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2026 FPR ETS 3 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/wednesbury
TS-0004Tests · Administrative · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 3
FPR Editors27 October 2026 · 5,454 words
Wednesbury Unreasonableness
Wednesbury unreasonableness keeps a supervising court out of the merits of an administrative choice, letting it intervene only where the decision-maker weighed what it should not have, ignored what it had to weigh, or reached a result no reasonable authority could reach; in India the test has been absorbed into Article 14 and assigned, since Om Kumar, to the large residual field of administrative action that does not engage fundamental freedoms or discriminatory classification, where proportionality takes over.
Abstract
The test takes its name from Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948), in which Lord Greene M.R. held that a court reviewing a statutory discretion sits not as an appellate authority but to see whether the authority kept within the matters it ought to consider and reached a conclusion a reasonable authority could reach. Lord Diplock recast it as "irrationality" in the GCHQ case (1985). Indian courts had reached similar ground through the review of "subjective satisfaction" in Barium Chemicals (1966) and Rohtas Industries (1968), and after E.P. Royappa (1973) the test came to be read as an aspect of Article 14's guarantee against arbitrariness. Tata Cellular (1994) made it the governing standard for government contracts; Om Kumar (2000) divided the field, reserving proportionality and primary review for restrictions on fundamental freedoms and for discriminatory classification, and leaving Wednesbury and secondary review for action challenged as arbitrary, including disciplinary penalties. After Hazarilal (2008) suggested that proportionality had replaced Wednesbury, K. Shyam Kumar (2010) held that the two continue to coexist. This entry traces that history, the test's place in tender and economic-policy review, its relationship with manifest arbitrariness after Shayara Bano (2017), and the criticism that the formula is circular and conceals the judgment it makes.
I. The Test and What It Protects
1Judicial review of administrative action is supervisory, not appellate. When a legislature gives an authority a discretion, it gives the choice among lawful options to that authority rather than to a judge. A court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, like the English High Court exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, does not ask whether the decision was right, wise or the one the court would have made. It asks whether the authority acted within its power, directed itself correctly in law and exercised its discretion lawfully.
2Wednesbury unreasonableness is the common law’s principal statement of that limit. An authority acting within its power cannot be overruled merely because the court thinks its decision harsh or unwise. The court may intervene on the ground of unreasonableness only if the authority took irrelevant matters into account, failed to take relevant matters into account, or reached a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have reached it.
3The restraint is usually justified on three grounds. The first is the separation of powers: the executive answers to the legislature and the electorate for its choices of policy and allocation, and a court that substitutes its own view takes on that choice without that accountability. The second is institutional competence: administrators often decide questions of technical, commercial or financial judgment that courts are poorly placed to second-guess. The third is the legislature’s own allocation of power: where a statute lets an authority act “as it thinks fit” or “if it is satisfied”, it contemplates a range of lawful outcomes, and the court’s task is to police the edges of that range rather than to pick the best point within it.
4The test has two strands. The first concerns the process of decision: the authority must consider the matters the statute requires it to consider and must not be moved by matters extraneous to the statutory purpose. The second concerns the result: even an authority that has considered the right matters may reach a conclusion so absurd that it falls outside its power altogether. Lord Greene’s illustration of the second strand, taken from Short v. Poole Corporation, was the teacher dismissed because she had red hair: a decision that could be described as taking an irrelevant matter into account, as unreasonable, or as made in bad faith, because it is so absurd that no sensible person could think it within the authority’s power.Short v. Poole Corporation, [1926] Ch 66 (C.A.); Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, [1948] 1 KB 223 (C.A.).
5The standard has been compared with the “arbitrary and capricious” review that United States courts apply to federal agencies, which asks whether the agency examined the relevant data and gave a satisfactory explanation for its action without the court substituting its own judgment.5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). In India the test has acquired a different footing: it has come to be treated as part of the guarantee against arbitrariness in Article 14, not only as a rule about the presumed intention of the legislature.
