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2026 FPR ETS 9 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/remoteness

TS-0023Tests · Contract · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 9

FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 4,759 words

Remoteness of Damage

Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 allows compensation for loss which naturally arose in the usual course of things from the breach, or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from it, and excludes remote and indirect loss; the injured party is to be placed so far as money can do it in the position of performance, but must take reasonable steps to mitigate, and must prove both the loss and its measure.

Abstract

A breach of contract can have endless consequences, but not all of them are compensable. Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 sets the limit, reflecting Hadley v. Baxendale. This entry sets out the provision and the two limbs of the test; the principles in Murlidhar Chiranjilal v. Harishchandra Dwarkadas on the measure of damages and mitigation; the treatment of a sub-contract in Karsandas H. Thacker v. Saran Engineering Co.; direct and remote loss in Pannalal Jankidas v. Mohanlal; the English refinements in Victoria Laundry and The Heron II; and the separate question of non-pecuniary loss, including Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Balbir Singh.


I. The test

Section 73

1Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides that when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by the breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to that party thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. It then adds that such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach. The Explanation says that in estimating the loss or damage arising from a breach of contract, the means which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract must be taken into account.

2The provision does three things. It defines what is recoverable through two limbs. It excludes what is remote and indirect. And it builds in the idea of mitigation.

Hadley v. Baxendale

3The two limbs reflect the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, as quoted in a decision of the Kerala High Court:

damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Exch 341, 354, as quoted in State of Kerala v. K. Bhaskaran, AIR 1985 Ker 49 (M. Fathima Beevi J.).

4The same judgment observes: “It is now well settled that Section 73 of the Contract Act reflects in full the principles in Hadley v. Baxendale”. The historic facts are well known: a mill’s crankshaft was delayed by a carrier, and the mill’s loss of profits was held not recoverable, because the carrier had not been told that the mill was at a standstill.

The two limbs

5The first limb looks at what naturally follows. Anyone would expect that loss, so the law treats it as within the parties’ contemplation. The second limb looks at special circumstances communicated to the party in breach, or otherwise actually known, so that the risk is one which that party took on by contracting. The test is applied at the time the contract is made, since that is when a party can decide what to charge and whether to take on the risk. Knowledge acquired later does not help.

II. Application in India

Murlidhar Chiranjilal

6Murlidhar Chiranjilal v. Harishchandra Dwarkadas is the leading decision on the measure of damages. The Supreme Court stated that section 73 and its Explanation lay down two principles:

(i) that, as far as possible, he who has proved a breach of a bargain to supply what he contracted to get is to be placed, as far as money can do it, in as good a situation as if the contract had been performed, but (ii) that there is a duty on him of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent on the breach and debars him from claiming any part of the damage which is due to his neglect to take such steps.Murlidhar Chiranjilal v. Harishchandra Dwarkadas, AIR 1962 SC 366, (1962) 1 SCR 653 (K.N. Wanchoo J.), reported headnote, relying on British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London, [1912] AC 673.

7The case concerned a contract for canvas. The buyer based the claim on the difference between a Calcutta rate and the contract rate. The Court held that the correct measure, for a contract for delivery for Kanpur, was “the difference between the market price in Kanpur on the date of breach and the contract price”. This was the loss that “naturally arose in the usual course of things”. But since the buyer had failed to prove the rate for similar canvas in Kanpur on the date of breach, it “was not entitled to any damages as there was no measure for arriving at the quantum.”

8That result is a warning about evidence. A breach may be clear and the principle may be favourable, and yet a claim fails if the plaintiff cannot prove the measure of loss.

Karsandas H. Thacker

9Karsandas H. Thacker v. Saran Engineering Co. Ltd. illustrates remoteness in a resale setting. The appellant agreed to buy scrap iron and had also agreed to supply 200 tons to Export Corporation, Calcutta. When the respondent failed to deliver, the appellant could not meet its own contract. Export Corporation bought in the open market and recovered the difference from the appellant. The appellant then sought to recover that from the respondent. The Court said:

Under Section 73 of the Contract Act, such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach. Now, the loss which could have naturally arisen in the usual course of things from the breach of contract by the respondent in the present case would be nil.Karsandas H. Thacker v. Saran Engineering Co. Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 1981 (Raghubar Dayal J.).

