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2026 FPR EDC 3 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/basic-structure
DC-0001Doctrines · Constitutional · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 3
FPR Editors27 October 2026 · 3,693 words
Basic Structure
Article 368 empowers Parliament to amend any provision of the Constitution, including the fundamental rights, but not to alter its basic structure or framework; an amendment that damages or destroys a basic feature is void, while ordinary legislation is tested against the express provisions of the Constitution and not against the basic structure as such.
Abstract
The basic structure doctrine limits the power to amend the Indian Constitution. This entry explains the idea behind it, the distinction between amending a constitution and replacing it, and how it compares with other systems. It traces the doctrine's origins through Shankari Prasad (1951), the doubts expressed in Sajjan Singh (1964), Golak Nath (1967) and the amendments of 1971, to the thirteen-judge decision in Kesavananda Bharati (1973) and the opinion of H.R. Khanna J. that decided it. It follows the doctrine's entrenchment in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), Minerva Mills (1980) and Waman Rao, sets out the features the Court has held basic and the tests it uses (M. Nagaraj, I.R. Coelho, Janhit Abhiyan), and explains why the doctrine does not apply to ordinary statutes (State of Karnataka, Kuldip Nayar, Anjum Kadari). It closes with the criticisms of the doctrine, its reception abroad, and the propositions that state the law today.
I. The doctrine
The rule
1Article 368 of the Constitution provides that Parliament may, in exercise of its constituent power, amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of the Constitution, by the procedure the Article lays down. Since Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court has held that this power, wide as it is, does not extend to altering the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. An amendment that damages or destroys a basic feature is void.
Amending is not replacing
2The doctrine rests on a simple idea: to amend something is to change it, not to destroy it and put something else in its place. A constitution that gives one of its own institutions the power to amend it does not, on that view, give that institution the power to abolish it. H.R. Khanna J., whose opinion decided Kesavananda, put it this way:
The word “amendment” postulates that the old Constitution survives without loss of its identity despite the change and continues even though it has been subjected to alterations.Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, AIR 1973 SC 1461 (Khanna J.).
3The idea is often expressed through a distinction between original and derived constituent power. The original power, exercised by a constituent assembly, makes a constitution and is not bound by any prior law. The derived power, conferred by the constitution on an organ it creates, is the power to amend; because it comes from the constitution, it is limited by it. Parliament, amending the Constitution under Article 368, exercises the second kind of power.
Comparisons
4Other systems handle the question differently. In the United Kingdom, Parliament is sovereign and there is no written constitution against which its Acts can be measured. In the United States, Article V makes amendment procedurally very difficult but imposes almost no substantive limit; its one remaining express limit is that no State may be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate without its consent. Germany, after the collapse of the Weimar Republic, wrote an express limit into Article 79(3) of its Basic Law, forbidding any amendment that affects the division of the federation into Länder, their participation in legislation, or the principles of Articles 1 and 20, including human dignity and the democratic and social federal state. India reached a comparable result by judicial interpretation rather than express text.
II. Origins
Shankari Prasad (1951)
5Soon after the Constitution came into force, High Courts struck down State laws abolishing zamindari as violations of the right to property. Parliament responded with the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which inserted Articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule to protect land reform laws. The amendment was challenged on the ground that it was a “law” that abridged fundamental rights and was therefore void under Article 13(2).
6In Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench rejected the argument.Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458, (1952) SCR 89 (Patanjali Sastri J.). Patanjali Sastri J. held:
in the context of article 13, “law” must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent powerSri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458; as quoted in Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
7Article 13(2) therefore did not affect amendments, and the power under Article 368 extended to the fundamental rights.