II. The English Origins
Wednesbury (1948)
6The Sunday Entertainments Act 1932 allowed licensing authorities to permit cinemas to open on Sundays subject to such conditions as the authority thought fit to impose. The Wednesbury Corporation licensed the plaintiffs’ cinema for Sunday performances on the condition that no children under fifteen be admitted, whether or not accompanied by an adult. The cinema company sought a declaration that the condition was unreasonable and ultra vires. Henn Collins J. dismissed the action, and the Court of Appeal (Lord Greene M.R., Somervell L.J. and Singleton J.) dismissed the appeal.Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, [1948] 1 KB 223 (C.A.).
7Lord Greene began by noting that “unreasonable” is often used loosely to describe anything an authority ought not to have done, and that in that loose sense it covers several distinct grounds of challenge. He then set out the limits of the court’s power:
“The court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether they have taken into account matters which they ought not to take into account, or, conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which they ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may be still possible to say that, although the local authority have kept within the four corners of the matters which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere. The power of the court to interfere in each case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has confided in them.”Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, [1948] 1 KB 223 (C.A.), at 233–234; quoted in Deen Dayal Shukla v. State of U.P. (Allahabad High Court, 19 November 2004).
8On the second strand he stressed how high the threshold was: “It is true to say that, if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere”, but “to prove a case of that kind would require something overwhelming”.Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, [1948] 1 KB 223 (C.A.), at 230; quoted in Deen Dayal Shukla v. State of U.P. (Allahabad High Court, 19 November 2004). The protection of children’s welfare was a matter the authority was entitled to consider, and the condition was not one that no reasonable authority could impose.
The GCHQ case (1985)
9In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, the House of Lords considered an instruction, made under the royal prerogative, that staff at the Government Communications Headquarters could no longer belong to national trade unions. The House held that the exercise of prerogative power was not immune from judicial review, but that the government’s evidence of a threat to national security justified the absence of prior consultation.Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] AC 374 (H.L.).
10Lord Diplock used the occasion to reorganise the grounds of review:
“... one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’ ...”Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] AC 374 (H.L.), at 410; quoted in Surat Green Precast Pvt. Ltd. v. Reliance Industries Ltd. (Gujarat High Court, 5 October 2020).
11He described the second head in words that have since become the standard formulation:
“By ‘irrationality’ I mean what can now be succinctly referred to as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ ... It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.”Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] AC 374 (H.L.), at 410; quoted in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651.
12The classification separated the two strands of Lord Greene’s test. Taking irrelevant matters into account, or ignoring relevant ones, became a question of illegality, of whether the authority understood and kept within its power. Irrationality was left for the result that no sensible decision-maker could have reached. Lord Diplock’s reference to proportionality anticipated the debate that would dominate the next three decades in both England and India.
III. Indian Adoption
Review of subjective satisfaction
13Indian courts were applying the substance of the test before they began to cite it by name. Many statutes conditioned executive power on the government’s “satisfaction” or “opinion”, and the executive often argued that the formation of an opinion was beyond review.
14Section 237(b) of the Companies Act, 1956 allowed the Central Government to appoint inspectors to investigate a company’s affairs if, in its opinion, there were circumstances suggesting fraud, misfeasance or other misconduct. In Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board (1966), a five-judge bench considered an order under that provision. Mudholkar J. wrote the leading judgment; Hidayatullah and Shelat JJ., in a separate judgment, held that although the opinion was subjective, the existence of the circumstances on which it rested was open to the court’s scrutiny.Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295; 1966 Supp SCR 311.
15In Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal (1968), a three-judge bench (Hegde J., with Sikri and Bachawat JJ.) applied that reasoning and set aside an investigation order. Hegde J. adopted the view taken by Hidayatullah and Shelat JJ. in Barium Chemicals:
“... the existence of circumstances suggesting that the company’s business was being conducted as laid down in sub-cl. (1) or the persons mentioned in sub-cl. (2) were guilty of fraud or misfeasance or other misconduct towards the company or towards any of its members is a condition precedent for the Government to form the required opinion and if the existence of those conditions is challenged, the courts are entitled to examine whether those circumstances were existing when the order was made.”Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal, (1969) 1 SCC 325; AIR 1969 SC 707.
