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2026 FPR EDC 11 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/cognizance-of-the-offence-not-the-offender
DC-0206Doctrines · Criminal · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 11
FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 4,331 words
Cognizance of the Offence, Not the Offender
Under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, now section 210 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a court takes cognizance of an offence and not of particular offenders; a Magistrate therefore has a duty to find out who the offenders really are and may proceed against persons not sent up by the police, a Court of Session may summon such persons once a case is committed, and later addition during trial under section 319 requires evidence stronger than a bare prima facie case.
Abstract
Who decides who stands trial: the police or the court? The principle that a court takes cognizance of the offence, and not of the offender, gives the answer. This entry sets out what cognizance means, from Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra; the principle in Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar; the Magistrate's relation to the police report, from Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra; the conflict over section 193 between Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar and Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, and its resolution by the Constitution Bench in Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana; and the test for adding an accused during trial in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab.
I. The principle
What cognizance is
1Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 allows a Magistrate of the first class, and a Magistrate of the second class specially empowered, to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute the offence, upon a police report of such facts, or upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon the Magistrate’s own knowledge. Section 210 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 now contains the corresponding provision.
2The Code does not define the word. The usual explanation is that of Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra:
Cognizance takes place when the Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence.Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 654, AIR 1971 SC 2372 (J.M. Shelat J.), reported headnote.
3It adds: “when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under s. 190, Cr.P.C. upon a police report, prima facie he does so of the offences alleged in the report.” So cognizance is the court’s first judicial application of mind to the matter, in order to proceed further. It is a step that precedes the issue of process under section 204.
The rule
4The rule that gives this entry its name was stated in Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar:
in our opinion once cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, he takes cognizance of an offence and not the offenders; once he takes cognizance of an offence it is his duty to find out who the offenders really are and once he comes to the Conclusion that apart from the persons sent up by the police ‘Some other persons are involved it is his duty to proceed against those persons.Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar, (1967) 2 SCR 423, AIR 1967 SC 1167 (S.M. Sikri J.).
5And it continues: “The summoning of the additional accused is part of the proceeding initiated by his taking cognizance of an offence.” The appellant had been discharged in earlier proceedings, rightly or wrongly, and the argument was that he could not be brought in again in that way.
6The principle has one central effect. A criminal case concerns a crime, and the list of persons accused in the police report is not a limit on the court’s concern with that crime. An inquiry that begins with one set of names may properly end with another. If the rule were otherwise, the investigating agency would have the last word on who could be tried, and a court that saw from the record that someone had been left out would be powerless.
II. The police report
The roles of police and Magistrate
7The principle does not make the Magistrate an investigator. Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra holds that the opinion on whether to send a charge-sheet belongs in the first place to the police, and that a Magistrate cannot compel them to file one. But the reported headnote shows that the Magistrate is not bound by the report’s conclusion. The Magistrate may agree with a final report and close the proceeding, or if the Magistrate disagrees, “he can give directions to the police under s. 156(3) to make a further investigation”. And if the police, after further investigation, are still of the opinion that there is insufficient evidence, “the magistrate may agree or disagree with it”.Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, (1967) 3 SCR 668, AIR 1968 SC 117 (C.A. Vaidialingam J.), reported headnote.
8The later practice follows the same line. A Magistrate who takes a different view may take cognizance on the material in the report, or treat a protest petition as a complaint, or call for further investigation. Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar is an example of a dispute arising from the Magistrate’s taking cognizance and issuing process against persons in a case where the police report did not suggest it.Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 4 SCC 359, AIR 2006 SC 1937 (Arijit Pasayat J.).
Notice to the informant
9Because the Magistrate has these choices, an informant has an interest in being heard. Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police holds that if the Magistrate is minded not to take cognizance on a report and to drop proceedings, notice must be given to the informant.Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537. This is another reflection of the principle. The report is not self-executing, and the court is the one that decides.