10The reasoning turned on the facts. The respondent did not know of the export purpose, and an offer at a fancy price was described as a “very remote and slender basis” for concluding that the seller must have known. The prices were also controlled, so there was no difference in the usual market sense. The case therefore shows both limbs at work. On the first limb, no natural loss arose in that market. On the second, there was no knowledge of the special circumstance.

11The general point should be noted. Loss on a sub-sale is not recoverable merely because the buyer had one. The seller must have known of it, or the circumstances must have made it within what the parties knew to be likely. A seller who knows that a buyer is a dealer may well be taken to know that the goods will be resold. Each case depends on what the seller knew.

Pannalal Jankidas

12Pannalal Jankidas v. Mohanlal concerned commission agents who bought goods for a principal and, although instructed and agreeing to insure them against fire, failed to do so. The goods were destroyed in the Bombay explosion of 1944. An Ordinance gave compensation for such damage only if there was a fire insurance policy. A majority held:

As full compensation under the Ordinance was payable on proof of the existence of a fire insurance policy irrespective of the terms of the policy, and the non-recovery of half the value of the goods from the Government under the Ordinance was due to the absence of a fire insurance policy, the loss to the defendants arose directly from the neglect or breach of duty of the plaintiffs to insure the goods as they had been instructed and agreed to doPannalal Jankidas v. Mohanlal, AIR 1951 SC 144, 1950 SCR 979, reported headnote (per Kania C.J. and Das J.; Patanjali Sastri J. dissenting).

13The intervention of a later statute did not make the loss too remote. The case is a reminder that the chain of causation can include unexpected events without being broken, if the loss flows directly from the failure. The fact that there was a dissent shows that such questions can be finely balanced.

III. The degree of likelihood

The English refinements

14English law has refined the second limb. Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd., [1949] 2 KB 528, spoke of what was reasonably foreseeable as liable to result, and distinguished ordinary laundry profits from special dyeing contracts about which the seller did not know. The Heron II (Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd.), [1969] 1 AC 350, cautioned against using the language of tort foreseeability, and required that the loss be of a kind which the defendant, at the time of the contract, should have realised was not unlikely to result. These are the usual summaries, and they are helpful in identifying the kind of question. They are not part of the statutory text.

15The word “likely” in section 73 is the Indian statutory test. An Indian court may use the English discussion to help decide the degree of probability needed, but the question always comes back to the words of the section: what naturally arose, and what the parties knew to be likely.

Kind and extent

16A related question is whether the parties must have contemplated the extent of the loss or only its kind. English authority generally treats the type of loss as the relevant matter. A party who foresees loss of ordinary profits but not an unusually lucrative contract may not be liable for the latter, as Victoria Laundry shows.

IV. Mitigation

The Explanation

17The Explanation to section 73 and Murlidhar Chiranjilal together establish the rule. A party cannot sit back and allow losses to increase. The buyer in a rising market should usually buy elsewhere. The seller left with the goods should resell them. The law does not require the party to take unreasonable risks. The duty is to take reasonable steps. A party who took reasonable steps and made matters worse should recover those costs. A party who avoided loss through mitigation cannot claim what was avoided.

18British Westinghouse, on which Murlidhar Chiranjilal relied, is the source generally given for these propositions. It is also cited for the rule that benefits flowing from the steps taken in mitigation are to be taken into account.

Who has the burden

19The claimant must prove the loss and its cause. A defendant who says the claimant could have reduced the loss should generally raise and support that point. The evidence will often be about the available market. The questions of breach, loss and mitigation therefore tend to involve the same material, and parties should approach them together.

V. Other kinds of loss

Non-pecuniary loss

20Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd., [1909] AC 488, is the classic English statement against recovery for injured feelings on breach of contract. Exceptions have developed, particularly for contracts whose purpose is enjoyment or peace of mind, as in Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd., [1973] QB 233. Indian law has also developed statutory routes, especially in consumer protection. Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Balbir Singh considered whether a consumer forum could award compensation “for harassment and agony to a consumer”.Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Balbir Singh, (2004) 5 SCC 65, AIR 2004 SC 2141. That decision rests on the consumer statute and public law considerations. It should not be taken as changing the rule in ordinary claims under section 73, in which such a head must meet the section’s terms.

Reputation and goodwill

21Loss of reputation or goodwill has generally been harder to recover, though a commercial party may in some circumstances be able to show that a pecuniary loss resulted. The same two limbs apply: whether the loss naturally arose, and whether the parties knew it was likely. Courts require evidence. Speculative claims of lost goodwill rarely succeed.