16He found that irrelevant considerations had “played an important part” in the order: the investigation would probably not have been ordered but for the company’s association with a particular individual. The Attorney General had not disputed that the order would fall “if we come to the conclusion that no reasonable authority would have passed the impugned order on the material before it”.Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal, (1969) 1 SCC 325; AIR 1969 SC 707. Both strands of the Wednesbury test were thus at work in Indian law under the heading of reviewing statutory opinion.
Article 14
17In England, Wednesbury rests on the presumed intention of Parliament. In India, it came to rest also on the Constitution. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, Bhagwati J., writing for himself, Chandrachud and Krishna Iyer JJ. in a judgment concurring in the result with the majority, said:
“Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be ‘cribbed, cabined and confined’ within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Art. 14 ...”E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3.
18Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India carried the requirement of non-arbitrariness into the procedure that Article 21 requires,Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248. and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India applied Article 14 to the State’s conduct in awarding contracts and distributing largesse.Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489. Once arbitrary action was treated as a breach of Article 14, unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense became a constitutional defect as well as an administrative one. It also reached the State’s commercial dealings. And because judicial review is part of the basic structure, the legislature cannot simply exclude it, as Parliament in theory can in England.Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261.
Tata Cellular (1994)
19Tata Cellular v. Union of India arose from the Department of Telecommunications’ tender for cellular mobile telephone licences in the four metropolitan cities. Unsuccessful bidders challenged the selection. A three-judge bench (Venkatachaliah C.J., Punchhi and S. Mohan JJ.), speaking through Mohan J., reviewed the English and Indian authorities, set out Lord Diplock’s classification, and stated the limits of review:Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651.
“The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law, 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers.”Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, at ¶ 77.
20The Court then drew the principles that have governed tender review since:
“The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. ... In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.”Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, at ¶ 94.
21“Fair play in the joints” is a phrase of Holmes J., who used it of the latitude a legislature needs.Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904), at 270. In Tata Cellular it describes the room an administrator needs to weigh commercial and technical factors without a court reworking each judgment.
IV. Wednesbury and Proportionality
Ganayutham (1997)
22By the late 1990s English courts, anticipating the Human Rights Act 1998, were debating whether Wednesbury gave enough protection where fundamental rights were at stake. The Supreme Court took up the question in Union of India v. G. Ganayutham.Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463. The respondent, a Superintendent of Central Excise, had been charged with misconduct causing loss of revenue. After he retired, a penalty withholding half his pension and half his gratuity was imposed. The Central Administrative Tribunal interfered with the penalty.
23M. Jagannadha Rao J., for a bench that included Sujata V. Manohar J., surveyed the English cases, including Brind and Smith, and allowed the Union’s appeal.R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind, [1991] 1 AC 696 (H.L.); R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith, [1996] QB 517 (C.A.). Where no fundamental freedom was involved, the court or tribunal acted “as a secondary reviewing Court to find out if the executive of the administrator in their primary roles have arrived at a reasonable decision on the material before them in the light of Wednesbury and CCSU tests”; the choice among the available options was for the authority. The Tribunal had made no finding that the penalty was “shockingly” disproportionate. Whether proportionality, and a primary role for the court, applied where fundamental freedoms were involved was expressly left open.Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463.
Om Kumar (2000)
24The question was answered in Om Kumar v. Union of India. The case arose from proceedings in which the Court had proposed to reopen the punishments imposed on officers of the Delhi Development Authority connected with the allotment of DDA land to Skipper Construction, and to consider whether higher punishments should be imposed. Jagannadha Rao J., for himself and U.C. Banerjee J., traced the English development from Wednesbury through Brind and Smith. He explained that English law had come to distinguish primary review, in which the court itself judges the balance struck, from secondary review, in which it asks only whether the administrator’s judgment was one a reasonable decision-maker could make.Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386.
25He held that Indian courts had always applied proportionality where legislation or administrative action restricted the freedoms in Article 19, citing the requirement in Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P. that restrictions “should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required for achieving the objects of the legislation”.Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386, citing Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118; 1950 SCR 759; see also State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196; 1952 SCR 597. Under Article 14 he drew a distinction based on the nature of the challenge:
“... in India where administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as being discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated equally, the question is for the Constitutional Courts as primary reviewing Courts to consider correctness of the level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the administrator. Here the Court deals with the merits of the balancing action of the administrator and is, in essence, applying ‘proportionality’ and is a primary reviewing authority. But where, an administrative action is challenged as ‘arbitrary’ under Article 14 on the basis of Royappa (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the administrative order is ‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ and the test then is the Wednesbury test. The Courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether the administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary.”Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386.
