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2026 FPR ETS 10 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/substantial-question-of-law

TS-0066Tests · Civil Procedure · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 10

FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 4,279 words

A Substantial Question of Law

Since 1976 a second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 lies only if the case involves a substantial question of law, which the High Court must formulate; a question is substantial if it is debatable, not previously settled, and has a material bearing on the decision, and the High Court may not reappreciate facts save in limited cases, such as misconstruction of a document or a perverse finding.

Abstract

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 limits second appeals to substantial questions of law. This entry sets out the provision and the duty to formulate the question; the test in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and how Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari adapted it to the amended section; the principles in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal on findings of fact and questions of law; Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala on the limited right of appeal; the relationship between section 100 and local laws in Kulwant Kaur and Pankajakshi v. Chandrika; and practical guidance.


I. The provision

Text and structure

1Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in its form since 1 February 1977, provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, “if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.” Its later sub-sections set out a procedure. As the Supreme Court set them out in Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala:

(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 100, as set out in Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala, AIR 2020 SC 4321 (Indira Banerjee J.).

2The proviso to sub-section (5) preserves the court’s power to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such a question.

The purpose of the change

3The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 replaced a much wider earlier provision, under which a second appeal could lie on grounds such as a decision contrary to law or a substantial error of procedure. The new section limits the High Court’s work and gives finality to facts found by the first appellate court. Nazir Mohamed emphasises the statutory nature of the remedy:

A second appeal, or for that matter, any appeal is not a matter of right. The right of appeal is conferred by statute. A second appeal only lies on a substantial question of law. If statute confers a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot expand the scope of the appeal.Nazir Mohamed, AIR 2020 SC 4321.

4The next sentence draws the consequence: “It was not open to the Respondent-Plaintiff to re-agitate facts or to call upon the High Court to rean” evaluate them. And it adds that the “existence of a ‘substantial question of law’ is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC.”

II. What makes a question substantial

The Chunilal test

5The classic formulation predates the 1976 amendment. It arose under what was then Article 133(1) of the Constitution, concerning appeals to the Supreme Court. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., a Constitution Bench said:

The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views.Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 (J.R. Mudholkar J.).

6The Bench considered a narrow Bombay view and a wider Nagpur one, and preferred a middle ground. It added that if the question is settled by the highest court, or the general principles to be applied are well settled, and the only question is their application to particular facts, it would not be a substantial question of law.

Santosh Hazari

7Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari applied this to the amended section 100. R.C. Lahoti J. noted that the phrase is not defined, and said the word substantial means “of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable”, and “something in contradistinction with - technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely”. The Legislature had chosen not to add the words “of general importance”, he said. The question need not therefore be of general importance. The test is given in a passage that has become central:

To be substantial, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned.Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179, AIR 2001 SC 965 (R.C. Lahoti J.).

8It goes on: “To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper” decision between the parties.

9The passage has three elements. First, there is the substance of the question: debatable and not settled. Second, there is its relevance: a material bearing on the decision. Third, there is its foundation: pleadings and sustainable findings. A question not resting on the pleadings or on findings of fact is not in the case at all.

A settled question

10A question can be important without being substantial in this sense. The same judgment says that a proposition of law “which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law”. A point that binding authority clearly answers does not qualify. The only appropriate exception is where the courts below have decided plainly contrary to binding authority, since the correct application of a rule may itself be a legal question. Hero Vinoth considered that situation.

III. Fact and law

Hero Vinoth’s principles

11Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal gives practical guidance on where the line between fact and law falls:

(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545, AIR 2006 SC 2234 (Arijit Pasayat J.).

12It goes on to say that the High Court “should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law”, and that a question of law having a material bearing on the decision will be substantial “if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle”. A court may interfere with findings of fact only in limited cases. The Court said the scope for interference with concurrent findings of fact while exercising jurisdiction under section 100 is very limited, though it is not absent.

Perversity

13The most common route to a factual challenge is the claim that a finding is perverse. The usual examples are a finding based on no evidence, a finding that ignores material evidence, a finding based on inadmissible evidence, or one that no reasonable person could reach on the evidence. In such a case the error is treated as one of law. A finding is not perverse merely because another view is possible, or because the High Court would have preferred that other view.