III. Summoning at the stage of committal
The conflict
10The principle was tested by section 193 of the 1973 Code, which says that no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction, unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate. Section 193 appears to prevent a Sessions Judge from adding an accused after committal, before the evidence begins. Section 319 applies only where it appears from evidence in the course of an inquiry or trial that a person not being an accused has committed an offence.
11In Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar, a two-judge Bench held that the Court of Session could summon such a person on committal. It reasoned as follows:
Once the case is committed to the Court of Session by a magistrate under the Code, the restriction placed on the power of the Court of Session to take cognizance of an offence as a court of original jurisdiction gets lifted. On the magistrate committing the case under Section 209 to the Court of Session the bar of section 193 is liftedKishun Singh v. State of Bihar, (1993) 2 SCC 16 (A.M. Ahmadi J.), reported headnote.
12The Court noted, however, that section 319 itself cannot be used before evidence. That power can be exercised “only if it so appears from the evidence at the trial and not otherwise”.
13Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab then took a different view. It said that “from the stage of committal till the Session Court reaches the stage indicated in Section 230 of the Code that Court can deal with only the accused referred to in Section 209 of the Code. There is no intermediary stage till then for the Session Court to add any other person to the array of the accused.”Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1998) 7 SCC 149, AIR 1998 SC 3148 (Bench: K.T. Thomas and S.S.M. Quadri JJ.).
Dharam Pal
14The Constitution Bench in Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana settled the point. A later decision records that it “has overruled the ratio decided in Ranjit Singh’s case (supra)” and upheld Kishun Singh. The later judgment quotes this passage:
The view expressed in Kishun Singh case, in our view, is more acceptable since, as has been held by this Court in the cases referred to hereinbefore, the Magistrate has ample powers to disagree with the final report that may be filed by the police authorities under Section 173(2) of the Code and to proceed against the accused persons dehors the police report, which power the Sessions Court does not have till the Section 319 stage is reached.Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2014) 3 SCC 306, as quoted in R.N. Agarwal v. R.C. Bansal, (2015) 1 SCC 48 (M.Y. Eqbal J.).
15Thus, the Court of Session can, on committal, summon a person whose complicity appears from the material, without waiting for section 319. This fits the original principle: on committal, the court is seized of the offence, and it is not limited by the names on the police report.
IV. Adding an accused during trial
Section 319
16Section 319 of the 1973 Code (section 358 of the 2023 Sanhita) deals with the situation at a later stage. If it appears from the evidence that a person not being an accused has committed an offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused, the court may proceed against that person. The principle in Raghubans Dubey helps to explain why the power exists. But since it subjects a new person to the ordeal of a trial already in progress, the power is carefully restricted.
Hardeep Singh
17Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, decided by five judges, answered several questions about the section, including whether it extends to “persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charged or who have been discharged”. On the standard, the Court was emphatic:
Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court not necessarily tested on the anvil of Cross-Examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction.Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92, AIR 2014 SC 1400 (B.S. Chauhan J.).
18It also warned that the power is not to be exercised simply because a court considers that some other person may be guilty: “Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner.” In another passage, the Court said: “Under Section 319 Cr.P.C., though the test of prima facie case is the same, the degree of satisfaction that is required is much stricter.”
The structure as a whole
19These authorities lay out different stages with different tests. At cognizance, the court considers whether there is a case to proceed. It may look past the police report’s conclusions. At committal, a Court of Session may also summon someone on the material placed before it, following Dharam Pal. During the trial, the test under section 319 is stricter. This reflects the fact that the later the addition, the greater the imposition on the person added.
V. Limits
Process is a distinct step
20Taking cognizance of the offence does not mean summoning everyone mentioned. Process under section 204 requires the court to find sufficient ground for proceeding against a particular person. So though cognizance is taken of the offence, the decision to summon is about the individual. An order summoning an accused should show application of mind to that person’s role. A person summoned may then seek relief on the ground that the record discloses no case against that person, without disturbing the proceedings as a whole against others.
