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2026 FPR ETS 13 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/manifest-arbitrariness
TS-0002Tests · Constitutional · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 13
FPR Editors1 November 2026 · 2,498 words
Manifest Arbitrariness
A statute may be struck down under Article 14 if it is manifestly arbitrary, that is, made capriciously, irrationally or without adequate determining principle, or if it is excessive and disproportionate; the ground has been settled since Shayara Bano (2017) and later Constitution Benches, but it is confined by the word "manifest", by the respect owed to legislative choice, especially in economic matters, and by an open question about how it relates to proportionality.
Abstract
Can a law passed by a competent legislature be struck down simply because it is arbitrary? Article 14 was given a new reading in E.P. Royappa (1973) and Ajay Hasia (1980), which treated arbitrariness as the opposite of equality. State of A.P. v. McDowell (1996) then said that a statute can be struck down on two grounds alone, lack of competence and violation of a constitutional provision, and that there was no third ground. The law stayed divided, with cases continuing to strike down statutes as arbitrary while others treated McDowell as a bar. In Shayara Bano (2017), Nariman J., for himself and Lalit J., held McDowell to be per incuriam and stated the present test; Kurian Joseph J. agreed on that question of law, though not with its application. This entry traces that history, shows how Joseph Shine, Navtej Singh Johar, Hindustan Construction and the Electoral Bonds case have used the test, and considers its limits: the deference given to economic legislation, the opinion of Sanjiv Khanna J. in the Electoral Bonds case that proportionality would subsume it, and the risk that it becomes a licence to review the wisdom of laws.
I. The Test
1The governing statement is that of R.F. Nariman J. in Shayara Bano v. Union of India:
“The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.”Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 : AIR 2017 SC 4609, ¶ 55 (Nariman, J.).
2The ground matters because it does not depend on classification. The older reading of Article 14 asks whether a law treats people differently without a reasonable basis. A law may satisfy that test, or may not classify at all, and still be open to attack on this ground.
3The word “manifest” is the limit. Nariman J. explained that this ground would not involve a challenge to a law as “unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted”, which was the kind of attack on wisdom that McDowell rightly rejected. It “would only involve a law being disproportionate, excessive or otherwise being manifestly unreasonable.”Shayara Bano, ¶ 45. The arbitrariness must be plain on a proper analysis, and it must be more than the court’s disagreement.
II. From Royappa to McDowell
The new reading of Article 14
4For the first two decades of the Constitution, the test under Article 14 was reasonable classification. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu added another approach. The case concerned the transfer of a senior civil servant. Bhagwati J., writing for himself and Krishna Iyer J., said:
“Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be ‘cribbed cabined and confined’ within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.”E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555.
5Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi drew the conclusion: “It must therefore now be taken to be well settled that what Article 14 strikes at is arbitrariness because any action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality.”Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : AIR 1981 SC 487. Classification became, in the Court’s words, “merely a judicial formula” for detecting arbitrariness.
6Applying this to legislation was a further step. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal, three judges said that when a statute is impugned under Article 14, “what the court has to decide is whether the statute is so arbitrary or unreasonable that it must be struck down.”State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal, (1995) 1 SCC 519, ¶ 7. In Mithu v. State of Punjab, a Constitution Bench struck down section 303 of the Indian Penal Code, and Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu also invalidated a law as arbitrary.
McDowell
7State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co. went the other way. Andhra Pradesh had imposed a prohibition on liquor, with exemptions, and it was argued that this made the law arbitrary. B.P. Jeevan Reddy J., for three judges, answered:
“A law made by the Parliament or the Legislature can be struck down by courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz., (1) lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground.”State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709 : AIR 1996 SC 1627, ¶ 43.
8The concern was substantive due process. The Court declined to go into “the concepts of procedural unreasonableness and substantive unreasonableness”, and it said that a court does not sit over the wisdom of a legislature. Read strictly, the “no third ground” statement does not settle whether arbitrariness is a violation of Article 14, which is a fundamental right. Later Benches nevertheless treated it as a bar.
The division
9For twenty years the two lines ran side by side. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, rent control provisions freezing rent at old levels were challenged on the footing that they had “with the passage of time, become arbitrary”. The Court accepted that a law could become arbitrary in that way.Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 2 SCC 1. Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India struck down the pre-deposit condition in section 17(2) of the SARFAESI Act.Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311. But State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli, Rajbala v. State of Haryana and Binoy Viswam v. Union of India read McDowell as excluding arbitrariness as a separate ground for statutes.
