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2026 FPR EDC 29 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/concurrent-and-consecutive-sentences
DC-0112Doctrines · Criminal · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 29
FPR Editors21 November 2026 · 2,050 words
Concurrent and Consecutive Sentences
Where a person is convicted of several offences at one trial, section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, now section 25 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, makes the sentences of imprisonment run one after another unless the court directs that they run concurrently, and leaves that choice to the court's judicial discretion; a sentence on a later conviction likewise follows an earlier one under section 427, now section 467, unless the court directs otherwise; offences arising from a single transaction ordinarily attract concurrent sentences, and because imprisonment for life lasts for the rest of the prisoner's life, life sentences cannot be made to run consecutively, though a term sentence may be directed to be served before a life sentence begins.
Abstract
Two provisions of the Code govern whether sentences run together or in sequence. Section 31 applies to sentences passed at one trial, and section 427 to a sentence passed on a person already serving another. Both make consecutive running the default and allow the court to direct concurrent running. This entry explains the provisions and the limits in the proviso to section 31(2), the three-Judge decision in O.M. Cherian (2014) that the choice is one of full discretion and not a rule with an exception, the single transaction rule stated in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (1988) and applied to cheque cases in V.K. Bansal (2013), and the Constitution Bench in Muthuramalingam (2016), which held that several life sentences may be imposed but not directed to run consecutively, and that a term sentence may be ordered to be served before a life sentence but not after it.
I. The Doctrine
1When a person is convicted of more than one offence, the court must decide not only the sentence for each but how the sentences relate to one another. They may run concurrently, so that the prisoner serves them at the same time and is released when the longest ends, or consecutively, so that each begins when the one before it ends.
2Two provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 govern the question. Section 31, now section 25 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, deals with several offences of which a person is convicted at one trial. Section 427, now section 467 of the Sanhita, deals with a person who is already serving a sentence and is sentenced on a later conviction. Both make consecutive sentences the default and leave the court free to direct concurrent ones.
II. Several Offences at One Trial
The text of section 31
3Section 31(1) provides:
“When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions of section 71 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), sentence him for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which such Court is competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct, unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently.”Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 31(1), as set out in Muthuramalingam v. State, (2016) 8 SCC 313.
4Sub-section (2) provides that, in the case of consecutive sentences, the court need not send the offender to a higher court merely because the aggregate exceeds what it could impose for a single offence. Its proviso sets limits: in no case may the person be sentenced to imprisonment for longer than fourteen years, and the aggregate may not exceed twice the punishment the court is competent to inflict for a single offence. In Chatar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh the Court held that the proviso clearly forbade a sentence longer than fourteen years, and that courts which had imposed consecutive sentences exceeding it had committed a serious illegality.Chatar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2006) 12 SCC 37 : AIR 2007 SC 319.
5Section 31 is subject to section 71 of the Indian Penal Code, now section 9 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. Where the offences are parts of one offence, or one act falls within two definitions, the punishment cannot exceed what could be awarded for one of them, however the sentences are arranged.
O.M. Cherian: a discretion, not a rule
6Because the text makes consecutive sentences the result in the absence of a direction, some decisions had described consecutive running as the normal rule and concurrent running as the exception. In O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala a Bench of three Judges rejected that description. The appellant had been convicted under sections 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code after his wife’s suicide, and the courts below had directed the sentences to run consecutively. R. Banumathi J., for the Court, held:
“Accordingly, we answer the Reference by holding that Section 31 Cr.P.C. leaves full discretion with the Court to order sentences for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently, having regard to the nature of offences and attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances. We do not find any reason to hold that normal rule is to order the sentence to be consecutive and exception is to make the sentences concurrent.”O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala, AIR 2015 SC 303.
7The Court said that the discretion “has to be exercised along the judicial lines and not mechanically”, and that an appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with a trial court’s refusal to direct concurrent running unless the refusal is arbitrary or unreasonable.O.M. Cherian. On the facts the appellant had worked abroad for most of the marriage, visiting only four times in eight years, and had arranged a mediation for the day on which his wife died. The Court directed the sentences to run concurrently.
III. A Sentence on an Offender Already Sentenced
Section 427
8Section 427(1) provides that when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a later conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, the later sentence commences at the end of the earlier one, unless the court directs that it shall run concurrently with it. Sub-section (2) provides an exception: where the person is already serving a sentence of imprisonment for life, a later sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life runs concurrently with it. In V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana T.S. Thakur J. explained that sub-section (1) states the general rule, subject to the court’s power to direct otherwise.V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeals decided 5 July 2013.
The single transaction rule
9The guide to that power, under both sections, is whether the offences arise out of the same transaction. In Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Assistant Collector of Customs the appellant, already serving seven years under the Gold (Control) Act for possessing gold, was sentenced to four years under the Customs Act for smuggling. K. Jagannatha Shetty J. stated the rule:
“The basic rule of thumb over the years has been the so called single transaction rule for concurrent sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two offences under two enactments generally, it is wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is proper and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But this rule has no application if the transaction relating to offences is not the same or the facts constituting the two offences are quite different.”Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Assistant Collector of Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183 : AIR 1988 SC 2143, as quoted in V.K. Bansal.
