FPR · First Precedent Research
2026 FPR ETS 7 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/reasonable-compensation
TS-0024Tests · Contract · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 7
FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 6,295 words
Reasonable Compensation for Liquidated Damages
Under section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 a party complaining of breach is entitled to reasonable compensation not exceeding the sum named in the contract, whether or not actual damage is proved; the named sum is recoverable as such only if it is a genuine pre-estimate of damages found to be so by the court, otherwise only reasonable compensation is awarded, and where loss is capable of proof the absence of loss may defeat the claim, while forfeiture of true earnest money of a reasonable amount stands apart.
Abstract
Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 removes the English distinction between liquidated damages and penalties. This entry sets out the section and its history; the statement of the law in Kailash Nath Associates v. Delhi Development Authority, drawing on Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass and Maula Bux v. Union of India; the treatment of agreed damages in Oil & Natural Gas Corporation v. Saw Pipes; earnest money, in Maula Bux, Shree Hanuman Cotton Mills v. Tata Air-Craft and Satish Batra v. Sudhir Rawal; and the limit on recovering unadjudicated damages in Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry.
I. The rule
Section 74
1Parties often agree in advance what will be paid on a breach. Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 addresses what a court does with that agreement. As amended in 1899 and set out in Kailash Nath Associates v. Delhi Development Authority, it opens:
When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for.Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 74, as set out in part in Kailash Nath Associates v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 4 SCC 136 (R.F. Nariman J.); the concluding words are from the section.
2Kailash Nath also records the original 1872 form of the section, which spoke only of a sum named, and the 1899 change that brought in stipulations by way of penalty.
A departure from English law
3English law has distinguished between a genuine pre-estimate of loss, which is enforced, and a penalty, which is not, as in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage & Motor Co. Ltd., [1915] AC 79. Section 74 takes a different path. It applies a single measure to both: reasonable compensation up to a ceiling. A label does not matter, and the question is what is reasonable. The Supreme Court in Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405, is the classic authority on that approach, and Saw Pipes reports it as holding that “jurisdiction of the Court to award compensation in case of breach of contract is unqualified except as to the maximum stipulated; and compensation has to be reasonable.”Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, AIR 2003 SC 2629 (Bench: M.B. Shah and Arun Kumar JJ.), describing Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405.
II. The statement of the law
Kailash Nath Associates
4Kailash Nath Associates gives the most useful summary. Delhi Development Authority forfeited earnest money after an auction transaction fell through. The Authority had in fact later re-auctioned the land for a much higher amount. Having reviewed the authorities, Nariman J. said:
On a conspectus of the above authorities, the law on compensation for breach of contract under Section 74 can be stated to be as follows:- Where a sum is named in a contract as a liquidated amount payable by way of damages, the party complaining of a breach can receive as reasonable compensation such liquidated amount only if it is a genuine pre-estimate of damages fixed by both parties and found to be such by the Court. In other cases, where a sum is named in a contract as a liquidated amount payable by way of damages, only reasonable compensation can be awarded not exceeding the amount so stated.Kailash Nath Associates, (2015) 4 SCC 136.
5The judgment continues with propositions on penalty, on what “whether or not actual damage or loss is proved” means and on cases where damage is difficult or impossible to prove, and it should be read in full. The important point on these facts was that “far from suffering any loss”, DDA “has received a much higher amount on re-auction of the same plot of land”.
“Whether or not actual damage is proved”
6The phrase does not mean a claimant recovers without having suffered any loss. Its effect is more limited. Under section 73, a party claiming damages generally must prove the loss. Section 74 relieves a party from that requirement where the loss is such as cannot readily be proved, as Maula Bux v. Union of India illustrated. In that case the Union forfeited deposits made as security for the due performance of contracts to supply goods.
