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2026 FPR ETS 11 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/three-ingredients-interim-injunction

TS-0020Tests · Civil Procedure · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 11

FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 5,395 words

The Three Ingredients of an Interim Injunction

A court asked for a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 considers whether the applicant has shown a prima facie case, irreparable injury and a balance of convenience in its favour, these being guides to a discretion aimed at protecting a plaintiff against injury that damages cannot repair while also protecting the defendant; a mandatory interim order needs a stronger case, an ex parte order requires recorded reasons, and an appellate court does not substitute its own discretion.

Abstract

Interim injunctions often decide the practical outcome of a suit. This entry sets out the three considerations in Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh and their basis in Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; the balance of competing needs in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India; the consideration of whether a defendant's enterprise has begun in Colgate Palmolive v. Hindustan Lever; the debate over American Cyanamid; the stronger test for interim mandatory orders in Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden; ex parte relief in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das; and appellate restraint under Wander.


I. The test

The source

1Order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 allows a temporary injunction where property in dispute is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated, or where a defendant threatens to remove or dispose of property to defraud creditors, or to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to property in dispute. Rule 2 deals with restraining a breach of contract or other injury. Sections 37 to 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 set out general principles on perpetual and temporary injunctions. The rules do not list the three elements. Those have been developed by the courts.

Dalpat Kumar

2Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh gives the customary statement. The court must be satisfied of three things, which it listed in substance as a prima facie case, then:

(2) the court’s interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it.Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719, AIR 1993 SC 276 (K. Ramaswamy J.).

3The passage also explains what the first element means:

The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits.

4The burden lies on the plaintiff, as the Court said, “by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise”. The Court’s statement of the first element shows that the applicant does not need to prove a title. It must show a real question.

The order of analysis

5The usual statement in cases such as Best Sellers Retail (India) (P) Ltd. v. Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. is that the court is to consider “(i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss and injury if an order of injunction was not passed.”Best Sellers Retail (India) (P) Ltd. v. Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 792, AIR 2012 SC 2448 (A.K. Patnaik J.). These are not independent tests to be applied mechanically. They are considerations that inform a single equitable decision.

II. The purpose

Two competing needs

6Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. explains why the elements are as they are. The interlocutory remedy is both temporary and discretionary:

The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated.Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727 (Bench: M.N. Venkatachaliah, N.D. Ojha and J.S. Verma JJ.).

7The Court then said that the court “must weigh one need against another and determine where the balance of convenience lies. This weighing is the core of the remedy. A court is deciding under uncertainty, and an order in either direction may turn out to be wrong. The task is to choose the course likely to cause the less serious and less remediable harm.

Status quo

8Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. adds an important consideration. The Court said that the interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case, and that the court:

in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing soColgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1999) 7 SCC 1, AIR 1999 SC 3105 (Bench: B.N. Kirpal and Umesh C. Banerjee JJ.).

9So an injunction against an ongoing business is treated differently from one against a planned launch. That goes to the balance of convenience, and it reflects the idea of preserving the current state of affairs.

III. The three elements

Prima facie case

10The applicant must show a serious question, supported by material. A plaint that shows no cause of action will fail. A case with a real issue will generally get past this stage, and the court is not required to try the merits on affidavits. Where the applicant fails to make out a prima facie case, relief will usually be refused. Kashi Math Samsthan v. Srimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy records this type of argument: since the applicants “could not make out any prima facie case”, the question of continuing interim relief could not arise.Kashi Math Samsthan v. Srimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy, (2010) 1 SCC 689, AIR 2010 SC 296 (Tarun Chatterjee J.).

American Cyanamid

11American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] AC 396, moved English law from requiring a strong prima facie case to asking whether there is a serious question to be tried, with the balance of convenience then doing the main work. Indian courts have referred to the case with some reservations. Colgate Palmolive discusses related English material on the “balance of convenience”. In practice, Indian decisions tend to use “prima facie case” language, and the strength of the case can legitimately weigh in the exercise of discretion. An applicant should not rest on the idea that mere arguability is enough.

Irreparable injury

12Injury need not be physically irreparable. It means injury for which damages would not be adequate. Dalpat Kumar frames it as injury that “would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial”. A claim easily measured in money usually fails this test. Loss of land, goodwill built over time, or the disclosure of confidential material may meet it. In Best Sellers Retail, counsel relied on the fact that a party who had claimed substantial damages in the alternative was thereby acknowledging that damages were adequate. A court will consider that when deciding what the claimed injury really is.

