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2026 FPR RLN 2 · https://firstprecedent.org/lineages/seat-of-arbitration

LN-0021Lineages · Arbitration · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR RLN 2

FPR Editors1 November 2026 · 3,055 words

Foreign-Seated Arbitration, from Bhatia to BALCO

Bhatia International extended Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to arbitrations held abroad in order to avoid leaving parties without interim relief, Venture Global carried that reasoning as far as challenges to foreign awards, and BALCO ended the experiment on a territorial reading of section 2(2), for future agreements only; Parliament then restored by statute the limited assistance that had been the original concern, which shows that the problem was never a need for general supervision over foreign arbitrations.

Abstract

For ten years Indian law on arbitrations held abroad rested on a single decision. In Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading (2002), the Supreme Court held that Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applied to international commercial arbitrations held outside India unless the parties excluded it, largely because the alternative seemed to leave a party with no interim relief. Venture Global (2008) applied the rule to allow a challenge in Secunderabad to an award made under the rules of the London Court of International Arbitration. The courts then contained the rule through implied exclusion in Videocon, Dozco and Yograj. In BALCO (2012) a Constitution Bench overruled Bhatia and Venture Global, held that Part I applies only to arbitrations within India, and made its ruling prospective, for agreements executed after 6 September 2012. This entry traces each stage, the gap in interim relief that BALCO left open, and the 2015 proviso to section 2(2) that filled it, and considers the later history in Raffles Design, Ashwani Minda and PASL Wind. It ends with the seat and venue cases, which show that the argument about territoriality continued in a new form.


I. The Starting Point

1The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 replaced older legislation and drew on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Part I deals with arbitration generally, and Part II with the enforcement of certain foreign awards. Everything in this lineage turns on a short sentence in section 2(2): “This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India.”

2The corresponding Article 1(2) of the Model Law says that its provisions, apart from specified exceptions, apply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of the State. The Indian provision has no word “only”. Some of the Model Law’s exceptions were also missing from it, including the one that lets a court grant interim measures in support of an arbitration elsewhere. Section 9 of the Act, the provision on interim measures, sits in Part I.

3Those two features created the problem. If Part I was limited to arbitrations in India, then on the Act as enacted, an Indian court had no statutory power under section 9 to protect assets in India for an arbitration held in Paris or Singapore.

II. Bhatia International (2002)

4The facts of Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. were simple. A contract provided for arbitration under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, and the parties agreed that the arbitration would be held in Paris. The foreign party applied under section 9 to the Additional District Judge at Indore for interim orders. The Indian party objected that Part I did not apply. The objection failed in the trial court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court, and the matter reached a Bench of Pattanaik, Phukan and Variava JJ.Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., (2002) 4 SCC 105 : AIR 2002 SC 1432.

5S.N. Variava J.’s judgment tested the limited reading against its consequences. It would create conflict between section 2(2) and other provisions, and it would “leave a party remediless inasmuch as in international commercial arbitrations which take place out of India the party would not be able to apply for interim relief in India even though the properties and assets are in India.”Bhatia International, ¶ 14. It would also leave a gap for arbitrations in countries outside the Convention regimes in Part II. The Court concluded:

“In cases of international commercial arbitrations held out of India provisions of Part I would apply unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. In that case the laws or rules chosen by the parties would prevail. Any provision, in Part I, which is contrary to or excluded by that law or rules will not apply.”Bhatia International, ¶ 32.

6The contrary view of several High Courts (Orissa, Bombay, Madras, Delhi and Calcutta) was disapproved.

7The judgment’s motive was practical and limited, and the problem it addressed was real. The difficulty lay in the instrument it used. To obtain section 9, the Court applied the whole of Part I, subject only to exclusion. Part I contains section 34 and section 11 as well as section 9. Nothing in Bhatia itself concerned the setting aside of an award, but its general rule left the door open.

III. Expansion

Appointment of arbitrators

8The reasoning was soon used for section 11. In Indtel Technical Services Pvt. Ltd. v. W.S. Atkins Rail Ltd. and Citation Infowares Ltd. v. Equinox Corporation, single judges exercising the section 11 jurisdiction applied the Bhatia rule to applications for the appointment of arbitrators where the agreement had a foreign element.Indtel Technical Services Pvt. Ltd. v. W.S. Atkins Rail Ltd., (2008) 10 SCC 308; Citation Infowares Ltd. v. Equinox Corporation, (2009) 7 SCC 220.