7The Court noted the High Court’s view that a reasonable forfeiture of a security deposit fell outside section 74 and that the deposit could be regarded as earnest money. It held the High Court to be in error.Maula Bux v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 554, AIR 1970 SC 1955 (J.C. Shah J.), reported headnote. The Court drew a distinction between cases where compensation for loss can be determined by evidence, where a party must prove it, and those in which it is impossible to assess compensation, where the named sum may be accepted as reasonable compensation if it is a genuine pre-estimate. In the former kind of case, such as an ordinary sale of goods for which market evidence exists, the party seeking to retain the amount must show the loss.
III. Saw Pipes
A strong statement for the claimant
8Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. is often cited by claimants. The contract said that the amounts were an agreed genuine pre-estimate of damages, not by way of penalty, and it let the purchaser recover them from bills. An arbitral tribunal required the amount to be refunded, because no loss had been proved. The Court considered this to be a failure to apply sections 73 and 74. It said:
It has been specifically mentioned that it was an agreed genuine pre-estimate of damages duly agreed by the parties. It was also mentioned that the liquidated damages are not by way of penalty.Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705.
9It continued that no evidence was led by the claimant “to establish that stipulated condition was by way of penalty or the compensation contemplated was, in any way, unreasonable”. The decision therefore places weight on a clear contractual statement in cases of this kind, and it puts on the party in breach the burden of showing unreasonableness.
Relationship with Kailash Nath
10The two cases can be read together, though they have different emphasis. In Saw Pipes, there was a clear estimate in a contract where the loss from delay was difficult to prove. In Kailash Nath Associates, the claimant had gained rather than lost, and the loss could be measured in the market. Kailash Nath requires the court to find that a stated sum is in fact a genuine pre-estimate, and does not treat the contract’s label as conclusive. Careful drafters should not rely on the recital alone. Parties should keep a record of how the estimate was made.
IV. Earnest money
The nature of earnest
11The treatment of a deposit depends on what it is. Maula Bux says:
Earnest money is a deposit made by a purchaser to be applied towards part payment of the price when the contract is completed and till then as evidencing an intention on the part of the purchaser to buy property or goods. Forfeiture of earnest money under a contract for sale of property, if the amount is reasonable, does not fall within s. 74 of the Contract Act.Maula Bux, (1969) 2 SCC 554, reported headnote.
12This was an important exception, and the later cases discussed below have to be read with it. True earnest money of a reasonable amount can ordinarily be forfeited on the buyer’s default. A deposit that is really security for performance, as in Maula Bux itself, stands on a different footing, and section 74 applies.
Shree Hanuman Cotton Mills
13Shree Hanuman Cotton Mills v. Tata Air-Craft Ltd. considered a sale of aero-scrap for Rs. 10,00,000, in which the buyer paid Rs. 2,50,000 at the date of the contract, and the terms of business required the buyer to make a deposit. The headnote treats the “Right of seller to forfeit” and the scope of sections 64 and 74 of the Act.Shree Hanuman Cotton Mills v. Tata Air-Craft Ltd., (1969) 3 SCC 522, AIR 1970 SC 1986 (C.A. Vaidialingam J.). The case is commonly cited for the principles on when a deposit is earnest money, including whether it was given at the moment the contract is concluded, and whether it was to be forfeited if the transaction fell through by the buyer’s fault.
Satish Batra
14In Satish Batra v. Sudhir Rawal, the seller received Rs. 7,00,000 as earnest money on a total consideration of Rs. 70,00,000, and the buyer defaulted. The Court said that the question “whether the seller can retain the entire amount of earnest money depends upon the terms of the agreement”.Satish Batra v. Sudhir Rawal, (2013) 1 SCC 345 (K.S. Radhakrishnan J.). The agreement’s terms provided for forfeiture of earnest money. Kailash Nath Associates reviewed the earlier cases on earnest money. Taken together, they suggest a limit on any broad claim that a seller may keep whatever has been called earnest. Forfeiture of a reasonable sum that is truly earnest is treated differently from a large sum stated to be earnest, which may in substance be a penalty. The reader should see both decisions on their facts. Desh Raj v. Rohtash Singh, (2023) 3 SCC 714, and Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, (2024) 6 SCC 641, are later decisions cited on related points of forfeiture and should also be considered.