Sajjan Singh (1964)
8The question returned with the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, which extended Article 31A and added more statutes to the Ninth Schedule. In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, the Court upheld the amendment and followed Shankari Prasad, in a judgment of P.B. Gajendragadkar C.J. for himself, K.N. Wanchoo and Raghubar Dayal JJ.Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845, (1965) 1 SCR 933. M. Hidayatullah and J.R. Mudholkar JJ. agreed with the result but expressed doubts. Hidayatullah J. said that “The Constitution gives so many assurances in Part III that it would be difficult to think that they were the playthings of a special majority”.Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845 (Hidayatullah J.); as quoted in I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643. Mudholkar J. went further:
It is also a matter for consideration whether making a change in a basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely as an amendment or would it be, in effect, rewriting a part of the Constitution; and if the latter, would it be within the purview of Article 368Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845 (Mudholkar J.); as quoted in Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
9He referred to a decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Fazlul Quader Chowdhry v. Abdul Haque, which had held that a power to remove difficulties could not be used to alter the fundamental features of that country’s Constitution.Fazlul Quader Chowdhry v. Abdul Haque, PLD 1963 SC 486.
10In 1965 the German scholar Dietrich Conrad lectured at the Banaras Hindu University on implied limitations on the amending power, asking whether Parliament could, by amendment, abolish Article 21 or turn the republic into a monarchy. His argument reached counsel in the cases that followed and was developed in Kesavananda.
Golak Nath (1967)
11In I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, a Bench of eleven judges held, by six to five, that Parliament had no power to amend the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights.I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643, (1967) 2 SCR 762. K. Subba Rao C.J. wrote for himself, J.C. Shah, S.M. Sikri, J.M. Shelat and C.A. Vaidialingam JJ.; Hidayatullah J. agreed in a separate opinion; K.N. Wanchoo, R.S. Bachawat, V. Ramaswami, G.K. Mitter and V. Bhargava JJ. dissented.
12Subba Rao C.J. held that Article 368, as it then stood, set out only the procedure for amendment; the power to amend came from Parliament’s residuary legislative power; an amendment was therefore a “law” within Article 13(2) and was void to the extent that it abridged a fundamental right. To avoid unsettling the land reform laws already enacted, the Court applied the doctrine of prospective overruling: the earlier amendments remained valid, but Parliament would have no power, in future, to abridge the fundamental rights.
The amendments of 1971
13Parliament responded after the general election of 1971. The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 inserted Article 13(4), providing that nothing in Article 13 applies to an amendment made under Article 368, and rewrote Article 368 to state that Parliament may, in exercise of its constituent power, amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of the Constitution. The Twenty-fifth Amendment replaced “compensation” in Article 31(2) with “amount”, and inserted Article 31C, protecting laws giving effect to the directive principles in Article 39(b) and (c) from challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 31, and providing that no law containing a declaration that it gave effect to that policy could be questioned on the ground that it did not. The Twenty-ninth Amendment added two Kerala land reform statutes to the Ninth Schedule. The amendments followed the Court’s decisions in the bank nationalisation and privy purses cases.R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248; Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85.
III. Kesavananda Bharati (1973)
The case
14Kesavananda Bharati, head of the Edneer Mutt in Kerala, challenged the Kerala land reform legislation affecting the Mutt’s property, and, when the 1971 amendments were made, challenged those as well.Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, AIR 1973 SC 1461. Because Golak Nath had been decided by eleven judges, a Bench of thirteen was constituted: S.M. Sikri C.J., J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Grover, A.N. Ray, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, D.G. Palekar, H.R. Khanna, K.K. Mathew, M.H. Beg, S.N. Dwivedi, A.K. Mukherjea and Y.V. Chandrachud JJ. N.A. Palkhivala argued for the petitioner; the Union and the States, among them Kerala represented by H.M. Seervai, contended that the amending power was unlimited. The hearing ran from October 1972 to March 1973, and judgment was delivered on 24 April 1973 in eleven opinions.
The opinions
15Six judges, Sikri C.J., Shelat, Grover, Hegde, Mukherjea and Jaganmohan Reddy JJ., held that the amending power was subject to inherent and implied limitations. Sikri C.J. gave as examples of basic features the supremacy of the Constitution, the republican and democratic form of government, the secular character of the Constitution, the separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, and the federal character of the Constitution. The other judges in this group gave similar lists.