26Applied to punishment, this meant that a court finding a breach of Wednesbury principles should normally remit the question of penalty to the authority. It could substitute its own view only in rare cases, such as where the proceedings had been long delayed. On the facts the Court found that the administrators’ decisions in their primary role did not violate the Wednesbury rules. It declined to refer the cases to the Vigilance Commissioner for higher punishments and dropped the proceedings.Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386.
Penalties and the “shock the conscience” formula
27The division in Om Kumar is applied most often to the quantum of punishment in disciplinary cases. The standard formulation is in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, decided by a three-judge bench (K. Ramaswamy, B.P. Jeevan Reddy and B.L. Hansaria JJ.). An Income-tax Officer found in a departmental inquiry to hold assets disproportionate to his known sources of income had been dismissed. The Tribunal upheld the findings but converted the dismissal into compulsory retirement.B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749. Ramaswamy J. held that the disciplinary authority and appellate authority, “being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline”, and that a High Court or Tribunal could not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty:
“If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.”B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749.
28The Union’s appeal was allowed and the dismissal restored. Hansaria J., agreeing, added a note on the High Court’s power to do complete justice.
29Later decisions spoke more readily of proportionality in this field. In State of M.P. v. Hazarilal, a peon in a middle school had been removed from service after a conviction under Section 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, for which the sentence was reduced on appeal to a fine of ₹500. The State Administrative Tribunal held the removal grossly excessive.State of M.P. v. Hazarilal, (2008) 3 SCC 273. S.B. Sinha J. (with Harjit Singh Bedi J.) dismissed the State’s appeal, observing: “Furthermore the legal parameters of judicial review has undergone a change. Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness has been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality.”State of M.P. v. Hazarilal, (2008) 3 SCC 273, at ¶ 12. He relied, among other decisions, on Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank Employees Assn., in which the Court had accepted the applicability of proportionality to disciplinary penalties.Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669. He also quoted Lord Steyn’s explanation in Daly of how proportionality goes further than the traditional grounds of review.
K. Shyam Kumar (2010)
30Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar rejected the suggestion that Wednesbury had been displaced.Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar, (2010) 6 SCC 614. The Railway Recruitment Board, Secunderabad, had held a written test for Group D posts in the South Central Railway, for which more than 3.2 lakh candidates appeared. After large-scale irregularities came to light, including leakage of question papers, the Railway Board directed a re-test confined to the candidates who had obtained the minimum qualifying marks in the first test. The High Court set the direction aside.
31K.S. Radhakrishnan J., for himself and Aftab Alam J., reviewed the English and Indian authorities. Of the statement in Hazarilal he said: “With due respect, we are unable to subscribe to that view, which is an overstatement of the English Administrative Law.” The Court continued: “Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness as such has not been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality though that test is being applied more and more when violation of human rights is alleged.”Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar, (2010) 6 SCC 614, at ¶¶ 28–29. Earlier in the judgment, describing the English position, it had said that the two tests continue to coexist, proportionality being applied more and more where human rights and fundamental freedoms are violated and Wednesbury finding its presence more in domestic law where citizens’ ordinary rights are in issue: “Proportionality principle has not so far replaced the Wednesbury principle and the time has not reached to say good bye to Wednesbury much less its burial.”Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar, (2010) 6 SCC 614, at ¶ 22.
32On the facts, the Court held that even a small leakage of the question paper could taint the test. It found no infirmity in the Board’s decision to hold a second test for those who had qualified in the first rather than proceed on a tainted result. The High Court’s judgment was set aside.
V. Tenders, Contracts and Economic Policy
Public procurement
33The Wednesbury standard has been applied with particular firmness to government tenders. In Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, R.V. Raveendran J. (for himself and G.P. Mathur J.) said that “A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance.” He framed the questions a court should ask before interfering:
“i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone. OR Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: ‘the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached.’ ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226.”Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517.
