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2026 FPR ETS 12 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/patent-illegality

TS-0032Tests · Arbitration · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 12

FPR Editors1 November 2026 · 3,056 words

Patent Illegality

Patent illegality, now in section 34(2A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, lets a court set aside a domestic award only for an illegality that goes to the root of the matter and appears on the face of the award, and it does not extend to a mere wrong application of law or a reappreciation of evidence; yet because perversity has been placed under this ground, the line it draws depends on judgment in each case and remains open to dispute, as the Delhi Metro litigation shows.

Abstract

The ground began as a judicial addition. In ONGC v. Saw Pipes (2003), the Supreme Court read patent illegality into "public policy of India" in section 34, departing from the narrow reading of public policy in Renusagar (1993). Western Geco (2014) widened the fundamental policy head still further, and Associate Builders (2014) organised the law into sub-heads. Parliament responded with the 2015 amendment: public policy was narrowed, a review on the merits was excluded, and section 34(2A) made patent illegality a separate ground for awards other than those in international commercial arbitrations, with a proviso against reappreciation of evidence and mere error in applying law. Ssangyong (2019) explained the new scheme and placed perversity within the new ground, although the award in that case fell on other grounds because the arbitration was international. This entry then follows the Delhi Metro litigation, where a 2021 judgment warning against dressing up disagreement as perversity was undone by the curative judgment of 2024, considers Batliboi (2023) on reasons and damages, and notes Gayatri Balasamy (2025) on severance and the limited power to modify.


I. The Test

1Section 34(2A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, inserted with effect from 23 October 2015, reads:

“An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award:
Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.”Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, s. 34(2A), reproduced in Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India, (2019) 15 SCC 131.

2The elements can be taken in turn. The ground applies only to arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, so it is not available where one party is foreign, even if the seat is in India. The illegality must be patent, which the Court reads as going to the root of the matter. It must appear on the face of the award. And the proviso removes the two most common ways of turning a challenge into an appeal.

3A court under section 34 reviews and does not sit in appeal. The ground exists to deal with something fundamentally wrong with an award, and not with the possibility that the court would have decided differently.

II. Origins: Saw Pipes

4The Act as enacted in 1996 had no such ground. Section 34(2)(b)(ii) allowed an award to be set aside if it was “in conflict with the public policy of India”. Under the Foreign Awards Act, Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. had read the same phrase narrowly: enforcement would be refused only if it was contrary to the “(i) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (ii) the interests of India; or (iii) justice or morality.”Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, ¶ 66.

5In Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., the tribunal held that ONGC could not deduct liquidated damages for delay in the supply of pipes, in the absence of proof of loss, and it ordered the sum refunded. The Court set the award aside. It distinguished Renusagar as a case about enforcing a foreign award, and it held:

“Therefore, in our view, the phrase ‘Public Policy of India’ used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term ‘public policy’ in Renusagar’s case (supra), it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal.”Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 : AIR 2003 SC 2629.

6The Court added: “Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court.”Saw Pipes.

7The decision was significant because it brought a form of error of law back into a statute that had been meant to reduce court intervention. Under the 1940 Act and the rule in Champsey Bhara, error of law on the face of the award had been a familiar ground, and it had been left out of the 1996 Act.

III. Expansion and Order

Western Geco

8Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd. expanded the head of fundamental policy. Thakur, Nagappan and Goel JJ. said that the concept included a judicial approach, natural justice and the principle that “a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same will not be sustained in a court of law”, to be tested on the Wednesbury principle. They then corrected the award in part, and said that an award open to these objections “may be cast away or modified depending upon whether the offending part is or is not severable from the rest.”Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 : AIR 2015 SC 363. A court reviewing on those lines was close to hearing an appeal.

Associate Builders

9Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, decided by Nariman and Gogoi JJ., gave the law the structure later cases use. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court had interfered with claims in a construction arbitration. The Supreme Court restored the award. On the way, it set out the content of each head. Three sub-heads of patent illegality were identified: a contravention of the substantive law of India, which “must be understood in the sense that such illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot be of a trivial nature”; a contravention of the Act itself, as where an arbitrator gives no reasons contrary to section 31(3); and a contravention of the terms of the contract.Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49, ¶ 42.

10The third came with a caution that has remained central:

“An arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be set aside on this ground. Construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide unless the arbitrator construes the contract in such a way that it could be said to be something that no fair minded or reasonable person could do.”Associate Builders, ¶ 42.3.

11The Court also gave the working definition of perversity, under the head of fundamental policy: “where: (i) a finding is based on no evidence, or (ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at; or (iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision would necessarily be perverse.”Associate Builders, ¶ 31.

IV. The 2015 Amendment

12The Law Commission’s 246th Report of August 2014 proposed to rein this in, and Parliament acted through the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. So far as relevant, four changes were made.

