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2026 FPR EDC 28 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/trivial-acts
DC-0110Doctrines · Criminal · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 28
FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 3,202 words
Trivial Acts
Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, carried forward as section 33 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, excepts from criminal liability harm so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it; the exception covers deliberately caused harm and physical injury, and whether harm is trivial depends on the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention behind the act and related matters, so that it cannot be assumed in an affront to a woman's modesty.
Abstract
Penal definitions are broad, and literally read they would criminalise many minor incidents of everyday life. Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (now section 33 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) excludes them. This entry sets out the section and its function as a general exception, the leading decision in Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan, the factors that determine triviality, the Supreme Court's treatment of the exception in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, the difference between a trivial act and a petty offence, and the burden and timing of the plea.
I. The exception
The text
1Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 provides:
Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 95, as set out in Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan, AIR 1966 SC 1773. Section 33 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the provision forward.
2It belongs to Chapter IV of the Code, on general exceptions. Every definition of an offence is to be understood subject to those exceptions, so section 95 does not need to be repeated in each offence. The common law’s idea of de minimis non curat lex, that the law does not concern itself with trifles, is its obvious ancestor, though the section has its own terms and the courts apply those terms.
Why it is needed
3The definitions in the Penal Code are written broadly and in general language. A person who jostles someone on a crowded bus, or who takes a sheet of paper from an office, might literally come within a definition. The Code does not leave such situations to prosecutorial restraint alone. In the words of the Supreme Court in Veeda Menezes:
It is true that the object of framing s. 95 was to exclude from the operation of the Penal Code those cases which from the imperfection of language may fall within the letter of the law, but are not within its spirit and are considered, and for the most part dealt with by the Courts, as innocent.Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan, AIR 1966 SC 1773, 1966 SCR 123 (J.C. Shah J.).
II. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan
The facts
4Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan, decided by three judges, is the leading authority. In the course of an altercation between neighbours, the first respondent slapped the appellant’s servant and “threw at the appellant’s husband a ‘file’ of papers”. The file missed the husband and hit the appellant’s elbow, causing a scratch. Her complaint described a house trespass, a shoe thrown at her, and a “bleeding incised wound on the forearm”. The police sub-inspector found a mere scratch on her elbow. A Presidency Magistrate convicted the first respondent under section 323 of the Code. The High Court set the conviction aside, holding that the act came within section 95. In the Supreme Court’s words, “The offence was petty, but was given undue importance.”
The two arguments
5The appellant made two arguments. The first was that section 95 applies only where the act is accidental and not deliberate. The Court rejected that as contrary to the section’s words. “It cannot however be said that harm caused by doing an act with intent to cause harm or with the knowledge that harm may be caused thereby, will not fall within the terms of s. 95. The argument is belied by the plain terms of s. 95.” Since the section covers an act that “causes”, or is “intended to cause” or “known to be likely to cause” harm, intent to harm is in terms contemplated.
6The second argument was that the section could not apply where the harm consisted of physical injury. The Court rejected that too. Reported in the headnote, the reasoning is that there is nothing in the section to justify the contention, that section 95 is a general exception, and that the word “harm” has a wide connotation in many other sections on general exceptions, inclusive of physical injury. There is no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended to use it restrictively here.
The test
7The Court then stated what matters:
Whether, an offence is trivial must depend on the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention with which the offending act is done, and other related matters.Veeda Menezes, AIR 1966 SC 1773, reported headnote.
8The list is open. It looks to the injury itself, but it also looks to the context. The same scratch may be trivial in a heated exchange between neighbours and may carry a different character if it was caused to a child or a person in a dependent position, or as part of a plan to intimidate. The decision thus treats the provision as a matter of judgment on the facts, and not as a fixed measure of harm.
III. The standard of ordinary sense and temper
An objective measure
9The section does not ask whether this complainant did complain. In Veeda Menezes, the complainant plainly did. It asks whether a “person of ordinary sense and temper” would. That is an objective test. It therefore protects an accused against an unusually sensitive or vindictive complainant, and it equally prevents an accused from saying that the victim was too timid to object.
10The objective standard does not mean the context is ignored. The factors listed in Veeda Menezes tell the court to ask how a person of ordinary sense and temper would react in the position of this complainant, in the actual relationship between these parties. A person of ordinary temper at a noisy family quarrel may shrug off words which the same person would not accept in public from a superior.
Relationship with the size of the harm
11The word “harm” is broad and is not limited to bodily or monetary loss. Reputation, feelings, property and dignity may all be harmed. The exception’s terms depend on how slight the harm is, not on what kind of harm it is. That carries a corresponding limit: a harm that looks physically slight may be serious in the sense the section cares about, if what is harmed is a person’s dignity.
IV. Rupan Deol Bajaj
The High Court’s use of section 95
12Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill is the decision most often cited on that limit. A senior IAS officer alleged that the respondent, a very senior police officer, had behaved indecently towards her at a party, including slapping her on the posterior. The High Court quashed the FIR for several reasons, including that “the nature of harm allegedly caused to Mrs. Bajaj did not entitle her to complain about the same in view of Section 95 IPC”.Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194, AIR 1996 SC 309 (M.K. Mukherjee J.).
