Skip to content

FPR · First Precedent Research
2026 FPR ETS 1 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/instrumentality-test

TS-0005Tests · Constitutional · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 1

FPR Editors18 October 2026 · 5,928 words

The Instrumentality Test

A non-statutory body qualifies as an "other authority" under Article 12 only when cumulative evidence establishes that it is financially, functionally, and administratively dominated by deep and pervasive State control.

Abstract

Article 12 binds the State to respect Part III rights, extending its reach beyond government departments to "other authorities". To prevent the State from evading constitutional discipline by outsourcing functions to autonomous corporate shells, the Supreme Court developed the instrumentality test. This entry traces that doctrine from its origins in the statutory birth rule through Sukhdev Singh, R.D. Shetty, and Ajay Hasia's six factors, through the expansion and pushback of the 1980s and 1990s, to the seven-judge bench correction in Pradeep Kumar Biswas, which rejected single-factor triggers in favour of cumulative deep and pervasive control. It then examines the application of that standard to monopolistic private bodies in Zee Telefilms, the boundary between Article 12 status and Article 226 review, and contemporary dilemmas surrounding disinvestment and horizontal rights.


I. The test

1Article 12 of the Constitution defines “the State” for Part III to include the Government and Parliament of India, the Government and Legislature of each State, and “all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.” When a department of state acts, it binds the Government directly. The difficulty arises when the State acts through an intermediary: a statutory corporation, a government company registered under the Companies Act, a society formed under registration laws, or an autonomous institute financed from the public purse.

2The instrumentality test determines when such an intermediary is an “other authority” under Article 12, and therefore “the State” itself. If the body is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it is subject to the discipline of Part III, and its decisions are vulnerable to direct challenge under Articles 32 and 226. If it is not, an aggrieved person cannot invoke fundamental rights against it as a State actor, even if the body exercises vast economic influence, manages essential public utilities, or receives substantial state patronage.

3The test received its modern formulation in 2002 from a seven-judge Constitution Bench in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology. Delivering the judgment of the five-judge majority, Ruma Pal J. stated the test in cumulative terms:

The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must ex hypothesi be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be — whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the pervasive control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be deep and pervasive. If it is found to be so, then the body is a State within the meaning of Article 12. On the other hand, even if some of the tests may be satisfied, if the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111, para 40.

4The test requires three concurrent inquiries: 1. Financial dominance: whether the State holds the share capital, meets almost the entire operational expenditure, or controls the budget. 2. Functional dominance: whether the body’s functions are historically governmental, conferred by sovereign mandate, or dedicated to public purposes closely integrated with state administration. 3. Administrative dominance: whether the Government exercises pervasive control over the governing body, senior appointments, and routine policy.

5Crucially, the control must be “deep and pervasive”, not merely regulatory. All corporate entities, registered societies, and private institutions operate within statutory regulations, tax regimes, and licensing frameworks. Such ambient state regulation does not transform an autonomous entity into an arm of the State. The control must be particular to the body, reaching into its internal governance to demonstrate that the corporate shell is an instrument through which the government executes its will.

II. The constitutional text and the statutory birth rule

The rejection of ejusdem generis

6The constitutional text offers little guidance on the outer limits of “other authorities”. In the first decade of the republic, High Courts construed the phrase restrictively by applying the canon of ejusdem generis. In University of Madras v. Shantha Bai, the Madras High Court held that “other authorities” could only encompass bodies exercising governmental or sovereign functions akin to the Government and the Legislature, and concluded that a university fell outside Article 12.University of Madras v. Shantha Bai, AIR 1954 Mad 67.

7The Supreme Court dismantled that construction in 1962 in Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. N. Rajagopala Ayyangar J. observed that the entities enumerated in Article 12 shared no common genus. Local authorities such as municipalities and district boards do not exercise sovereign power in the sense that Parliament does. Because no common genus exists, the rule of ejusdem generis cannot restrict “other authorities” to bodies exercising sovereign functions.Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1621.

The statutory authority rule in Mohan Lal

8In 1967, a Constitution Bench in Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal considered whether a statutory electricity board constituted under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 was an “other authority”.Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, (1967) 3 SCR 377 : AIR 1967 SC 1857. The Board argued that it was engaged in commercial trade—the generation and sale of power—and was not discharging governmental functions.

