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2026 FPR ECN 5 · https://firstprecedent.org/concepts/seat-and-venue
CN-0032Concepts · Arbitration · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ECN 5
FPR Editors1 November 2026 · 2,703 words
Seat and Venue
The seat of an arbitration is its legal home: it fixes the law governing the arbitration and, once designated, works like an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of that place, whereas a venue is only where the tribunal happens to sit; since the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 uses the single word "place" for both, the difference has to be worked out by construing each clause.
Abstract
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 never uses the word "seat" in section 20. It speaks of the "place" of arbitration, which in sub-sections (1) and (2) means the seat and in sub-section (3) means a convenient place to meet. This entry explains why the distinction matters: it decides the law governing the arbitration, the court that supervises it, and whether an award is domestic or foreign. It traces the Supreme Court's treatment from BALCO (2012), including the troublesome paragraph 96, through Enercon (2014) and Indus Mobile (2017), where a neutral seat was held to vest exclusive jurisdiction though no part of the cause of action arose there. It sets out the conflict between Hardy Exploration (2018) and BGS SGS Soma (2019), which declared Hardy not to be good law and adopted the Shashoua principle, and then explains why that conflict has not fully gone away, since Mankastu Impex (2020) and Ravi Ranjan Developers (2022) continue to speak of Hardy or of the need to find intention from other material, while Arif Azim (2024) applies BGS. It concludes with changes of seat, with section 42, and with a practical guide to drafting and reading clauses.
I. The Concept
1Every arbitration has a legal home. That home is its seat. The seat is a legal idea and not a place on a map: an arbitration seated in Delhi may hear a witness in Bengaluru or inspect goods in Chennai, and it remains a Delhi arbitration throughout.
2Three consequences depend on the seat.
3The first is the law of the arbitration, also called the curial law or the lex arbitri. This governs the procedure and the conduct of the arbitration. It is distinct from the law governing the contract, and it may also be distinct from the law governing the arbitration agreement.
4The second is the supervising court. The courts of the seat exercise the supervisory jurisdiction, most importantly over a challenge to the award under section 34.
5The third is the character of the award. Section 31(4) provides that the award shall state the place of arbitration as determined under section 20, and that it “shall be deemed to have been made at that place”. An arbitration seated outside India produces a foreign award, to be enforced under Part II, and it cannot be set aside by an Indian court under Part I.
6A venue has none of these effects. It is simply where the tribunal sits.
II. The Text
7Section 20 of the Act follows Article 20 of the UNCITRAL Model Law:
“(3) Notwithstanding sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the arbitral tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses, experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, goods or other property.”Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, s. 20(3), reproduced in Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678.
8Sub-section (1) leaves the parties free to agree on the place of arbitration, and sub-section (2) lets the tribunal determine it if they do not agree, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties. The structure shows the difference. “Place” in sub-sections (1) and (2) is the seat. “Place” in sub-section (3) is a venue, and it is expressly separated from the other two by its opening words.
9Section 2(2) provides that Part I applies “where the place of arbitration is in India”, and there too “place” means the seat. Section 2(1)(e) raises a further difficulty. It defines “Court” as the principal civil court having jurisdiction “to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit”. On its face, that points to the ordinary rules about where a suit may be filed, and those rules have nothing to do with a chosen neutral seat.
10The Law Commission proposed to clear up the language in its 246th Report, which would have used “seat” and “venue” expressly in section 20.Law Commission of India, Report No. 246, Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (August 2014), discussed in BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234. Parliament’s 2015 amendments did not adopt that change in section 20. The word “place” remains, and the courts have had to do the work.
III. BALCO and the Court of the Seat
11In Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (BALCO), a Constitution Bench held that Part I “is applicable only to all the arbitrations which take place within the territory of India.”Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552, ¶ 200. The history of that decision belongs to the companion lineage entry. For present purposes, the important passage is its treatment of section 2(1)(e) in paragraph 96.
12The Court said that “the term ‘subject matter of the arbitration’ cannot be confused with ‘subject matter of the suit’”, and that section 2(1)(e) must be read with section 20, which gives recognition to party autonomy. It then said:
“In our view, the legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and the courts where the arbitration takes place. This was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the courts where the arbitration takes place would be required to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral process.”BALCO, ¶ 96.
13The Court’s example was a Delhi arbitration between parties from Mumbai and Kolkata. The passage did two things at once. It established that the courts of a neutral seat have jurisdiction, even though no cause of action arose there. And its words “two courts” suggested that the court of the cause of action might have jurisdiction as well. That second suggestion produced a decade of argument, because combined with section 42 it meant that whoever filed first in a cause-of-action court might lock all later proceedings there.
IV. Neutral Seats and Exclusive Jurisdiction
14Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. resolved a large part of this. The respondent had its registered office in Amritsar and supplied goods from Delhi to the appellant in Chennai. The agreement fixed Mumbai as the seat, and Clause 19 gave the Mumbai courts exclusive jurisdiction. No part of the cause of action arose in Mumbai. The Delhi High Court nevertheless took up the matter. R.F. Nariman J. held otherwise:
“A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause.”Indus Mobile, ¶ 19.
