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2026 FPR ETS 6 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/readiness-and-willingness
TS-0065Tests · Contract · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 6
FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 4,320 words
Readiness and Willingness
Under section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 a plaintiff who seeks specific performance must prove having performed or having always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract; readiness refers to capacity, including financial capacity, willingness to conduct, and both must be shown continuously from the date of the contract to the decree, though actual tender or deposit is not required except as the court directs.
Abstract
A plaintiff who asks a court to compel performance must show a readiness to perform. This entry sets out section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; the requirement of continuous readiness from Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon and N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao; the distinction between readiness and willingness in Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar; proof of financial capacity, with U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy and Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh; the role of a power of attorney holder in Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha; the 2018 amendment; and the sequence of reciprocal promises in Nathulal v. Phoolchand.
I. The test
Section 16(c)
1Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 lists the personal bars to relief. Clause (c), as amended, says that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to prove having performed or having always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by that person, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The Explanation adds two points. Where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court. And the plaintiff must prove performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.
2The rule has an evident fairness. A person asking a court to compel the other side to perform must show that person’s own side of the bargain is real. It is also a condition of an equitable kind of relief. A plaintiff who only wants specific performance if the market has moved upward, and who stands back otherwise, is not the person the remedy is for.
Continuous
3The classic statement is the Privy Council’s in Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon. The right of the plaintiff, the Judicial Committee said, depended on his having been himself up to the date of decree ready and willing to perform the contract on his part:
an allegation which imports a continuous readiness and willingness up to the time of the hearingArdeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon, (1928) 55 IA 360, AIR 1928 PC 208, as reported at (1928) 30 Bom LR 1242, referring to Lord Selborne in Hipgrave v. Case, (1885) 28 Ch D 336, 361.
4In the case itself, some nine months before the trial, the plaintiff’s solicitors had notified the defendant that the plaintiff had decided to abandon the claim for specific performance and would instead claim damages. A plaintiff who has said that cannot truthfully claim to have been ready and willing throughout.
5N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao puts the rule in strong terms for section 16(c):
The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail.N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115, AIR 1996 SC 116 (K. Ramaswamy J.).
6It goes on to say that to adjudge readiness and willingness the court “must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit alongwith other attending circumstances”, and that “Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract.”
II. Two distinct requirements
Readiness and willingness compared
7Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar draws the distinction usually quoted. As a later judgment records:
In Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar , (1996) 4 SCC 526] this Court drew a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. It was observed that by readiness it may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which would include the financial position to pay the purchase price.Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526, as quoted in a later Supreme Court judgment reproduced in Ashok Kumar Kinra v. Ishwar Industries Ltd. (decided 31 January 2023).
8On willingness, the same passage says that “the conduct of the plaintiff has to be properly scrutinised along with the attendant circumstances”. Readiness is thus a matter of capacity, and willingness is a matter of intention as shown by conduct. A plaintiff may be willing and unable, in which case the claim fails on readiness. A plaintiff may be able and unwilling, because the plaintiff is holding off until something happens, in which case the claim fails on willingness.
Financial capacity
9Readiness in money terms means the plaintiff could have paid the balance when required. N.P. Thirugnanam says that the amount of consideration “must of necessity be proved to be available”. The Explanation means the plaintiff need not actually have the money sitting in cash, and it is not necessary to tender or deposit it. But a plaintiff must be able to show how the sum would have been found: savings, income, a loan or sale of an asset. A claim that fails to give any such evidence is exposed. Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh shows how the question arises: the defendants there pleaded that the plaintiffs did not have sufficient means, and the trial court dismissed the suit, holding that they had failed to prove they had enough funds to repurchase the land.Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh, (1997) 2 SCC 200, AIR 1996 SC 2510 (K. Ramaswamy J.). Courts have considered the facts in such cases differently, and a single formula will not suit every set of facts.