Sanction and other statutory limits
21Statutes may restrict cognizance. Under section 197 of the 1973 Code and section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for example, prior sanction is required for the prosecution of certain public servants. Such limits do attach to particular persons. They are an express statutory exception to the general statement of the principle. Whether a sanction is required, and for whom, is a question for each such statute, and a court cannot take cognizance in the face of the bar. The same is true of any period of limitation applying under section 468 of the 1973 Code, as to which the Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62, has held that the relevant date for computing the period is the date of filing the complaint or the institution of the prosecution, not the date of cognizance.
Multiple cognizance
22Since cognizance is of the offence, the addition of an accused does not need a fresh act of cognizance in the same case. The summoning, in the words of Raghubans Dubey, is “part of the proceeding initiated by his taking cognizance”. On the other hand, a new and different offence arising from different facts would require its own cognizance.
VI. Practice
For a complainant or victim
23Read the police report and compare it with the material gathered. If a named person has been left out, file a protest petition and ask the Magistrate to take cognizance on the material, or to proceed on the complaint, or to direct further investigation. If the case has reached the Court of Session, consider an application under Dharam Pal. If the evidence emerges during trial, section 319 may be available, but the application should show why the evidence meets the Hardeep Singh standard.
For a person summoned
24Check the stage and the test that goes with it. Check whether there is a sanction requirement. Check whether the order shows any application of mind to the role of that person. An application to quash under section 482 of the 1973 Code (section 528 of the 2023 Sanhita) should be directed at that person’s position. An attack on cognizance of the offence itself will rarely help if others remain accused. At the section 319 stage, the argument is that the evidence does not reach the required standard.
VII. The recent restatement
25Pradeep S. Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka, a three-judge decision of 2021, restates the principle and traces it through the text of the Code:
It is a well settled principle of law that cognizance as envisaged in Section 190 of the CrPC is of the offence and not of the offender. The expression ―cognizance of any offence‖ is consistently used in the provisions of Sections 190, 191, 192 and 193.Pradeep S. Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka (Supreme Court, 29 November 2021) (D.Y. Chandrachud J., with Vikram Nath and B.V. Nagarathna JJ.).
26It then compares the old and new forms of section 193. Under the 1898 Code, the Court of Session could not take cognizance “unless the accused has been committed to it by a Magistrate duly empowered in that behalf”. Under the 1973 Code, the words are “unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code”. This change from “accused” to “case” is a textual support for the principle, and it explains much of the reasoning in Kishun Singh and Dharam Pal. The Court in Pradeep Wodeyar added, in a footnote, that the expression “cognizance of any offence” is also used in the sections that follow, and that the same principle is emphasised in Chapter 15, on complaints to Magistrates, and in Chapter 16, in which section 204(1) refers to a Magistrate “taking cognizance of an offence”.
27So the principle is not merely a judicial gloss. It rests on the language used throughout the relevant part of the Code.
VIII. Ranjit Singh’s reasoning
28The reasoning in Ranjit Singh, later overruled, still deserves to be understood, since it shows the difficulty that Dharam Pal had to resolve. Ranjit Singh accepted the point about “case” and “accused”, and it then pressed a further point:
We have no doubt that with the committal order Session Court gets unfettered jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences involved in the case. But the crucial question is whether such jurisdiction would envelop powers to summon any person as an accused other than those covered by the committal order. The change made by the new Code in Section 209 is that it is the “case” which is committed to the Court of Session and not the accused. But while committing the case to the Court of Session the committing court has a further duty which is in respect of the accused in the case. Section 209 says that the committal court has to “remand the accused to custody until such commitment has been made”.Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1998) 7 SCC 149, AIR 1998 SC 3148.
29That was the crux of the view that the Sessions Court could deal only with those accused who had been committed. There is an obvious attraction in this. Section 319 is the express provision on adding an accused, and it refers to evidence. Allowing an addition before there is evidence appears to get around that requirement. Dharam Pal resolved the matter in favour of the wider view by treating the powers as those of a court of original jurisdiction on committal. The practical result is that, between committal and the start of the trial, the Court of Session can act on the material before it. It is however expected to act with care, and a person who is summoned at that stage can raise the point that the material does not support the order.
