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2026 FPR ETS 5 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/cheque-dishonour
TS-0052Tests · Banking · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 5
FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 3,754 words
The Ingredients of Cheque Dishonour
An offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is made out only when a chain of statutory steps is complete: a cheque drawn on the accused's account for a debt or other liability, presentation in time, return unpaid for want of funds, a written demand within thirty days of learning of the return, and failure to pay within fifteen days of receiving it; once the cheque and signature are established the court must presume a legally enforceable debt, and the accused may rebut that presumption on a preponderance of probabilities.
Abstract
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 makes the return of a cheque for want of funds a criminal offence, but only after the drawer has had notice and a chance to pay. This entry sets out the ingredients as stated in Kusum Ingots; the presumption under section 139 as settled in Rangappa and summarised in Basalingappa; blank signed cheques (Bir Singh); part-payment (Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel); cheques described as security (Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao, Sripati Singh); the company as an accused (Aneeta Hada, Himanshu) and the averments needed against directors (S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals); territorial jurisdiction from K. Bhaskaran through Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod to the 2015 amendment; premature complaints (Yogendra Pratap Singh); repeated presentation (MSR Leathers); service of notice (C.C. Alavi Haji); and compounding and interim compensation.
I. The test
The offence and its steps
1Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 forms part of Chapter XVII, added to the Act in 1988. It applies where a cheque drawn on an account maintained by a person is returned unpaid because the money in the account is insufficient or the cheque exceeds an arrangement with the bank. The drawer is then deemed to have committed an offence, punishable with imprisonment of up to two years, a fine of up to twice the cheque amount, or both.
2The return of the cheque is not enough. The proviso to the section adds three conditions. The Supreme Court set out the whole chain in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd.:
(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any debt or other liability; (ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier; (iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank;Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745 (D.P. Mohapatra J.).
3The remaining ingredients in that statement are the demand and the default. The payee or holder in due course must demand payment by written notice to the drawer within thirty days of receiving information of the return from the bank, and the drawer must fail to pay within fifteen days of receiving the notice.
Six months in the statute, three in practice
4The six-month period in the statute should not be confused with the practical limit. The section takes the earlier of six months and the cheque’s period of validity. Following a Reserve Bank of India circular of 2011, cheques have generally been valid for three months, and courts have applied that shorter period under the words “the period of its validity”.See Yogesh Krishnamurti Halale v. State of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, 10 July 2026), referring to the circular. A draftsman should therefore not paraphrase the section as saying “three months”.
When the offence is complete
5The notice and the fifteen days are part of the offence. K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan listed the components as drawing the cheque, presenting it, its return unpaid, giving notice demanding payment, and failure to pay within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. It added that the “concatenation of all the above five is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence”.K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510 (Bench: K.T. Thomas and M.B. Shah JJ.). Until the last step fails, a drawer who pays commits no offence at all.
II. The presumption
Section 139
6Section 139 requires the court to presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received it for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Section 118(a) separately presumes consideration for a negotiable instrument.
7Before 2010 there was doubt about how far section 139 went. A decision in Krishna Janardhan Bhat had suggested that it did not cover the existence of a debt. In Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, a Bench of three judges corrected this:
we are in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 (K.G. Balakrishnan C.J.).
8The Court described section 139 as “an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments.” It also made clear that the presumption is rebuttable, and that the accused may contest the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
The standard of rebuttal
9The accused does not have to meet the prosecution’s standard. Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa collected the earlier cases into a summary:
(ii) The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. (iii) To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence.Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418 (Ashok Bhushan J.).
10The summary adds that it is “not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence”, because section 139 imposes an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive one. In Basalingappa itself the complainant claimed to have lent Rs. 6 lakhs in cash, and the challenge to the complainant’s capacity to do so was central. The acquittal by the trial court was ultimately restored.
Blank signed cheques
11A common defence is that a blank signed cheque was given in trust and filled in later by someone else. Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, which restored a conviction, gives such a defence little room:
If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 (Indira Banerjee J.).
12The Court also said that “It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer.”
