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2026 FPR EDC 32 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/intoxication

DC-0108Doctrines · Criminal · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 32

FPR Editors21 November 2026 · 2,026 words

Intoxication

Intoxication is a complete defence under section 85 of the Indian Penal Code, now section 23 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, only where it was caused without the person's knowledge or against his will and left him incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it was wrong or contrary to law; voluntary intoxication is no defence, and under section 86, now section 24, the drunken person is treated as having the knowledge he would have had if sober, although intoxication so severe that it prevented him from forming a specific intention may be taken into account in deciding whether he had it.

Abstract

The Code of 1860 deals with intoxication in two sections. Section 85 gives a complete defence where the intoxicant was administered to the accused without his knowledge or against his will and he was, as a result, incapable of understanding his act. Section 86 deals with offences that require a particular knowledge or intent: a voluntarily intoxicated person is to be dealt with as if he had the knowledge he would have had if sober, but the section says nothing about intention. This entry explains the two provisions and the gap between them, the reading in Basdev v. State of Pepsu (1956), which adopted the rules in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard (1920), and the later application of those rules in Bablu v. State of Rajasthan (2006) and Shankar Jaiswara v. State of West Bengal (2007), where the plea failed for want of evidence of the degree of intoxication.


I. The Doctrine

1The Indian Penal Code, 1860 contains two provisions on intoxication, carried into the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 as sections 23 and 24.

2Section 85 provides a complete defence. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is by reason of intoxication incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law, provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will. The defence is a counterpart of the defence of unsoundness of mind in section 84, and the test of incapacity is expressed in the same words.

3Section 86 deals with the much commoner case of voluntary intoxication:

“86. Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.”Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 86, as set out in Shankar Jaiswara v. State of West Bengal, (2007) 9 SCC 360.

4The two sections together state three rules. Involuntary intoxication that makes a person incapable of understanding his act excuses him entirely. Voluntary intoxication is not a defence. And a voluntarily intoxicated person is treated as having the knowledge he would have had if sober.

II. The Gap in Section 86

5Section 86 begins by referring to offences that require “a particular knowledge or intent”, but its operative part deems only knowledge. It does not say that the drunken person is to be treated as having the intention he would have had if sober. The question is therefore what the court is to do when an offence, such as murder under the first, second or third clauses of section 300, requires a particular intention, and the accused says he was too drunk to form it.

6The Supreme Court considered the question in Basdev v. State of Pepsu. The appellant, a retired military jamadar, had been drinking heavily at a wedding. At the midday meal he asked a boy of fifteen or sixteen to move so that he could take a convenient seat. When the boy did not move, he shot him in the abdomen with a pistol, and the boy died. The Sessions Judge found that he was very drunk, and in view of that and the absence of any motive imposed the lesser sentence of transportation for life. Special leave was limited to whether, having regard to section 86, the offence was murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

7N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., for the Court, noted the difficulty: “It is no doubt true that while the first part of the section speaks of intent or knowledge, the latter part deals only with knowledge and a certain element of doubt in interpretation may possibly be felt by reason of this omission.”Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488 : 1956 SCR 363. He then summarised the result of the authorities:

“So far as knowledge is Concerned, we must attribute to the intoxicated man the same knowledge as if he was quite sober. But so far as intent or intention is concerned, we must gather it from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due regard to the degree of intoxication. Was the man beside his mind altogether for the time being? If so it would not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. But if he had not gone so deep in drinking, and from the facts it could be found that he knew what he was about, we can apply the rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act or acts.”Basdev.

8The distinction is between knowledge and intention. Knowledge is deemed: the drunken man is taken to know what a sober man would have known about the likely consequences of what he did. Intention is not deemed. It is a fact to be inferred from all the circumstances, of which the degree of intoxication is one.

9The Court traced the rule through earlier English authority. Stephen J. had put the principle in Reg. v. Doherty in a form that the Court quoted with approval: “although you cannot take drunkenness as any excuse for crime, yet when the crime is such that the intention of the party committing it is one of its constituent elements, you may look at the fact that a man was in drink in considering whether he formed the intention necessary to constitute the crime”.Reg. v. Doherty, (1887) 16 Cox CC 306, as quoted in Basdev. Drunkenness is relevant as evidence on the question of intention, not as an excuse.

III. The Rules in Beard

10Basdev reviewed a line of English cases and adopted the rules stated by the House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, in which a man who had raped a girl of thirteen had suffocated her while stopping her screams, and pleaded drunkenness to a charge of murder. As the Supreme Court set them out, the rules were:

“(1)That insanity, whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise, is a defence to the crime charged; (2) That evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent; (3)That evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved incapacity in the accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime, and merely establishing that his mind was affected by drink so that he more readily gave way to some violent passion, does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts.”Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, [1920] AC 479, as set out in Basdev.