V. Enforcement before adjudication
Raman Iron Foundry
15A separate question is what a party may do with a sum named before a court has ruled. In Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry, the Union appropriated other sums due under other contracts in satisfaction of a damages claim which was disputed and pending before an arbitrator. The respondent sought to restrain this. The Court, per Bhagwati J., held that the purchaser “is not entitled under Clause 18 to recover the amount of its claim for damages by appropriating other sums due to the contractor until the claim for damages is adjudicated upon and culminates in a decree.”Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry, (1974) 2 SCC 231, AIR 1974 SC 1265 (P.N. Bhagwati J.). A larger Bench decision on the interim relief point, H.M. Kamaluddin Ansari & Co. v. Union of India, (1983) 4 SCC 417, later took a different view of the interpretation of the clause, so Raman Iron Foundry should be cited with care on that aspect. The underlying point about adjudication continues to be used.
VI. Interaction with other law
Section 73
16Section 74 does not replace section 73. Section 73 states the general rule about loss flowing from a breach, including the rule against remote loss and the Explanation on means of remedying the breach. Saw Pipes shows how they work together: a court considers the nature of the loss and whether it is the type that the parties expected, and the reasonable compensation under section 74 is informed by that. Mitigation therefore remains a relevant consideration.
Arbitration
17Awards made on liquidated damages have to meet the standards of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Saw Pipes was itself an arbitration case. Kailash Nath Associates was a writ-type dispute with a public body, and it is frequently cited in arbitral proceedings. Reviewing courts have narrowed the extent to which such awards can be set aside since Saw Pipes, in Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49, and Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131. A party should keep the merits of section 74 apart from the question of the grounds of challenge.
VII. Practice
For a drafter
18State the reasons for the sum. Say what losses it is meant to cover and why they are difficult to prove. Avoid a figure that appears unconnected to the transaction. Distinguish earnest money from security deposits and from part payment, and state which is which. Do not assume that a recital of “genuine pre-estimate” will be conclusive.
For a claimant
19Show that the sum is a genuine pre-estimate. Show the nature of the loss and why it was difficult to prove, and then provide what evidence you can. Where evidence of loss could readily be given, give it. Do not simply rely on the clause if the transaction left you better off.
For a party resisting
20Identify what kind of sum it is: earnest, deposit, part payment or damages. Ask whether loss was capable of proof and whether any was suffered. Show that the amount is out of proportion. Refer to Kailash Nath Associates if the other side’s position has improved after the breach, as in that case.
VIII. The full statement in Kailash Nath
21The propositions in Kailash Nath Associates have become the usual reference, and the remainder of the passage deserves to be read in full:
Similarly, in cases where the amount fixed is in the nature of penalty, only reasonable compensation can be awarded not exceeding the penalty so stated. In both cases, the liquidated amount or penalty is the upper limit beyond which the Court cannot grant reasonable compensation. Reasonable compensation will be fixed on well known principles that are applicable to the law of contract, which are to be found inter alia in Section 73 of the Contract Act. Since Section 74 awards reasonable compensation for damage or loss caused by a breach of contract, damage or loss caused is a sine qua non for the applicability of the Section. The Section applies whether a person is a plaintiff or a defendant in a suit. The sum spoken of may already be paid or be payable in future. The expression “whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby” means that where it is possible to prove actual damage or loss, such proof is not dispensed with. It is only in cases where damage or loss is difficult or impossible to prove that the liquidated amount named in the contract, if a genuine pre-estimate of damage or loss, can be awarded. Section 74 will apply to cases of forfeiture of earnest money under a contract. Where, however, forfeiture takes place under the terms and conditions of a public auction before agreement is reached, Section 74 would have no application.Kailash Nath Associates v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 4 SCC 136.
22This passage contains several separate rules.