U.N. Krishnamurthy
10U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy is a recent restatement. It notes that a plaintiff “is required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part”, referring to Lord Blanesburgh in Ardeshir Mama.U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, (2023) 11 SCC 775 (Indira Banerjee J.). The case also records the argument that the Court should take notice of steep rises in real estate prices before granting the discretionary relief, an argument that often appears alongside section 16(c). The two issues are distinct: section 16(c) concerns the plaintiff’s position, and discretion concerns whether relief should be granted in the circumstances.
III. Pleading and proof
The time at which it is judged
11The requirement looks at the whole period, not at one moment. A plaintiff who was short of funds for a time, and who then shows the money just before the decree, must explain the earlier gap. That is the force of the word “always” in the section and of the phrase “continuous readiness” in the cases.
The 2018 amendment
12Before 2018, section 16(c) spoke of a plaintiff “who fails to aver and prove”. The Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 removed the word “aver”. It is sometimes suggested that this relaxes the requirement of pleading. But the general rules of pleading in Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 still require material facts to be pleaded. A plaintiff who wants to prove readiness and willingness should plead them expressly, with the facts. Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal shows the risk of relying on a case not pleaded. U.N. Krishnamurthy also refers to a decision in which the absence of an averment meant that the plaintiff had no cause of action for specific performance.
Evidence of the plaintiff
13The question of who can prove readiness and willingness has a clear answer. Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha concerned a plaintiff who lived in the United Kingdom and did not enter the witness box, relying on the evidence of an attorney holder. The Court drew on an earlier decision to say that a power of attorney holder who has done some acts may depose for the principal on those acts, but “he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him”, and “he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined.”Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512 (Bench: R.V. Raveendran and Aftab Alam JJ.). Readiness and willingness often depend on personal knowledge, because the plaintiff’s means and intentions are facts within the plaintiff’s own knowledge. A plaintiff who stays out of the witness box faces a serious difficulty. An attorney holder who was actually involved may give evidence of what the holder personally did.
Conduct
14The court looks to what the plaintiff did. Replying to letters, asking for the sale deed, arranging funds, attending the registrar’s office on the appointed day, paying any further sums due and filing the suit promptly are all relevant. Long silence usually tells against the plaintiff. So does a shift between demanding performance and claiming a refund. K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, (1997) 3 SCC 1, shows that delay may also bear on the discretion to grant specific performance, including where the time was not of the essence but the plaintiff’s delay was long and the circumstances had changed.
IV. Reciprocal obligations
Sequence of performance
15The plaintiff need only be ready and willing to perform “the contract according to its true construction”. If the contract requires the defendant to do something first, such as to obtain a permission or to clear a mortgage, the plaintiff need not perform out of turn. The clause also expressly excludes terms “the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant”. Nathulal v. Phoolchand, though a case on section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, treats the sequence of parties’ obligations as relevant to whether a party is deemed to be ready and willing.Nathulal v. Phoolchand, (1969) 3 SCC 120, AIR 1970 SC 546 (J.C. Shah J.).
16A defendant cannot therefore resist by saying the plaintiff did not pay on a date on which the defendant had not done what was required first. The plaintiff, however, must still show a readiness to pay when the defendant does so.
Default by the defendant
17A plaintiff sometimes says that because the defendant was in default, readiness and willingness do not matter. That argument fails. U.N. Krishnamurthy records the contention that readiness and willingness have to be proved “regardless of any default by the original Defendant”, and the requirement in section 16(c) is on the plaintiff in any event. Default by the defendant is what gives rise to the suit. It does not relieve the plaintiff from showing that the plaintiff’s side remains real.
V. Relief and the 2018 changes
18The 2018 amendment did more than change section 16(c). It removed the discretionary language of section 20 in its earlier form, and it made specific performance more readily available. Section 10 now says that specific performance shall be enforced subject to sections 11(2), 14 and 16. Whether the amendment applies to contracts or suits predating it is a question addressed in later Supreme Court decisions, including Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214, and any reader should check the current position, including proceedings after that decision. What remains is the requirement of section 16(c), which stands as the main defence under section 10.
