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2026 FPR RLN 1 · https://firstprecedent.org/lineages/amending-power

LN-0002Lineages · Constitutional · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR RLN 1

FPR Editors18 October 2026 · 5,064 words

The Amending Power, from Shankari Prasad to Kesavananda

Between 1951 and 1973 the Supreme Court moved from holding that constitutional amendments are unconstrained by fundamental rights to holding that Parliament cannot alter the basic structure of the Constitution.

Abstract

The Constitution does not say whether the power of amendment under Article 368 is subject to the fundamental rights in Part III. In Shankari Prasad (1951) a unanimous bench held that an amendment is not "law" under Article 13(2) and that fundamental rights may be amended. In Sajjan Singh (1965) the majority affirmed that rule, but two judges voiced doubts that contained the seeds of basic features. In Golak Nath (1967) an eleven-judge bench overruled both decisions by a six-to-five majority, holding that amendments are law and applying prospective overruling. Parliament responded with the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Amendments to reassert its unfettered power. In Kesavananda Bharati (1973) thirteen judges sat for sixty-eight days and, by a seven-to-six majority guided by the decisive opinion of Khanna J., recognized that while Parliament may amend any provision, it cannot damage or destroy the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. This entry traces the twenty-two-year contest through each case, the legislative counter-offensives, and the doctrine's settled modern form.


I. The contest

1At the inception of the Republic, the Constitution of India posited two competing principles of sovereignty. The first was representative democracy through parliamentary supremacy: a newly independent nation committed to radical agrarian and social reform required an adaptable organic instrument capable of overcoming entrenched property rights. The instrument for that adaptation was Article 368, which authorized Parliament to amend the Constitution. The second principle was constitutional supremacy: a bill of fundamental rights, enshrined in Part III, withdrawn from the reach of political majorities. The guardian of those rights was Article 13(2), which commanded that the State “shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part”, declaring any law enacted in contravention void to the extent of the inconsistency.

2The text left their relationship unresolved. Did the word “law” in Article 13(2) encompass a constitutional amendment passed under Article 368? If it did, Part III stood beyond the reach of parliamentary amendment, potentially freezing an unequal social order in perpetuity. If it did not, a transient parliamentary majority commanding two-thirds of the votes could extinguish civil liberties, dismantle democratic institutions, and subvert the republican character of the State.

3Between 1951 and 1973, that architectural tension produced one of the most sustained institutional struggles in modern constitutional history. It unfolded across four landmark decisions: Shankari Prasad, Sajjan Singh, Golak Nath, and Kesavananda Bharati. The journey moved through complete deference to Parliament, hesitant judicial misgivings, an unworkable judicial prohibition, a retaliatory legislative counter-offensive, and finally a synthesis—the basic structure doctrine—that preserved parliamentary constituent power while denying Parliament the authority to destroy the constitutional framework itself.

II. Shankari Prasad (1951)

Agrarian reform and the First Amendment

4The conflict originated in the politics of land. Upon independence, State legislatures enacted statutes to dismantle the zamindari system and redistribute agricultural land to tenant cultivators. Dispossessed proprietors challenged these enactments in the High Courts, asserting that compulsory acquisition of their estates without market compensation infringed their fundamental rights to equality under Article 14, to acquire, hold, and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f), and to compensation under Article 31.

5The litigation produced immediate conflict. While the Allahabad and Nagpur High Courts upheld land reform enactments,Suryapalsingh v. State of U.P., AIR 1951 All 674; Visweshwar Rao v. State of M.P., 1952 SCR 1020. the Patna High Court struck down the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, holding that its graduated compensation schedule violated the equal protection clause of Article 14.Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1951 Pat 91.

6The Union Government refused to await the outcome of appeals before the Supreme Court. In June 1951, the Constituent Assembly, functioning as the unicameral Provisional Parliament under Article 379, enacted the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.

7The First Amendment insulated land reform through three devices: 1. It inserted Article 31A, providing that no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any “estate” or rights therein should be deemed void on the ground of inconsistency with Articles 14, 19, or 31. 2. It inserted Article 31B, creating a retrospective statutory vault known as the Ninth Schedule. Article 31B declared that none of the Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule, nor any of their provisions, should be deemed void or ever to have become void on the ground of inconsistency with Part III. 3. It appended the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, initially populating it with thirteen State agrarian reform statutes, including the invalidated Bihar Act.