23The ceiling is absolute. The named sum is “the upper limit beyond which the Court cannot grant reasonable compensation”. So a claimant cannot prove a larger loss and recover it under the section. A claimant who wants more than the sum named would have to show that the clause was not meant to limit recovery.
24The measure comes from section 73. Reasonable compensation is to be fixed “on well known principles that are applicable to the law of contract”. That brings in the rules on remoteness, mitigation and proof, so far as they apply.
25Loss is required. The phrase “damage or loss caused is a sine qua non for the applicability of the Section” should be read with care. It does not say that loss has always to be proved. It says that loss must exist. The next sentences deal with proof.
26The section applies whichever side a party is on. A defendant who has paid a sum and is seeking to keep it from forfeiture, or a plaintiff who is seeking payment, is covered. The sum may have been already paid, or may be payable in future.
27Proof is required where it is possible. This is the most important practical holding. If actual loss can be proved, the words of the section do not relieve the claimant from proving it.
28Earnest money under a contract falls within the section. This goes beyond Maula Bux, as explained below. But forfeiture under the terms of a public auction before an agreement is reached falls outside it.
IX. Fateh Chand
The Constitution Bench’s statement
29Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass remains the fundamental authority. Its central passage, as set out in Kailash Nath Associates, says:
The section is clearly an attempt to eliminate the somewhat elaborate refinements made under the English common law in distinguishing between stipulations providing for payment of liquidated damages and stipulations in the nature of penalty. Under the common law a genuine pre-estimate of damages by mutual agreement is regarded as a stipulation naming liquidated damages and binding between the parties: a stipulation in a contract in terrorem is a penalty and the Court refuses to enforce it, awarding to the aggrieved party only reasonable compensation. The Indian Legislature has sought to cut across the web of rules and presumptions under the English common law, by enacting a uniform principle applicable to all stipulations naming amounts to be paid in case of breach, and stipulations by way of penalty.Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405, 1964 SCR (1) 515, as quoted in Kailash Nath Associates, (2015) 4 SCC 136.
30It goes on:
The measure of damages in the case of breach of a stipulation by way of penalty is by Section 74 reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated for. In assessing damages the Court has, subject to the limit of the penalty stipulated, jurisdiction to award such compensation as it deems reasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Jurisdiction of the Court to award compensation in case of breach of contract is unqualified except as to the maximum stipulated; but compensation has to be reasonable, and that imposes upon the Court duty to award compensation according to settled principles. The section undoubtedly says that the aggrieved party is entitled to receive compensation from the party who has broken the contract, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused by the breach. Thereby it merely dispenses with proof of “actual loss or damages”; it does not justify the award of compensation when in consequence of the breach no legal injury at all has resulted, because compensation for breach of contract can be awarded to make good loss or damage which naturally arose in the usual course of things, or which the parties knew when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach.
31This is the source of the argument later taken up in Kailash Nath Associates. The section “merely dispenses with proof of ‘actual loss or damages’” and “does not justify the award of compensation when in consequence of the breach no legal injury at all has resulted”. That is different from saying that a claimant must always prove the amount of loss. The claimant must have suffered legal injury, and the section does not allow compensation to appear from nowhere.
The facts of Fateh Chand
32The facts help explain the result, and they are set out in Satish Batra. By an agreement of 21 March 1949, the plaintiff agreed to sell a building and land for Rs. 1,12,500. Rs. 1,000 was paid as earnest money at the time of the agreement. A further cheque for Rs. 24,000 was to be given on the delivery of possession. The agreement said that if the vendee failed to get the sale deed registered by June 1949, “this sum of Rs. 25,000/- (twenty-five thousand) mentioned above shall be deemed to be forfeited and the agreement cancelled.” The defendant was the party in default. The plaintiff relied on the clause to keep the whole Rs. 25,000.