13The presumption therefore depends on voluntary delivery of a signed cheque. Where the accused proves a different story on the balance of probabilities, such as a cheque given for a different purpose, the presumption can still fall away. Bir Singh does not remove that defence. It requires evidence for it.
III. What debt the cheque must represent
Part-payment after the cheque
14The section speaks of a debt or other liability. The question is when that liability is measured. In Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel, the drawer paid part of the debt after issuing a post-dated cheque, and the payee presented the cheque for its full amount without recording the payment. Chandrachud J. said:
Though a post-dated cheque might be drawn to represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of its drawing, for the offence to be attracted, the cheque must represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment. If there has been a material change in the circumstance such that the sum in the cheque does not represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of maturity or encashment, then the offence under Section 138 is not made out.Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel, (2023) 1 SCC 578 (D.Y. Chandrachud J.).
15The Court had noted the argument that a part-payment should be endorsed under section 56 of the Act before presentation. A payee who has received part of the money should therefore endorse it and present the cheque for the balance only, or else obtain a fresh cheque.
Cheques called security
16The label on a cheque does not decide the matter. In Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Ltd., post-dated cheques were handed over under a loan agreement that described them as security for instalments. The Court held that they fell within section 138, because the question “depends on the nature of the transaction”: “If on the date of the cheque liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the Section is attracted and not otherwise.”Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Ltd., (2016) 10 SCC 458 (Adarsh Kumar Goel J.). The word security in the agreement, on the Court’s reading, referred to cheques towards the repayment of instalments.
17Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand continued this reasoning. The High Court had treated a cheque issued as security as incapable of supporting the offence. The Supreme Court disagreed, saying there was no categorical declaration in the earlier case law “that the cheque issued as security cannot be presented for realisation under all circumstances.”Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand (Supreme Court, 28 October 2021) (A.S. Bopanna J.). The practical test is whether a debt was due when the cheque was presented.
IV. Who may be prosecuted
The company as an accused
18Section 141 extends liability, where the drawer is a company, to those in charge of and responsible for its business. Whether they could be prosecuted without the company produced a split in a two-judge Bench, and the point went to three judges. In Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., Dipak Misra J. concluded:
for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself.Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 (Dipak Misra J.).
19The Court overruled Sheoratan Agarwal and, with a qualification, Anil Hada.
20The consequence can be severe for a complainant. In Himanshu v. B. Shivamurthy, the signatory of a company’s cheque was prosecuted alone, and the High Court suggested that the company could still be added. The Supreme Court applied Aneeta Hada and held the complaint not maintainable. Since no notice of demand had been served on the company, the High Court was wrong to think the company could now be arraigned, and the complaint was quashed.Himanshu v. B. Shivamurthy, (2019) 3 SCC 797 (Bench: D.Y. Chandrachud and Hemant Gupta JJ.).
Averments against directors
21Directors are not liable merely because they hold office. S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla holds that liability under section 141 is a departure from the usual rule against vicarious criminal liability, and that “A clear case should be spelled out in the complaint against the person sought to be made liable.”S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89 (Arun Kumar J.). A complaint must therefore say in terms that the person was in charge of and responsible for the business at the relevant time.
V. Where and when to complain
Territorial jurisdiction
22K. Bhaskaran allowed the complainant to choose among the places where any of the five components occurred. This favoured payees, who could sometimes bring a complaint far from the drawer. A three-judge Bench reversed the position in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra:
we hold that the place, situs or venue of judicial inquiry and trial of the offence must logically be restricted to where the drawee bank, is located.Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129 (Vikramajit Sen J.).
23Parliament then changed the law again. The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 inserted section 142(2). In Bridgestone India (P) Ltd. v. Inderpal Singh, the Court read the amended section to mean that the place where a cheque is delivered for collection, that is, the branch of the payee or holder in due course, “would be determinative of the place of territorial jurisdiction.”Bridgestone India (P) Ltd. v. Inderpal Singh, (2016) 2 SCC 75 (Jagdish Singh Khehar J.). For cheques delivered for collection through an account, that is now the rule, and section 142A deals with pending cases and further complaints.