13Explanation 1 to section 34(2)(b)(ii) now confines public policy to fraud or corruption and similar matters, contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, and conflict “with the most basic notions of morality or justice”. Explanation 2 provides: “For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.”

14Section 34(2A) was inserted, as set out above, as a separate ground for arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations.

15Section 28(3) now provides that the tribunal “shall, in all cases, take into account the terms of the contract and trade usages applicable to the transaction”, in place of the earlier direction to decide in accordance with the terms.Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, ss. 28(3), 34(2)(b)(ii), as amended, reproduced in Ssangyong.

16The design is clear. What had been one wide public policy head became two narrower channels, one of them closed to international cases.

V. Ssangyong

17Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India, decided by Nariman and Vineet Saran JJ., is the authoritative reading of the amended scheme. It concerned a price adjustment formula in a highway contract. When the index base year was changed, NHAI issued a circular applying a linking factor. A majority of the tribunal applied a linking factor of its own, relying on government guidelines which were not in evidence.

18On public policy, the Court said: “the Western Geco (supra) expansion has been done away with”, and that it “would no longer obtain, as under the guise of interfering with an award on the ground that the arbitrator has not adopted a judicial approach, the Court’s intervention would be on the merits of the award, which cannot be permitted post amendment.”Ssangyong.

19On the new ground, it made four points which are now the working law.

20First, section 34(2A) refers to “such illegality as goes to the root of the matter but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of the law”. The contravention of a statute not linked to public policy or public interest “cannot be brought in by the backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award on the ground of patent illegality”. This narrowed the first sub-head in Associate Builders: “a mere contravention of the substantive law of India, by itself, is no longer a ground”.Ssangyong, (2019) 15 SCC 131, ¶¶ 37–39.

21Second, “re-appreciation of evidence, which is what an appellate court is permitted to do, cannot be permitted under the ground of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.”Ssangyong, ¶ 38.

22Third, on contracts, the construction of the terms is primarily for an arbitrator, “unless the arbitrator construes the contract in a manner that no fair-minded or reasonable person would; in short, that the arbitrator’s view is not even a possible view to take. Also, if the arbitrator wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits an error of jurisdiction. This ground of challenge will now fall within the new ground added under Section 34(2A).”Ssangyong, ¶ 40.

23Fourth, perversity moved. A perverse decision is “no longer” a ground under public policy but “would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on documents taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence”.Ssangyong, ¶ 41.

24It is important to see how the case itself was decided, because it is often misdescribed. Ssangyong was a Korean company, so this was an international commercial arbitration, and the Court said that “the ‘patent illegality’ ground for setting aside arbitral awards in international commercial arbitrations will not apply”. The award therefore could not fall under section 34(2A). It fell on other grounds. Reliance on guidelines not in evidence meant that the appellant was unable to present its case under section 34(2)(a)(iii).Ssangyong. The Court also used the “most basic notions of justice” ground, which “can be attracted only in very exceptional circumstances when the conscience of the Court is shocked by infraction of fundamental notions or principles of justice”. On the facts, it held that “the majority award has created a new contract for the parties by applying the said unilateral Circular”, and that “a unilateral addition or alteration of a contract can never be foisted upon an unwilling party”.Ssangyong. It then upheld the minority award under Article 142, an unusual step taken to avoid fresh arbitration.

VI. The Delhi Metro Litigation

25The difficulty of holding this line can be seen from one dispute decided twice by the Supreme Court. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. (DAMEPL) terminated a concession agreement for the Airport Express Line on account of defects it said had not been cured. A tribunal upheld the termination and made a large award. A Single Judge dismissed the section 34 petition. A Division Bench, under section 37, held the award perverse and patently illegal.

26In 2021, Nageswara Rao and Ravindra Bhat JJ. restored the award, with a warning that has since been widely cited: “There is a disturbing tendency of courts setting aside arbitral awards, after dissecting and reassessing factual aspects of the cases to come to a conclusion that the award needs intervention and thereafter, dubbing the award to be vitiated by either perversity or patent illegality”.Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 131 (decided 9 September 2021), ¶ 24.

27In 2024 a curative Bench of Chandrachud C.J. and Gavai and Surya Kant JJ. reversed that outcome. It restated the ground: an award “which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside under the head of ‘patent illegality’”, and an arbitrator commits a patent illegality “by deciding a matter not within his jurisdiction or violating a fundamental principle of natural justice”.Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., 2024 INSC 292 : (2024) 6 SCC 357, ¶ 40.