33The Constitution Bench separated the two sums. It was conceded that the plaintiff could forfeit the Rs. 1,000 that was earnest money. The Rs. 24,000 stood differently, as part of the purchase price. The High Court had awarded ten per cent of the price as reasonable compensation, and the Supreme Court said this rested “on arbitrary assumption”:
The plaintiff failed to prove the loss suffered by him in consequence of the breach of the contract committed by the defendant, and we are unable to find any principle on which compensation equal to ten percent of the agreed price could be awarded to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has been allowed Rs. 1,000/-which was the earnest money as part of the damages. Besides he had use of the remaining sum of Rs. 24,000/-, and we can rightly presume that he must have been deriving advantage from that amount throughout this period. In the absence therefore of any proof of damage arising from the breach of the contract we are of opinion that the amount of Rs. 1,000/- (earnest money) which has been forfeited, and the advantage that the plaintiff must have derived from the possession of the remaining sum of Rs. 24,000/-during all this period would be sufficient compensation to him.Fateh Chand, AIR 1963 SC 1405, as quoted in Satish Batra v. Sudhir Rawal, (2013) 1 SCC 345.
34The High Court’s award of Rs. 11,250 as damages was set aside. So a payment named in a forfeiture clause does not thereby become earnest money, and a court will not fix compensation by a percentage without any basis in evidence. A court may also take account of the use the seller has had of the money retained.
X. Maula Bux and Rampur Distillery
35The rule in Maula Bux on security deposits is shown clearly by Union of India v. Rampur Distillery and Chemical Co. Ltd., a later two-judge decision. There the contract was for the supply of rum, the rum was found not to conform to the quality stipulated and was rejected, and the Union forfeited the whole security deposit of Rs. 18,332. An arbitrator held that the Union was entitled only to reasonable compensation under section 74, and fixed that at Rs. 7,332. The award was made a rule of court and an appeal failed. In the Supreme Court, the Union’s only argument was that the deposit had been taken to ensure due performance and so was forfeitable in full. The Court rejected it, describing the holding in Maula Bux:
It was held by this Court that forfeiture of earnest money under a contract for sale of property does not fall within Section 74 of the Contract Act, if the amount is reasonable, because the forfeiture of a reasonable sum paid as earnest money does not amount to the imposition of a penalty. But, “where under the terms of the contract the party in breach has undertaken to pay a sum of money or to forfeit a sum of money which he was already paid to the party complaining of a breach of contract, the undertaking is of the nature of a penalty.”Union of India v. Rampur Distillery and Chemical Co. Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 649, AIR 1973 SC 1098 (J.M. Shelat and Y.V. Chandrachud JJ.), describing Maula Bux. The report prints the section number as 70 at this point, and the sense requires 74.
36The result is that a label of “security” does not protect a forfeiture. A court will ask what loss the deposit was meant to cover, and whether the amount retained is reasonable.
XI. Saw Pipes at length
37Saw Pipes gave a summary of its own, and it should be set beside the statement in Kailash Nath Associates:
(1) Terms of the contract are required to be taken into consideration before arriving at the conclusion whether the party claiming damages is entitled to the same; (2) If the terms are clear and unambiguous stipulating the liquidated damages in case of the breach of the contract unless it is held that such estimate of damages/compensation is unreasonable or is by way of penalty, party who has committed the breach is required to pay such compensation and that is what is provided in Section 73 of the Contract Act. (3) Section 74 is to be read along with Section 73 and, therefore, in every case of breach of contract, the person aggrieved by the breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage suffered by him before he can claim a decree. The Court is competent to award reasonable compensation in case of breach even if no actual damage is proved to have been suffered in consequences of the breach of a contract. (4) In some contracts, it would be impossible for the Court to assess the compensation arising from breach and if the compensation contemplated is not by way of penalty or unreasonable, Court can award the same if it is genuine pre-estimate by the parties as the measure of reasonable compensation.Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705.