The challenge and the holding

8Zamindars from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh challenged the First Amendment under Article 32. In Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, a unanimous Constitution Bench of five judges—Kania C.J., Patanjali Sastri, Mukherjea, S.R. Das, and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.—heard the petitions.Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458: 1952 SCR 89.

9The petitioners raised three principal objections: 1. The Provisional Parliament lacked competence to amend the Constitution under Article 368, which required an amendment bill to be passed by “either House of Parliament”, presupposing a bicameral body. 2. Article 368 prescribed only procedure, not an independent substantive amending power. 3. Constitutional amendments were governed by Article 13(2). The word “law” was broad enough to include constitutional amendments; consequently, Parliament could not enact an amendment abridging Part III.

10Delivering the judgment, Patanjali Sastri J. rejected all three arguments. The objection regarding the Provisional Parliament was answered by Article 379, which conferred on that body all the powers of Parliament, reinforced by the President’s adaptation power under Article 392.

11On the core constitutional question, the Court formulated a doctrine of harmonious construction grounded in a distinction between legislative power and constituent power. Patanjali Sastri J. acknowledged that the term “law” in a generic sense includes constitutional law. However, within the scheme of the Indian Constitution, the Court found an implicit dichotomy:

“Although there is no doubt some force in the argument that the State is prohibited under Article 13(2) from making a law which takes away or abridges rights conferred by Part III, and ‘law’ in its generic sense may include constitutional law, it must be remembered that there is a clear distinction between ordinary law, which is made in exercise of legislative power, and constitutional law, which is made in exercise of constituent power.”Shankari Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 458, 463, para 13.

12Article 13(2) and Article 368 operated in separate spheres. Article 13(2) governed ordinary law-making under Articles 245 and 246; Article 368 conferred a distinct constituent power. If “law” in Article 13(2) included constitutional amendments, Article 368 would be stripped of its efficacy regarding Part III. Harmonious construction required reading “law” in Article 13(2) as ordinary statutory enactments, leaving the amending power under Article 368 unconstrained:

“We are of opinion that in the context of Article 13 ‘law’ must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent power, with the result that Article 13(2) does not affect amendments made under Article 368.”Shankari Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 458, 463, para 13.

13For fourteen years, Shankari Prasad governed Indian constitutional law. It established that Parliament possessed plenary constituent authority to amend any provision of the Constitution, including the fundamental rights.

III. Sajjan Singh (1965)

The Seventeenth Amendment

14The constitutional truce held while land reforms expanded. Parliament amended the Constitution repeatedly: the Fourth Amendment Act, 1955 widened Article 31A and added seven statutes to the Ninth Schedule.

15In 1964, Parliament enacted the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act. It broadened the definition of “estate” in Article 31A to include ryotwari settlements, agricultural lands, and waste lands, thereby overturning decisions of the High Courts of Kerala and Rajasthan that had struck down local tenancy statutes. Crucially, the Seventeenth Amendment added forty-four new statutes to the Ninth Schedule, swelling the total number of immunized enactments to sixty-four.

16Affected landholders challenged the amendment in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan.Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845: (1965) 1 SCR 933. A Constitution Bench of five judges heard the matter: Gajendragadkar C.J., Wanchoo, Raghubar Dayal, Hidayatullah, and Mudholkar JJ.

The majority opinion of Gajendragadkar C.J.

17The petitioners raised a federal procedural objection. By immunizing State statutes from challenge under Articles 14, 19, and 31, the Seventeenth Amendment directly affected the powers of High Courts under Article 226, which falls within Chapter V of Part VI. Consequently, under the proviso to Article 368, the amendment required ratification by not less than half the State legislatures.

18Writing for himself, Wanchoo, and Dayal JJ., Gajendragadkar C.J. dismissed the petitions. Applying the doctrine of pith and substance, the majority held that the amendment dealt with agrarian reform under Entry 18 of List II. Its effect on Article 226 was merely indirect and incidental; ratification under the proviso was therefore unnecessary.