9The Court rejected the commercial distinction. Writing for the majority, Bhargava J. held that “other authorities” includes all constitutional or statutory authorities upon whom powers are conferred by law:

The expression “other authorities” in Article 12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities. Under the Constitution, the State is itself envisaged as having the right to carry on trade or business... There is no reason to exclude such authorities from the purview of Article 12.Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, (1967) 3 SCR 377 : AIR 1967 SC 1857.

10In a concurring opinion, J.C. Shah J. added that to be an authority under Article 12, a body must be invested with the sovereign power of the State to issue binding directions, make rules or regulations, and enforce them with statutory sanctions.

11Mohan Lal established the “statutory birth” rule: any body created directly by a statute and endowed with statutory power was an authority under Article 12. Yet this formalistic test carried an evident limitation. It answered whether a statutory body was State, but had nothing to say about bodies that the Government formed under general incorporation laws—such as companies incorporated under the Companies Act or societies registered under the Societies Registration Act. If statutory birth was the sole gateway to Article 12, the executive could readily bypass Part III by organising its operations through corporate shells.

III. The welfare state and the corporate veil

Mathew J.’s concurrence in Sukhdev Singh

12The conceptual breakthrough occurred in 1975 in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi.Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421. A Constitution Bench examined whether three statutory corporations—the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC), and the Industrial Finance Corporation (IFC)—were “authorities” within Article 12, and whether their statutory service regulations had the force of law.

13A.N. Ray C.J., delivering the majority opinion for three judges, followed Mohan Lal. Because the corporations were created by parliamentary statutes and possessed the power to enact binding regulations, they were authorities under Article 12.

14The enduring contribution of Sukhdev Singh, however, came in the concurring opinion of Mathew J. Looking beyond the formal fact of statutory creation, Mathew J. addressed the functional reality of the modern welfare state. The twentieth-century state had ceased to be a mere night-watchman collecting revenue and keeping the peace; it had become an entrepreneur, an educator, and a provider of essential services. To conduct these tasks efficiently, government adopted the corporate device.

15Mathew J. saw that corporate personality could become a constitutional shield if courts insisted on formal identity:

The State is an abstract entity. It can only act through the instrumentality or agency of natural or juridical persons... A state agency may be defined as an organ of the State and it is only when the organ is an instrumentality or agency of the State that the action of the organ would be State action.Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421 (Mathew, J., concurring).

16Mathew J. identified the indicia that would later govern the field: public financing, state-created monopolies, public or governmental functions, and comprehensive governmental control. If these factors demonstrated that a corporation was an instrumentality or agency of the government, its acts were State action, and it was bound by the guarantees of Part III.

The anomaly of Sabhajit Tewary

17On the very day Sukhdev Singh was decided, the same Constitution Bench delivered judgment in Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India.Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India, (1975) 1 SCC 485. Sabhajit Tewary, a junior stenographer at the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), filed a writ petition under Article 32 claiming pay parity under Article 14.

18CSIR was a premier scientific institution formed in 1942. Its President was the Prime Minister; its governing body was appointed by the Central Government; it was funded almost entirely by parliamentary grants; and it carried out scientific research that had previously been conducted directly by the Department of Commerce. Yet it was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.

19In a brief judgment running to fewer than three pages, Ray C.J. dismissed the writ petition. Relying strictly on the statutory birth rule, the Court held that because CSIR was not created directly by an Act of Parliament, but was merely registered under a general statute, it did not possess statutory character and could not be an “other authority” under Article 12.

20Sabhajit Tewary created a stark contradiction with Mathew J.’s opinion in Sukhdev Singh. Two bodies performing identical public functions with public funds were treated differently based entirely on whether Parliament had passed a dedicated statute to incorporate them or whether the executive had registered them under a general incorporation Act. For the next twenty-seven years, that anomaly troubled the law.

IV. The formulation of the instrumentality doctrine

R.D. Shetty and the International Airport Authority

21The contradictions between Mohan Lal and Sabhajit Tewary were resolved by Bhagwati J. in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India.Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489. The International Airport Authority was a statutory corporation, but the Court did not rest its decision on statutory birth alone.

22Bhagwati J. took up the threads of Mathew J.’s concurrence in Sukhdev Singh and formalised the doctrine of the instrumentality or agency of the State. He affirmed that the form of incorporation was immaterial:

It is not every corporation which is created by a statute which can be said to be an authority under Article 12. But whether a corporation is created by a statute or is incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act, 1956 or the Societies Registration Act, 1860, the question would be whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the State... If a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it must be subject to the same limitations in the field of constitutional and administrative law as the Government itself.Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489, para 14.