Venture Global (2008)

9The full reach of the rule appeared in Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. A shareholders’ agreement between a Michigan company and an Indian company led to arbitration before the London Court of International Arbitration. A sole arbitrator directed the American party to transfer its shares. The Indian party sought enforcement in a United States District Court in Michigan. The American party then sued in the City Civil Court at Secunderabad for a declaration setting the award aside and for an injunction against the transfer of shares, arguing that the transfer violated Indian foreign exchange law.Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 190 : AIR 2008 SC 1061.

10The trial court and the High Court held against the American party, and the Supreme Court reversed them. It said: “In terms of the decision in Bhatia International (supra), we hold that Part I of the Act is applicable to the Award in question even though it is a foreign Award.”Venture Global, ¶ 29. It did not decide the merits, and it left open which court would be competent.

11The consequence was stark. An award made abroad might now be challenged under section 34 in India as well as in the courts of the seat. The later cases described the risk in plain terms: two court systems in two countries “exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the same dispute”, with “a clear risk of conflicting decisions”.Passage set out in BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234, in its discussion of the overruling of Venture Global.

Containment by implied exclusion

12The Court then began to narrow the rule without disturbing it. Bhatia had allowed exclusion, express or implied, and the later cases used that.

13In Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, the venue under the contract was Kuala Lumpur, and it provided that “the arbitration agreement contained in this Article 34 shall be governed by the laws of England.” G.S. Singhvi J., for himself and Raveendran J., held: “This necessarily implies that the parties had agreed to exclude the provisions of Part I of the Act.”Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 6 SCC 161, ¶ 19. The Delhi High Court therefore had no jurisdiction under section 9.

14In Dozco India Pvt. Ltd. v. Doosan Infracore Co. Ltd., Sirpurkar J. refused a section 11 application where the contract was governed by Korean law and the arbitration was to be in Seoul: “the law governing the arbitration will be Korean law and the seat of arbitration will be Seoul in Korea”, so there would be “no question of applicability of Section 11(6)”.Dozco India Pvt. Ltd. v. Doosan Infracore Co. Ltd., (2011) 6 SCC 179.

15In Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. v. Ssang Yong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., the arbitration was under the rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, and an appeal in India against the arbitrator’s interim order under section 37 failed. Once the arbitrator was appointed and the arbitral proceedings commenced, the Court said, “the SIAC Rules became applicable shutting out the applicability of Section 42 and for that matter Part I of the 1996 Act, including the right of appeal under Section 37 thereof.”Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. v. Ssang Yong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., (2011) 9 SCC 735, ¶ 39.

16By 2012 the law was therefore in an awkward state. Whether Part I applied depended on how much a particular clause could be read as an implied exclusion, which meant that results varied with drafting and that parties had reason to argue the point in every case.

IV. BALCO (2012)

The decision

17Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. came before a Constitution Bench of Kapadia C.J. and D.K. Jain, Nijjar, Ranjana Desai and Khehar JJ., with S.S. Nijjar J. writing for the Court. The appeal concerned section 34 applications against two foreign awards, and the Madhya Pradesh High Court had held them not maintainable. Many other matters were heard with it.

18The Court’s holdings can be put shortly. It answered the argument from the missing “only” directly. It agreed that the omission “is not an instance of ‘CASUS OMISSUS’” and that “the Model Law has not been bodily adopted by the Arbitration Act, 1996. But that can not mean that the territorial principle has not been accepted.”Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 (decided 6 September 2012). It also rejected the “subject matter centric” reading of the Act: “We are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid provisions have to be interpreted by keeping the principle of territoriality at the forefront.”BALCO. Section 2(1)(e) was read with section 20 to recognise the courts of the seat, an aspect discussed in the entry on seat and venue.

19Its conclusions were these:

“With utmost respect, we are unable to agree with the conclusions recorded in the judgments of this Court in Bhatia International (supra) and Venture Global Engineering (supra). In our opinion, the provision contained in Section 2(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is not in conflict with any of the provisions either in Part I or in Part II of the Arbitration Act, 1996. In a foreign seated international commercial arbitration, no application for interim relief would be maintainable under Section 9 or any other provision, as applicability of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is limited to all arbitrations which take place in India. Similarly, no suit for interim injunction simplicitor would be maintainable in India, on the basis of an international commercial arbitration with a seat outside India.”BALCO, ¶ 199.