38The passage on the burden is also quoted in Desh Raj v. Rohtash Singh:
Section 74 emphasizes that in case of breach of contract, the party complaining of the breach is entitled to receive reasonable compensation whether or not actual loss is proved to have been caused by such breach. Therefore, the emphasis is on reasonable compensation. If the compensation named in the contract is by way of penalty, consideration would be different and the party is only entitled to reasonable compensation for the loss suffered. But if the compensation named in the contract for such breach is genuine pre-estimate of loss which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it, there is no question of proving such loss or such party is not required to lead evidence to prove actual loss suffered by him. Burden is on the other party to lead evidence for proving that no loss is likely to occur by such breach.Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705, as quoted in Desh Raj v. Rohtash Singh, (2023) 3 SCC 714.
39The case arose from a contract to supply casing pipes for offshore oil work, due by 14 November 1996. The supplier said that a general strike of steel mill workers in Europe had held up its raw material, and it asked for more time. ONGC extended time, stating that an amount equivalent to liquidated damages would be recovered, and it deducted US $ 3,04,970.20 and Rs. 15,75,559 from the price. The arbitral tribunal required a refund, because no loss had been proved. The propositions have particular strength in large contracts, where it is difficult to identify the loss caused by the delay of one supplier.
The tension with Kailash Nath
40There is a real tension between the two cases, though they do not formally conflict. Saw Pipes says that the burden is on the other party to show that no loss is likely to occur. Kailash Nath says that where it is possible to prove actual damage or loss, such proof is not dispensed with. Who, then, must do what?
41A reconciliation goes like this. The first step is to ask whether the loss is one that can be proved. If it is, as in a sale of land with a market value and a resale, the claimant must prove it and cannot rest on the clause. If it cannot be readily proved, as with delay in a complex project, the claimant can rely on a genuine pre-estimate, and the party in breach must then show that it is unreasonable or penal. Kailash Nath frames the rule in that way when it speaks of damage or loss that “is difficult or impossible to prove”. The two cases are thus concerned with different types of loss.
42This is the approach taken in this entry as a reading of the two decisions, and the reader should note that courts have not always spelled it out in that way.
Public utility contracts
43A further line of authority concerns contracts for public works, where the loss is often to the public and not to the employer’s balance sheet. Construction & Design Services v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 14 SCC 263, is usually cited for the view that a public body need not prove a specific financial loss from the delay of a public utility project, while the court may still reduce the liquidated sum claimed. That decision has not been read in full for this entry, and the proposition should be checked against the report before it is relied on.
XII. Earnest money after Kailash Nath
Satish Batra
44The treatment of earnest money has become uncertain. Satish Batra took a generous approach to the seller. The agreement there said that if the purchaser failed to fulfil the conditions “The transaction shall stand cancelled and earnest money will be forfeited”. On a price of Rs. 70,00,000, the purchaser paid Rs. 7,00,000, being 10%, towards earnest money, and did not pay the balance by the agreed date. The trial court dismissed the buyer’s suit for refund. The High Court, relying on Fateh Chand, allowed the seller to forfeit only Rs. 50,000. The Supreme Court considered the earlier authorities, beginning with the Privy Council’s statement in Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup, as the Court summarised it:
it has been held that the earnest money is part of the purchase price when the transaction goes forward and it is forfeited when the transaction falls through, by reason of the fault or failure of the purchaser.Satish Batra v. Sudhir Rawal, (2013) 1 SCC 345, describing Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup, AIR 1926 PC 1.
45The Court then explained the nature of the clause before it:
It represents the guarantee that the contract would be fulfilled. In other words, ‘earnest’ is given to bind the contract, which is a part of the purchase price when the transaction is carried out and it will be forfeited when the transaction falls through by reason of the default or failure of the purchaser.
46It concluded that “the seller was justified in forfeiting the amount of Rs.7,00,000/- as per the relevant clause, since the earnest money was primarily a security for the due performance of the agreement and, consequently, the seller is entitled to forfeit the entire deposit.” The appeal was allowed, and the High Court was held to have misunderstood Fateh Chand. The proposition is that a deposit that is truly earnest belongs to a separate category, and the seller is not confined to a nominal part of it.
