivedi JJ., in a judgment of Bhat J., found that trial courts commonly imposed death without any real information about the offender.Manoj v. State of M.P., (2023) 2 SCC 353 (Bhat J.). To give effect to Bachan Singh, the Court directed that mitigating material be collected at the trial stage. The State must produce material about the accused’s background, including information about family, education and socio-economic circumstances, criminal antecedents, and mental and psychological health; the trial court may call for a psychiatric and psychological evaluation; and reports on the accused’s conduct in prison must be obtained. The accused must be given the opportunity to place such material before the court.

The reference on sentencing hearings (2022)

27Decisions of the Court had differed on whether imposing a death sentence on the same day as the conviction vitiates the sentence. Some held that it did, requiring a fresh hearing;Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 190; Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 4 SCC 341. others treated a defect in the hearing as curable by a hearing on sentence in appeal.Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 3 SCC 68. In September 2022, in proceedings taken up on its own motion on the framing of guidelines for mitigating circumstances, a Bench of three judges referred the question to a Constitution Bench, observing that a meaningful hearing on sentence requires time for the collection of mitigating material.In re: Framing Guidelines Regarding Potential Mitigating Circumstances to be Considered While Imposing Death Sentences, Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022 (Supreme Court, order of 19 September 2022).

IX. Delay and mercy

28Delay in carrying out a death sentence may itself be a ground for commutation. In Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, a Bench of three judges, in a judgment of P. Sathasivam C.J., held that undue and unexplained delay in deciding mercy petitions under Articles 72 and 161 is a ground for commutation, as are insanity and solitary confinement, and laid down procedural safeguards for prisoners on death row.Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1. The Court relied on the principle that “Article 21 inheres a right in every prisoner till his last breath and this Court will protect that right even if the noose is being tied on the condemned prisoner’s neck”. In Mohd. Arif v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, a Constitution Bench held that review petitions in death sentence cases must be heard in open court.Mohd. Arif v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9 SCC 737.

X. Criticisms

29The test has been criticised from its inception. Bhagwati J.’s dissent argued that it could not be applied consistently, and the Court’s own later decisions, in Bariyar and Sangeet, acknowledged that it had not been. Machhi Singh’s reliance on the “collective conscience” has been criticised for inviting courts to respond to public outrage rather than to the constitutional standard; Bariyar and later decisions have insisted that public opinion is not a substitute for the requirements of Bachan Singh.

30In 2015, the Law Commission of India, in its 262nd Report, recommended the abolition of the death penalty for all crimes other than terrorism-related offences and waging war, concluding that the rarest of rare framework had not prevented arbitrariness in sentencing.Law Commission of India, Report No. 262, The Death Penalty (2015). Empirical studies of prisoners sentenced to death, notably the Death Penalty India Report published by the National Law University, Delhi in 2016, have found that most came from economically and socially disadvantaged backgrounds, a finding that echoes Bhagwati J.’s concern.Death Penalty India Report (National Law University, Delhi 2016).

31Parliament has meanwhile extended the death penalty to new offences, including certain cases of rape after the Delhi gang-rape case in 2012, in which the Supreme Court confirmed the death sentences of four of the accused.Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1, AIR 2017 SC 2161. The tension between the narrowness of the test and the breadth of the legislation remains.

XI. The position today

32The law on the rarest of rare test in India may be stated in seven propositions.

331. For offences punishable with death, life imprisonment is the rule and death the exception; a sentence of death requires special reasons (section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, now section 393(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita; Bachan Singh).

342. Death may be imposed only in the rarest of rare cases, when the alternative option of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed (Bachan Singh).

353. The court must consider both the crime and the criminal. A sentence based only on the nature of the crime is contrary to Bachan Singh, and Ravji, which held otherwise, was decided per incuriam (Bachan Singh; Santosh Kumar Bariyar).

364. The State must prove by evidence that the accused cannot be reformed and is a continuing threat to society (Bachan Singh; Santosh Kumar Bariyar).

375. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances are distinct and are not to be weighed in a mechanical balance sheet (Sangeet).

386. Mitigating material must be collected and considered from the trial stage, and the accused must have a real opportunity to be heard on sentence (Manoj). Where life imprisonment subject to remission is inadequate but death is not warranted, a court may impose life imprisonment for a fixed term or for the rest of the convict’s life without remission (Swamy Shraddananda; Sriharan).

397. A mandatory death sentence is unconstitutional (Mithu; Dalbir Singh). Undue delay in deciding a mercy petition is a ground for commuting a death sentence (Shatrughan Chauhan).


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  • Published · 27 October 2026

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