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2026 FPR ETS 15 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/interlocutory-order

TS-0155Tests · Criminal · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 15

FPR Editors21 November 2026 · 3,286 words

Interlocutory Order

The bar on revising an interlocutory order in section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, now section 438(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, reaches only orders of a purely interim or procedural kind; an order that would end the proceeding if decided the other way, such as summoning an accused, framing a charge or refusing discharge, is an intermediate order that remains open to revision, although the High Court interferes with it only for a clear error.

Abstract

Section 397(2) of the Code of 1973 took away a power of revision that the High Courts had exercised over every kind of order under the Code of 1898, in order to stop interim orders from delaying trials. Amar Nath (1977) read "interlocutory order" in a restricted sense, as an order of a purely interim or temporary nature, and held that an order summoning the accused was a matter of moment and open to revision. Madhu Limaye (1977) recognised a middle class of orders, neither final nor interlocutory, and held that the inherent power of the High Court survives the bar where there is an abuse of process. This entry sets out those decisions, the narrower reading in V.C. Shukla (1979) under the Special Courts Act, the working test in K.K. Patel (2000), the three categories named in Girish Kumar Suneja (2017), the treatment of orders framing charges in Asian Resurfacing (2018) and Sanjay Kumar Rai (2021), the Constitution Bench's withdrawal in 2024 of the rule that stays lapse after six months, and examples of orders that remain interlocutory.


I. The Test

1Section 397(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 allows the High Court or a Sessions Judge to call for the record of a proceeding before an inferior criminal court and examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. Sub-section (2) limits that power:

“(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.”Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 397(2), as set out in Girish Kumar Suneja v. CBI, AIR 2017 SC 3620.

2The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 carries the revisional power into section 438 and repeats the bar in its sub-section (2).Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, s. 438, in force from 1 July 2024.

3The Code does not define “interlocutory order”. The Supreme Court has read it narrowly. The question is not whether the order was made while the case was still pending, since almost every order before judgment is. The question is whether the order is of a purely interim or procedural kind, or whether it decides something of substance. The working test was put in this way in K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat:

“It is now well neigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage ... The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, would it result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code.”K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 6 SCC 195 : AIR 2000 SC 3346.

4An order of that kind is now called an intermediate order. It can be revised. An order that is truly interlocutory cannot be, though in rare cases the High Court may still act under its inherent power.

II. Why the Bar Was Enacted

5Under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of 1898 the High Court’s revisional power extended to any order, final or interlocutory. As Fazal Ali J. recorded in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, “The High Court could examine the propriety of any order-whether final or interlocutory-passed by any Subordinate Court in a criminal matter.”Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 : AIR 1977 SC 2185. The courts had confined that power by a rule of prudence to cases of legal error or injustice, but the power itself had no limit, and it was used against every kind of interim order.

6Parliament enacted section 397(2) to stop that. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra Untwalia J. explained that, as pointed out in Amar Nath, “the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally.”Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : AIR 1978 SC 47. Forty years later, in Girish Kumar Suneja, the Court described the object of the provision as being “to curb delays in the decision of criminal cases and thereby to benefit the accused by giving him or her a fair and expeditious trial.”Girish Kumar Suneja.

7The bar is therefore a means to an end. It prevents trials from being held up by challenges to steps that do not decide anything. It was not meant to take away the accused’s remedy against an order that wrongly puts him on trial.

III. Amar Nath

The facts

8In Amar Nath a first information report named several persons, including the appellants, as participants in a murder. The police filed a final report, and the Magistrate released them. The complainant’s revision failed. He then filed a regular complaint, which the Magistrate dismissed; on a further revision, the Sessions Judge remanded the matter for inquiry, and the Magistrate then issued summons to the appellants straightaway. The appellants’ petition to the High Court was dismissed on the ground that the summoning order was interlocutory, so revision was barred, and the inherent power could not be used to do what revision could not.

The meaning of the term

9Fazal Ali J., for himself and Untwalia J., agreed that the inherent power could not be used to defeat an express bar. But he held that the summoning order was not interlocutory. The term, he said, was used “in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense”:

“It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights, or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the, right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in s. 397 of the, 1973 Code.”Amar Nath.

10The Court gave examples on both sides of the line:

“Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under s. 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.”Amar Nath.

The result

11The summoning order was a matter of moment. Until it was made the appellants faced no proceeding at all, and the Magistrate had made it, the Court found, prima facie in a mechanical fashion. “If the appellants were not summoned, then they could not have faced the trial at all, but by compelling the appellants to face a trial without proper application of mind cannot be held to be an interlocutory matter but one which decided a serious question as to the rights of the appellants to be put on trial.”Amar Nath. A revision was competent, and the High Court was directed to decide it on the merits.