VI. Practice
For the plaintiff
19Plead readiness and willingness expressly, with facts. Keep a record: letters, bank statements, loan sanctions and other evidence of means. Get into the witness box. Do not allow the position to change during the case, such as by abandoning a claim for specific performance and then returning to it. If a court so directs, deposit the balance. Consider doing so voluntarily in an appropriate case, as a signal of intent. A plaintiff who is unable to do so should not assume that the Explanation protects against all scrutiny.
For the defendant
20Test the plaintiff’s means, including by demanding documents. Look at the plaintiff’s conduct from the date of the contract onwards, and look for any gap or contrary statement. If the plaintiff is absent from the witness box, rely on Man Kaur. If the plaintiff claims the defendant’s prior obligations were not done, respond on the true construction of the contract. Raise delay on the question of discretion to the extent the law still allows.
VII. What must be pleaded and proved about funds
U.N. Krishnamurthy’s statement
21The most detailed modern statement of what a plaintiff must do about money is in U.N. Krishnamurthy:
To aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform an obligation to pay money, in terms of a contract, the plaintiff would have to make specific statements in the plaint and adduce evidence to show availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time. In other words, the plaintiff would have to plead that the plaintiff had sufficient funds or was in a position to raise funds in time to discharge his obligation under the contract. If the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds with him to discharge his obligations in terms of a contract, which requires payment of money, the plaintiff would have to specifically plead how the funds would be available to him. To cite an example, the plaintiff may aver and prove, by adducing evidence, an arrangement with a financier for disbursement of adequate funds for timely compliance with the terms and conditions of a contract involving payment of money.U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, (2023) 11 SCC 775.
22This goes beyond what is sometimes thought to be required. The plaintiff must make “specific statements in the plaint”. The plaintiff must adduce evidence “to show availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time”. If the plaintiff does not have the funds, the plaintiff must plead how they would be available. It gives the example of an arrangement with a financier. The decision was given on section 16(c) as it stood before the 2018 amendment, which is why it speaks of averment. But the substance of the passage about how money is to be shown would not obviously be different now.
23The Court also explained the effect of Explanation (i). A plaintiff does not have to tender or deposit, unless directed. That does not reduce what must be proved. It only means that the plaintiff need not have put the actual money forward to prove readiness. A plaintiff who confuses these two things is likely to come to the hearing with no evidence at all.
Thirugnanam on the facts
24N.P. Thirugnanam shows what happens when such evidence is tested. The contract was of 9 April 1979, to buy a house for Rs. 2,30,000. The plaintiff called a witness, PW-2, who said that he had been prepared to lend Rs. 2,00,000 on a promissory note. Counsel argued that “It is not necessary for the plaintiff that he should keep ready the money on hand. What is relevant and material is that he should have the necessary capacity to raise the funds”. The Court accepted the principle but not the evidence. The plaintiff had been directed on 11 February 1991 to deposit Rs. 2,00,000 or furnish a bank guarantee by 11 March 1991, and he did neither. The Court went on:
It was also found that the plaintiff was dabbling in real estate business. He had house on hire purchase agreement with the T.N. Housing Board. He paid only Rs. 7,750/- upto 1980. A sum of Rs. 29,665/- was further payable. He had an agreement with one Annamma Philip for Rs. 49,500/- to sell the said house after purchase from the Board. Obviously, he had obtained advance and sold the house to his vendee on February 7, 1980 after getting a sale deed executed in his favour. He entered into an agreement (Ex.p.1) on 9.4.79 to purchase the suit house for Rs. 2,30,000/-. He was not able to pay the loans and he adjusted Rs. 20,000/- which was paid towards arrears of rent and paid only Rs. 1975/- under Ex.P.30 for the sale consideration of his house. He was unable to pay the rent to the respondents and had deposited huge amount towards arrears of rent pursuant to the orders of the courts. PW-2, though professed to be willing to advance a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/-, did not have cash and admitted that had to obtain Rs. 2,00,000/- by hypothicating his property and at the same time was willing to lend on a pronote to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/-, which was hard to believe.N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115, AIR 1996 SC 116.