23Bhagwati J. identified five primary indicia: capital and financial assistance; monopoly status conferred or protected by the State; deep and pervasive State control; functions of public importance closely related to governmental functions; and the transfer of a pre-existing government department. None was conclusive alone; they were pointers to be weighed together to pierce the corporate veil.

Som Prakash Rekhi and government companies

24The test was applied to a commercial government company in Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India.Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 449. Burmah Shell had been nationalised under the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976. The statute vested the undertaking in a government company, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL), registered under the Companies Act, 1956. A retired employee petitioned under Article 32 against the arbitrary deduction of his pensionary benefits.

25BPCL raised a preliminary objection: it was an independent commercial company with separate legal personality. Krishna Iyer J. swept the objection aside:

The true test is not whether the corporation has been created by a statute or under a statute, but whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government... Is the corporation an incarnation of the Government or its agency? If it is, the formal corporate veil is transparent and the Court will look behind it to see whether the State is acting through the corporation.Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 449, para 29.

26Looking behind BPCL’s corporate veil, the Court found that the Central Government held all its shares, appointed its directors, dictated its policy, and had transferred an entire public industry into its hands. BPCL was held to be an “other authority” under Article 12.

V. Ajay Hasia and the six factors

27The consolidation of the doctrine occurred in 1981 in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi.Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722. Candidates denied admission to the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar, challenged the selection procedure under Article 14. The college was established and administered by a society registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Societies Registration Act, 1898.

28Citing Sabhajit Tewary, the college argued that a registered society could not be “State” under Article 12. A unanimous Constitution Bench of five judges rejected that defense. Delivering the judgment, Bhagwati J. addressed Sabhajit Tewary directly, confining it to its facts: the five-judge bench had not laid down an absolute rule that a registered society could never be State; it had merely held that CSIR, on the record then before the Court, was not an agency of the government.

29Bhagwati J. then gathered the principles from R.D. Shetty into six structured tests:

(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. (3) It may also be a relevant factor whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supporting this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government.Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722, para 9.

30Applying these factors, the Court found that the society’s founding members were appointed by the Central Government and four State Governments; its funds came entirely from state grants; its rules required central government approval; and the government held pervasive veto power over its administration. The college society was therefore an instrumentality of the State, and its admission proceedings were subject to Article 14.

31Bhagwati J. added that these tests are not a rigid formula or an exhaustive catalogue, but rather pointers to be used with care and caution to ascertain whether the body is in substance an agency of the State.

VI. The expansion and the pushback

The expansive phase (1981–1990)

32In the decade following Ajay Hasia, the Supreme Court applied the six factors aggressively. The corporate veil was regularly pierced to bring public sector undertakings, research bodies, and educational institutions within Article 12.

33In P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India, the Court held that the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, was an instrumentality of the State.P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 141. The bench distinguished Sabhajit Tewary and relied on ICAR’s complete financial dependence on the Union, its succession to imperial government departments, and the Union Minister for Agriculture serving as its President.

34In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, a government company incorporated under the Companies Act was held to be State, and the Court used Article 14 to strike down a service rule permitting the termination of permanent employees on three months’ notice as unconscionable and arbitrary.Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156. Similarly, the Sainik Schools Society was held to be State in view of the Ministry of Defence’s complete administrative and financial authority over it.All India Sainik Schools Employees’ Assn. v. Defence Minister-cum-Chairman, Board of Governors, Sainik Schools Society, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 205.

The pushback: Tekraj Vasandi and Chander Mohan Khanna

35This expansion soon generated serious practical problems. If performing an activity of “public importance” or receiving substantial state grants sufficed to make an entity State, then every aided school, private university, charitable hospital, and cooperative society in India would fall under Article 12, paralyzing institutional autonomy and flooding the Supreme Court with routine employment disputes under Article 32.

36A counter-current emerged in the late 1980s. In Tekraj Vasandi alias K.L. Basandhi v. Union of India, a three-judge bench considered the status of the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies (ICPS), a registered society.Tekraj Vasandi alias K.L. Basandhi v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 236. The Institute was headed by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and received nearly 98 per cent of its annual budget from government grants.