IV. Madhu Limaye and the Middle Class of Orders

The facts

12The appellant in Madhu Limaye was prosecuted under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code for statements said to defame the Law Minister of Maharashtra, Shri A.R. Antulay. The Public Prosecutor filed the complaint directly in the Court of Session, under the procedure then available for defamation of a public servant in respect of his public functions. The appellant objected that the statements concerned the Minister’s personal conduct, so the court had no jurisdiction, and he challenged the sanction. The Sessions Judge rejected the objections and framed a charge. The High Court held that his revision was barred by section 397(2).

Orders between final and interlocutory

13Untwalia J., for a Bench of three Judges, reaffirmed the second point in Amar Nath and rejected the idea that every order which is not final must be interlocutory. Reading the bar together with the revisional power the Legislature had kept intact, he said:

“There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami’s case (supra), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order-pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two.”Madhu Limaye.

14The bar was not meant to reach those intermediate orders. The Court then stated the rule for the order before it: “an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397(2).”Madhu Limaye. The appellant’s objection, if upheld, would have ended the prosecution; the order rejecting it was revisable.

15The Court also pointed to an asymmetry that a wider reading would create. If a complaint is dismissed, or the accused is discharged, the complainant or prosecutor can seek revision. It would not stand to reason, Untwalia J. said, to deny the accused a corresponding remedy against an order that wrongly sets the proceeding going against him.

The inherent power

16On the first point in Amar Nath, the Court said the statement was “not quite accurate and needs some modulation”. Section 482 says that nothing in the Code limits the inherent power, yet if the bar did not operate at all on that power, the bar would be pointless. The Court’s solution was this:

“In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order.”Madhu Limaye.

17If the order is purely interlocutory, the High Court will ordinarily refuse to use its inherent power against it. “But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between.”Madhu Limaye. The Court gave as an example a prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act launched without sanction, where the trial would be without jurisdiction and the accused should not be made to wait until the end of it. The appeal was allowed and the case remitted to the High Court.

V. V.C. Shukla and the Special Courts Act

18V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI concerned a different statute. Section 11(1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979 gave an appeal as of right to the Supreme Court from any judgment, sentence or order of a Special Court “not being interlocutory order”, and section 11(2) excluded any other appeal or revision. The Special Judge framed charges against the appellant, and the State objected that no appeal lay. A Bench of four Judges upheld the objection by majority, Shinghal J. dissenting. Fazal Ali J., in the leading opinion for the majority, held that the order framing the charge was interlocutory in the ordinary and natural meaning of the term in section 11(1), and that the reading of section 397(2) in Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye could not be carried into a statute that excluded the Code.

19The majority did not depart from those decisions under the Code. Fazal Ali J. said that “the term ‘interlocutory order’ used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial”, and that the revisional power could be attracted “if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final.”V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, 1980 Supp SCC 92 : AIR 1980 SC 962. V.C. Shukla is therefore authority on the Special Courts Act, and it confirms rather than narrows the position under the Code.

VI. Later Restatements

Issuing process

20In Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam a Magistrate issued process on a complaint of defamation after an inquiry under section 202. The Sessions Judge set the order aside in revision, holding that the complaint fell within the eighth exception to section 499, and the High Court restored it, holding that an order issuing process is interlocutory. Pattanaik J. disagreed. “The very object of conferring revisional jurisdiction upon the superior criminal courts is to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law or irregularity of procedure.”Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam, (1999) 3 SCC 134 : AIR 1999 SC 1028. The order issuing process was revisable, and on the facts the Court quashed the proceeding.

The feasible test

21K.K. Patel, decided by K.T. Thomas and D.P. Mohapatra JJ., gave the test quoted in Part I. A police officer had filed a complaint against two senior officers. They objected that the complaint was barred for want of sanction and by the limitation in section 161(1) of the Bombay Police Act. The Magistrate held that further evidence was needed before those objections could be decided. The Sessions Judge, in revision, upheld the objections and dismissed the complaint, and the High Court set that aside as a revision against an interlocutory order. The Supreme Court held that if the objections had been upheld the entire prosecution would have ended, so the order was revisable, and it restored the Sessions Judge’s order on the ground of limitation.

Three categories

22In Girish Kumar Suneja v. CBI the appellants, accused in the coal block allocation cases, had sought to challenge orders framing charges in the High Court. The Supreme Court had directed on 25 July 2014 that any application to stay or impede those trials would be subject to its own orders, and a Bench of three Judges declined to revisit that direction. On the way, Madan B. Lokur J. stated the classification that is now standard:

“There are three categories of orders that a court can pass – final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction – that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.”Girish Kumar Suneja.