Balance of convenience

13The third element asks who suffers more from each possible order. In Dalpat Kumar’s words, the question is whether the hardship from withholding the injunction “will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it”. It considers the applicant’s delay, conduct and clean hands, because the remedy is equitable. A plaintiff who waited for months while the defendant invested in a project is less likely to succeed. Similarly, the public interest may matter if a public project is affected.

IV. Stronger cases

Mandatory interim orders

14An order requiring someone to do something, as distinct from refraining, usually needs a stronger showing, because it can change the position finally. Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden gives the leading statement. It accepts that “The courts can grant interlocutory mandatory injunction in certain special circumstances”:

Generally stated, the guidelines are: (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction; (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money; (3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief.Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, (1990) 2 SCC 117, AIR 1990 SC 867 (L.M. Sharma J.), reported headnote.

15The relief, the Court said, is “granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing”. That phrase explains when the relief fits: a party who wrongfully changed the position before the suit, or by a move intended to defeat it, may be ordered to restore things. The appellant’s case there was that the purchaser, with full knowledge, had kept the transaction secret and taken possession before the appellant could obtain redress, and the Court allowed the appeal.

Orders that give final relief

16Interim orders that give effect to the main relief are viewed with concern. Samir Narain Bhojwani v. Aurora Properties & Investments, (2018) 17 SCC 203, is a recent example of the Supreme Court’s concern, in an arbitration setting, with interim directions that in effect give a party the relief sought finally. The usual reasons for caution are clear: the court is acting on incomplete material, and such an order may not be reversible.

V. Ex parte orders

Order XXXIX Rule 3

17Rule 3 requires the court, before granting an injunction, to direct notice to the opposite party, unless it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. The proviso requires the court to record its reasons for an opinion that the delay would defeat the object. It also requires the applicant to send copies of the papers to the opposite party immediately and to file an affidavit stating this. Rule 3A requires the court to try to dispose of the application within thirty days.

18Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi insists on the reasons:

When the statute itself requires reasons to be recorded, the Court cannot ignore that requirement by saying that if reasons are recorded, it may amount to expressing an opinion in favour of the plaintiff before hearing the defendantShiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1993) 3 SCC 161 (N.P. Singh J.), reported headnote.

19The Court explained that an opinion expressed on an interlocutory application has no bearing at the stage of final adjudication, so the concern about prejudging the suit is a misconception.

Morgan Stanley

20Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das lists factors for an ex parte order, stating that “ex parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances”. The factors listed include:

(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff; (b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it would involve;Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, (1994) 4 SCC 225 (S. Mohan J.).

21The Court adds other factors, including the time at which the plaintiff first had notice of the act complained of. The list as a whole reflects the idea that a person who has known of a threat for a long time has little reason to seek an order without notice. An applicant who gets an ex parte order must be fully candid, and an application that hides material facts should expect the order to be vacated.

VI. Appeal

Wander’s rule

22An order under Order XXXIX can be appealed under Order XLIII Rule 1(r). The appellate court’s task is limited. Wander states the rule:

In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material.Wander, 1990 Supp SCC 727.

23It adds that the appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering “solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion”. A party who has lost at first instance therefore needs to find a real error of principle or a conclusion which could not reasonably have been reached. A different weighing is not enough. Wander is among the most frequently cited decisions on interlocutory appeals in India.

VII. Practice

For the applicant

24Show each element with specific facts. Annex the documents on which your right is based. Explain why damages will not do, and why you moved quickly. If seeking an ex parte order, say exactly why notice would defeat the purpose, disclose all relevant facts, and comply immediately with Rule 3. If seeking a mandatory order, plead the higher standard.

For the respondent

25Attack delay, conduct and any non-disclosure. Show that the applicant’s interests can be protected in money, especially if the plaint claims damages in the alternative. Show the harm that an injunction would cause, and offer an undertaking or other arrangement as an alternative to it. If an order is passed ex parte, use Rule 4 to have it reviewed quickly.

Terms and undertakings

26Indian courts do not always require an undertaking in damages as English courts do, but a court can impose conditions when it grants relief. A defendant should ask for that where the harm from an order could be serious. A party whose interim order proves unjustified can face consequences, as the Morgan Stanley reference to exemplary costs illustrates in the submissions recorded there.