VI. Practice

For the claimant

22Identify which limb applies to each head of loss. If it is the second limb, prove what the other party knew when the contract was made, using documents where possible. Prove the loss and its measure, including the market rate at the correct place and date, as Murlidhar Chiranjilal requires. Show what steps were taken to reduce the loss, and record them at the time.

For the defendant

23Check the date of knowledge. What was said after the contract does not help the claimant. Test the market evidence. Argue that a claimed loss is one of unusual extent, or arises from a special contract unknown to the defendant. Raise mitigation with evidence of what was available.

For the drafter

24Parties who want special losses to be covered, or excluded, should say so in the contract. A notice of a particular purpose given before the contract is made may bring a loss within the second limb. An exclusion of consequential loss is common, and its effect depends on how it is drafted.

VII. The illustrations to section 73

25The illustrations to section 73 are the first source for how the section works, and they are often passed over. There are many of them, and they are worth reading as a group, since each one fixes a point of application.

26One deals with the ordinary sale. A contracts to sell and deliver fifty maunds of saltpetre to B at a certain price to be paid on delivery. A breaks the promise. B is entitled to compensation in the sum, if any, by which the contract price falls short of the price at which B might have obtained fifty maunds of saltpetre of like quality at the time when it ought to have been delivered. So the measure in the ordinary case is a market measure, fixed at the date of breach, and it depends on the existence of a market.

27Another deals with the ordinary debt. A contracts to pay a sum of money to B on a day specified. A does not pay on that day. B, in consequence, is unable to pay debts and is totally ruined. A is not liable to make good to B anything except the principal sum, together with interest up to the day of payment. This illustration shows how far the rule on remoteness can go. A person who does not pay money on time may in fact cause ruin, and the ruin may even be quite foreseeable, but the law limits recovery to the debt with interest.

28A further group shows the second limb at work. Several illustrations involve a party who is told of a special purpose when the contract is made, and is held liable for a loss that would not otherwise have been recoverable. Those illustrations depend on the fact of being told. They reinforce the point in Hadley v. Baxendale that notice converts an unusual loss into one within the bargain.

29The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 applies the same ideas to sales. Sections 56 and 57 provide damages for non-acceptance and non-delivery, and they do not set out a measure in detail. Section 73 and its Explanation therefore supply the working rules. Section 61 preserves the right to interest or special damages where recoverable by law. A party claiming on a contract for goods should refer to both Acts.

VIII. Murlidhar Chiranjilal on its facts

The dispute

30Murlidhar Chiranjilal is worth reading closely, because it shows how the courts decide which limb applies. The parties contracted for the sale of canvas at Re. 1 per yard. Delivery was to be by railway receipt from Kanpur to Calcutta. The seller was to bear the cost of transport and labour charges, and the receipt was to be delivered on 5 August 1947. Booking from Kanpur to Calcutta was closed at that date. The seller could not deliver the railway receipt, and cancelled the contract. The buyer sued. It argued that since the seller knew that the goods were going to Calcutta, it must be taken to know that they would be sold there, so that the buyer’s lost profit, measured by the Calcutta rate, was recoverable.

The holding

31The Court rejected this:

that the contract in the present case was for delivery for Kanpur in which it was open to the buyer to sell the goods where it liked, and no inference could be drawn from the mere fact that goods were to be booked for Calcutta that the seller knew that the goods were for resale in Calcutta only. The contract was therefore not of the special type to which the words “which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it” appearing in s. 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, would apply, but an ordinary contract, for which the measure of damages would be such as “naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach” within the meaning of that section. The damages would be the difference between the market price in Kanpur on the date of breach and the contract price.Murlidhar Chiranjilal v. Harishchandra Dwarkadas, AIR 1962 SC 366, (1962) 1 SCR 653, reported headnote.

32The reasoning repays attention. The mere fact that the seller knew where the goods were going did not establish that it knew they were bound for resale at that place, or that it had taken on the risk of the Calcutta market. A buyer who wants to bring a resale market within the second limb has to show more. The buyer here also failed on the first limb, because it had not proved the Kanpur rate. It could not fall back on a general assertion of loss. The result was a decree for nothing, even though there had been a breach.