19Gajendragadkar C.J. then reaffirmed Shankari Prasad. The power to amend under Article 368 was plenary; “amendment of this Constitution” meant the amendment of each and every provision. Had the framers intended to place Part III beyond the reach of amendment, they would have made that intention clear by an express provision:

“If the Constitution-makers also intended that their character should be so unique that they should be never touched by any amendment for all time to come, nothing would have been easier than to make that intention clear by an express provision in that behalf.”Sajjan Singh, AIR 1965 SC 845, 850, para 18.

20Article 13(2), the majority repeated, applied solely to ordinary legislative enactments.

The separate opinions: Mudholkar and Hidayatullah JJ.

21The historical significance of Sajjan Singh lies in the separate concurring opinions of Hidayatullah and Mudholkar JJ. While concurring in dismissing the petitions on the narrow procedural issue of Article 226, both voiced grave misgivings regarding the correctness of Shankari Prasad.

22Hidayatullah J. doubted whether fundamental rights could be left to the mercy of a temporary parliamentary majority:

“I would not have hesitated to join the Chief Justice in accepting the view of this Court in Shankari Prasad’s case if I was not also impressed by the other view which was also projected before us... It is not likely that a right which is declared to be fundamental would be left to the play of a special majority in Parliament.”Sajjan Singh, AIR 1965 SC 845, 861, para 44.

23Hidayatullah J. emphasized that Article 13(2) contained an express negative prohibition against the State. If an amendment was an act of the State that abridged fundamental rights, its validity was open to serious question.

24Mudholkar J. went further, articulating the conceptual seed of the basic structure doctrine. Citing the judgment of Chief Justice A.R. Cornelius of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Fazlul Quader Chowdhry v. Mohd. Abdul Haque,Fazlul Quader Chowdhry v. Mohd. Abdul Haque, PLD 1963 SC 486. which held that executive powers could not alter the “fundamental features” of the constitution, Mudholkar J. asked:

“It is also a question for consideration whether making a change in a basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely as an amendment or would it be, in effect, rewriting a part of the Constitution; and if the latter, would it be within the purview of Article 368?”Sajjan Singh, AIR 1965 SC 845, 864, para 57.

25He questioned whether Parliament could, by a two-thirds majority, abolish the republican form of government, extinguish democratic elections, or abrogate the rule of law. Every constitution has an underlying architecture; could the amending power be used to dismantle the foundation upon which that architecture stood?

26The separate opinions in Sajjan Singh shattered the judicial consensus. The seed of the basic structure was planted.

IV. Golak Nath (1967)

The eleven-judge bench

27The opportunity to resolve these doubts arose within two years. In Jalandhar, Punjab, Henry and William Golak Nath held an estate of over 500 acres. Under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, revenue authorities declared that each brother could retain only thirty standard acres, treating the remainder as surplus to be resumed by the State.

28The 1953 Punjab statute was placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Seventeenth Amendment. The Golak Nath family petitioned the Supreme Court under Article 32, challenging the First, Fourth, and Seventeenth Amendments, and directly asking the Court to overrule Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh.

29Recognizing that Sajjan Singh had divided the Court, Chief Justice K. Subba Rao constituted a special bench of eleven judges: Subba Rao C.J., Wanchoo, Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, Sikri, Bachawat, Ramaswami, Shelat, Bhargava, Mitter, and Vaidialingam JJ.

30On 27 February 1967, the Court delivered its decision in I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab.I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643: (1967) 2 SCR 762. By a narrow majority of 6 to 5, the Supreme Court overruled Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh, holding that Parliament had no power to amend Part III so as to abridge or take away fundamental rights.

Subba Rao C.J.’s majority reasoning

31The majority comprised Subba Rao C.J., writing for himself and Shah, Sikri, Shelat, and Vaidialingam JJ., with Hidayatullah J. delivering a separate concurring opinion.

32Subba Rao C.J. dismantled Shankari Prasad through a three-step analysis: 1. Locus of amending power: The marginal note to Article 368 read simply: “Procedure for amendment of the Constitution”. The Article contained the procedure, but not the substantive grant of power. That power was derived from ordinary legislative competence under Articles 245, 246, and 248, read with the residuary Entry 97 of List I. 2. Amendment is “law”: Because constitutional amendment derived from the residuary legislative entry, it was an exercise of ordinary legislative power. There was no qualitative difference between legislative and constituent power. An amendment was therefore a “law” within the comprehensive definition in Article 13(3)(a). 3. The supremacy of Part III: As “law”, amendments collided directly with Article 13(2). Fundamental rights were natural, primordial rights given a “transcendental position” beyond the reach of parliamentary majorities:

“Fundamental rights are the primordial rights necessary for the development of human personality... They are given a transcendental position under our Constitution and are kept beyond the reach of Parliament.”Golak Nath, AIR 1967 SC 1643, 1656, para 22.