20And then: “We conclude that Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is applicable only to all the arbitrations which take place within the territory of India.”BALCO, ¶ 200.

21The reasoning was firm about the limits of the Court’s role. On the supposed gap in the statute, the Court agreed that “it is not the function of the Court to supply the supposed omission, which can only be done by Parliament”, and said: “In our opinion, legislative surgery is not a judicial option, nor a compulsion, whilst interpreting an Act or a provision in the Act.”BALCO. The earlier cases had treated the gap as a reason to interpret differently. BALCO treated it as a matter for the legislature.

Prospective effect

22The last paragraph is as important as any other, and it is often forgotten.

“The judgment in Bhatia International (supra) was rendered by this Court on 13th March, 2002. Since then, the aforesaid judgment has been followed by all the High Courts as well as by this Court on numerous occasions. In fact, the judgment in Venture Global Engineering (supra) has been rendered on 10th January, 2008 in terms of the ratio of the decision in Bhatia International (supra). Thus, in order to do complete justice, we hereby order, that the law now declared by this Court shall apply prospectively, to all the arbitration agreements executed hereafter.”BALCO, ¶ 201.

23This means that Indian arbitration law divides into two regimes by date. An arbitration agreement executed on or before 6 September 2012 stays under the Bhatia rule, with its implied exclusion cases. One executed after it is governed by BALCO. A practitioner advising on an old contract must begin by checking its date. It may seem surprising that a case overruling an earlier interpretation of a statute should operate only prospectively, but the Court invoked its power to do complete justice, and the effect has been accepted as the law.

V. The Gap and the Statutory Repair

24BALCO expressly left a party to a foreign-seated arbitration with no interim relief from an Indian court, even by suit. This was the very difficulty that had moved the Court in Bhatia. The Court had pointed to Parliament, and Parliament acted.

25The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, in force from 23 October 2015, added this proviso to section 2(2):

“Provided that subject to an agreement to the contrary, the provisions of sections 9, 27 and clause (a) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of section 37 shall also apply to international commercial arbitration, even if the place of arbitration is outside India, and an arbitral award made or to be made in such place is enforceable and recognised under the provisions of Part II of this Act.”Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, s. 2(2), proviso, reproduced in Mankastu Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Airvisual Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 399.

26The list is the point. Interim measures, court assistance in taking evidence and related appeals are included. Section 34 is not. Nor is section 11, and Mankastu Impex drew attention to that: “It is pertinent to note that Section 11 is not included in the proviso”.Mankastu Impex. The proviso gives what Bhatia wanted without what Venture Global did. In that sense the statute confirmed the view that the concern was assistance to foreign arbitrations and that it did not call for supervision over them.

27The proviso is limited in two ways. First, it covers “international commercial arbitration”. Whether it helps two Indian parties who choose a foreign seat was raised in PASL Wind Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. GE Power Conversion India Pvt. Ltd., and the Court held their section 9 application maintainable, while upholding their freedom to choose Zurich as the seat.PASL Wind Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. GE Power Conversion India Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 1. In doing so, R.F. Nariman J. settled a long-standing debate concerning party autonomy, holding that nothing in the Indian Contract Act or the Arbitration Act bars two Indian corporate entities from designating a neutral foreign arbitral seat. The consequence of that choice is that Part I is excluded except for the targeted provisions preserved by the proviso to Section 2(2), while the resulting award qualifies as a foreign award enforceable exclusively under Part II.

28Second, it yields to “an agreement to the contrary”, and High Court decisions demonstrate that the phrase requires rigorous construction. In Raffles Design International India Pvt. Ltd. v. Educomp Professional Education Ltd., Vibhu Bakhru J. held a section 9 petition maintainable in support of a Singapore arbitration under the SIAC Rules, on the reasoning that by choosing those rules the parties had “impliedly agreed that it would not be incompatible for them to approach the Courts for interim relief.”Raffles Design International India Pvt. Ltd. v. Educomp Professional Education Ltd. (Delhi High Court, 7 October 2016). In Ashwani Minda v. U-Shin Ltd., on different facts, where the parties had agreed to institutional rules and had already sought and failed to obtain relief from an emergency arbitrator, the High Court held the petition not maintainable: “Having excluded the applicability of Part I of the Act and agreeing to be governed by different Rules and procedures, binding on the parties and having invoked the same, jurisdiction of this Court under Section 9 of the Act cannot be invoked”.Ashwani Minda v. U-Shin Ltd. (Delhi High Court, 12 May 2020). It is noticeable that a form of the implied exclusion debate survives here, though now on a much narrower subject.