33It may be asked why the seller’s closed booking was not treated as a frustrating event. The case was fought on the footing of breach, and the seller’s cancellation does not affect the analysis of damages. The decision should be cited for its measure of damages only.

IX. Karsandas on its reasoning

34The appellant in Karsandas H. Thacker needed to show that the seller knew it was buying for export. It relied on the fact that it had offered a very good price. The Court answered that this was:

very remote and slender basis for coming to the conclusion that the respondent company must have known that the ‘appellant wanted to purchase the items for export. The effect of the Controller’s fixing the prices is only this that nobody can lawfully charge a price higher than the fixed price. The seller is however at liberty to sell the article at any price lower than the price fixed. It is therefore that the appellant had asked the respondent to quote their lowest prices. Readiness to pay a very fancy price could therefore mean a good price within the price limit fixed by the Controller.Karsandas H. Thacker v. Saran Engineering Co. Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 1981.

35The Court therefore agreed with the High Court that the seller did not know that the appellant was purchasing for export. The passage is interesting because it shows knowledge being inferred, or not inferred, from commercial circumstances. There was no direct evidence of what the seller knew, and the buyer tried to prove it by an inference from its offer of a high price. The inference failed because a good price within a controlled limit has another explanation. A party relying on the second limb should therefore prove knowledge directly if at all possible, by a letter, an order form or a recorded conversation. An inference from the circumstances is available, but it will be tested against other explanations.

36The case also deserves attention for the way the Court found that the natural loss was nil. The prices were controlled, and the controlled price on the date of breach was the same as it had been when the contract was made. A buyer in such a market loses nothing on the market measure. So the buyer’s only loss was the special one, on the sub-contract with Export Corporation, and that failed for want of knowledge.

X. Pannalal Jankidas in detail

37Pannalal Jankidas shows the problem of remoteness in an unusual form. The facts were as follows. Commission agents bought piece-goods for a principal and stored them in a godown in Bombay, pending a permit for sending them on. The principal had instructed them to insure the goods against fire, and they had agreed but failed to do so. In April 1944 a large explosion took place in Bombay Harbour, and the goods were destroyed either by fire or by the explosion. A few months later the Governor-General promulgated the Bombay Explosion (Compensation) Ordinance, 1944. This provided that the Government would pay 50 per cent of the damage for uninsured goods and the entire damage for insured goods. It also said that no person had any other right to compensation for loss arising out of the explosion.

38The agents received 50 per cent and sued the principal for indemnity for the rest. The principal answered that if the agents had insured as agreed, the Government would have paid in full. The agents replied, among other things, that a fire policy would not have covered an explosion in any case, and that the Ordinance could not have been foreseen, so that the loss was too remote.

39The majority held that the loss flowed directly from the failure to insure. The Ordinance gave full compensation on proof of the existence of a fire insurance policy, whatever its terms. Patanjali Sastri J. dissented.

40The case is usually read as saying that a later and unforeseen event does not necessarily break the chain, if the loss can be traced directly to the breach. But it also has a limit. The loss of the insurance money was just the kind of loss that an obligation to insure is meant to guard against. It was the unusual route by which the money came, through an Ordinance and not through a policy, that was unforeseen. A court may be more willing to overlook the route where the kind of loss is the same as the kind that was contemplated. That is similar to the English discussion of kind and extent noted above.

XI. Mitigation in more detail

The content of the duty

41The Explanation to section 73 speaks of “the means which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract”. The Court in Murlidhar Chiranjilal drew from this, and from British Westinghouse, “a duty on him of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent on the breach”, which “debars him from claiming any part of the damage which is due to his neglect to take such steps”. Although the word “duty” is used, it is not a duty in the sense that its breach gives anyone a claim. It is a limit on what the injured party can recover.

42Three rules are generally taken to follow.

43The first is that the claimant cannot recover for loss that could have been avoided by reasonable steps. A buyer who could have bought substitute goods at a slightly higher price, and who instead lets a factory stand idle, recovers the difference in price and not the loss from the idle factory.

44The second is that the claimant can recover the reasonable cost of the steps taken in mitigation, even if the steps fail or make the loss greater. The claimant is judged by what was reasonable at the time, and the party in breach is not well placed to complain if the attempt to repair its breach turned out badly.

45The third is that the claimant must give credit for any benefit actually gained through mitigation. A buyer who bought replacement goods at a lower price than the contract price has no loss on that head. This is the point for which British Westinghouse is often cited, as noted above.