33Under Article 13(2), an amendment taking away or abridging fundamental rights was unconstitutional and void. If the nation required a fundamental revision of those rights, Subba Rao C.J. held, Parliament could not achieve it through Article 368; it would have to convoke a new Constituent Assembly.

Prospective overruling

34To avoid invalidating sixteen years of agrarian reforms and unsettling settled titles, Subba Rao C.J. imported the American doctrine of prospective overruling, citing Cardozo J. in Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.287 US 358 (1932).

35The Court laid down three conditions for the doctrine: it could be invoked only in constitutional matters; it could be applied only by the Supreme Court; and its scope was to be moulded by the Court to prevent injustice. Applying this rule, the majority held that the First, Fourth, and Seventeenth Amendments remained valid for the past, but prospectively, from 27 February 1967, Parliament had no power to abridge fundamental rights.

Concurrence and dissent

36In his concurrence, Hidayatullah J. agreed that fundamental rights could not be abridged. He located amending power within Article 368 itself, but held that it could not breach the express prohibition in Article 13(2). He observed that property was the “weakest of all the fundamental rights” and suggested it ought to have been placed outside Part III altogether, rather than used to erode civil liberties.Golak Nath, AIR 1967 SC 1643, 1700, para 142.

37Five judges dissented: Wanchoo J. (for himself, Bhargava, and Mitter JJ.), Bachawat J., and Ramaswami J. Wanchoo J. held that Article 368 contained both power and procedure. To locate amending power in residuary legislation under Article 248 was anomalous: residuary legislation was subject to the Constitution, whereas an amendment altered it. The dissenters warned that denying Parliament the power to amend fundamental rights created a rigid, unyielding constitution that invited revolution rather than peaceful reform.

38Golak Nath brought judicial power and parliamentary authority into direct collision.

V. The Legislative Counter-Offensive (1967–1972)

Political crisis and judicial confrontation

39The aftermath of Golak Nath coincided with intense political instability. In the general election of 1967, the Congress party suffered severe electoral setbacks. In Parliament, Nath Pai introduced a Private Member’s Bill to restore Parliament’s constituent power over Part III, but the bill lapsed before enactment.

40In 1969, the Congress party split. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi led a minority government that embarked on an aggressive socialist programme. That programme clashed repeatedly with the Supreme Court: 1. Bank Nationalisation: In R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, an eleven-judge bench struck down the bank nationalisation statute by a 10 to 1 majority, holding that the compensation provided was illusory and violated Articles 14, 19(1)(f), and 31(2).R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248. 2. Privy Purses: In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, a nine-judge bench struck down the presidential order derecognizing former rulers by an 8 to 1 majority, holding that privy purses constituted enforceable property rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31.Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85.

41Indira Gandhi dissolved the Lok Sabha in December 1970. The general election of March 1971 was fought on an explicit constitutional manifesto: seeking a mandate to amend the Constitution, abolish feudal privileges, and carry out socialist reforms. The electorate returned the Government with a two-thirds majority.

The Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Amendments

42Enacted in November 1971, the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act undertook a surgical overhaul of the text to dismantle every premise of Golak Nath: 1. Marginal Note: It altered Article 368’s marginal note to: “Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor.” 2. Express Constituent Power: It inserted Article 368(1), declaring that Parliament may “in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution”. 3. Mandatory Assent: It made presidential assent to an amendment bill mandatory. 4. Exclusion of Article 13: It inserted Article 368(3), providing that “Nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article”, and inserted a reciprocal clause (4) into Article 13.

43The Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 followed: 1. Substitution of “Amount”: In Article 31(2), it replaced “compensation” with “amount”, barring judicial review of adequacy. 2. Insertion of Article 31C: It provided that no law giving effect to Directive Principles in Article 39(b) or (c) could be challenged under Articles 14, 19, or 31. 3. The Ouster Clause: The second part of Article 31C provided that “no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy.”