25Several kinds of evidence were considered here: the plaintiff’s other dealings, whether the plaintiff could pay small sums already due, whether rent had been paid, and whether the proposed lender really had the money. The promise of a loan was not taken at face value. The lender’s own means were examined. So a plaintiff who relies on a friend’s or relative’s promise should be ready for the friend’s bank statements to be asked for. A sanction letter from a bank is far stronger.
26The direction to deposit was treated as significant. Explanation (i) preserves the power to direct a deposit. A plaintiff who is directed to deposit and fails to do so has provided very strong evidence against readiness.
VIII. The relation between breach and readiness
Man Kaur’s example
27A plaintiff often begins by saying that the defendant broke the contract. Man Kaur, in a passage quoted in U.N. Krishnamurthy, disposes of the idea that this is enough:
A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct. Let us give an example. Take a case where there is a contract for sale for a consideration of Rs. 10 lakhs and earnest money of Rs. 1 lakh was paid and the vendor wrongly refuses to execute the sale deed unless the purchaser is ready to pay Rs. 15 lakhs. In such a case there is a clear breach by the defendant.Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512, as quoted in U.N. Krishnamurthy, (2023) 11 SCC 775. The words “waived by the plaintiff” in the second parenthesis appear in this form in the online text.
28The example continues with the case of a purchaser who has no money. The defendant’s refusal to complete at the agreed price is a breach. But if the plaintiff could not have paid the agreed price anyway, the plaintiff has no right to specific performance. The plaintiff may have a claim in damages, for the sum paid or for loss on the bargain, but section 16(c) bars the decree for performance.
29This separates two questions that are often run together. Breach by the defendant gives a cause of action. Readiness and willingness are conditions on one particular remedy. A plaintiff can win on the first and lose on the second. Such a plaintiff should therefore plead an alternative claim for refund or compensation. Under section 22 of the Act, refund of earnest money or other money paid must be specifically claimed, and the entry on no relief beyond pleadings deals with that in more detail.
Why the rule is not unfair
30It may seem harsh that a defendant who has broken a contract escapes specific performance because the plaintiff could not perform. The reason is that specific performance gives the plaintiff the property or other subject matter itself. A decree in favour of a plaintiff who cannot pay would either be pointless, because it will never be carried out, or would give the plaintiff time and leverage at the other party’s expense while the market moves in its favour. The plaintiff still has the ordinary remedy of damages under the Contract Act. The rule keeps the special remedy for those who really do want the bargain and can carry it out.
IX. The Ardeshir Mama decision
31Ardeshir Mama is also useful for what it says about the plaintiff’s choice of remedy. The Privy Council said that in a suit for specific performance, the right of the plaintiff depended on his having been ready and willing up to the date of decree, as earlier noted. It treated this as an essential allegation in such a plaint. The plaintiff who had given notice that he had abandoned specific performance, and who then turned to damages, had in effect shown that he was not ready and willing. An interesting practical question follows. Can a plaintiff who has sued for specific performance also claim damages in the alternative without being taken to have given up the first? The answer under the 1963 Act is that section 21 expressly allows compensation in addition to or in substitution for performance. A plaintiff may plead both, without a suggestion of inconsistency. But a plaintiff who writes a letter that states that the plaintiff no longer wants the property, or that the plaintiff will only take money, runs the risk of the Ardeshir Mama conclusion. Letters written during the litigation should therefore be drafted with care.
X. The conduct of the plaintiff
32Several types of conduct arise regularly.