VIII. The tests in Gujarat Bottling and their reasoning

The statement

27The fullest statement of the rule at Supreme Court level is in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., which is often cited alongside Dalpat Kumar. It appears in Colgate Palmolive:

The grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the court. While exercising the discretion the court applies the following tests - (i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. The decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when the existence of the legal right assailed by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence.Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 SCC 545, AIR 1995 SC 2372, as quoted in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1999) 7 SCC 1.

28The reasoning explains why the three questions are asked. The court is deciding in a state of uncertainty, since neither the right nor its violation has been established. An injunction is a means of managing the risk of injustice during that uncertainty. That is why the three elements are not independent hurdles. Each bears on the risk. A stronger case on the merits means a lower risk that an injunction will turn out to be wrong. Injury that cannot be remedied in money raises the cost of refusing. And the balance of convenience compares those costs.

Colgate Palmolive and American Cyanamid

29Colgate Palmolive discusses the English position at some length. It recorded that before American Cyanamid, the House of Lords in J.T. Stratford & Sons Ltd. v. Lindley had said that the plaintiff had to show a strong prima facie case, and then that damages would be inadequate and that the balance of convenience favoured the grant. It went on:

A strong prima facie case, therefore, stands substituted by a serious issue to be decided. At this juncture, however, the decision of the House of Lords in American Cyanamid’s case though raised certain eye-brows lately, ought to be considered in slightly more greater detail. Lord Diplock in Cyanamid’s case laid down the following guiding principles for the grant of interlocutory injunction: (1) “The plaintiff must first satisfy the Court that there is a serious issue to decide and that if the defendants were not restrained and the plaintiff won the action, damages at common law would be inadequate compensation for the plaintiff’s loss. (2) The Court, once satisfied of these matters will then consider whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting injunction or not, that is, whether justice would be best served by an order of injunction. (3) The Court does not and cannot judge the merits of the parties’ respective cases and that any decision of justice will be taken in a state of uncertainty about the parties’ rights.”Colgate Palmolive, (1999) 7 SCC 1, describing American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] AC 396.

30The Court then added its own comment on Lord Diplock’s speech:

It would seem to follow therefore, that what should be borne in mind, in addition to what has been phrased in Lord Diplock’s speech, is that if there is uncertainty, the Court should be doubly reluctant to issue an injunction, the effect of which is to settle the parties’ rights once for all. On a clear analysis of the speech of Lord Diplock, it appears that if damages, recoverable at common law, would be an adequate remedy and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay the same, no interlocutory injunction should normally be granted, howsoever strong the plaintiff’s claim appear to be at that stage.Colgate Palmolive, (1999) 7 SCC 1.

31It noted that Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines Ltd., following Wander, had expressly approved the main dicta of American Cyanamid, while Gujarat Bottling “sounded a different note”. The precise relationship between the two is therefore not closed in Indian law. The position that emerges is that Indian courts still ask for a prima facie case, not merely for a serious question. They treat the adequacy of damages as very close to decisive. And they are particularly cautious where an injunction would settle the rights once for all.

32The Court in Colgate Palmolive went on to list other considerations. Zenit Mataplast later set them out:

(i) Extent of damages being an adequate remedy; (ii) Protect the plaintiff’s interest for violation of his rights though however having regard to the injury that may be suffered by the defendants by reason therefor ; (iii) The court while dealing with the matter ought not to ignore the factum of strength of one party’s case being stronger than the others; (iv) No fixed rules or notions ought to be had in the matter of grant of injunction but on the facts and circumstances of each case, the relief being kept flexible; (v) The issue is to be looked from the point of view as to whether on refusal of the injunction the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury keeping in view the strength of the parties’ case; (vi) Balance of convenience or inconvenience ought to be considered as an important requirement even if there is a serious question or prima facie case in support of the grant; (vii) Whether the grant or refusal of injunction will adversely affect the interest of general public which can or cannot be compensated otherwise.Colgate Palmolive, (1999) 7 SCC 1, as summarised in Zenit Mataplast (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 10 SCC 388.

33Factors (iii) and (vii) are the ones most often passed over. The relative strength of the parties’ cases is allowed to count, even though the merits are not to be tried. And the general public’s interest is treated as a matter in its own right.