44Two further amendments followed: the Twenty-sixth Amendment abolished privy purses, and the Twenty-ninth Amendment inserted Kerala land reform statutes into the Ninth Schedule.

45The stage was set for the final judicial trial of strength.

VI. Kesavananda Bharati (1973)

The petition and the thirteen-judge bench

46In Kasaragod, Kerala, Swami Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru, head of the Edneer Mutt, challenged the Kerala Government’s acquisition of mutt lands under the Kerala Land Reforms Acts. Represented by Nani Palkhivala, the mutt filed a writ petition under Article 32.

47When the 24th, 25th, and 29th Amendments were enacted, Palkhivala amended the petition to challenge the amendments themselves. A bench of thirteen judges was constituted: Sikri C.J., Shelat, Hegde, Grover, Ray, Jaganmohan Reddy, Palekar, Khanna, Mathew, Beg, Dwivedi, Mukherjea, and Chandrachud JJ.

48The Bench sat for sixty-eight working days between 31 October 1972 and 23 March 1973. Palkhivala conceded that Golak Nath’s reliance on residuary legislative power was incorrect; Article 368 did confer constituent power. However, relying on the lectures of German jurist Dieter Conrad, Palkhivala argued that “amendment” inherently preserves constitutional identity: a power to amend cannot be used to destroy or abrogate the basic framework of the Constitution.

49Government counsel, led by Attorney General Niren De and H.M. Seervai, argued that constituent power was sovereign, absolute, and without implied limitations. In the absence of an express textual prohibition, Parliament could repeal or vary any provision of the Constitution.

The split: Six against six

50On 24 April 1973, the Court delivered eleven separate opinions spanning 703 pages.Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.

51All thirteen judges unanimously agreed that Golak Nath was wrongly decided: Article 368 contained both power and procedure; constituent power was distinct from ordinary legislative power; Article 13(2) did not govern constitutional amendments; and the Twenty-fourth Amendment was valid.

52Beyond that consensus, the Bench divided evenly:

53The First Camp (Six Judges): Sikri C.J., Shelat, Hegde, Grover, Jaganmohan Reddy, and Mukherjea JJ. held that the amending power was subject to implied limitations: Parliament could not alter the essential elements or basic structure of the Constitution. Sikri C.J. enumerated basic features: supremacy of the Constitution, republican and democratic governance, secularism, separation of powers, and federalism.Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 366, para 292. These judges held that Part III rights were an essential feature.

54The Second Camp (Six Judges): Ray, Palekar, Mathew, Beg, Dwivedi, and Chandrachud JJ. held that constituent power under Article 368 was plenary, supreme, and completely unfettered. Parliament could amend or repeal any provision, including fundamental rights.

55The Bench stood tied at 6 to 6.

Justice Khanna’s swing opinion

56Justice Hans Raj Khanna broke the deadlock, refusing to align fully with either camp.

57Khanna J. rejected the doctrine of implied limitations as subjective. Instead, he derived the limitation from the meaning of the word “amendment”:

“Amendment of the Constitution necessarily contemplates that the Constitution has not to be abrogated but only changes have to be made in it. The word ‘amendment’ postulates that the old Constitution survives without loss of its identity despite the change and continues even though it has been subjected to alterations. As a result of the amendment, the old Constitution cannot be destroyed and done away with; it is retained though in the amended form.”Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 768, para 1426.

58From this linguistic and structural premise, Khanna J. held that Parliament cannot alter the “basic structure or framework” of the Constitution:

“The power of amendment under Article 368 does not include the power to abrogate the Constitution nor does it include the power to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.”Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 770, para 1437.

59However, Khanna J. parted company with Sikri C.J. on fundamental rights. He held that Part III was not completely immune from amendment: Parliament had full power to modify, abridge, or adjust fundamental rights to implement social reforms. Specifically, the right to property was not part of the basic structure. But Parliament could not abrogate the foundational institutional pillars of the Republic, including democracy, secularism, and judicial independence.

60By joining the first camp on the proposition that Article 368 does not permit altering the basic structure, Khanna J. forged the 7 to 6 majority.