28It then found “a fundamental error” in the 2021 judgment. The Division Bench had found that the award overlooked crucial evidence. The Court said: “The award overlooked the express terms of clause 29.5.1(i) which stipulated that if ‘effective steps’ were taken during the cure period by DMRC, the contractual power to terminate could not be exercised. This Court incorrectly considered the CMRS certificate to be irrelevant to the validity of the termination.”Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, ¶ 46. The certificate was the safety clearance of the Commissioner of Metro Railway Safety. The Court concluded that it had “restored a patently illegal award which saddled a public utility with an exorbitant liability. This has caused a grave miscarriage of justice”, and the parties were returned to the position under the Division Bench’s judgment.Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, ¶¶ 68–69.

29Two things should be noted. The 2024 decision is an exercise of curative power, and the Court itself treated such cases as rare. It did not change the test, and it applied Associate Builders and Ssangyong. It is also a reminder that the warning given in 2021 cuts both ways. A court must not dress up disagreement as perversity, but ignoring a contractual term or a piece of vital evidence is not protected merely by calling the result a plausible view. Whether a particular case is one or the other is the judgment the courts must make, and here two Benches made it differently on the same record.

VII. Other Applications

Reasons and damages

30Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., decided by Sanjiv Khanna and Sundresh JJ. under the law before the 2015 amendment, shows two applications. The tribunal had awarded 10% of contract value for loss of overheads and another 10% for loss of profits. The Court treated a conclusion “without any discussion and reasons” as non-compliant with section 31(3), and it criticised the computation, upholding the Division Bench’s decision that the award was unsustainable.Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., (2024) 2 SCC 375 : 2023 INSC 850. Since it applied the pre-amendment law, care is needed in carrying over its reasoning, although the point about reasons remains good under section 31(3).

31The standard for reasons was set in Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.: “three characteristics of a reasoned order can be fathomed. They are: proper, intelligible and adequate.”Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1, ¶ 36.

Appeals under section 37

32The curative judgment restates the appellate position. The section 37 jurisdiction “is akin to the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 and restricted to the same grounds of challenge as Section 34.”Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, ¶ 41. An appellate court has no wider review than the first court.

Severance and modification

33When a part of an award is patently illegal, what may the court do? In Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem the Court had held that section 34 gives no power to modify an award. In 2025 a Constitution Bench considered the matter in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. Writing for the majority, Sanjiv Khanna C.J. held that “the Section 34 court can apply the doctrine of severability and modify a portion of the award while retaining the rest”, subject to the parts being separable, legally and practically. The Court added: “We hold that the power of judicial review under Section 34, and the setting aside of an award, should be read as inherently including a limited power to modify the award within the confines of Section 34.”Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., 2025 INSC 605, ¶¶ 45–46. It also dealt with post-award interest. K.V. Viswanathan J. dissented, holding that Hakeem lays down the correct law. In practice, where patent illegality affects a separable claim, the rest of the award need not fall. The limits of the new power will have to be worked out.

VIII. Open Questions

34Three difficulties remain.

35The first concerns the line in the proviso. Every challenge alleges more than an “erroneous application of the law”. What separates an erroneous application from an illegality going to the root is largely a matter of degree. Ssangyong’s statement about statutes not linked to public policy helps, but it does not remove the question.

36The second concerns perversity and “on the face of the award”. To decide whether vital evidence was ignored, a court must look at the evidence. That sits uneasily with the bar on reappreciation, and with the requirement that the illegality appear on the face of the award. The distinction usually offered is that the court may ask whether something was considered, but not how it should have been weighed. The Delhi Metro litigation shows how difficult it is to keep the two apart.

37The third concerns the two-tier structure. A domestic award is open to a ground that an international award in India is not, and this means that a party may get less finality for a dispute with an Indian counterparty than with a foreign one. Parliament made that choice deliberately, and it can be defended by reference to the needs of international arbitration. It nevertheless raises a fair question about why domestic parties should get a weaker form of finality, especially where they have chosen arbitration for the same commercial reasons.

IX. Applying the Test

38A court or counsel can work through the following steps.

39Is this an international commercial arbitration? If so, section 34(2A) does not apply, and the challenge must be brought within section 34(2)(a) or the narrow public policy head.

40Is the complaint really about the merits? If it requires weighing evidence again, or only argues that the law was wrongly applied, the proviso answers it.

41If the complaint is about the contract, was the arbitrator’s view a possible view? If so, the award stands, even if the court prefers another reading. If the arbitrator ignored an express term or went outside the contract altogether, the ground may be available.

42If the complaint is about evidence, is it that a finding rests on no evidence, that vital evidence was ignored, or that documents were used behind a party’s back? These qualify. Complaints about the weight given to evidence do not.

43If the complaint is about reasons, are they proper, intelligible and adequate? A complete absence of reasons is a patent illegality. Sparse but intelligible reasons usually are not.

44And finally, does the illegality go to the root? If it affects only a separable part of the award, severance after Gayatri Balasamy may be the right course, and the rest may survive.


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  • Published · 1 November 2026

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