Kailash Nath’s different view
47Kailash Nath reached a different result on different facts. DDA auctioned a plot, and the appellant made a bid and paid Rs. 78,00,000 as earnest money. DDA extended time for the balance of 75% twice, after setting up two committees to look into the appellant’s grievances, and then cancelled and forfeited by a letter of 6 October 1993. It later re-auctioned the plot for Rs. 11.78 crores. The Division Bench held that the forfeiture was in order. The Supreme Court held that there had been no breach by the appellant, as the time had been extended. It also said that section 74 applied to the forfeiture of earnest money under a contract, and it rejected the view that the profit on re-auction was irrelevant:
Further, we cannot accept the view of the Division Bench that the fact that the DDA made a profit from re-auction is irrelevant, as that would fly in the face of the most basic principle on the award of damages - namely, that compensation can only be given for damage or loss suffered. If damage or loss is not suffered, the law does not provide for a windfall.Kailash Nath Associates, (2015) 4 SCC 136.
48The appeal was allowed and the Single Judge’s order for refund was restored.
49The Court distinguished forfeiture “under the terms and conditions of a public auction before agreement is reached”. That suggests a limited class of bidders’ deposits which remain outside the section.
Desh Raj v. Rohtash Singh
50Desh Raj v. Rohtash Singh appears to return some ground to the seller. Two agreements to sell were made on 17 February 2004, under which the buyer paid Rs. 22,90,000 as part of the price, in the nature of earnest money. Clause 4 allowed confiscation of the earnest money if the sale deed was not executed on the agreed date. The buyer failed to appear before the Sub-Registrar. After discussing Fateh Chand, Kailash Nath and Saw Pipes, Surya Kant J. said:
Hence, in a scenario where the contractual terms clearly provide the factum of the pre estimate amount being in the nature of ‘earnest money’, the onus to prove that the same was ‘penal’ in nature squarely lies on the party seeking refund of the same. Failure to discharge such burden would treat any pre-estimated amount stipulated in the contract as a ‘genuine pre-estimate of loss’.Desh Raj v. Rohtash Singh, (2023) 3 SCC 714 (Surya Kant and Bela M. Trivedi JJ.). Hyphens have been normalised.
51The Court added that the buyer “has neither pleaded for refund of the earnest money nor has he claimed any damages or penalty”, and that the buyer’s sole objective was title to the property. A buyer who wants refund of earnest money must therefore plead it, and bear the burden of showing that the sum was penal. This does not sit entirely easily with the broad language of Kailash Nath Associates. A buyer’s counsel will emphasise that where actual loss can be proved it must be proved. A seller’s counsel will emphasise the burden on the buyer in Desh Raj. Neither is a decision of a larger Bench than the other, and the Constitution Bench in Fateh Chand remains the underlying authority.
XIII. Claims before adjudication
Rameshwara Rice Mills
52The rule on self-help has a companion in State of Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills, a decision on the assessment of damages by a contracting party. Clause 12 of the agreements said that for any breach the respondent would be liable to pay damages “as may be assessed by the second party”, the State. Damages were assessed by the State’s officers and recovered as arrears of land revenue. The Court, per O. Chinnappa Reddy J., held:
it is clear that the right of the second party to assess damages would arise only if the breach of conditions is admitted or if no issue is made of it. If it was the intention of the parties that the officer acting on behalf of the State was also entitled to adjudicate upon a dispute regarding the breach of conditions the wording of Clause 12 would have been entirely different. A right to adjudicate upon an issue relating to a breach of conditions of the contract would not flow or is not inhered in the right conferred to assess the damages arising from a breach of conditions. The power to assess damages is a subsidiary and consequential power and not the primary power.State of Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills, (1987) 2 SCC 160, AIR 1987 SC 1359, reported headnote.
53It added that “a party to the agreement cannot be an arbiter in his own cause”. So a clause allowing a party to assess damages does not allow it to decide whether the other party committed a breach, if that is disputed. A clause under section 74 does not change this position, because the sum named still depends on a breach. A party in dispute cannot make itself the judge of breach by the wording of the contract.