The disposition of the amendments

61Nine judges signed the “View by the Majority”, recording the operational holdings: 1. Golak Nath was overruled. 2. Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. 3. The Twenty-fourth Amendment was valid in its entirety. 4. Section 2 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment (substituting “amount” for “compensation”) was valid, though an illusory amount remained reviewable. 5. The first part of Section 3 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment (saving laws under Article 39(b) and (c) from Articles 14, 19, and 31) was valid. 6. The second part of Section 3—the conclusive declaration clause barring judicial review—was struck down as unconstitutional and void. 7. The Twenty-ninth Amendment was upheld, but individual Ninth Schedule statutes remained subject to basic structure review by a Constitution Bench.

62The basic structure doctrine was a constitutional compromise: Parliament retained constituent power to enact socioeconomic reforms, but lost the power to dismantle the constitutional democracy itself.

VII. Fortification: From the Emergency to Minerva Mills

The supersession and the November 1975 bench

63The political reaction was immediate. Chief Justice Sikri retired on 25 April 1973, the day following the judgment. The Government bypassed the three senior-most judges who voted in the majority—Justices J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, and A.N. Grover—and appointed Justice A.N. Ray, the senior-most dissenter, as Chief Justice of India. Shelat, Hegde, and Grover JJ. resigned in protest.

64During the national Emergency declared in June 1975, the Government attempted to overturn the doctrine. On 20 October 1975, Chief Justice Ray, without any review petition or application by any party, convened a thirteen-judge bench to reconsider Kesavananda Bharati.

65Palkhivala raised a devastating preliminary objection: no review petition had been filed; the doctrine had caused no paralysis in governance; and to reconsider foundational principles while opposition leaders were imprisoned was an institutional betrayal. Several judges, including Khanna and Untwalia JJ., questioned Chief Justice Ray as to who had requested the bench. When the Attorney General conceded that no review had been sought, Chief Justice Ray announced on 12 November 1975: “This Bench is dissolved.”Kartavya Sadhana, ‘The Dissolution of the 13-Judge Bench’, livelaw.in (12 Nov. 1975).

Indira Gandhi and the first invalidation

66The first practical application of the doctrine occurred during the Emergency. In June 1975, the Allahabad High Court invalidated Indira Gandhi’s election in State of U.P. v. Raj Narain. While her appeal was pending, Parliament enacted the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, inserting Article 329A.

67Clause (4) of Article 329A declared that no electoral law applied to the election of the Prime Minister or Speaker; that their election could not be questioned before any court; that pending proceedings abated; and that any prior judgment holding such election void was deemed valid and effective.

68In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, a Constitution Bench unanimously invalidated Article 329A(4).Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1. For the first time, the Court used the basic structure doctrine to strike down a constitutional amendment. The Court held that Article 329A(4) subverted democracy, free and fair elections, the rule of law, and the separation of powers.

69In his opinion, Khanna J. clarified that his judgment in Kesavananda did not place all fundamental rights outside the basic structure; while individual property rights could be amended, fundamental constitutional values—including equality, secularism, and democratic governance—belonged to the unalterable basic framework.Indira Nehru Gandhi, 1975 Supp SCC 1, 115, paras 251–252 (Khanna, J.).

Minerva Mills (1980)

70Parliament made its final attempt at absolute power through the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. Section 55 inserted clauses (4) and (5) into Article 368: Clause (4) barred judicial review of amendments. Clause (5) declared that “there shall be no limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend... the provisions of this Constitution”.

71Section 4 of the amendment altered Article 31C to give blanket precedence to all Directive Principles over Articles 14 and 19.

72In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench struck down clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 and the expansion of Article 31C as unconstitutional.Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625.

73Chandrachud C.J. formulated a timeless constitutional principle: a limited amending power is itself a basic feature of the Constitution. Parliament cannot convert a limited constituent authority into an absolute power:

“Since the Constitution had conferred a limited amending power on the Parliament, the Parliament cannot under the exercise of that limited power enlarge that very power into an absolute power. Indeed, a limited amending power is one of the basic features of our Constitution and therefore, the limitations on that power cannot be destroyed... The donee of a limited power cannot by the exercise of that power convert the limited power into an unlimited one.”Minerva Mills, (1980) 3 SCC 625, 644, para 17.

74Chandrachud C.J. also invalidated the expansion of Article 31C, holding that the harmony and balance between Part III and Part IV is an essential element of the basic structure:

“The Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts III and IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution which is an essential feature of its basic structure. The two parts... are like two wheels of a chariot, one no less important than the other.”Minerva Mills, (1980) 3 SCC 625, 654, para 56.