34He added that cases of blacklisting, penal consequences for a tenderer, and the distribution of State largesse such as sites, licences and dealerships stand on a different footing and may require a higher degree of fairness.
35In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., Madan B. Lokur J. (for himself and R.K. Agrawal J.) held that the author of a tender is best placed to interpret it:
“The owner or the employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. The constitutional Courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the tender documents, unless there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the tender conditions.”Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818.
36In Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, Deepak Gupta J. (for himself and Surya Kant J.) gave reasons for dismissing special leave petitions arising from tenders for two works at Kochi. He warned that “The Courts must realise their limitations and the havoc which needless interference in commercial matters can cause”, that in contracts involving technical issues courts should be “even more reluctant”, and that courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning tenders.Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489. N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain (Hemant Gupta J., with V. Ramasubramanian J.) repeated that warning in a road-construction tender. It held that the High Court had in effect sat as an appellate authority over the State’s decision.N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain, (2022) 6 SCC 127.
37In Tata Motors Ltd. v. Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking (2023), a bench of Chandrachud C.J., P.S. Narasimha and J.B. Pardiwala JJ., speaking through Pardiwala J., considered a tender for electric buses. The Court said that it was duty-bound to interfere where there was “arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias”, but that it was “normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out”. A writ court should not impose its decision on the employer’s “unless something very gross or palpable is pointed out”.Tata Motors Ltd. v. Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking, Civil Appeal No. 3897 of 2023 (Supreme Court, 19 May 2023), at ¶¶ 48, 52. It dismissed Tata Motors’ appeal against its own disqualification. It also set aside the part of the High Court’s order that had overturned the acceptance of the successful bid.
Economic policy
38A similar restraint governs review of economic policy. In BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, the Court, speaking through B.N. Kirpal J., rejected a challenge to the Government’s decision to disinvest 51 per cent of its shareholding in Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd.:BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333.
“It is neither within the domain of the courts nor the scope of the judicial review to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise or whether better public policy can be evolved. Nor are our courts inclined to strike down a policy at the behest of a petitioner merely because it has been urged that a different policy would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or more logical.”BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333.
39In the case of a policy decision on economic matters, the Court added, courts “should be very circumspect in conducting any enquiry or investigation and must be most reluctant to impugn the judgement of the experts who may have arrived at a conclusion unless the court is satisfied that there is illegality in the decision itself”.BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333.
Variable intensity
40The common law has never applied reasonableness review at a single intensity. In Bugdaycay v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, an asylum case in which removal was said to put the applicant’s life at risk, Lord Bridge said that such a decision called for “the most anxious scrutiny”.Bugdaycay v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1987] AC 514 (H.L.). In R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith, which concerned the policy excluding homosexual men and women from the armed forces, the Court of Appeal upheld the policy on the Wednesbury standard. It accepted, however, that the more substantial the interference with human rights, the more the court would require by way of justification before treating a decision as reasonable.R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith, [1996] QB 517 (C.A.).
41Indian decisions reflect the same gradation. Om Kumar noted that courts allow the administrator a large discretion in matters of high-level economic and social policy, while scrutinising restrictions on fundamental freedoms more closely.Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386. The tender cases show the most deferential end of the range. Ordinary licensing and service decisions sit in the middle. Restrictions on rights under Articles 19 and 21 are now tested by structured proportionality, in which the State must show a legitimate aim, a rational connection, the absence of less restrictive alternatives and a proper balance.Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of M.P., (2016) 7 SCC 353; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
Manifest arbitrariness
42In Shayara Bano v. Union of India, Rohinton F. Nariman J. (for himself and U.U. Lalit J.) held that the practice of instant triple talaq, as recognised by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, was manifestly arbitrary and void under Article 14. He said that “The thread of reasonableness runs through the entire fundamental rights chapter”, and explained the standard:
“Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary.”Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 (Nariman J.).
43Manifest arbitrariness was articulated as a ground for striking down legislation, a field in which Wednesbury had no English counterpart because of parliamentary sovereignty. The two tests overlap, since both condemn the irrational. But manifest arbitrariness expressly includes the excessive and disproportionate, and asks whether there is an adequate determining principle. Wednesbury remains the more particular instrument for reviewing the process and outcome of individual administrative decisions.