37Nevertheless, the Court held that ICPS was not an instrumentality of the State. R.S. Pathak C.J. observed that financial assistance alone does not make a body State; the Institute was set up as a voluntary academic society to promote comparative research, and the Government exercised no deep administrative or operational control over its academic programs.

38The cautionary trend culminated in Chander Mohan Khanna v. NCERT.Chander Mohan Khanna v. NCERT, (1991) 4 SCC 578. An employee challenged the termination of his services by the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT), a registered society. A two-judge bench held that NCERT was not State. K. Jagannatha Shetty J. warned against extending Article 12 indiscriminately:

Article 12 should not be stretched so as to bring every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression “State”. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation... If the State’s financial support acts only as an aid to an autonomous body to enable it to carry on its activities, that support does not make the body an agency or instrumentality of the Government.Chander Mohan Khanna v. NCERT, (1991) 4 SCC 578, para 2.

The doctrinal crisis

39By the close of the 1990s, the law under Article 12 was divided into two irreconcilable streams: 1. The expansive line (Ajay Hasia, Ramachandra Iyer), where substantial funding and public purpose sufficed to classify registered societies as State. 2. The restrictive line (Sabhajit Tewary, Tekraj Vasandi, Chander Mohan Khanna), where non-statutory societies performing educational or research functions were excluded from Article 12 despite total public funding.

40Most glaringly, Sabhajit Tewary remained unreversed by any bench of equal strength. While three-judge benches bypassed it by distinguishing its facts, the formal precedent stood: CSIR was not State, even while bodies identical to CSIR, like ICAR, were held to be State. A definitive resolution by a larger Constitution Bench was unavoidable.

VII. Pradeep Kumar Biswas: The seven-judge bench correction

Overruling Sabhajit Tewary

41The opportunity arose in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, when terminated employees of an institute governed by CSIR challenged their dismissal under Article 226.Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111. The Calcutta High Court held the writ petition non-maintainable on the binding authority of Sabhajit Tewary. On appeal, a two-judge bench referred the question to a larger bench, and a seven-judge Constitution Bench was constituted.

42By a 5:2 majority, the Court overruled Sabhajit Tewary. Writing for the majority, Ruma Pal J. examined the original records of CSIR and observed that the 1975 bench had ruled on an unexamined factual premise, assuming without analysis that CSIR was an autonomous society merely because it was registered under the Societies Registration Act:

Sabhajit Tewary was decided on the basis of an erroneous premise... We cannot allow a precedent to continue when its reasoning is found to be unsustainable and in conflict with subsequent authoritative developments of the law.Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111, para 60.

The recalibration: cumulative dominance

43The majority in Pradeep Kumar Biswas restructured the entire doctrine. Ruma Pal J. identified the root cause of the previous instability: courts had treated the six factors in Ajay Hasia as an alternative checklist, assuming that if an entity satisfied any single factor—such as receiving state financial aid, or exercising a monopoly, or performing an important public task—it was automatically State.

44The majority rejected that disjunctive approach. The six factors were not independent triggers; they were evidentiary pointers whose cumulative effect must answer a single underlying question: Is the body financially, functionally, and administratively dominated by or under the pervasive control of the Government?

45The Court dissected the three limbs: Financial dominance: It is not enough that the body receives grants-in-aid or subsidies. The financial control must be dominant: the State must meet almost the entire operational expenditure, or provide the share capital, such that the body cannot survive without state funding. Functional dominance: It is not enough that the body performs a function of public importance. The function must be closely allied to sovereign or governmental functions, or must be an activity historically performed by the State and delegated to the entity. Administrative dominance: The Government must hold deep, direct, and pervasive control over the management and governing organs of the body, leaving the entity with no genuine operational autonomy.

Pervasive control versus regulatory control

46The most significant refinement introduced by Pradeep Kumar Biswas was the strict distinction between “deep and pervasive control” and “mere regulatory control”.

47All legal entities in a modern constitutional democracy operate within statutory frameworks. A private company is governed by the Companies Act; a private university is governed by state university legislation; a scheduled commercial bank is regulated by the Reserve Bank of India under the Banking Regulation Act. Such statutory control is external and regulatory. It prescribes minimum standards, prevents fraud, and enforces public policy.

48Regulatory control does not make an entity State. For an entity to be State, the government’s control must be particular to the body in question and must penetrate into its internal governance:

Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be deep and pervasive. If it is found to be so, then the body is a State within the meaning of Article 12. On the other hand, even if some of the tests may be satisfied, if the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111, para 40.