10On the facts, the two prosecutions concerned different transactions: possession of primary gold in one, and smuggling of gold and export of silver on a much larger scale in the other. Consecutive sentences were therefore not unjustified. The Court added that the sentencing court must consider the totality of the sentences the accused would serve if they ran consecutively. The High Court had raised the sentence under the Customs Act to the maximum, looking only at the enormity of the crime; the Supreme Court restored the trial court’s sentence of four years, which with the earlier sentence already meant eleven years in prison.
V.K. Bansal
11V.K. Bansal applied the rule to prosecutions under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The appellant, a director of several companies, had been convicted in many separate complaints for cheques dishonoured in repaying loans from a State financial corporation. The Court held that cheques issued in repayment of a single loan arose from a single transaction, and directed the sentences in the cases relating to each loan to run concurrently. It refused to extend the direction to cheques relating to loans to different companies, or to a separate transaction with a bank, so that the groups of sentences ran consecutively among themselves. It added that the direction applied to the substantive sentences only, and that section 427 does not permit sentences in default of payment of fine or compensation to run concurrently with them.
IV. Life Sentences
The question
12A sentence of imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the rest of the prisoner’s natural life, subject to remission or commutation by the executive. Two decisions, Kamalanantha v. State of Tamil Nadu and Sanaullah Khan v. State of Bihar, had directed life sentences for several murders to run consecutively. Others had held that this was impossible. The question was referred to a Constitution Bench in Muthuramalingam v. State.
The earlier views
13The two lines of authority had different starting points. In O.M. Cherian, the three-Judge Bench had reasoned from the nature of a life sentence: “Since sentence of imprisonment for life means jail till the end of normal life of the convict, the sentence of imprisonment of fixed term has to necessarily run concurrently with life imprisonment.”O.M. Cherian, as quoted in Muthuramalingam. Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa had relied on the proviso to section 31(2) to reach the same result.
14Sanaullah Khan v. State of Bihar took the other view. The appellant had been convicted of three murders, and the Court, following Kamalanantha, held that the term “imprisonment” in section 31 includes imprisonment for life. It directed that “the imprisonments for life should not run concurrently but consecutively and such punishment of consecutive sentence of imprisonment for the triple murder committed by the appellant will serve the interest of justice.”Sanaullah Khan v. State of Bihar, (2013) 3 SCC 521. The reasoning was that each murder deserved its own punishment, and that concurrent sentences treated the second and third killings as costing the offender nothing.
Muthuramalingam
15T.S. Thakur C.J., for the Court, held that the logic of a life sentence prevents consecutive running. Once a life sentence is awarded, the prisoner is to spend the remainder of his life in prison, and “Once that happens there is no question of his undergoing another life sentence.”Muthuramalingam. The Court answered the reference:
“We hold that while multiple sentences for imprisonment for life can be awarded for multiple murders or other offences punishable with imprisonment for life, the life sentences so awarded cannot be directed to run consecutively. Such sentences would, however, be super imposed over each other so that any remission or commutation granted by the competent authority in one does not ipso facto result in remission of the sentence awarded to the prisoner for the other.”Muthuramalingam.
16The distinction is between superimposing sentences and adding them together. Several life sentences may be imposed for several offences, and each must be separately remitted or commuted before the prisoner can be released; but they are served at the same time. Decisions directing life sentences to run one after another were overruled to that extent.
Life sentences and term sentences
17The Court also dealt with a prisoner who receives both a life sentence and sentences for fixed terms. It held that section 31 lets the court direct the order in which sentences run: “The Court can, therefore, legitimately direct that the prisoner shall first undergo the term sentence before the commencement of his life sentence.”Muthuramalingam. The converse is not possible. If the life sentence runs first, the term sentence necessarily runs concurrently with it, because once the prisoner spends his life in prison there is no question of his undergoing any further sentence.
18The Court also explained why superimposition answers the concern behind Sanaullah Khan. Each life sentence remains a separate sentence. If the executive remits or commutes one, the prisoner is not released, because the others remain in force; each must be separately remitted. The multiple sentences therefore have real effect on the prisoner’s prospect of release, even though they are not served one after another.
V. Exercising the Discretion
19The cases indicate the matters the court weighs. Offences arising from one transaction, or from closely connected transactions, ordinarily attract concurrent sentences. Distinct offences, committed on different occasions against different victims or in different transactions, may justify consecutive ones. The court must look at the total period the prisoner will serve and ask whether it is proportionate to the whole of his conduct. And the court must give reasons, because the choice is a discretion to be exercised on judicial principles, not a formula to be applied.
20The discretion is limited by law in three ways. The aggregate under section 31 is capped by its proviso. Section 71 of the Penal Code prevents the same wrong from being punished more than once. And under Muthuramalingam, life sentences cannot be added to one another or followed by a term sentence.
VI. The Position Today
21Where a person is convicted of several offences at one trial, the sentences of imprisonment run consecutively unless the court directs that they run concurrently, and the court has a full judicial discretion to give that direction, having regard to the nature of the offences and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The aggregate is limited by the proviso to the sub-section, and punishment is subject to section 9 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. A sentence on a later conviction follows the earlier sentence unless the court directs otherwise, but runs concurrently with an earlier life sentence. Offences arising from a single transaction ordinarily attract concurrent sentences; distinct offences may attract consecutive ones.
22Several sentences of imprisonment for life may be imposed but cannot be directed to run consecutively; they are superimposed, so that each must be separately remitted or commuted. A court may direct a term sentence to be served before a life sentence begins, but not after it. Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita the provisions are sections 25 and 467.
History
- Published · 21 November 2026
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