14The risk of misuse is obvious. Any finding that a party dislikes can be called perverse. The point is underlined by decisions such as Gurnam Singh v. Lehna Singh, where the Supreme Court considered an argument that the High Court had reappreciated the entire evidence as if deciding a first appeal under section 96.Gurnam Singh v. Lehna Singh, (2019) 7 SCC 641, AIR 2019 SC 1441 (M.R. Shah J.). The High Court should state clearly why a finding meets that high threshold.

Kshitish Chandra Bose

15Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi is a case in which the Supreme Court examined a High Court’s approach in second appeal on a question of title and adverse possession and on the scope of section 100.Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, (1981) 2 SCC 103, AIR 1981 SC 707 (Syed Murtaza Fazalali J.). It serves as an early example of the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the limits of second appellate review of factual findings. Its reasoning should be read with the amended section’s emphasis on substantial questions of law.

IV. Procedure

Formulation

16Sub-sections (4) and (5) give the High Court’s duty a procedural form. The High Court must be satisfied, formulate the question, and hear the appeal on that question. A second appeal in which no question has been formulated, or one which is disposed of on a matter not formulated without recorded reasons under the proviso, is exposed to challenge. The requirement has real value. It focuses the hearing and lets the respondent know exactly what is at stake, and it allows the respondent to argue that the question does not arise.

17Merely reciting a statement in the words of the section does not satisfy this requirement. In Nazir Mohamed, the Supreme Court examined what had been framed by the High Court. It held that the appeal had in substance re-agitated facts. A question may be phrased as one of law and yet in substance be a factual complaint.

The respondent’s right

18The respondent is given a right at the hearing to argue that the case does not involve the question formulated. That is a real right, and a respondent should use it. If the question was not really one of law or does not arise, the appeal can fail without the court having to answer it.

Additional questions

19The proviso to sub-section (5) permits the court to hear the appeal on another substantial question of law, not formulated, for reasons to be recorded. It is a limited power. Fairness requires that the parties have notice and the opportunity to be heard on the new question.

V. Local laws

Kulwant Kaur

20The rule’s reach has been tested where local law gives a second appeal on different terms. Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann concerned section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, which contains language similar to the pre-1976 section 100.Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann, (2001) 4 SCC 262, AIR 2001 SC 1273. The Court considered whether the old section could survive the 1976 amendment.

Pankajakshi

21Pankajakshi v. Chandrika, decided by five judges, reconsidered this line of thinking. It explained that “The judgment in Kulwant Kaur’s case raised a question which arose on an application of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918”, a section “couched in language similar to Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it existed before” the 1976 amendment.Pankajakshi v. Chandrika, (2016) 6 SCC 157, AIR 2016 SC 1213 (R.F. Nariman J.). The online report also gives (2016) 5 SCC 223 in its list of citations; readers should confirm the reporter. The Constitution Bench’s concern was the relation between general law and local law under section 97 of the Code. The practical lesson is that a litigant in a State with its own appeal provisions must consider this decision, and not assume that section 100 applies in the same way everywhere.

VI. Practice

For the appellant

22The memorandum must state the question precisely. A question framed in the abstract, or which is really a complaint about the appreciation of evidence, is not enough. Show where the point was pleaded, where the courts below dealt with it, how the answer would change the result, and why the question is debatable. If the case rests on perversity, identify the evidence ignored and show how it was material. If it rests on a document, show what legal principle was misapplied.

For the respondent

23At the admission stage or the hearing, take the point that no substantial question arises. Show that the question is settled, that it relies on facts, or that it was not pleaded. If the High Court is moving towards reappreciating evidence, object by reference to Nazir Mohamed.

VII. The change made in 1976

24Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami states the change in the plainest terms. The Court said:

It appears to us that the learned Single Judge of the High Court overlooked the change brought about in Section 100 C.P.C. by the Amendment Act of 1976 which has drastically restricted the scope of second appeals. Prior to the amendment, a second appeal could lie to the High Court on the grounds set out in Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 100 (1), namely: (a) the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law; (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law; (c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits.Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, (1997) 4 SCC 713, AIR 1997 SC 1041.