49Applying this synthesized standard, the majority concluded that CSIR was State. Financially, 70 per cent of its funds came directly from the Central Government. Functionally, it carried out scientific research originally vested in the Department of Commerce. Administratively, the Prime Minister was its ex-officio President; its governing body was nominated by the Central Government; and its rules, budget, and winding-up were entirely subject to central government control.

The dissent

50R.C. Lahoti J. (joined by Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri J.) dissented. The dissenting opinion rested primarily on stare decisis: Sabhajit Tewary had stood for twenty-seven years, and scores of institutions had structured their operations on that basis. On the merits, Lahoti J. drew a sharp line between statutory bodies and non-statutory societies: non-statutory societies possess voluntary origin, and unless an institution performs an inalienable sovereign function—such as maintenance of law and order, administration of justice, or defence—it should not be brought within Article 12 merely because it receives public funds or conducts scientific research.

VIII. Post-Biswas boundaries: Zee Telefilms and beyond

51The discipline imposed by Pradeep Kumar Biswas was tested three years later before a five-judge Constitution Bench in Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India.Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649. The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) had cancelled a tender for telecasting rights for which Zee Telefilms had submitted the highest bid. Zee Telefilms petitioned the Supreme Court directly under Article 32, asserting that the BCCI was an instrumentality of the State and had acted arbitrarily in breach of Article 14.

The majority in Zee Telefilms

52By a 3:2 majority, the Constitution Bench held that the BCCI was not an “other authority” under Article 12, and dismissed the Article 32 petition as non-maintainable. Writing for the majority, N. Santosh Hegde J. applied the cumulative tripartite standard from Pradeep Kumar Biswas: 1. Financial: The BCCI received no financial assistance, grants, or subsidies from the State. Its revenues were derived entirely from commercial sponsorships, ticket sales, and broadcasting rights. 2. Functional: While cricket is a sport of enormous public popularity, the regulation and promotion of sports is not an inalienable or exclusive governmental function. The BCCI’s domestic monopoly over cricket was not conferred or protected by statute; it was a de facto monopoly created by historical success and public support. 3. Administrative: The State held no share capital, appointed no office-bearers, held no representation on the Board’s management committees, and had no power to dissolve or supersede the Board.

53The petitioner pointed to the fact that the Government granted permission for foreign tours, permitted the national team to wear the national colours, and conferred Arjuna awards on cricketers. Hegde J. dismissed these as instances of ambient regulatory oversight:

All these facts only show that the State has a regulatory control over the sports activities of the Board... But this control is not complete or pervasive... It is a regulatory control which every sovereign State exercises over its citizens and organizations. Such control does not satisfy the requirement of deep and pervasive control required under Pradeep Kumar Biswas.Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649, paras 24–30.

The dissent in Zee Telefilms

54S.B. Sinha J. (concurring with S.N. Variava J.) delivered a powerful dissent. In Sinha J.’s analysis, the BCCI exercised complete, monopolistic control over a sport that represented the nation on the international stage. It selected the team that wore the national flag, wielded power to extinguish the careers of professional athletes, and exercised de facto state-like authority over a field of vital public interest. When a private society exercises an unregulated, state-tolerated monopoly that affects millions of citizens, it exercises public power, and should be treated as an instrumentality of the State under Article 12.

Subsequent applications of the Biswas doctrine

55The majority opinion in Zee Telefilms demonstrated that the post-Biswas Court would not expand Article 12 without proving actual government control. Subsequent decisions consolidated this restrictive threshold: Private scheduled banks: In Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, a private scheduled commercial bank was held not to be State.Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733. Merely because banking is an activity of public importance and is heavily regulated by the Reserve Bank of India under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the bank does not become an instrumentality of the Government. Cooperative societies: In General Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v. Satrughan Nishad, a cooperative sugar mill where the State held one-third of the share capital was held not to be State, as the government did not exercise deep and pervasive control over its routine management.General Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v. Satrughan Nishad, (2003) 8 SCC 639. Conversely, where the State owned a majority of shares and appointed the managing director with plenary veto powers, a cooperative federation was held to be State.M.P. State Cooperative Dairy Federation Ltd. v. Rajnesh Kumar Vaish, (2007) 7 SCC 81. Educational councils: In Lt. Governor of Delhi v. V.K. Sodhi, the State Council of Educational Research and Training (SCERT) was held not to be State under Biswas, affirming that educational research bodies without direct administrative subjugation remain autonomous.Lt. Governor of Delhi v. V.K. Sodhi, (2007) 15 SCC 136.