Anticipatory breach

46A special problem arises with anticipatory breach. If a seller repudiates before the date for delivery, the buyer may either accept the repudiation at once, or keep the contract alive until the date for performance. If the buyer accepts and sues, the general rule is that damages are still measured by reference to the date for performance, and not the date of the repudiation. But the buyer must act reasonably in the interval. Roper v. Johnson, (1873) LR 8 CP 167, is the English decision usually cited for this. It has not been read for this entry, and it is mentioned in general terms only. If the buyer keeps the contract alive and the market moves, the buyer takes the risk of that movement, and the duty to mitigate does not arise until there has been a breach that the buyer has accepted. The same principles should be expected in India, given the similarity of the two laws on this point.

No duty to do the unreasonable

47The buyer’s duty does not extend to taking substantial risks, or to damaging its own reputation, or to starting a difficult lawsuit against a third party. English cases usually state that a claimant is not required to do what a reasonable person would not do in the ordinary course of business. The standard should not be set too high, as the party complaining of the failure to mitigate is the party in breach. It is the party in breach who should bear the burden of showing what could reasonably have been done.

XII. Non-pecuniary loss in the consumer cases

48Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Balbir Singh drew on the earlier decision in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, and it framed the matter in terms that go beyond the Contract Act. It said that “Compensation as explained includes both the just equivalent for loss of goods or services and also for sufferance of injustice.” It also distinguished cases where the loss is simply one arising in the due discharge of duties from those where it results from mala fide, oppressive or capricious acts by a public servant. So in such consumer cases, the award may reflect the injustice suffered and not merely the financial loss.

49A claimant in a civil suit for breach of contract should not assume that the same rule applies. Section 73 speaks of “loss or damage” that “naturally arose”. An award for mental agony could be justified under the section only if such distress was the natural result of the breach, or if it was known to be likely. The usual examples are contracts whose object is to provide peace of mind or enjoyment. Beyond those, the safer course is to treat the Balbir Singh line as resting on the consumer statute, as noted above.

XIII. Causation and the date of knowledge

50Two general points may be added.

51Section 73 speaks of loss “caused” by the breach. Causation is thus a separate step from remoteness. A claimant must first show that the breach caused the loss. Only then does the question arise whether the loss naturally arose or was contemplated. Many claims fail on causation, because the evidence shows that the loss would have happened anyway, or that it was caused by something else. An expert’s report on lost profits that assumes that nothing else affected the business may show a loss, but it does not show that the breach caused it.

52The time for testing knowledge is when the contract is made. The words are clear: “which the parties knew, when they made the contract”. A party who is told after the contract of a special purpose has not taken on that risk, unless the contract is varied. This rule should affect how business is conducted. A buyer who has a special need should make that need known before the deal is done, and should keep a record. A seller who is told of an unusual risk before contracting can price it, or exclude it. In a long-term contract, a later change in the known facts may not bring new risks within the section, unless the parties have actually varied the contract.

XIV. Certainty of proof

53Finally, the Indian courts require proof of the amount of loss, and Murlidhar Chiranjilal is an extreme example. In that case, a want of proof of the market rate at the right place meant the buyer recovered nothing. In other cases, where it is clear that some loss occurred but its exact amount is hard to calculate, courts have been willing to make an estimate, particularly where the difficulty was not of the claimant’s making. A claimant should not rely on that. The record should contain the best available evidence of market price, of what would have been earned, and of the costs saved, so that the court has something to work with. Loss of profits, in particular, must be shown net of the costs that would have been incurred in earning them.

XV. The position today

54Compensation under section 73 is available for loss which naturally arose in the usual course of things from the breach, or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from it. Remote and indirect loss is excluded. The section reflects the principles in Hadley v. Baxendale. As far as possible, the injured party is to be placed as if the contract had been performed, but must take all reasonable steps to mitigate, and cannot claim loss due to neglect to do so. In a sale, the usual measure is the difference between the contract price and the market price at the relevant place and date, and a claim may fail for want of proof of that rate. Loss on a sub-sale or other special contract is not recoverable unless the seller knew of the circumstances or the loss otherwise falls within the section. Non-pecuniary loss generally falls outside the ordinary measure, subject to specific statutes and exceptions.


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  • Published · 31 October 2026

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ELSEWHERECounterparts · the same question in other jurisdictions

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