75Minerva Mills permanently closed the door on absolute amending power.

VIII. The Ninth Schedule Settled: Waman Rao to I.R. Coelho

The temporal cut-off: Waman Rao

76The Court next addressed the Ninth Schedule vault. If Parliament could not destroy the basic structure by amending the Constitution directly, could it do so indirectly by placing an unconstitutional statute into the Ninth Schedule?

77In Waman Rao v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench established a temporal line of demarcation at 24 April 1973, the date of Kesavananda Bharati:Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362. 1. Amendments and Ninth Schedule inclusions enacted prior to 24 April 1973 were valid and immune under stare decisis. 2. Amendments and Ninth Schedule inclusions enacted on or after 24 April 1973 enjoyed no blanket immunity and were subject to judicial review for basic structure violation.

The definitive formulation: I.R. Coelho

78The standard for reviewing Ninth Schedule laws was settled by a unanimous nine-judge bench in I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N.I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1.

79Sabharwal C.J. formulated the “rights test”: 1. No absolute immunity: The Ninth Schedule does not confer a blind vault. While Article 31B shields listed laws from direct challenge under Part III as ordinary legislation, it cannot shield them if the constitutional amendment inserting them damages the basic structure. 2. The golden triangle: Foundational fundamental rights—the golden triangle of Articles 14, 19, and 21—form the core of the basic structure. 3. The dual test: When a post-1973 Ninth Schedule law is challenged, the court asks: first, does the statute infringe a fundamental right in Part III? Second, does that infringement damage or destroy the basic structure? 4. The essence of rights: If a statute abrogates the core or essence of an essential right, the amendment inserting it into the Ninth Schedule is struck down, stripping the statute of its protection.

80I.R. Coelho brought the lineage to full circle: Parliament could neither amend the Constitution to abolish basic rights, nor use a procedural schedule to protect laws that achieve the same result.

IX. The Position Today

81The journey from Shankari Prasad to Kesavananda Bharati, consolidated through Minerva Mills and Coelho, establishes the law of the amending power in eight propositions:

821. Constituent power is distinct from legislative power: The power to amend under Article 368 is constituent, not ordinary legislative power. It is not governed by Article 13(2), and the word “law” in Article 13(2) excludes constitutional amendments. 2. The amending power is inherently limited: Article 368 is wide, plenary, and extends to every provision, but it cannot alter, damage, or destroy the basic structure or essential framework of the Constitution. 3. Amendment is not abrogation: The word “amendment” implies the preservation of constitutional identity. Parliament may modify or reform provisions, but cannot replace the Constitution or dismantle its core architecture. 4. Limited amending power is a basic feature: Parliament cannot convert its limited constituent authority into an unlimited power. Provisions barring judicial review (former Article 368(4)) or asserting unlimited competence (Article 368(5)) are void. 5. Fundamental rights are amendable, but their core is protected: Parliament may abridge individual rights (such as property) for public welfare, but the core principles of Part III—the rule of law, equality (Article 14), basic freedoms (Article 19), personal liberty and fair procedure (Article 21), and secularism—belong to the basic structure. 6. Judicial review is an unalterable basic feature: The power of the Supreme Court and High Courts under Articles 32 and 226 to review the validity of legislation and constitutional amendments cannot be excluded. 7. The Ninth Schedule is subject to the rights test: Additions prior to 24 April 1973 are immune. Additions on or after that date are tested: if a statute violates fundamental rights in a manner that damages the basic structure, its constitutional protection fails. 8. The doctrine governs structural amendments: The basic structure limitation applies to all institutional alterations. When Parliament enacted the Ninety-ninth Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014 to replace the collegium with the National Judicial Appointments Commission, the Supreme Court struck down the amendment for violating the independence of the judiciary as part of the basic structure.Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India (NJAC), (2016) 5 SCC 1.

83In twenty-two years, Indian constitutional law completed an intellectual arc: from the complete parliamentary sovereignty of Shankari Prasad, through the rigid judicial prohibition of Golak Nath, to the enduring equilibrium of Kesavananda Bharati. The amending power belongs to Parliament; the identity of the Constitution belongs to the Republic.


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  • Published · 18 October 2026

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