IX. The divide between Article 12 and Article 226

56A decisive doctrinal consequence of Pradeep Kumar Biswas and Zee Telefilms was the clarification of the boundary between Article 12 and Article 226. Litigants frequently conflated two distinct inquiries: whether a body is “State” under Article 12, and whether a body is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.

The textual divergence

57The text of the two provisions explains the divergence: Article 12 defines “the State” exclusively for Part III. If an entity is State under Article 12, it is bound by the entire catalogue of fundamental rights—Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, and 21. A writ petition lies directly against it before the Supreme Court under Article 32. Article 226 empowers the High Courts to issue writs to “any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government” not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but also “for any other purpose”.

58An entity may therefore be amenable to Article 226 without being “State” under Article 12.

Public duty as the trigger for Article 226

59In Zee Telefilms, although the majority held that the BCCI was not State under Article 12, Hegde J. expressly affirmed that the Board remained subject to the writ jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226:

It is clear that the Board discharges public duties like selecting an Indian cricket team to represent India in international tournaments... Therefore, even if the Board is not an instrumentality of the State under Article 12, a writ petition under Article 226 would lie against the Board before the High Court for the enforcement of those public duties.Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649, para 31.

60This principle was applied decisively in BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar.BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar, (2015) 3 SCC 251. A two-judge bench headed by T.S. Thakur J. reaffirmed that while the BCCI was not State under Article 12, its regulation of cricket was a public function of national importance. The Board was an institution discharging public functions and was therefore amenable to judicial review under Article 226 on standard administrative law grounds, including procedural fairness, reasonableness, and the rule against conflicts of interest.

The limit: the public law element

61Amenability to Article 226 does not, however, convert every private grievance into a constitutional dispute. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that even when a body performs public functions, a writ under Article 226 will lie only if the specific act challenged has a public law element.

62In Ramakrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya, D.Y. Chandrachud J. clarified that the running of a charitable hospital or school is an activity of public interest, but an employment dispute between such an institution and its staff is a matter of private contract lacking any statutory or public duty character.Ramakrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya, (2019) 16 SCC 303.

63The principle was reaffirmed in St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava.St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava, (2023) 4 SCC 498. J.B. Pardiwala J. held that an unaided private educational institution, though performing the public duty of imparting education, is not amenable to Article 226 in respect of service disputes with its teachers, because the terms of employment are purely contractual and governed by private law.

64The constitutional architecture is thus clear: Where an entity satisfies the Biswas cumulative dominance test, it is State under Article 12, bound by all Part III rights, and amenable to both Article 32 and Article 226 for any arbitrary action. Where an entity is private but discharges a public function, it is not State under Article 12, but remains amenable to Article 226 solely in respect of actions involving a public law duty. Where an entity’s action concerns private employment or commercial contracts with no public law element, no writ lies under either provision.

X. Contemporary frontiers: Disinvestment and horizontal rights

Disinvestment and the loss of Article 12 status

65The instrumentality test was formulated during the ascendance of the public sector, when the State routinely nationalized private industries and created statutory monopolies. In the twenty-first century, the direction of economic restructuring has reversed: the State is systematically disinvesting its holdings and transferring public sector undertakings to private ownership.

66What happens to pending fundamental rights challenges when a government company is privatised during the litigation?

67The Supreme Court addressed this question in R.S. Madireddy v. Union of India.R.S. Madireddy v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 965. Air India Limited, originally a statutory corporation and subsequently a wholly-owned government company, was indisputably State under Article 12. During the pendency of writ petitions filed by employees challenging adverse service conditions under Articles 14 and 16, the Government of India transferred 100 per cent of its equity shareholding in Air India to Talace India Private Limited (a subsidiary of Tata Sons).

68The Supreme Court held that the privatization of the company extinguished its character as an instrumentality of the State: 1. Cessation of Article 12 status: Once the Government transferred its entire share capital and relinquished administrative governance, Air India became a purely private company. It ceased to be financially, functionally, or administratively dominated by the State. 2. Non-maintainability of pending writs: Because Air India was no longer State under Article 12, and because its employment relations were governed by private contracts without any public duty, the writ petitions under Article 226 were rendered non-maintainable. 3. Remedy: The employees’ constitutional claims vanished with the corporate sale, leaving them to pursue civil suits or industrial dispute remedies under labour legislation.