11The third rule is the one most often decisive. Drink commonly lowers inhibition and makes a person quicker to anger. That is not enough. The accused must show that he was so intoxicated that he was incapable of forming the intention, not merely that drink made him more likely to act on it.

IV. Basdev on the Facts

12The High Court had found that the appellant, though under the influence, was not so affected that he was incapable of forming the required intention. He had staggered at times and been incoherent, but he had also moved independently and talked coherently. He had come to the house by himself, chosen his own seat, and asked the boy to move; after the shooting he had tried to get away, and when caught he had realised what he had done and asked to be forgiven. The Supreme Court accepted those findings. There was no proved incapacity, so the presumption that the appellant intended the natural consequences of his act applied. “On this finding the offence is not reduced from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the second part of section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction and sentence are right and the appeal is dismissed.”Basdev.

13The case shows the kind of evidence that defeats the plea. Purposeful conduct before the act, an attempt to escape after it, and an understanding of what had been done are inconsistent with a mind so clouded that it could not form an intention.

V. Later Applications

Bablu v. State of Rajasthan

14In Bablu v. State of Rajasthan the appellant had killed five people, four of them young children, and was sentenced to death. In the Supreme Court he argued that he had been drunk and did not know the consequences of what he was doing. Arijit Pasayat J., for himself and S.H. Kapadia J., restated the effect of the provisions. Under section 85 the intoxication must have been against the person’s will or without his knowledge, and the expression “without his knowledge” “simply means an ignorance of the fact that what is being administered to him is or contains or is mixed with an intoxicant.”Bablu v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 13 SCC 116 : AIR 2007 SC 697. No such plea had been made. “The defence of drunkenness can be availed of only when intoxication produces such a condition as the accused loses the requisite intention for the offence. The onus of proof about reason of intoxication due to which the accused had become incapable of having particular knowledge in forming the particular intention is on the accused.”Bablu. The Court restated the three rules from Beard, held that drunkenness could not excuse what it called brutal and diabolic acts, and confirmed the death sentence.

Shankar Jaiswara v. State of West Bengal

15Shankar Jaiswara v. State of West Bengal shows the evidential burden at work. The appellant had stabbed a man several times in the neck and body, and was convicted of murder. His only argument was that he had been drunk and did not know what he was doing, so that he could at most be convicted under the second part of section 304. B. Sudershan Reddy J., for himself and S.H. Kapadia J., applied Basdev and rejected the argument:

“There is no evidence available on record as to the quantity of the alcohol consumed by the appellant except the observation of PW-1 and PW-3 that he was under the influence of liquor. No one stated that he was not in his senses and lost self control. There is no evidence as regards the degree of intoxication. There is no evidence of any attending general circumstances to arrive at any conclusion that the appellant was beside his mind altogether temporarily at the time of incident.”Shankar Jaiswara.

16Immediately after the incident the appellant had walked to a friend’s house and hidden the weapon and his clothes. He was “apparently conscious and fully capable of understanding the consequences of his act”.Shankar Jaiswara. The appeal was dismissed.

VI. Voluntary and Involuntary Intoxication

17The line between the two kinds of intoxication is drawn by the proviso common to sections 85 and 86: whether the thing that intoxicated the person was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will. A person who drinks knowing that he is drinking alcohol is voluntarily intoxicated, even if he does not expect it to affect him as it does. A person whose drink is laced without his knowledge, or who is forced to take an intoxicant, is not.

18The consequences differ sharply. Involuntary intoxication that produces the incapacity described in section 85 is a complete defence, as unsoundness of mind is under section 84. Voluntary intoxication is never a complete defence. Its only relevance is to intention, under the rule in Basdev, and even there it helps the accused only if it was so severe that he could not form the intention at all. Because knowledge is deemed, a voluntarily intoxicated person who is acquitted of murder for want of intention will ordinarily be convicted of culpable homicide not amounting to murder on the footing that he knew his act was likely to cause death.

VII. The Position Today

19Intoxication is a complete defence only if the intoxicant was administered without the person’s knowledge or against his will, and it left him incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that it was wrong or contrary to law. The provision is now section 23 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

20Voluntary intoxication is no defence. Under section 24 of the Sanhita, formerly section 86, a voluntarily intoxicated person is dealt with as if he had the knowledge he would have had if sober. Intention is not deemed; it is inferred from all the circumstances, including the degree of intoxication. Evidence that drink made the accused excitable, irritable or more ready to give way to passion does not rebut the presumption that he intended the natural consequences of his act. Only proof that he was so intoxicated as to be incapable of forming the intention will do so, and the burden of proving that incapacity is on the accused. Purposeful conduct before and after the act, and the absence of evidence of how much was drunk and with what effect, ordinarily defeat the plea.


History

  • Published · 21 November 2026

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