16Six judges, Ray, Palekar, Mathew, Beg, Dwivedi and Chandrachud JJ., held that there were no such limitations, and that the power to amend under Article 368 extended to every provision.
17Khanna J. held that there were no implied limitations of the kind the first group described, but that the word “amendment” itself contained a limit. He rejected the idea that the Constitution could be abrogated by amendment:
amendment of the Constitution necessarily contemplates that the Constitution has not to be abrogated but only changes have to be made in it.Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (Khanna J.).
18And he stated the scope of the power:
Subject to the retention of the basic structure or framework of the Constitution, I have no doubt that the power of amendment is plenary and would include within itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles including those relating to fundamental rights.Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (Khanna J.).
19He also held that the right to property was not part of the basic structure. His opinion was the narrowest ground on which a majority could be formed: seven judges agreed that the amending power was limited, and seven, including Khanna J., agreed that it extended to the fundamental rights.
What was decided
20A summary of the view of the majority, signed by nine of the judges, recorded the result. Golak Nath was overruled. Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. The Twenty-fourth Amendment was valid. The Twenty-fifth Amendment was valid except for the part of Article 31C that made the legislature’s declaration conclusive and excluded judicial review, which was struck down. The Twenty-ninth Amendment was valid, but the statutes it added to the Ninth Schedule remained open to examination.
IV. Entrenchment
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)
21On 12 June 1975, the Allahabad High Court set aside the election of Indira Gandhi to the Lok Sabha for corrupt practices. A national Emergency was proclaimed on 25 June. Parliament then passed the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, inserting Article 329A, clause (4) of which provided that the election laws should not apply to the election of the Prime Minister or the Speaker, and that such an election should not be void, notwithstanding any court’s order declaring it void.
22In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, a Constitution Bench of A.N. Ray C.J., H.R. Khanna, K.K. Mathew, M.H. Beg and Y.V. Chandrachud JJ. struck down clause (4).Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1, AIR 1975 SC 2299. Four of the five had been in the minority in Kesavananda; all accepted the basic structure doctrine as binding. Khanna J. held that free and fair elections are part of the democratic structure, and that validating an election held to be void for corrupt practices, without applying any law, offended it. Chandrachud J. held that the clause offended equality and the rule of law:
these provisions are an outright negation of the right of equality conferred by Article 14, a right which more than any other is a basic postulate of our ConstitutionIndira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1 (Chandrachud J.).
23Mathew J. held that an amendment deciding a particular election dispute was an exercise of judicial power that the constituent body could not perform. Later in 1975, a Bench of thirteen judges was convened to reconsider Kesavananda; after two days of hearing it was dissolved, and the reconsideration did not proceed.
Minerva Mills (1980)
24During the Emergency, the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 added clauses (4) and (5) to Article 368, providing that no amendment could be called in question in any court on any ground and declaring that there was no limitation on Parliament’s constituent power. It also extended Article 31C to protect laws giving effect to any of the directive principles.
25In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench struck down both changes.Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625, AIR 1980 SC 1789. On clauses (4) and (5), Y.V. Chandrachud C.J. said:
Since the Constitution had conferred a limited amending power on the Parliament, the Parliament cannot under the exercise of that limited power enlarge that very power into an absolute power. Indeed, a limited amending power is one of the basic features of our Constitution and therefore, the limitations on that power cannot be destroyed.Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 (Chandrachud C.J.).
26On Article 31C, the majority held, P.N. Bhagwati J. dissenting, that subordinating the rights in Articles 14 and 19 to all the directive principles destroyed the balance between Parts III and IV, which it described as part of the basic structure.
Waman Rao (1981)
27In Waman Rao v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench in a judgment of Chandrachud C.J. fixed the date from which the doctrine applies to the Ninth Schedule.Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362, AIR 1981 SC 271. Amendments made before 24 April 1973, the date of Kesavananda, were not open to challenge on the ground that they damaged the basic structure; amendments made on or after that date were.