23The Court identified the usual intermediate orders. “Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind – an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges.”Girish Kumar Suneja. Each is interlocutory in form, but if reversed it ends the proceeding against the person concerned. The Court noted that the same class of orders had been called intermediate, quasi-final or a matter of moment, and said: “Our preference is for the expression ‘intermediate order’ since that brings out the nature of the order more explicitly.”Girish Kumar Suneja.

VII. Orders Framing Charges

Asian Resurfacing

24The status of an order framing a charge was considered by a Bench of three Judges in Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. CBI, a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Adarsh Kumar Goel J. held:

“Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter.”Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. CBI, (2018) 16 SCC 299 : AIR 2018 SC 2039.

25The Court was concerned with the length of time for which trials had been stayed. It directed that a stay should not normally be unconditional or indefinite, and that “Where the matter remains pending for longer period, the order of stay will stand vacated on expiry of six months, unless extension is granted by a speaking order showing extraordinary situation where continuing stay was to be preferred to the final disposal of trial by the trial Court.”Asian Resurfacing.

The Constitution Bench of 2024

26That direction was reconsidered by a Bench of five Judges in High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh. Abhay S. Oka J., for himself, the Chief Justice and the other puisne Judges, with Pankaj Mithal J. concurring, held: “We hold that there cannot be automatic vacation of stay granted by the High Court.”High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 3589 of 2023, decided 29 February 2024. The Court also held that “Constitutional Courts, in the ordinary course, should refrain from fixing a time-bound schedule for the disposal of cases pending before any other Courts.”High Court Bar Association, Allahabad. Orders of automatic vacation already acted on, where trials had concluded, were left undisturbed. The 2024 decision concerns the duration of stays; it did not disturb the holding of Asian Resurfacing that an order framing a charge is not purely interlocutory.

Discharge as a valuable right

27The other side of Asian Resurfacing was explained in Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The High Court had dismissed a revision against an order refusing discharge, treating its jurisdiction as confined to errors of jurisdiction. Surya Kant J., for a Bench of three Judges, held that it had under-appreciated Asian Resurfacing, which had concerned charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Following Madhu Limaye, the Court held that “orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature and are therefore not affected by the bar of Section 397 (2) of CrPC.”Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2021 SC 2351. It added: “The High Court has committed jurisdictional error by not entertaining the revision petition on merits and overlooking the fact that ‘discharge’ is a valuable right provided to the accused.”Sanjay Kumar Rai. The matter was remanded for the revision to be decided afresh.

28The two decisions can be read together. The High Court has jurisdiction over an order framing a charge or refusing discharge, and must decide a revision against it on the merits. How readily it interferes, and whether it stays the trial meanwhile, depends on the case and the statute, and in a corruption case under a statute designed for speed it will do so only in a clear case.

VIII. Orders That Remain Interlocutory

29Many orders remain interlocutory. Amar Nath named orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, granting bail and calling for reports. Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam added orders refusing applications under section 91 for the production of documents and under section 311 for the recall of a witness. The trial court in that cheque case had rejected both applications, and the High Court had allowed a revision against them. V.S. Sirpurkar J. held that the orders “were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable.”Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam, (2009) 5 SCC 153. They decided nothing finally, and their correctness could be examined if necessary in an appeal against the final judgment.

30The distinction is between steps in the trial and decisions about whether there is to be a trial at all. An order about how evidence is to be taken, or when the case is to be heard, does not end the proceeding however it is decided. An order on whether the court has jurisdiction, whether a sanction is valid, whether the complaint is barred, or whether the material justifies a charge, does.

IX. The Position Today

31Revision is barred against an interlocutory order, and only against an interlocutory order. The term covers orders of a purely interim or temporary nature: orders on the summoning of witnesses, adjournments, bail, calls for reports, and applications under sections 91 and 311 of the Code. An order is not interlocutory if, decided the other way, it would have ended the proceeding. Orders taking cognizance and summoning an accused, framing a charge, refusing discharge, and rejecting an objection to jurisdiction, sanction or limitation are intermediate orders and may be revised.

32The bar limits only the revisional power. The High Court’s inherent power, now preserved by section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, survives it, but is used against a purely interlocutory order only to prevent an abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice, in cases the Court has called few and far between. A High Court reviewing an intermediate order must decide the revision on its merits, but it interferes only for a real error, and it does not re-weigh the evidence. A stay of trial granted by the High Court does not lapse merely by the passage of time. The provisions under the Sanhita are sections 438 and 528, and the decisions under the Code continue to apply to them.


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  • Published · 21 November 2026

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