25The contrast with the present text is striking. Under the old section, a substantial error of procedure was by itself a ground, and so was a failure to determine some material issue of law. The word “substantial” attached only to the procedural ground. In the amended section, the word applies to everything. Panchugopal Barua itself concerned two courts below that had concurrently found that a person who claimed to be a prospective purchaser had been only a permissive user. A single judge in second appeal gave relief on another footing, and the Supreme Court set this aside. The case also includes a useful reminder about a statute not applying in the State concerned. The respondent had relied on section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, which, as was pointed out, does not apply to Assam.

VIII. The duty to formulate

Santosh Hazari on the duty

26Santosh Hazari itself was a case in which the second appeal had been dismissed in limine, with a brief order saying that the matter stood concluded by findings of fact. The Court’s statement of the duty goes as follows:

The High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if it does so it acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court.Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179, AIR 2001 SC 965.

27It also said that “An obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal”, and that the question “may be the one proposed by the appellant or may be any other question which though not proposed by the appellant yet in the opinion of the High Court arises as involved in the case and is substantial in nature.” So the High Court is not bound by the appellant’s draft. At the hearing, “the scope of hearing is circumscribed by the question so formulated by the High Court”. And the respondent “is at liberty to show that the question formulated by the High Court was not involved in the case”.

Suresh Lataruji Ramteke

28The most recent comprehensive statement is Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar, written by Sanjay Karol J. and collecting earlier authorities. Quoting Gurdev Kaur, it says:

At the time of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial questions of law and then only the High Court is permitted to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law. The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as “substantial question of law” which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become “third trial on facts” or “one more dice in the gamble”.Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, as quoted in Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar (Supreme Court, 21 September 2023) (Sanjay Karol J.).

29It then adds a series of points that are often overlooked in practice:

Non-formulation of substantial question(s) of law renders proceedings “patently illegal”. This Court’s decisions in Umerkhan v. Bimillabi and Shiv Cotex v. Tirgun Auto Plast Pvt Ltd. & Ors. indicate this position.

30And it continues, on the handling of the questions once framed:

Substantial questions of law, as framed by the High Court must be answered in light of the contentions raised therein. 14.1 If the Court is of the view that a question framed is to be altered, deleted or a new question is to be added, then the Court must hear the parties. 14.2 For both the above principles, reference may be made to Gajaraba Bhikhubha Vadher v. Sumara Umar Amad where the following principles were observed: - a) The substantial question of law framed by the High Court must be answered, with reasons. Disposing off the appeal without answering the same cannot be justified. b) If a need is felt to modify, alter or delete a question, a hearing must be provided to the parties in respect thereof.Suresh Lataruji Ramteke, drawing on Gajaraba Bhikhubha Vadher v. Sumara Umar Amad.

31So the High Court has three separate duties. It must frame the question. It must answer the question it framed, with reasons. And it must hear the parties before it alters or adds to the questions. Two common errors follow. One is an order that frames questions at admission and then decides the appeal on general grounds without returning to those questions. The other is a judgment that reaches a conclusion on a different question that first appeared in the reasoning. Both are open to challenge.

32Nazir Mohamed adds, in the same spirit, that a High Court which has been told that it cannot dismiss a second appeal by a non-speaking order “cannot also allow a second appeal, without discussing the question of law, which the High Court has done.” The duty runs in both directions.

Limited notice and remand

33Where the High Court has failed in this duty, the usual remedy is to send the matter back. Santosh Hazari itself began with notice limited to the question of why the matter should not be remanded for decision after framing the question of law. That is a common result, because the Supreme Court would otherwise be doing the High Court’s work. It is not automatic. Where the record shows that no substantial question could arise, or the delay has been long, the Supreme Court may decide the point itself.

IX. Findings of fact in the Hero Vinoth and Nazir Mohamed lists

34The further propositions in Hero Vinoth complete the list set out earlier. They deal with settled law and with concurrent findings:

A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.
(iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to ‘decision based on no evidence’, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545. Nazir Mohamed repeats these propositions in substantially the same words.

35The first of these passages deals with what would otherwise be an obvious gap. Santosh Hazari says that a question settled by binding precedent is not substantial. Taken alone, this could mean that a lower court’s plain error in applying settled law could never be corrected in second appeal. Hero Vinoth closes that gap. If the courts below ignored or acted contrary to the settled position, a substantial question arises because the decision “violates the settled position of law”.