V. Basic features and tests
The features
28The Court has never given a closed list of basic features, but it has identified many. They include the supremacy of the Constitution; the republican and democratic form of government, including free and fair elections (Kesavananda; Indira Gandhi); the rule of law and equality (Indira Gandhi); the separation of powers; secularism and federalism, both affirmed by a nine-judge Bench in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India;S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1, AIR 1994 SC 1918. the limited nature of the amending power and the balance between Parts III and IV (Minerva Mills); judicial review; and the independence of the judiciary.
29On judicial review, a Bench of seven judges in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, in a judgment of A.M. Ahmadi C.J., considered provisions inserted by the Forty-second Amendment that allowed administrative tribunals to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts.L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261, AIR 1997 SC 1125. It held:
the power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Articles 226 and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structureL. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 (Ahmadi C.J.).
30Tribunals could perform a supplemental role, but could not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
31On judicial independence, a Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India struck down, by four to one (J. Chelameswar J. dissenting), the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014, holding that the composition of the Commission compromised the primacy of the judiciary in appointments and so the independence of the judiciary.Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1.
Width and identity: M. Nagaraj
32In M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench, in a judgment of S.H. Kapadia J., considered amendments enabling reservation in promotion for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, with consequential seniority.M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212, AIR 2007 SC 71. It examined the amendments under two tests: whether they enlarged the width of the State’s power beyond constitutional limits, and whether they altered the identity of the Constitution. It upheld them as enabling provisions, subject to the State showing backwardness, inadequacy of representation and the maintenance of efficiency in administration under Article 335, and to the limits laid down in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India.Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217.
The economically weaker sections: Janhit Abhiyan (2022)
33In Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench considered the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, which enabled reservation of up to ten per cent for economically weaker sections of citizens other than the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes.Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1. By three to two, the Court upheld it. The majority (Dinesh Maheshwari, Bela M. Trivedi and J.B. Pardiwala JJ.) held that reservation on economic criteria alone does not damage the basic structure, that the exclusion of classes already eligible for reservation under other provisions does not do so either, and that the fifty per cent ceiling stated in Indra Sawhney applies to reservations for backward classes and is not inflexible. S. Ravindra Bhat J., with U.U. Lalit C.J., dissented, holding that excluding the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes from a benefit given on the ground of poverty was a form of discrimination that violated the equality code and so the basic structure. The division shows how much depends on how broadly or narrowly a basic feature is described.
The Ninth Schedule: I.R. Coelho (2007)
34In I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, a Bench of nine judges, in a judgment of Y.K. Sabharwal C.J., held that statutes placed in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 are open to challenge on the ground that they damage the basic structure.I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1, AIR 2007 SC 861. The Ninth Schedule cannot give a statute immunity that an amendment could not itself obtain. The Court applied what it called the “rights test”: it looks at the effect of the law on the fundamental rights, and if the law abrogates or abridges rights in Part III that form part of the basic structure, particularly those in Articles 14, 19 and 21, the protection of Article 31B is withdrawn.
VI. Ordinary legislation
35The basic structure doctrine limits the power to amend the Constitution. It does not, on the settled view, provide a separate ground for challenging ordinary legislation. A statute may be struck down for want of legislative competence or for violating a provision of the Constitution, including Part III; it is not tested directly against the basic structure.
36The view goes back to Indira Gandhi, where the majority held that the validity of a statute could not be challenged for violation of the basic structure, and to State of Karnataka v. Union of India.State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC 608. It was followed in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India.Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1. In Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, the Allahabad High Court had struck down the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 for violating secularism as a basic feature. A Bench of D.Y. Chandrachud C.J., J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra JJ., in a judgment of the Chief Justice, reversed it, and summarised the law:
a statute can be struck down only for the violation of Part III or any other provision of the Constitution or for being without legislative competence. The constitutional validity of a statute cannot be challenged for the violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. The reason is that concepts such as democracy, federalism, and secularism are undefined concepts.Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 831, ¶ 55 (Chandrachud C.J.).