VI. Criticism
Circularity
44The most common criticism is that the test is circular. To call a decision unreasonable because no reasonable authority could have reached it defines the standard by reference to itself and supplies no independent criteria. Jeffrey Jowell and Anthony Lester argued that the formula conceals the substantive principles that courts in fact apply. Courts would do better, they said, to identify and articulate those principles openly.Jeffrey Jowell and Anthony Lester, “Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative Law”, [1987] Public Law 368. The concern is that a test without structured steps lets a court label an outcome irrational when it disapproves of it, or call a challenge a mere dispute on the merits when it prefers to defer, without showing its reasoning either way.
45In R. (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, which concerned a policy of examining prisoners’ legal correspondence during cell searches in their absence, Lord Cooke of Thorndon said that the day would come when it would be more widely recognised that Wednesbury “was an unfortunately retrogressive decision in English administrative law, in so far as it suggested that there are degrees of unreasonableness and that only a very extreme degree can bring an administrative decision within the legitimate scope of judicial invalidation”.R. (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532; quoted in Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana (Supreme Court, 11 December 2007). In the same case Lord Steyn explained that proportionality may require the court to assess the balance the decision-maker struck and the relative weight given to competing interests. It goes further than the traditional grounds, and even the heightened scrutiny of Smith was not necessarily enough to protect human rights. Hazarilal quoted that passage.R. (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2001] 2 AC 532; quoted in State of M.P. v. Hazarilal, (2008) 3 SCC 273.
Recent English developments
46In Kennedy v. Charity Commission and Pham v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Justices of the UK Supreme Court suggested that the common law’s reasonableness review was not monolithic. Its intensity varies with the context and the importance of the right affected, and in substance it can draw on considerations close to those of proportionality even outside the field of European law.Kennedy v. Charity Commission, [2014] UKSC 20; [2015] AC 455; Pham v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2015] UKSC 19; [2015] 1 WLR 1591. Neither case formally replaced Wednesbury with a general proportionality test.
Indian concerns
47In India the criticism has focused on the “shock the conscience” formula and on inconsistency. Whether a penalty shocks the conscience depends heavily on the bench. The same misconduct may be held to justify dismissal in one case and to make dismissal disproportionate in another. A related concern is that the Court defers almost entirely to the executive in large contracts and disinvestment, while examining the record closely in smaller service disputes. Applied strictly, the test risks abdicating review; applied loosely, it risks turning supervisory review into an unacknowledged appeal on the merits.
VII. The Position Today
48Judicial review under Articles 32 and 226 is supervisory. The court examines the legality and rationality of the decision and the regularity of the process. It does not decide whether the decision was correct or wise, and it does not substitute its own discretion for that of the authority.
49A decision is open to challenge on Wednesbury grounds where the authority took into account matters it ought not to have considered or failed to consider matters it was bound to consider, or where its conclusion is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have reached it. Since GCHQ, the first of these is often described as illegality and the second as irrationality.
50In India, unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense is treated as arbitrariness contrary to Article 14. It therefore applies to all exercises of State power, including the award of contracts and the distribution of largesse.
51Under Om Kumar, the court acts as a primary reviewer and applies proportionality where administrative action restricts fundamental freedoms or is challenged as discriminatory under Article 14. Where action is challenged as arbitrary, including in most challenges to disciplinary penalties, the court acts as a secondary reviewer and applies the Wednesbury test.
52In tender and contract cases the courts intervene only for mala fides, favouritism, irrationality of the Jagdish Mandal kind, or harm to the public interest. They defer to the tendering authority’s reading of its own tender. In economic policy, they do not ask whether a better policy was available.
53The quantum of a disciplinary penalty is for the disciplinary authority. A court or tribunal may interfere only if the penalty shocks its conscience. Even then it should ordinarily remit the matter, imposing a penalty itself only in exceptional and rare cases.
54Wednesbury has not been displaced by proportionality. Since K. Shyam Kumar, the two are understood to coexist, with proportionality applied more and more where rights are infringed and Wednesbury remaining the general standard for administrative discretion.
History
- Published · 27 October 2026
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