36The second passage lists the recognised exceptions: ignoring material evidence or acting on no evidence; drawing wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; and wrongly casting the burden of proof. The last words on what “no evidence” means should be noted. The phrase covers a case where the evidence taken as a whole “is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding”. It is wider than a total lack of evidence, but it is not an invitation to reweigh.

37Hero Vinoth itself illustrates a sound exercise of the power. The High Court there found that the trial court and first appellate court had proceeded as if the case were one of easement of necessity, an error in the legal framing of the issue. The Supreme Court considered that approach. So when lower courts have approached the facts through the wrong legal category, a question of law arises, even though the facts themselves are not disturbed.

X. New points in second appeal

38The Court’s summary in Nazir Mohamed, as also in Suresh Lataruji Ramteke, includes the rule that a “New point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter”. This follows from what Santosh Hazari says about a foundation in the pleadings.

39There are two reasons for it. First, a new point may require evidence that was never led, and the second appellate court cannot receive evidence in the ordinary course. Second, a point raised for the first time on second appeal gives the other side no chance to answer it in the courts below. The exception for matters that go to the root of the case generally covers matters such as jurisdiction, or a statutory bar that appears on the face of the record, where no further facts are needed and where the decree would be a nullity.

40An appellant wanting to raise a new point should show three things: that it is a pure question of law; that all the facts needed for it are already found; and that the other side will not be prejudiced. The entry on no relief beyond pleadings deals with the related question of a court’s power to decide an unpleaded case.

XI. Letters patent and Section 100A

41A further question is what happens after a single judge of the High Court has decided a second appeal. Section 100A of the Code, as now in force, provides that no further appeal lies from the judgment and decree of a single judge in such a case, notwithstanding anything in any letters patent. There is thus no intra-court appeal. A party’s next step is a petition for special leave to the Supreme Court under Article 136. Since the Supreme Court is not bound by the framing of the question in the same way, its examination of a second appeal often begins with whether the High Court had the jurisdiction at all, in that it asks whether a substantial question arose and was properly framed.

XII. Section 103

42Section 103 of the Code gives the High Court a limited power to determine an issue of fact in a second appeal, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, where the issue has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both courts below, or where it has been wrongly determined by reason of a decision on such a question of law as is referred to in section 100. The section is narrow. It does not provide a general power to reappraise. It is a means of avoiding a remand once a substantial question of law has been answered and the facts needed for final disposal are on the record, and it should not be used to reach a different view of facts properly found by the courts below.

XIII. A checklist for framing a question

43The cases suggest the following tests for any proposed question.

44Is it a question of law? A question that asks whether the courts below were right to believe a witness is not.

45Does it arise from the pleadings, and from findings that can stand? If it depends on a fact that has not been found, or that was found the other way, it does not arise.

46Is the answer open? If binding authority clearly answers it, the question can be raised only by showing that the courts below acted contrary to that authority.

47Would the answer change the result? If the decree would stand on some other ground anyway, the question has no material bearing.

48Is it stated specifically, by reference to the actual provision, document or evidence? A question that reads “Whether the courts below were justified in the facts and circumstances of the case” tells the High Court nothing, and a High Court should decline to frame it.

49Questions drafted in this way help the appellant as well. A High Court is much more likely to admit an appeal in which the question is clear, and the appellant’s argument will then be confined to the point on which it is strongest.

XIV. The position today

50A second appeal under section 100 lies only where the case involves a substantial question of law, and the existence of that question is the sine qua non of the High Court’s jurisdiction. The right is statutory and cannot be expanded. A substantial question must be debatable, not settled by binding precedent, and materially relevant to the decision. It must have a foundation in the pleadings, and it must emerge from sustainable findings of fact. It need not be of general public importance. The High Court must formulate the question and hear the appeal on it, and the respondent can argue that the question does not arise. The legal effect of a document can be a question of law, while the inference of fact from a document is not. The scope for interfering with concurrent findings of fact is very limited, and perversity must be properly shown.


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  • Published · 31 October 2026

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