37Allowing courts to strike down legislation for violating such concepts, it said, would introduce uncertainty into constitutional adjudication; a challenge must be traced to the express provisions of the Constitution. Decisions striking down statutes about tribunals on grounds of judicial independence, such as those in the Madras Bar Association cases, are best understood in that way, as giving effect to specific constitutional provisions rather than to the basic structure as such.Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2014) 10 SCC 1; Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2021) 7 SCC 369.
VII. Criticism and reception abroad
Criticism
38The doctrine has been criticised on three grounds. The first is textual: Article 368 contains no such limit, and since 1971 it has expressly empowered Parliament to amend any provision. The second is democratic: the doctrine gives judges a final say over amendments passed by the people’s representatives by special majorities. The third is uncertainty: since the Court has not given a closed list of basic features, what counts as one depends on the Bench.
39Its defenders answer that the doctrine guards against the use of lawful amendment procedures to dismantle democracy from within, as happened during the Emergency, and that it protects the choices of the people who made the Constitution against those of a temporary majority acting under it. H.M. Seervai, who argued against the doctrine in Kesavananda for Kerala, later came to defend it in his treatise.H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th edn, Universal Law Publishing).
Reception abroad
40The doctrine has influenced courts elsewhere. In Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh struck down an amendment that dispersed the High Court Division into permanent regional benches.Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh, 1989 BLD (Spl) 1. In District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of Pakistan, a Bench of seventeen judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan discussed the “salient features” of that country’s Constitution, though the judges divided on whether courts could strike down amendments for violating them.District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2015 SC 401. In Kenya, the High Court and Court of Appeal relied on the doctrine in the Building Bridges Initiative litigation, but the Supreme Court, while upholding the result on other grounds, held by a majority that the basic structure doctrine does not apply in Kenya.Attorney General v. David Ndii, [2022] KESC 8 (KLR). In January 2024 the Supreme Court of Israel struck down an amendment to a Basic Law that would have barred review of government decisions for unreasonableness, holding that it had power to review Basic Laws in extreme cases.Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Knesset, HCJ 5658/23 (Supreme Court of Israel, 1 January 2024).
VIII. The position today
41The law on the basic structure doctrine in India may be stated in seven propositions.
421. Parliament may, under Article 368, amend any provision of the Constitution, including the fundamental rights, but it may not alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution (Kesavananda Bharati).
432. An amendment is void only if it damages or destroys a basic feature; that it changes or limits a provision is not enough (Kesavananda Bharati, Khanna J.; M. Nagaraj).
443. The basic features are not closed. They include the supremacy of the Constitution, democracy and free and fair elections, the rule of law and equality, the separation of powers, secularism, federalism, judicial review, the independence of the judiciary, the limited nature of the amending power, and the balance between Parts III and IV (Kesavananda Bharati; Indira Gandhi; Minerva Mills; S.R. Bommai; L. Chandra Kumar; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association).
454. The power to amend cannot be used to enlarge itself into an unlimited power, or to exclude judicial review of amendments (Minerva Mills).
465. Amendments made before 24 April 1973 are not open to challenge for damaging the basic structure; those made on or after that date are (Waman Rao). Statutes added to the Ninth Schedule after that date may be examined under the rights test (I.R. Coelho).
476. Courts examine an amendment by asking whether it enlarges the State’s power beyond constitutional limits and whether it alters the identity of the Constitution (M. Nagaraj; Janhit Abhiyan).
487. Ordinary legislation is not tested directly against the basic structure. It may be struck down only for want of legislative competence or for violating Part III or another provision of the Constitution (Indira Gandhi; State of Karnataka; Kuldip Nayar; Anjum Kadari).
History
- Published · 27 October 2026
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