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2026 FPR EDC 36 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/necessity-as-a-criminal-defence
DC-0106Doctrines · Criminal · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 36
FPR Editors21 November 2026 · 2,017 words
Necessity as a Criminal Defence
Section 81 of the Indian Penal Code, now section 19 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, excuses an act done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it is done without any criminal intention to cause harm and in good faith to prevent or avoid other harm to person or property, and the harm avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify the risk; because it protects only acts done without intention to cause harm, it does not excuse the deliberate killing of an innocent person to save oneself or others, which the common law also refused to excuse in R v. Dudley and Stephens.
Abstract
The Code of 1860 put the defence of necessity into a single section with two illustrations: a ship's captain who alters course and risks running down a boat with two passengers to avoid one with twenty or thirty, and a man who pulls down houses to stop a fire spreading. This entry explains the elements of section 81, the role of its Explanation in making the nature and imminence of the threatened harm a question of fact, and the requirement of good faith under section 52. It distinguishes necessity from private defence and from the exceptions for acts done for a person's benefit, considers the leading English case of the shipwrecked sailors in Dudley and Stephens (1884) and the reason section 81 cannot reach intentional killing, and describes how Indian courts have applied the section, from the Madras Full Bench in Gopal Naidu (1922), which pointed to it as a protection for restraining a dangerous person, to recent High Court decisions in which the plea failed for want of evidence of any greater harm.
I. The Doctrine
1Section 81 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, now section 19 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, provides:
“Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property.”Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 81, as set out in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Arjun Singh, Himachal Pradesh High Court, Cr. Appeal No. 495 of 2011, decided 7 July 2026.
2An Explanation adds:
“It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm.”Arjun Singh.
3The section has four elements. The act is done with knowledge that it is likely to cause harm. It is done without any criminal intention to cause harm. It is done in good faith. And it is done to prevent or avoid other harm to person or property. The Explanation adds a fifth requirement, expressed as a question of fact: the harm to be avoided must be of such a nature and so imminent that it justifies or excuses the risk taken.
II. The Illustrations
4The two illustrations show the kind of case the section was written for.
5In the first, the captain of a steam vessel, through no fault of his own, finds that before he can stop he must run down a boat carrying twenty or thirty passengers, unless he changes course; if he does, he risks running down a boat with two passengers, which he may possibly clear. If he changes course in good faith to avoid the danger to the larger boat, without any intention to run down the smaller one, he commits no offence even if he does run it down, provided the danger he meant to avoid was such as to excuse the risk.
6In the second, a person in a great fire pulls down houses to stop the fire from spreading, intending in good faith to save life or property. If the harm to be prevented was of such a nature and so imminent as to excuse the act, he is not guilty of an offence.
7Both illustrations concern a choice between harms, made in an emergency, by a person who does not want to cause the harm that results from his choice. The captain does not want to hit the small boat; he accepts a risk of doing so to avoid a near-certain disaster. The man pulling down houses knows he is destroying property; he does so to save more. Neither intends harm as an end, and neither causes harm he could reasonably have avoided.
III. Without Criminal Intention to Cause Harm
Knowledge, not intention
8The section protects acts done with knowledge that harm is likely, not acts done with the intention of causing it. The distinction is between knowing and wanting. The Kerala High Court put it this way in Saseendran v. State of Kerala:
“This section stipulates the absence of criminal intention. This means that this section contemplates a situation that the accused has knowledge that he is likely to cause harm but such knowledge shall not be held against him. The primary importance of the protection is that such an act has been done in good faith i.e. with good care and attention.”Saseendran v. State of Kerala, Kerala High Court, Crl. R.P. No. 193 of 2005, decided 27 March 2015.
9The word “criminal” qualifies the intention. The man pulling down a house intends to pull it down, and in that sense intends harm to property, but he does not intend the harm as a criminal object; his purpose is to save life or property. A person who sets out to injure someone, by contrast, has a criminal intention to cause harm, and section 81 cannot protect him, however good his reasons.
Necessity and private defence
10This is why section 81 is distinct from the right of private defence in sections 96 to 106. Private defence permits harm to be intentionally inflicted on an aggressor, within limits, to repel an attack. Section 81 is concerned with harm that is a foreseen side effect of an act done to avert a danger, often to persons who are not the source of it. The two sometimes overlap in practice, but a person who intentionally strikes another to stop an attack must justify himself under the provisions on private defence, not under section 81.
11Section 81 is also distinct from the exceptions in sections 88, 89 and 92, which protect acts done in good faith for the benefit of a person, with his consent or, in emergencies, without it. Those exceptions concern harm to the person who benefits, such as a surgeon’s operation. Section 81 concerns harm to anyone, done to avoid harm to anyone.
IV. Good Faith and Imminence
Good faith
12Section 52 provides that nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care and attention. The person relying on section 81 must therefore have acted with reasonable care in assessing both the danger and the response. A belief that a danger existed, formed carelessly, does not qualify.