15He explained the difference from ordinary civil litigation: “The neutral venue may not in the classical sense have jurisdiction – that is, no part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of Section 16 to 21 of the CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment ‘seat’ is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties.”Indus Mobile, ¶ 19.
16This matters because of the older civil rule in Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd., under which parties may choose among competent courts but cannot by agreement confer jurisdiction on a court that has none.Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd., (1971) 1 SCC 286. In arbitration, the designation of a seat itself supplies the jurisdiction.
V. When Is a Venue a Seat?
17Agreements often say “venue” and say nothing of a seat. This is the most litigated question in the area.
The Shashoua principle
18In Roger Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma, Cooke J. in the English Commercial Court considered a clause with London as “venue”, ICC Rules, and Indian governing law. He held London to be the seat. BGS SGS Soma later restated his principle: “wherever there is an express designation of a ‘venue’, and no designation of any alternative place as the ‘seat’, combined with a supranational body of rules governing the arbitration, and no other significant contrary indicia, the inexorable conclusion is that the stated venue is actually the juridical seat of the arbitral proceeding.”BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234, on Roger Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma, [2009] EWHC 957 (Comm).
Enercon
19The word “venue” is not conclusive either way. In Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, S.S. Nijjar J. and Kalifulla J. considered a clause naming London as the venue of the arbitration proceedings, in an agreement governed by Indian law and with the Indian Act applying to the arbitration. The Court treated India as the seat and London as a convenient place to sit, while also approving the reasoning of Shashoua.Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1. The significance is that other terms of the agreement may be contrary indicia.
Hardy Exploration
20In Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc., Article 33.12 of a production sharing contract provided that the venue of arbitration proceedings would be Kuala Lumpur, unless the parties otherwise agreed, and Article 33.9 applied the UNCITRAL Model Law. A Bench of Dipak Misra C.J. and Khanwilkar and D.Y. Chandrachud JJ. held that the tribunal had made no determination of the place of arbitration, and that the Indian courts had jurisdiction. The operative reasoning was:
“To elaborate, a venue can become a seat if something else is added to it as a concomitant. But a place unlike seat, at least as is seen in the contract, can become a seat if one of the conditions precedent is satisfied. It does not ipso facto assume the status of seat.”Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472 : AIR 2018 SC 4871, ¶ 33.
BGS SGS Soma
21In BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., Nariman, Aniruddha Bose and V. Ramasubramanian JJ. considered a clause under which arbitration proceedings “shall be held at New Delhi/Faridabad”. The Court gave a test based on the words of the clause:
“whenever there is the designation of a place of arbitration in an arbitration clause as being the ‘venue’ of the arbitration proceedings, the expression ‘arbitration proceedings’ would make it clear that the ‘venue’ is really the ‘seat’ of the arbitral proceedings, as the aforesaid expression does not include just one or more individual or particular hearing, but the arbitration proceedings as a whole, including the making of an award at that place.”BGS SGS Soma, ¶ 82.
22This is to be contrasted with language such as “tribunals are to meet or have witnesses, experts or the parties”, which may show only a convenient place of meeting. The words “shall be held” also point to the seat, and all of this is subject to there being “no other significant contrary indicia”.BGS SGS Soma, ¶ 82.
23On paragraph 96 of BALCO, the Court held that the example given there supported the conclusion that the courts of the seat alone have jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the award, when the judgment was read as a whole. It then turned to Hardy Exploration, and it used strong words: “We, therefore, declare that the judgment in Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc. (supra), being contrary to the Five Judge Bench in BALCO (supra), cannot be considered to be good law.”BGS SGS Soma, (2020) 4 SCC 234. The Court’s reason was that Hardy would expose a foreign award to challenge both abroad and in India, the very situation that BALCO ended.
24Section 42 received an answer that has since been repeated. In Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHPC Ltd., the same judge set out his holding from BGS and applied it: where there is a designated seat, an application made first to a cause-of-action court “would be made to a court without jurisdiction” and does not attract section 42. But “where it is found on the facts of a particular case that either no ‘seat’ is designated by agreement, or the so-called ‘seat’ is only a convenient ‘venue’, then there may be several Courts where a part of the cause of action arises that may have jurisdiction”, and there the earliest application would decide.Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 310, ¶¶ 4–6, quoting BGS SGS Soma. This is how section 42 and the seat can both work.
After BGS
25It would be neat to say BGS ended the matter. The later cases do not quite allow that.
26Mankastu Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Airvisual Ltd., decided by Banumathi, Bopanna and Hrishikesh Roy JJ. a few months later, held Hong Kong to be the seat where the clause spoke of arbitration “administered in Hong Kong” and of Hong Kong as the place of arbitration. It reached a result consistent with BGS but expressed the approach differently: “It has also been established that mere expression ‘place of arbitration’ cannot be the basis to determine the intention of the parties that they have intended that place as the ‘seat’ of arbitration. The intention of the parties as to the ‘seat’ should be determined from other clauses in the agreement and the conduct of the parties.”Mankastu Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Airvisual Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 399, ¶ 20.