IX. The questions in Hardeep Singh
30Hardeep Singh framed five questions for the Constitution Bench, and they are set out here since they define the modern law of section 319:
(i) What is the stage at which power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised? (ii) Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned? (iii) Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded during trial? (iv) What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood convicted? (v) Does the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charged or who have been discharged?Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92, AIR 2014 SC 1400.
31The answers on the fourth and fifth are given above. On the meaning of the word “evidence”, the Court said this:
significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) Inquiry (2) Trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 Cr.P.C.; and under Section 398 Cr.P.C. are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 Cr.P.C. Materials coming before the Court in course of such enquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the chargesheet. In view of the above position the word ‘evidence’ in Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.
32On cross-examination it said:
Considering the fact that under Section 319 Cr.P.C. a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) Cr.P.C. the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the Court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination.
33The judgment is long, and it states its answers with qualifications. It is enough to note here that the Court read the word “evidence” broadly, and placed the real limit in the degree of satisfaction required.
34The first and second questions show why the test of “more than prima facie” is so important. If a person can be summoned on evidence not yet tested by cross-examination, the protection must come from the strength required of that evidence.
35Kishun Singh had earlier explained the requirement of evidence in these terms: “This power, can be exercised only if it so appears from the evidence at the trial and not otherwise”, and it had said that “Even a person who has earlier been discharged would fall within the sweep of the power conferred by Section 319 of the Code.”Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar, (1993) 2 SCC 16, reported headnote.
X. Cognizance and issue of process: Videocon
36S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. is a useful illustration of why it matters to separate cognizance from process. The question arose under a transitional provision in the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, under which cognizance of an offence under the older Act had to be taken within two years. A complaint was filed on 24 May 2002, and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance that day. Process was issued on 3 February 2003. The High Court, treating the later date as the date of cognizance, held that the proceedings were out of time. The Supreme Court had to consider “whether issuance of process in a criminal case is one and the same thing or can be equated with taking cognizance by a Criminal Court”.S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd., AIR 2008 SC 1213 (C.K. Thakker and P.P. Naolekar JJ.). The discussion of the meaning of cognizance should be read in the report.
37The result in that case follows from the separation of the two acts. Cognizance is the application of mind to the offence. Process is what follows against a particular person. They may occur on the same day or months apart. Limitation under a statute that refers to cognizance is therefore to be measured differently from a rule about summons. Sarah Mathew goes further, in saying that for section 468 of the Code, the relevant date is that of the filing of the complaint or the institution of the prosecution, and not that of cognizance. That was necessary because a complainant has no control over when a court acts.
XI. Before cognizance: Tula Ram
38There is a stage before cognizance, and the choice made at that stage has its own effects. Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh considered the options open to a Magistrate on a complaint. A complaint had been filed in a murder case by a person presenting a counter version. The Magistrate first ordered investigation under section 156(3). On 8 March 1975 the police submitted a final report, saying that no case was made out. The Magistrate gave notice to the complainant, recorded the statements of the complainant and witnesses, and issued process. The accused argued that having once ordered investigation, the Magistrate could not revive the complaint. Their appeal was dismissed, the Court holding that the Magistrate’s action “was fully supported in law”.Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 459, AIR 1977 SC 2401 (S. Murtaza Fazal Ali J.), reported headnote.
39The decision is usually cited for the point that an order for investigation under section 156(3) is not itself the taking of cognizance. This matters for two reasons. A Magistrate who orders such an investigation has not used the power under section 190. And the Magistrate is therefore free, when the report comes, to take cognizance on the material, on the original complaint, or not at all. Pradeep Wodeyar confirms the same point in another context, quoting the conclusion that the bar on cognizance under another statute “shall be attracted only when the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences... and orders issuance of process/summons”.