Kamaluddin Ansari
54The treatment of Raman Iron Foundry in H.M. Kamaluddin Ansari & Co. v. Union of India needs to be understood. A three-judge Bench described the earlier holding, that “unless there was adjudication of the claim by Court or admission by the contractor the Union of India had no authority to appropriate the amount due under pending bills of the contractor towards the satisfaction of its claim for damages”, and it dealt with the interim injunction power under section 41(b) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Readers should go to the report for the exact extent to which the earlier interpretation was overruled. As noted above, Raman Iron Foundry should not be cited for its reading of the standard Clause 18 without reference to Kamaluddin Ansari.
XIV. Comparative note
55English law has moved since Dunlop. In Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi, [2015] UKSC 67, the United Kingdom Supreme Court recast the penalty rule, asking whether the sum is out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the obligation. That is a different inquiry from section 74. Indian law does not ask whether a clause should be struck down. It asks what compensation is reasonable, within a ceiling set by the clause. English cases should thus be used with caution in India, and the Indian Legislature’s decision to “cut across the web of rules and presumptions under the English common law”, in the words of Fateh Chand, should be kept in mind.
XV. Pleading and proof in practice
56The cases suggest a clear order for a party relying on a clause.
57The first step is to establish the breach. Without a breach, there is no section 74. Kailash Nath Associates itself was decided first on the ground that there had been no breach at all, since time had been extended. Rameshwara Rice Mills shows that breach must be adjudicated if it is disputed.
58The second is to characterise the sum. Is it earnest, a security deposit, part of the price, or liquidated damages? Each has a different treatment. The label in the contract is relevant but not conclusive, as Fateh Chand and Maula Bux show.
59The third is to say whether the loss is capable of proof. If so, evidence should be led. A claimant should not rely on the clause alone, because of the words in Kailash Nath that “where it is possible to prove actual damage or loss, such proof is not dispensed with.”
60The fourth is to show the basis of the pre-estimate, if the claimant relies on one. Contemporary documents will help.
61The fifth concerns the party in breach, which should plead the penal nature of the sum and any absence of loss. Desh Raj shows the risk of leaving these matters unpleaded. A claim for refund should be stated as a claim. It should not be left to be implied from a suit for specific performance.
62The sixth is to ask the court to fix a figure in the alternative. Because the court’s jurisdiction under section 74 is to award reasonable compensation up to the ceiling, both parties should lead material on what would be reasonable if the primary case fails. Rampur Distillery is an example of an award of a middle figure which was upheld.
XVI. The position today
63Section 74 entitles a party complaining of breach to reasonable compensation not exceeding the sum named or the penalty stipulated for, whether or not actual damage is proved. The liquidated amount itself can be received only if it is a genuine pre-estimate of damages fixed by both parties and found to be such by the court. In other cases only reasonable compensation not exceeding the stated sum can be awarded. The words “whether or not actual damage or loss is proved” dispense with proof where loss is difficult to establish. They do not mean that compensation can be given where no loss exists, and a party who has suffered no loss may recover nothing. A clear contractual pre-estimate carries weight and casts on the party in breach a burden to show unreasonableness in an appropriate case. Maula Bux and Satish Batra treat true earnest money as forfeitable without the same enquiry, while Kailash Nath Associates says that section 74 applies to forfeiture of earnest money under a contract, though not to forfeiture under auction terms before an agreement is reached. Desh Raj places on the buyer the burden of showing that a sum stated to be earnest is penal. A security deposit or a large sum merely called earnest does not have the protection of true earnest money.
History
- Published · 31 October 2026
© 2026 First Precedent Research. Free to share and adapt with credit, for non-commercial use, under CC BY-NC 4.0. A published piece is changed only to correct an error, and each correction is listed under History. If the law changes, we add a linked afterword. Nothing on FPR is legal advice.