27Ravi Ranjan Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Aditya Kumar Chatterjee, decided in 2022, involved an agreement that the tribunal’s sittings would be in Kolkata. The Court treated Kolkata as a venue only, and in doing so it cited Hardy Exploration for the proposition that sittings at various places are relatable to venue, without treating the case as discredited.Ravi Ranjan Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Aditya Kumar Chatterjee (Supreme Court, 24 March 2022), ¶¶ 43–45. Ravi Ranjan is consistent in result with the contrast drawn in BGS between sittings and proceedings, but it shows Hardy still being used.
28Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE, decided in 2024 by Chandrachud C.J. and Pardiwala and Manoj Misra JJ., in a judgment by Pardiwala J., applied BGS directly. The clause named Dubai as the venue, and it stipulated UAE arbitration rules. The Court held “that the Dubai, UAE has not been designated merely as a venue but rather as the juridical seat of arbitration”.Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE, 2024 INSC 850, ¶ 56.
29The High Courts have noticed the issue. The Punjab and Haryana High Court, for instance, has framed the question whether Mankastu should be read as having set BGS aside, which shows the point is still being argued.Aditya Birla Retail Ltd. v. Biren Sahni (Punjab and Haryana High Court, 5 January 2024).
30One further point deserves notice. BGS and Hardy were both decisions of three judges. A Bench of equal strength would ordinarily refer a doubt to a larger Bench, and the Constitution Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra states that discipline. BGS does not rest merely on disagreement, however. It treats Hardy as contrary to a five-judge decision, which binds both. A careful advocate should cite BGS as the fuller and more recent reasoning, should take account of the facts of Mankastu and Ravi Ranjan, and should not assume that a court will treat the question as closed.
VI. Changing the Seat
31Parties who can choose a seat may later change it. In Inox Renewables Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd., the purchase order provided that the venue of the arbitration would be Jaipur, and that the jurisdiction for lawful remedies would be the courts in Rajasthan. The arbitrator recorded in the award that the parties had mutually agreed, irrespective of that clause, that the place of arbitration would be Ahmedabad, not Jaipur. The Court said: “What is clear, therefore, as per this paragraph is that by mutual agreement, parties have specifically shifted the venue/place of arbitration from Jaipur to Ahmedabad.”Inox Renewables Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd., (2023) 3 SCC 733 (decided 13 April 2021), ¶ 11. It rejected the argument that this could only be done by written agreement, and treated Ahmedabad as the seat.
32A tribunal is differently placed. In BBR (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.P. Singla Constructions Pvt. Ltd., as later cases describe it, the seat stood fixed earlier in the proceedings, and a change of venue following the recusal of the first arbitrator did not change it.BBR (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.P. Singla Constructions Pvt. Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 693, as described in Aditya Birla Retail Ltd. v. Biren Sahni. We have not read the judgment itself in the sources used for this entry. A seat fixed under section 20(2) is not displaced by sittings held elsewhere for convenience.
VII. Two Indian Parties and a Foreign Seat
33The seat also decides a broader question. In PASL Wind Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. GE Power Conversion India Pvt. Ltd., two Indian companies had agreed to arbitrate in Zurich. A three-judge Bench (Nariman, Gavai and Hrishikesh Roy JJ.) held that nothing prevented that choice, and that the resulting award could be enforced as a foreign award under Part II.PASL Wind Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. GE Power Conversion India Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 1. The nationality of the parties did not prevent the seat from having its usual effect.
VIII. Reading and Drafting a Clause
34For someone reading an existing clause, the current law suggests this order of questions.
35Does the clause use the word “seat” or otherwise fix the juridical home? If so, that place is the seat, and its courts have exclusive jurisdiction, as Indus Mobile holds, whether or not any cause of action arose there.
36If the clause says only “venue” or “place”, what is it attached to? “Arbitration proceedings shall be held at X” points towards a seat. “The tribunal may meet at X” points towards a venue. Only one place named, and not a choice of places, also helps, as Arif Azim shows.
37Is there any contrary indication? Other terms of the agreement may point elsewhere, as they did in Enercon. The conduct of the parties may matter on the Mankastu approach. A clause giving another court exclusive jurisdiction is a frequent difficulty, and the courts look at it in the context of the whole agreement, since it may be meant for matters other than the arbitration.
38If there is no agreed seat and the tribunal has not fixed one, section 2(1)(e) applies in its ordinary way, several courts may have jurisdiction, and section 42 gives priority to the first application to a competent court.
39For someone drafting a clause, the lesson is simple. Use the word “seat”, state one place, say so separately from any provision on where hearings may be held, and make any jurisdiction clause expressly subject to the arbitration clause. Nearly all the litigation discussed above could have been avoided by those few words.
History
- Published · 1 November 2026
© 2026 First Precedent Research. Free to share and adapt with credit, for non-commercial use, under CC BY-NC 4.0. A published piece is changed only to correct an error, and each correction is listed under History. If the law changes, we add a linked afterword. Nothing on FPR is legal advice.