13Before the Supreme Court, counsel for the appellant argued that in a case where the modesty of a woman is involved, “the said section cannot have any manner of application”. Counsel for the respondent, in fairness, conceded that two of the High Court’s reasons could not be sustained, although he supported its other conclusions, including on section 95.
The Supreme Court’s reversal
14The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, holding that “the High Court has committed a gross error of law in quashing the FIR and the complaint”. It found that the alleged slapping was the finale to earlier overtures, and that the allegations disclosed offences under sections 354 and 509 of the Code. Nothing in the FIR indicated that the act was accidental or a slip. Its reasoning treats an alleged outrage of modesty as a serious matter that cannot be dismissed as a trifle. The decision is rightly read as establishing that section 95 is not a route to dispose of an allegation of this kind at the threshold of an investigation. Taken with Veeda Menezes, it shows why the factors matter. The position of the parties, the setting and the nature of the harm in that case pointed clearly against triviality. The physical slightness of an act does not settle the question.
15It is sometimes said that the decision makes section 95 categorically inapplicable to offences of outraging modesty. That is a fair inference from the logic and is how the case is often used, but it should be stated with care. The judgment’s central concern is whether the allegations disclosed offences and whether the High Court was justified in quashing the proceedings. The practical effect is plain, and any court invoking section 95 for such an allegation would have to confront Rupan Deol Bajaj directly.
V. Trivial acts and petty offences
The difference
16Section 95 is not a sentencing principle, and it is not concerned with offences that are merely minor. A minor offence remains an offence, punished lightly. An act within section 95 is no offence at all. Three consequences follow. A successful plea means an acquittal or a quashing, not a reduced sentence. The plea is available for an offence that is in principle serious, if the harm in the case is so slight, though that will rarely be so. And the statute’s provision of community service for certain first-time minor offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 does not affect section 33: those provisions punish what is still an offence, in a new way.
Regulatory and public offences
17Harm in the case of many regulatory offences is not personal. It is a harm to the public or to a scheme of regulation. A small quantity of contraband or a small adulteration may do little harm in itself, but the relevant harm is the danger that the law aims to prevent. For this reason section 95 will rarely help in such cases, and the test itself explains why: the “person of ordinary sense and temper” is asked whether the harm is something that would be complained of, and public health or economic offences are the sort of harm of which the community would complain.
Words and insults
18Trivial words between people in a quarrel raise the question directly, particularly under the provisions on insult and defamation. The section is not limited to physical conduct. In the setting of a sharp commercial or personal dispute, the question is what a person of ordinary sense and temper would make of the words. Those provisions have their own elements and exceptions, and a court must apply those first. Section 95 is the general safety-valve beyond them.
VI. Procedure
Burden
19Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, whose rule is carried forward in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, places the burden of proving the circumstances bringing a case within a general exception on the accused, and the court presumes the absence of such circumstances. On that footing, an accused who pleads section 95 must show the circumstances, though the prosecution’s own evidence may do so. In Veeda Menezes the triviality appeared from the facts as they emerged in the case.
Timing
20The plea is available at any stage, but its value varies with the stage. At the trial stage, the evidence will show what was done, between whom and how. At the stage of quashing, the court only has the allegations. Because the factors require context, a court should be slow to dismiss a complaint on section 95 grounds at the threshold unless triviality is plain on the complaint’s own terms. Rupan Deol Bajaj is a warning against doing so where the allegation concerns dignity or modesty.
The court’s attitude to exaggeration
21Veeda Menezes also shows how section 95 intersects with exaggeration. The complainant’s account of a wound and a thrown shoe grew larger than what the police found. A court may rightly consider, in judging triviality, what the injury in fact was rather than how it was described.
VII. Further questions
What the Court said about harm
22Veeda Menezes defined the central term with some care. The expression “harm”, it pointed out, has not been defined in the Code, and in its dictionary meaning “it connotes hurt, injury; damage; impairment, moral wrong or evil”. That is why the Court would not limit it. It observed that the section applies “if the act causes harm or is intended to cause harm or is known to be likely to cause harm, provided the harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.”Veeda Menezes, AIR 1966 SC 1773. The test is therefore about the size of the harm. It is not about the character of the act. An act done in anger, with intent to harm, can come within the section if the harm is slight.
23It also follows that a conviction for a trivial act is not merely a matter of a lighter sentence. In Veeda Menezes the Magistrate had convicted and the High Court set the conviction aside. The appeal against that was dismissed, and the first respondent stood acquitted of the offence.