XII. Further investigation after cognizance
40A question that often arises after cognizance is whether the police may go on investigating. State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre is sometimes cited in this connection. A charge-sheet was filed, with an application stating that evidence against some persons who had not been sent up was yet to be collected, and seeking permission to make “further investigation” and to file an “additional charge-sheet”. The Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance on the same day and issued process. The High Court quashed the proceedings on the ground that cognizance could not be taken on what it treated as an “incomplete police report”.State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre, (1995) 1 SCC 42, AIR 1995 SC 231 (R.M. Sahai and N.P. Singh JJ.). The treatment of the High Court’s view should be read in the report.
41Section 173(8) of the 1973 Code (now section 193(9) of the 2023 Sanhita) expressly preserves the power to investigate further after a report has been forwarded. So in general, cognizance does not end the police’s powers of investigation. That is consistent with the principle in this entry. Since the Magistrate’s cognizance attaches to the offence, material later collected about other persons can be placed before the court as part of the same case. A further report can bring in new names.
XIII. Sanction: a person-specific bar
42The entry has noted that the requirement of sanction is an exception to the idea that cognizance is impersonal. N.K. Ganguly v. CBI shows how this works in practice. The CBI filed a charge-sheet for offences under the Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Sanction for some of the persons had been refused. A Special Judge took cognizance and summoned the appellants. They sought quashing under section 482 and argued that sanction under section 197 of the Code had been necessary. The proceedings against the public servants in question were challenged on that ground.N.K. Ganguly v. CBI, (2016) 2 SCC 143 (V. Gopala Gowda and Amitava Roy JJ.). The disposal should be read in the report.
43The combined effect of such provisions is that a court may lawfully take cognizance of an offence as regards some persons, and be barred as regards others. Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh records the related argument that the bar in section 19(1) of the 1988 Act “operates only against the taking of cognizance by the Court”, and that it does not prevent a private citizen from filing a complaint or seeking sanction. The law therefore keeps the two questions apart. The offence is one matter, and whether a particular person may be prosecuted for it is another.
XIV. The test at each stage, gathered
44It may help to summarise the different stages.
45Pre-cognizance is the stage at which a Magistrate may direct investigation under section 156(3), or may hold an inquiry under section 202 after cognizance on a complaint. No formal decision has yet been made against anyone.
46At cognizance, the court applies its mind to the offence. The material may be a police report, a complaint or other information. The court is not deciding guilt and does not yet need to identify every offender.
47At the issue of process under section 204, the court must find sufficient ground for proceeding against a particular person.
48At committal, the Magistrate commits the case, and on committal the Court of Session can act under Dharam Pal.
49At the framing of charge, the court considers whether there is sufficient ground, and whether a person should be discharged.
50During the trial, section 319 is available on the stricter Hardeep Singh test.
51The degree of scrutiny increases as the proceeding advances, in line with the interference with a person’s liberty. A party who misunderstands what stage has been reached will often apply the wrong test. So the first step in any such dispute is to identify the stage, and then to apply the test that goes with it.
XV. The position today
52A court takes cognizance of an offence and not of the offenders. It has a duty to find out who the offenders really are, and to proceed against those who appear to be involved, apart from those sent up by the police. A Magistrate is not bound by the conclusion in a police report, and can take a different view, or direct further investigation. A Court of Session on committal is released from the bar in section 193 and can summon persons whose complicity appears, as the Constitution Bench held in Dharam Pal, overruling Ranjit Singh. During trial, section 319 permits adding persons not named or charged or who have been discharged, but only on evidence stronger than mere probability of complicity. Summoning remains a decision about the individual, and statutory requirements of sanction continue to apply.
History
- Published · 31 October 2026
© 2026 First Precedent Research. Free to share and adapt with credit, for non-commercial use, under CC BY-NC 4.0. A published piece is changed only to correct an error, and each correction is listed under History. If the law changes, we add a linked afterword. Nothing on FPR is legal advice.