29This jurisdictional interplay reached its apex in Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd., where the Supreme Court considered the legal status of an interim order passed by an Emergency Arbitrator under the SIAC Rules in an India-seated arbitration.Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 209. While Amazon arose in a domestic seat, Rohinton Nariman J. underscored that party autonomy allows parties to embrace institutional emergency procedures without forfeiting recourse to court-ordered interim protection under Section 9, provided there is no explicit covenant excluding court intervention. For foreign-seated arbitrations, however, the statutory gap concerning direct enforcement of emergency awards under Section 17 remains unbridged by Part II, compelling foreign award creditors to file fresh Section 9 petitions in Indian courts to replicate emergency arbitrator reliefs against Indian assets.

30The temporal effect of the Amendment Act has its own case. In Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd., the Court construed section 26 of the Amendment Act, which distinguished arbitral proceedings commenced before the amendment from court proceedings in relation to arbitration commenced after it. Parliament’s later attempt to change that result was struck down in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India.Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 287; Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2020) 17 SCC 324.

VI. The Afterlife: Seat and Venue

31BALCO made the seat decisive, and that moved the dispute. Before 2012 the question was whether Part I applied to an arbitration held abroad. After 2012 the question often became whether an arbitration said to be held abroad was truly seated abroad, given that many clauses speak only of a “venue”.

32The most direct return of the old problem came in Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc., where a three-judge Bench held that Kuala Lumpur, named as the venue, was not the seat in the absence of something more, and that Indian courts had jurisdiction under section 34. In BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., another three-judge Bench saw this as a return to Venture Global, because the result “would lead to the result that a foreign award would not only be subject to challenge in the country in which it was made, but also subject to challenge under Section 34 of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996”. It declared that Hardy “cannot be considered to be good law”.BGS SGS Soma, (2020) 4 SCC 234; Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472.

33That story, with its later complications in Mankastu Impex and Ravi Ranjan Developers, is told in the entry on seat and venue. For this lineage what matters is the pattern. Each time the courts have felt pulled to keep a dispute within Indian supervision, the same objections have appeared: double challenge, conflicting decisions, and uncertainty for parties choosing a neutral seat. This territorial discipline was reaffirmed by the seven-judge Constitution Bench in In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, which elevated the principle of minimal judicial intervention under Section 5 to the core architecture of the Act.In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, (2024) 6 SCC 1. By insisting that curial courts must refrain from entering the merits at the threshold or second-guessing the arbitral tribunal’s kompetenz-kompetenz under Section 16, the seven-judge Bench reinforced the fundamental structural lesson of BALCO: the supervisory authority of a court belongs exclusively to the legal seat chosen by the parties, and curial courts elsewhere cannot bypass that territorial boundary under the pretext of correcting substantive error.

VII. What the Lineage Teaches

34Three lessons stand out.

35The first is about interpretation under pressure. Bhatia began with a real problem, and it solved that problem by giving a broad rule. It is fair to say the Court at that time saw no other way to protect a party in India, given the text. Yet the rule’s width later produced Venture Global, which the Court in Bhatia did not have in view. When a narrow need drives a general holding, the later cases will test the holding and not the need.

36The second is about the respective roles of courts and Parliament. BALCO put the responsibility for the gap on Parliament, and Parliament solved it in three years by a proviso of a single sentence. That it could be done so simply shows what was available from the beginning, though it had to be done by legislation. Whether the Court in 2002 should have waited for that is the question on which the two decisions disagree.

37The third is practical. The law for contracts of different dates is different, and this remains so. For an agreement executed on or before 6 September 2012, one must ask whether Part I was impliedly excluded under the Bhatia line. For one executed later, one must identify the seat, and then, if it is abroad, ask whether the proviso’s assistance has been excluded by agreement. For any agreement, a clause that names its seat plainly, using that word, avoids most of the litigation described here.


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  • Published · 1 November 2026

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