The modesty cases
24Rupan Deol Bajaj contains a discussion that shows what the word “harm” misses if it is considered only in physical terms. Looking at the alleged slap, the Court said “it cannot but be held that the alleged act of Mr. Gill in slapping Mrs. Bajaj on her posterior amounted to ‘outraging of her modesty’ for it was not only an affront to the normal sense of feminine decency but also an affront to the dignity of the lady”.Rupan Deol Bajaj, (1995) 6 SCC 194. It also dealt with an argument that the necessary intention was missing, by reference to the circumstances: “the slapping was the finale to the earlier overtures”, the act being committed “in the presence of a gathering comprising the elite of the society”. The harm in such a case is to dignity. In the setting of that case, that harm could not be treated as something no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of.
25Other offences involving sexual harassment raise the same point. An act that seems minor as a matter of physical force may be serious in its meaning. Section 95 must be applied with the factors in Veeda Menezes in mind: the nature of the injury and the position of the parties are expressly relevant.
Authority and the position of the parties
26The position of the parties can make the same act more or less serious. In Rupan Deol Bajaj, the accused was a very senior police officer and the complainant an IAS officer, at a social gathering. In Veeda Menezes, the parties were neighbours in a quarrel. A court should ask how the relationship affected what was done and how it would be received. A jostle between strangers is different from the same contact by a person in a position of authority over the other, or towards a vulnerable person. The phrase “person of ordinary sense and temper” does not exclude those considerations, since a person of ordinary sense would take the relationship into account in deciding whether to complain.
Intention and knowledge
27The third factor in Veeda Menezes is the knowledge or intention with which the act is done. The section’s text, as the Court said, covers intended harm. This factor therefore cannot mean that an intentional act falls outside the exception. It rather means that intention may help in judging how serious the act was. Throwing a file in the heat of a quarrel, as in Veeda Menezes, is a very different thing from a calculated act of the same physical force meant to humiliate. Where an act is part of a course of conduct, the court should look at the whole course and not treat each step on its own, as Rupan Deol Bajaj’s reference to earlier overtures shows.
Taking and property
28Section 95 can apply to property as well as to the person. A trifling taking may in principle come within it. The value is not the only factor, though it will often be important. A taking of something of little value, in circumstances that show no real wrong, may be excused. A pattern of small takings from an employer, or a taking which is a breach of trust, raises different concerns. The rule of the English common law that the law does not concern itself with trifles is a helpful guide, but courts must keep in view that the section’s standard is what a person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of.
Regulated conduct
29Statutes that protect public health or the revenue often punish very small breaches deliberately, because a small quantity of adulterated food, or a small undeclared item, may be part of a larger harm. A court should begin by asking what the statute is aimed at and whether Parliament intended to catch small amounts. Some statutes state a minimum quantity, and that may answer the question. Where a statute fixes no such minimum, an argument under section 95 is not impossible, but the harm that it considers will be the harm against which the statute is directed. Section 40 of the Penal Code extends the word “offence” in Chapter IV to things punishable under special or local laws, so the exception is not in terms confined to the Penal Code, but the scheme of the particular statute must still be considered.
Reform in the 2023 codes
30The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 keeps the exception in section 33. It separately introduces community service as a punishment for some minor offences, including a first conviction for petty theft where the property is returned and the value is small. These provisions do not replace the exception. They offer a different response to minor offending in cases that are still offences. A court should therefore first consider whether the act is an offence at all, and only then consider the appropriate sentence. An accused should not concede the first question merely because the second may have a lenient answer.
Prosecutorial and judicial discretion
31Nothing in section 95 prevents the police from declining to investigate an evidently trivial complaint, or a Magistrate from refusing to take action on one. A complaint can also be dismissed under section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, now section 226 of the 2023 Sanhita, if there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. The cost to the accused of even a small prosecution may be high. The court in Veeda Menezes commented on the way a petty matter had been made to appear more serious, and a court at an early stage should be alert to that. The caution from Rupan Deol Bajaj remains, however. A court should not treat a complaint as trivial without a proper appreciation of what the complainant says happened and of what it meant.
VIII. The position today
32Section 95, now section 33 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, is a general exception that makes an act no offence if the harm caused, intended or known to be likely is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it. It applies to deliberate acts as well as accidental ones and to physical injury as well as other harm. Whether the harm is trivial depends on the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention with which the act is done and other related matters. Physical slightness is therefore not decisive. The Supreme Court in Rupan Deol Bajaj set aside a High Court order that had used the section, among other grounds, to quash proceedings in a case involving an alleged outrage of a woman’s modesty, and a court should not use the section to dismiss such allegations.
33A person considering this defence should ask whether the case is truly about nothing. If a reasonable person in the complainant’s position would have let it pass, the section may apply. If the complaint reflects a real injury to person, dignity or the public interest, however small it appears in physical terms, the section will not be an answer.
History
- Published · 31 October 2026
© 2026 First Precedent Research. Free to share and adapt with credit, for non-commercial use, under CC BY-NC 4.0. A published piece is changed only to correct an error, and each correction is listed under History. If the law changes, we add a linked afterword. Nothing on FPR is legal advice.