69R.S. Madireddy confirms that Article 12 status is not permanent; it is dynamic and co-extensive with active, pervasive state dominance. When the state retreats, the constitutional umbrella retreats with it.

Horizontal rights after Kaushal Kishor

70In 2023, a five-judge Constitution Bench in Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P. held that the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 19 and 21 can be enforced horizontally against private individuals and non-State entities.Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P., (2023) 4 SCC 1.

71Does horizontal enforcement render the Article 12 instrumentality test obsolete? It does not, for three reasons: 1. Textual scope: The ruling in Kaushal Kishor applied specifically to Articles 19 and 21. Core constitutional safeguards such as Article 14 (equality before the law and manifest arbitrariness), Article 15 (prohibition of discrimination), and Article 16 (equal opportunity in public employment) remain textually addressed to “the State”. 2. Standard of review: A State instrumentality under Article 12 must satisfy strict public law standards of non-arbitrariness, fairness, and transparent procedure across all its operations. A private entity, even when bound by negative prohibitions under Articles 19 and 21, is not subject to the affirmative obligations of equal opportunity and affirmative action that bind the State. 3. Remedies: Direct recourse to the Supreme Court under Article 32 remains anchored to Article 12. Proving that an entity is an instrumentality remains the essential prerequisite for mounting a direct constitutional challenge against institutional bias, nepotism, and arbitrary administrative policy.

XI. The position today

72The law governing the instrumentality test under Article 12 stands settled in the following propositions:

731. Statutory birth vs. instrumentality: A body created directly by an Act of Parliament or a State legislature is an “other authority” under Article 12 (Mohan Lal, Sukhdev Singh). For any other body—whether a registered society, a government company, or an autonomous institute—amenability to Article 12 depends on whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government.

742. The cumulative tripartite test: To qualify as an instrumentality, the body must be financially, functionally, and administratively dominated by or under the pervasive control of the Government (Pradeep Kumar Biswas). These three requirements are cumulative, not alternative.

753. Indicia are illustrative, not conclusive: The six factors articulated in Ajay Hasia are evidentiary pointers. Fulfilling one or two factors (such as receiving public grants or performing an activity of public interest) does not make the body State unless cumulative dominance is established.

764. Pervasive control vs. regulatory control: The governmental control must be deep, particular to the body, and pervasive over its internal governance. Ambient regulatory control—such as registration, licensing, safety standards, or compliance with general statutory laws—does not satisfy the test (Pradeep Kumar Biswas, Zee Telefilms, Federal Bank).

775. Public function alone does not create State status: Monopolistic status or the performance of functions of vast public importance (such as sports administration, commercial banking, or private education) does not bring an entity within Article 12 in the absence of government dominance (Zee Telefilms).

786. The dual track of Article 12 and Article 226: While only a body satisfying the Biswas standard is “State” under Article 12 and subject to Article 32, a non-State entity discharging public functions may be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, provided the specific act challenged has a public law character (BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar, Ramakrishna Mission, St. Mary’s Education Society).

797. Dynamic status: A body’s classification under Article 12 is contingent upon ongoing government dominance. Upon disinvestment or complete privatization, the body loses its character as an instrumentality of the State, and pending writ petitions under Article 226 for enforcement of fundamental rights become non-maintainable (R.S. Madireddy).


History

  • Published · 18 October 2026

Nothing has been changed since publication. How FPR corrects a piece · Report an error


The editors wrote this draft to get the entry started. A student can claim the entry, rework the draft or start over, and the piece will then carry their name.

© 2026 First Precedent Research. Free to share and adapt with credit, for non-commercial use, under CC BY-NC 4.0. A published piece is changed only to correct an error, and each correction is listed under History. If the law changes, we add a linked afterword. Nothing on FPR is legal advice.

Found a mistake? Report an error, giving the paragraph number. If you are right, the text is corrected and the correction is recorded publicly.

SEEAlso in Constitutional

Everything in Constitutional

ELSEWHERECounterparts · the same question in other jurisdictions

No scholar has written on another country’s law here yet. Write a counterpart from your jurisdiction


Comments · 0

Sign in to comment. Comments are moderated.