33Delay in filing suit, within the limitation period, is not of itself fatal. But it is evidence on willingness, and it may be strong evidence if the market has risen in the interval. N.P. Thirugnanam requires the court to look at “the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit”.
34Silence after the agreement is damaging. A purchaser who did nothing during the months allowed for completion, and who wrote only when the vendor was about to sell elsewhere, faces an inference of unwillingness.
35Asking for changes in the bargain, such as a reduction in the price, more time, or a different mode of payment, may not be fatal, but it should be considered. A plaintiff who offered less than the contract price has not shown willingness to perform the contract as it stands, unless the offer was merely a negotiating position and the plaintiff also made clear that the original terms would be met.
36Disputing the amount due, or requiring a condition that the contract does not contain, may be held to show the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform “according to its true construction”. Explanation (ii) makes this clear. A plaintiff who insisted on a wrong construction may have shown an unwillingness to perform the actual contract. Where the construction was reasonably open, and where the plaintiff also showed that it would perform on the true construction if the court so found, the position is better.
37Attending the Sub-Registrar’s office on the date fixed, with the money or a draft, and obtaining some record of that attendance, is excellent evidence. Many such suits turn on who attended and when, and a record of attendance can be decisive.
38Sale of other assets to meet the price, and an application for a loan made close to the time, are strong evidence of readiness. So is a statement of account showing the money in hand at the right date. A plaintiff who produces no such documents will face an adverse inference, given that those documents are within the plaintiff’s own power.
XI. Where the defendant has a prior obligation
39The second half of Explanation (ii), reading the requirement according to the true construction of the contract, becomes especially important where the vendor has an obligation that comes first. Common examples are obtaining an income tax clearance, obtaining permission under a land law, clearing a mortgage, partitioning the property, or providing title deeds. The plaintiff need not pay the balance before these are done, if that is what the contract says. A plaintiff’s non-payment is not then a failure of readiness. But the plaintiff must still show that it would have been able to pay when the prior step was taken. The plaintiff should also take care to call on the defendant in writing to do what is required, and to state that the money is available. That gives a record both of the sequence and of readiness.
40In Nathulal v. Phoolchand, the seller’s obligation to clear a statutory obstacle was treated as coming first, and the buyer’s readiness was judged with that in mind. The reasoning there, as noted above, was given under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, but it applies in the same way to section 16(c). A defendant’s failure to do what it had to do first will often supply the explanation for what might otherwise look like inaction by the plaintiff.
XII. The end of the requirement: the decree and after
41Under section 28 of the Act, where a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property directs payment within a time, and the purchaser or lessee does not pay within the period allowed, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit to have the contract rescinded. The court may also extend the time. So the plaintiff’s readiness has a further test after the decree. A plaintiff who has succeeded on all the issues and who then fails to pay can lose the decree. Although this is not section 16(c), it is directed at the same concern. The Court has been willing to extend the time in appropriate cases, but a plaintiff should not rely on such relief. A plaintiff should plan to pay within the time set.
XIII. The position today
42A plaintiff claiming specific performance must prove having performed or having always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract to be performed by the plaintiff, other than those prevented or waived by the defendant. Readiness refers to capacity, including financial capacity to pay. Willingness refers to intention as shown by conduct, considered with the attendant circumstances. Both must be shown continuously from the contract to the decree. Actual tender or deposit is not essential unless the court directs it, but the money must be shown to be available. The requirement is read according to the true construction of the contract, so a plaintiff need not perform out of turn. A plaintiff who stays out of the witness box may fail, since an attorney holder cannot speak to matters within the principal’s personal knowledge. Although the word “aver” was removed in 2018, the general rules of pleading still apply.
History
- Published · 31 October 2026
© 2026 First Precedent Research. Free to share and adapt with credit, for non-commercial use, under CC BY-NC 4.0. A published piece is changed only to correct an error, and each correction is listed under History. If the law changes, we add a linked afterword. Nothing on FPR is legal advice.