10Meanwhile subordinate legislation was treated differently. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India said it “may also be questioned on the ground that it is unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary.”Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641, as quoted in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113. It is from this context that the word “manifest” came.
III. Shayara Bano
11Shayara Bano v. Union of India concerned talaq-e-biddat, or instant triple talaq. The Court’s formal order was short: “by a majority of 3:2 the practice of ‘talaq-e-biddat’ - triple talaq is set aside.”Shayara Bano, Order of the Court. The reasoning of the majority was divided, and this matters for the test.
12Nariman J., with Lalit J., held that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 recognised and enforced triple talaq, so that the practice could be tested under Article 14. He then took on McDowell.
13He gave several reasons. McDowell had explained away the Constitution Bench decision in Mithu, and it had not referred at all to Sunil Batra, among other decisions of equal or greater strength. Its objection that this was substantive due process had been answered by the later development of Article 21 from Maneka Gandhi onwards. Its separation of Article 14 from Article 19 repeated the approach of A.K. Gopalan, which R.C. Cooper had abandoned. And it was internally inconsistent, since it accepted that a law might fall as “disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable” while refusing a challenge based on unreasonableness.Shayara Bano, ¶¶ 44–45. His conclusion was direct: “Mcdowell (supra) itself is per incuriam, not having noticed several judgments of Benches of equal or higher strength, its reasoning even otherwise being flawed. The judgments, following McDowell (supra) are, therefore, no longer good law.”Shayara Bano, ¶ 53.
14Applying the test, he held triple talaq manifestly arbitrary because it allowed a marital tie to be broken capriciously and whimsically, without any attempt at reconciliation.
15Kurian Joseph J. supplied the third vote on the outcome, but on a different basis. He held that the practice lacked legal sanctity, relying on Shamim Ara, and he disagreed that the 1937 Act regulated triple talaq so as to be tested under Article 14. On the point of law, however, he wrote: “on the pure question of law that a legislation, be it plenary or subordinate, can be challenged on the ground of arbitrariness, I agree with the illuminating exposition of law by Nariman, J.”Shayara Bano (Kurian Joseph, J.). That is why the proposition has the support of three of five judges, even though only two applied it to the facts. Khehar C.J. and Nazeer J. dissented.
IV. Later Decisions
16Later Constitution Benches removed any remaining doubt.
17In Joseph Shine v. Union of India, Dipak Misra C.J. set out the passage from Shayara Bano and said: “We respectfully concur with the said view.” He then held that section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as the definition of the aggrieved person in the related procedure, was “absolutely and manifestly arbitrary as it does not even appear to be rational”, and that it “confers a licence on the husband to deal with the wife as he likes which is extremely excessive and disproportionate.”Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39, ¶¶ 20–23 (Misra, C.J.).
18Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India used the test for section 377. As the Court later summarised it, Misra C.J. held the section manifestly arbitrary for failing to distinguish between consensual and non-consensual acts, Nariman J. did so for penalising consensual sexual activity between persons of the same sex, and Chandrachud J. and Malhotra J. reached similar conclusions.Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1, as summarised in Association for Democratic Reforms, ¶ 190.
19The ground has reached commercial statutes as well. In Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, Parliament had inserted section 87 into the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which brought back the automatic stay of awards, and it had omitted section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act, shortly after the Court had pointed out what would go wrong. Nariman J. held that to do this “would render Section 87 and the deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act manifestly arbitrary, having been enacted unreasonably, without adequate determining principle, and contrary to the public interest sought to be subserved”.Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2020) 17 SCC 324 : AIR 2020 SC 122.
The Electoral Bonds case
20The fullest later discussion is Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India. A Constitution Bench considered, among other things, the removal of the cap on corporate political contributions in section 182 of the Companies Act, 2013. The Union argued that manifest arbitrariness did not apply to invalidate legislation. Chandrachud C.J. reviewed the cases and said that “the relevant question” was “whether a legislative enactment can be challenged on the sole ground of manifest arbitrariness”.Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113, ¶ 181 (Chandrachud, C.J.). He answered in the affirmative, and then gave a further specific use of the test:
“The doctrine of manifest arbitrariness can be used to strike down a provision where: (a) the legislature fails to make a classification by recognizing the degrees of harm; and (b) the purpose is not in consonance with constitutional values.”Association for Democratic Reforms, ¶ 209.