IX. Wander in detail

34Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. is worth reading for its facts as well as its rule. Wander claimed to be the registered proprietor of the mark Cal-De-Ce for a medicinal product. Under an agreement of 28 March 1986, Antox was to manufacture vitaminised calcium gluconate tablets under that mark and sell the entire production to Wander. Antox later sued, claiming a right to the mark by continuous user, and sought to restrain Wander from passing off. A single judge of the Madras High Court refused a temporary injunction on 2 March 1989. A Division Bench granted one on appeal. The Supreme Court heard the stay application and disposed of the main appeals with it. It held against the Division Bench’s approach to an appeal from a discretionary order. The principle has become the standard answer to an appeal from an interim order.

35The structure of the rule deserves attention. The Court’s first statement concerns the appellate court’s limited role. It “will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion” except in stated cases. The stated cases are that the discretion has been “exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely” or that the court “had ignored the settled principles of law”. The second statement concerns the material. It “will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material.” The third deals with the temptation to disagree. Interference is not justified “solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion”.

X. Procedure for ex parte relief

Venkatasubbiah Naidu and thirty days

36Rule 3A was added to the Code because ex parte injunctions were being left in place for months and years. A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan is the leading case. An order had been made: “Notice by 25.8.99. Ad interim injunction till then. Order 39 Rule 3 to be complied with.” It was the third suit in a series relating to the same property. The High Court said that the trial court should not have granted an ex parte injunction that could operate beyond thirty days. The Supreme Court corrected this. It set out Rule 3A and said:

The Rule does not say that the period of the injunction order should be restricted by the Court to thirty days at the first instance, but the Court should pass final order on it within thirty days from the day on which the injunction was granted. Hence, the order does not ipso facto become illegal merely because it was not restricted to a period of thirty days or less.A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695, AIR 2000 SC 3032 (K.T. Thomas and R.P. Sethi JJ.).

37It then asked what follows when a court neither disposes of the application in thirty days nor records reasons. A court acting in that way “would have by-passed the three protective humps which the legislature has provided”. The usual route of appeal under Order XLIII is not open while the application is pending. So the Court held:

It is the acknowledged position of law that no party can be forced to suffer for the inaction of the court or its omissions to act according to the procedure established by law. Under the normal circumstances the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal only against an order passed under Rules 1,2,2A, 4 or 10 of Order 39 of the Code in terms of Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. He cannot approach the appellate or revisional court during the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. In such circumstances the party who does not get justice due to the inaction of the court in following the mandate of law must have a remedy. So we are of the view that in a case where the mandate of Order 39 Rule 3A of the Code is flouted, the aggrieved party, shall be entitled to the right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction, against the order remaining in force.

38This is an important practical remedy. A respondent who has been left under an ex parte order for more than thirty days, with no reasons recorded, need not wait for the application to be heard, and may go straight to the appellate court.

The candour requirement

39The courts’ insistence on full disclosure follows from the nature of the procedure. A judge who hears only one side depends entirely on that side. The rule in Morgan Stanley requires the court to consider, among other factors, “the time at which the plaintiff first had notice of the act complained of”. A plaintiff who has known of a threat for months cannot explain why notice to the other side would defeat the object of the order. The material in Morgan Stanley and in Rule 3 should be taken as a list for the applicant’s own affidavit.

XI. Public interest

Ramniklal Bhutta

40A court must also consider those not before it. Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra puts it strongly, in a case about land acquisition for a bus station:

Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power or grant in stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 - indeed any of their discretionary powers.Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 134, AIR 1997 SC 1236 (B.P. Jeevan Reddy J.).

41It then explained that the same result could often be achieved without an injunction:

It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lumpsum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests.Ramniklal N. Bhutta, (1997) 1 SCC 134.

42Although the statement was made about Article 226, the Court expressly extends it to civil suits. A party seeking to stop a public project must therefore face a fourth question, which is in effect part of the balance of convenience. A plaintiff with a sound claim may be left to damages, if public works would otherwise be held up.

Zenit Mataplast

43Zenit Mataplast (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra provides an example of an applicant being refused an interim order in a public allotment case, where the High Court had admitted the writ petition and expedited it, while declining interim relief. The company complained that land next to its plot had been allotted to a large industrial house in haste. Its argument was the usual one, that the writ petition would be infructuous if the third party developed the land. The Court gave a useful general account:

Interim order is passed on the basis of prima facie findings, which are tentative. Such order is passed as a temporary arrangement to preserve the status quo till the matter is decided finally, to ensure that the matter does not become either infructuous or a fait accompli before the final hearing. The object of the interlocutory injunction is, to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial.Zenit Mataplast, (2009) 10 SCC 388 (B.S. Chauhan J.).