The question of fact
13The Explanation leaves the critical judgment to the court as a question of fact. The court asks what harm was threatened, how serious it was, how soon it would have occurred, and whether the risk taken by the accused was justified in proportion to it. The illustrations make the same point twice: the captain is protected “if it be found” that the danger was such as to excuse the risk, and the man in the fire “if it be found” that the harm to be prevented was of such a nature and so imminent as to excuse his act.
14The section therefore gives no protection for a harm that was remote or speculative, or one that could have been avoided in some less harmful way. It does not license a person to cause harm because, on his own view of the public good, the end justified it.
V. Dudley and Stephens
15The limit of the doctrine is shown by the English case that the catalogue entry names, R v. Dudley and Stephens. In 1884 the yacht Mignonette sank in the South Atlantic. Four survivors, the captain Dudley, the mate Stephens, a seaman named Brooks and a seventeen-year-old cabin boy, Richard Parker, drifted in a small boat for nearly three weeks with almost no food. When the boy was very weak, Dudley and Stephens killed him, and the three men lived on his body until they were rescued a few days later. They were tried for murder, and the jury found the facts by special verdict, including that the men would probably have died had they not done it.
16The Queen’s Bench Division held that this was murder. The judgment of Lord Coleridge C.J. rejected any rule that a person may kill an innocent person to save his own life. To preserve one’s life, he said, “is generally speaking a duty, but it may be the plainest and highest duty to sacrifice it”.R v. Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 QBD 273, as quoted in Arjun Singh. The sentence of death was passed and then commuted by the Crown to six months’ imprisonment.
17Section 81 reaches the same result by its terms. An act that kills or injures a person deliberately, to use his body or to remove him as a burden, is done with intention to cause harm. However great the danger to the others, the section does not protect it. The captain in the first illustration may risk the lives of two to save twenty, because he does not intend to harm the two. He may not choose one person and kill him to save the rest.
VI. Indian Applications
Restraint of a dangerous person
18In In re Gopal Naidu a Full Bench of the Madras High Court considered whether police constables who had arrested a drunken man causing a disturbance could rely on the English common law power of any person to restrain a breach of the peace. The Court held that the Code was a complete statement of the criminal law, and that the answer had to be found in it. Phillips J. said that section 81 might be considered in such cases, and Devadoss J. said that an earlier decision, upholding the arrest of a drunken man by a village magistrate, should have rested on that section:
“A private person is justified in doing an act which would prevent any harm happening to himself or to another person provided he does that act, bona fide and without unnecessary force or violence.”Gopal Naidu v. King-Emperor, (1923) ILR 46 Mad 605 (FB).
19The case illustrates a modest but important use of the section: restraining a person whose conduct threatens others, where the restraint is no more than necessary and is done in good faith.
20The Full Bench’s wider point concerned codification. Phillips J. said of section 81 that, although he was not prepared to say it was strictly applicable to the facts referred, “it appears to me that it and other provisions of chapter IV of the Penal Code have been framed to provide for cases like the present one, to which before the enactment of the Code, the common law would have applied.”Gopal Naidu. The general exceptions, in other words, replaced the common law defences, and a court looking for a justification for an act that would otherwise be an offence must find it in the Code.
The plea that fails
21Most recent cases in which section 81 is raised are cases in which it fails, because there is no evidence of the greater harm said to have been avoided. In Saseendran the accused had taken a bottle from a shop veranda, and when the shopkeeper resisted, thrown it down so that the broken glass injured him. The accused claimed the protection of section 81. The Court asked what greater evil he had avoided, and found nothing in the evidence to show any necessity. The conviction for causing hurt and house trespass was upheld.
22In Arjun Singh a tanker had struck a State transport bus on the wrong side of the road; two passengers died and ten or twelve were injured. The tanker’s driver said he had moved across because a car was overtaking the bus. The High Court observed that the section “applies where a smaller harm is caused while trying to protect a major harm”,Arjun Singh, quoting Kutcharlapati Krishnam Raju v. State, 2003 (2) APLJ 469. but held that the benefit was not available because no car was found at the scene, which falsified the defence version. The acquittal recorded in appeal was set aside and the conviction restored.
23These cases show the evidential burden that section 81 places on the accused. Because the general exceptions are matters the accused must establish under section 105 of the Evidence Act, now section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, he must bring the circumstances of necessity before the court. A bare assertion that the harm was caused to avoid something worse is not enough.
VII. The Position Today
24A person who does an act knowing that it is likely to cause harm commits no offence if he acts without any criminal intention to cause harm and in good faith, to prevent or avoid other harm to person or property, and the harm to be avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk. The provision is now section 19 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, with the same Explanation and illustrations.
25Whether the threatened harm justified the risk is a question of fact, judged by its nature and imminence and by whether the accused’s response was proportionate and taken with due care. The section does not protect harm intended as such, and so does not excuse the deliberate killing or injuring of an innocent person to save oneself or others. Harm intentionally inflicted on an aggressor is governed by the right of private defence, and harm done to a person for his own benefit by the exceptions in sections 26 to 30 of the Sanhita. The accused must prove the circumstances that bring him within the section.
History
- Published · 21 November 2026
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