21The Court applied this to the removal of the cap. The earlier limit on contributions had been meant to discourage loss-making companies and shell companies, and removing the cap was at odds with the stated aim of discouraging shell companies. The Court concluded that “the amendment to Section 182 is manifestly arbitrary for (a) treating political contributions by companies and individuals alike; (b) permitting the unregulated influence of companies in the governance and political process violating the principle of free and fair elections; and (c) treating contributions made by profit-making and loss-making companies to political parties alike.”Association for Democratic Reforms, ¶ 215.
22Sanjiv Khanna J., writing separately and reaching the same result on the validity of the Scheme by a different route, said: “I would rather apply the principle of proportionality which, in my opinion, would subsume the test of manifest arbitrariness.”Association for Democratic Reforms (Sanjiv Khanna, J.). His remark points to the question discussed below.
V. Limits
What the test does not do
23The ground is not a general licence to review legislation. McDowell remains right on one point that Shayara Bano did not disturb: a court does not sit over the wisdom of a law, and Shayara Bano preserves the distinction between manifest arbitrariness and a law merely being “unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted”.
24Economic legislation receives particular latitude. R.K. Garg v. Union of India is the classic authority for the view that laws on economic matters deserve greater deference, since the legislature must experiment and may make mistakes.R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675. The test has been raised and rejected in such cases, as in Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, where the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code survived challenges framed in those terms.Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17. The presumption of constitutionality also remains, and the burden stays with the challenger. Hindustan Construction and the Electoral Bonds case show that economic laws are not immune, but in both the Court found something beyond a poor policy choice: in the first, a disregard of what the Court had pointed out in an earlier judgment and what the Act was intended to achieve, and in the second, a conflict with the law’s own stated purpose.
Proportionality
25The formula in Shayara Bano includes “excessive and disproportionate”. It is not clear how this relates to the structured proportionality analysis from Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of M.P. and Puttaswamy, which has distinct stages of purpose, connection, necessity and balancing. If a law is excessive under the first, it would often fail the second, but the two are not the same. Manifest arbitrariness applies without any need for a right to be restricted, while proportionality applies to a restriction on a right.
26Sanjiv Khanna J.’s view that proportionality would subsume the test has not become the law. It does raise a fair concern: a loosely stated test may do less well at explaining its reasoning than a structured one. The opposing concern is that a structured test does not obviously fit a law that does not restrict a particular right at all, such as a law that fails on grounds of irrationality.
Criticism
27Three objections deserve to be taken seriously.
28The first is the original concern about the separation of powers. Terms like “capriciously” and “irrationally” are not self-applying, and an elected legislature’s work can be set aside on the strength of them. Those who defend the test answer that the limit is real, since what counts is manifest arbitrariness and not error.
29The second is about precedent. McDowell was a decision of three judges, and it was held per incuriam by what was formally an opinion of two, with the third judge agreeing on law. The later Constitution Benches have now removed that objection in practice.
30The third is about content. The test combines ideas of irrationality, lack of principle, and excess, and its application has been uneven: from a law on marriage and a penal provision to the regulation of arbitration and of political finance. Whether the test can be stated more exactly is a question for the coming cases, and the formula in the Electoral Bonds case, on failing to recognise degrees of harm, may be a beginning.
VI. Applying the Test
31A challenge on this ground can be examined through these questions.
32Is the law valid on classification and within competence? If the challenger has a straightforward classification argument, that usually comes first. Manifest arbitrariness is most needed where classification does not capture the wrong.
33Is there an adequate determining principle? The court looks for what the law is trying to do and for whether its terms relate to that purpose. A law that contradicts its own stated purpose, or that ignores a defect in the existing law that it was said to address, is more exposed.
34Is the law capricious or irrational, in that it permits or requires action without any rational basis? Triple talaq in Shayara Bano, and the treatment of the wife in section 497 in Joseph Shine, are the leading examples.
35Is the law excessive or disproportionate? The question is whether it goes well beyond what its purpose could justify.
36Is the challenge really to the wisdom of the policy? If the complaint is that a better law could be written, or that the law will not work as well as another, the challenge should fail. And if the law is economic in nature, the court will give the legislature greater latitude.
37Finally, is the remedy proportionate? Where the arbitrary element can be separated, the court may strike down only that part, or may read the provision down if the words permit it, as the entry on reading down explains.
History
- Published · 1 November 2026
© 2026 First Precedent Research. Free to share and adapt with credit, for non-commercial use, under CC BY-NC 4.0. A published piece is changed only to correct an error, and each correction is listed under History. If the law changes, we add a linked afterword. Nothing on FPR is legal advice.