44It added that the three principles “are required to be considered in a proper perspective in the facts and circumstances of a particular case”, and that “it may not be appropriate for any court to hold a mini trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction”.

XII. After the order

Duration and vacation

45An interim injunction lasts until disposal of the suit or until further orders, unless otherwise stated. Order XXXIX Rule 4 allows the court to discharge, vary or set it aside on application. It also provides that where an order has been made after giving a party an opportunity of being heard, it is not to be discharged except where a change in circumstances makes that necessary, or where the court is satisfied that the order has caused undue hardship.

Breach

46Rule 2A provides the sanction for disobedience. The court may order the property of the person guilty of disobedience to be attached, and may order that person to be detained in civil prison for up to three months, unless the court directs earlier release. An attachment that remains in force for one year without the breach being made good may lead to sale, and compensation may be paid from the proceeds. The sanction applies to an order that has actually been made, and it is no answer to disobedience that the order was wrongly made and may be reversed later.

Costs and restitution

47The Supreme Court has been concerned that litigants who obtain an interim order take the benefit of delay at no cost. In Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, which it described as “a classic example which abundantly depicts the picture of how the civil litigation moves in our courts and how unscrupulous litigants (appellants in this case) can till eternity harass the respondents”, the Court gave wide directions, in a case about a dispute over family premises in Lajpat Nagar that had gone on since 1977. The decision is often cited in support of realistic costs, and of the proposition that a party who has wrongly enjoyed property under an interim order ought to pay for it.Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249 (Dalveer Bhandari and Deepak Verma JJ.).

XIII. Why the elements are cumulative, and how far

48Courts commonly treat all three elements as necessary. It is plain that a plaintiff without a prima facie case gets no help from a strong balance of convenience. A plaintiff who shows a strong case on title, but who can be fully compensated in money, also fails, as Colgate Palmolive’s reading of Lord Diplock suggests.

49That does not mean that each element must be equally strong. The strength of the case on the merits may affect how the others are viewed. The Indian cases on mandatory orders in Dorab Cawasji Warden openly raise the first requirement where the effect of the order is more severe. It is natural to think of the converse as well. A prohibitory order that merely holds the position for a few weeks does not call for a strong showing on the merits. The real question throughout is what risk of injustice the court is being asked to take, and for how long.

50Three additional matters tend to influence the outcome, though they are not separately listed.

51The first is delay. An applicant who has waited does much to show that the injury is not urgent and may be compensated, and the court may conclude that the status quo now favours the other side.

52The second is the conduct of the applicant, including whether the applicant has come to court with clean hands and has fully disclosed the facts. The remedy is equitable, and sections 37 to 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 reflect that.

53The third is the existence of an alternative protective order. A court may prefer a less drastic order, such as requiring the keeping of accounts, a deposit into court, or an undertaking not to create third-party rights. Such an order often meets the plaintiff’s real need at far less cost to the defendant. A respondent who offers such terms early may avoid an injunction entirely.

XIV. Undertakings

54The English practice of requiring the plaintiff to give an undertaking in damages as the price of an interim injunction is not automatic in India. A court can impose it, or any other condition, in the exercise of its discretion. In practice, a respondent should ask for it, setting out what harm would be caused by the injunction, and the applicant should be prepared to say what it can offer. The risk that an applicant might not be able to pay is itself a matter for the balance of convenience. Section 95 of the Code also provides a limited remedy of compensation where a temporary injunction was obtained on insufficient grounds, though the limit on the amount makes it a modest protection.

XV. The position today

55A court considering a temporary injunction asks whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case, whether irreparable injury would ensue without the order, and whether the balance of convenience favours the applicant. The burden is on the applicant. A prima facie case means a substantial question raised in good faith that needs investigation, and it is not the same as prima facie title. These considerations guide a discretion that weighs the plaintiff’s need for protection against the defendant’s corresponding need. The status of the defendant’s activity is relevant. An interim mandatory order generally requires a strong case of a higher standard than a prima facie case. An ex parte order is for exceptional circumstances, and reasons must be recorded. An appellate court will not substitute its own discretion, unless the first court has acted arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely, or ignored settled principles.


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  • Published · 31 October 2026

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