Premature complaints
24Section 142 requires a complaint within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso. A complaint filed too early raises the opposite problem. In Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey, a three-judge Bench answered in the negative whether cognizance could be taken on a complaint filed before the fifteen days had run. It held that such a complaint is not maintainable and that “the complainant cannot be permitted to present the very same complaint at any later stage”. The remedy is a fresh complaint and, if the time under section 142(b) has passed, an application under the proviso showing sufficient cause. For cases already pending, the Court allowed a fresh complaint within one month of the decision in the criminal case, with the delay treated as condoned.Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey, (2014) 10 SCC 713 (R.M. Lodha C.J.).
Repeated presentation
25A payee can present a cheque several times within its validity. The older rule, from Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, was that once a notice was given after one dishonour, a prosecution could not rest on a later one. MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan ended that:
we overrule the decision in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) and hold that prosecution based upon second or successive dishonour of the cheque is also permissible so long as the same satisfies the requirements stipulated in the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan, (2013) 1 SCC 177 (T.S. Thakur J.).
Service of the notice
26Drawers often claim that the notice never reached them. C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed, a three-judge decision, held that where notice is dispatched by registered post to the correct address, the principle in section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applies and the requirement of clause (b) stands complied with, subject to the drawer’s right to show lack of knowledge. It also gave such a drawer a remedy: pay “within 15 days of receipt of summons” and ask that the complaint be rejected. A drawer who does not do so cannot complain that notice was not properly served.C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed, (2007) 6 SCC 555 (D.K. Jain J.).
VI. Ending or securing the case
Compounding
27Section 147 makes offences under the Act compoundable. In Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H., the Court acted on a concern that accused persons delayed settlement for years, and it framed guidelines to encourage early compounding. Under these, an application made “at the first or second hearing of the case” may be allowed without costs, and later applications attract graded costs.Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H., (2010) 5 SCC 663 (Bench: K.G. Balakrishnan C.J., P. Sathasivam and J.M. Panchal JJ.).
Interim compensation
28Section 143A, added in 2018, lets the trial court order interim compensation of up to twenty per cent of the cheque amount. Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand considered whether the word “may” in section 143A(1) made the power mandatory. The Court held that the power is discretionary and the provision “directory and not mandatory”, and that a court granting such compensation must record brief reasons considering the relevant factors.Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand (Supreme Court, 15 March 2024) (Abhay S. Oka J.).
VII. Further questions
The nature of the offence
29Rangappa describes the offence in terms that shape how the whole scheme is read:
it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions.Rangappa, (2010) 11 SCC 441.
30For this reason, the Court said, “the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof”. It also called the presumption “a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation”. P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat (P) Ltd. later treated a section 138 proceeding as covered by the moratorium under section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, against the corporate debtor. It described it as “a quasi-criminal proceeding” that “would result in the assets of the corporate debtor being depleted as a result of having to pay compensation which can amount to twice the amount of the cheque”.P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat (P) Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258 (R.F. Nariman J.). A section 138 case has therefore come to be seen as sitting between civil and criminal law.
Basalingappa on the facts
31The application of the test in Basalingappa shows what rebuttal can look like. The signature was admitted, so the presumption arose. The question was whether a probable defence had been raised. The complainant’s evidence showed a retirement benefit of Rs. 8 lakhs in 1997, and various later dealings, and the accused used this in cross-examination to question whether the complainant could have lent the Rs. 6 lakhs said to have been advanced in cash. The Court restored the trial court’s view that the transaction was doubtful. It is an example of the accused winning without giving evidence, on the complainant’s own material.Basalingappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418. The case does not say that every complainant must prove financial capacity. Capacity becomes relevant when the defence puts it in issue.
Forum shopping and the amendment
32The reasoning in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod is worth reading even though the 2015 amendment changed the result. The Court said that “traders and businessmen have become reckless and incautious in extending credit where they would heretofore have been extremely hesitant, solely because of the availability of redress by way of criminal proceedings”. It described every Magistracy as “inundated with prosecutions under Section 138 NI Act”. It added that section 138 should not be interpreted so as to “render it as a device of harassment”.Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod, (2014) 9 SCC 129. Parliament’s response gave the payee the forum of the bank branch where the payee maintains an account. So the question of forum has now been answered by statute, and the policy debate remains relevant only to how a court views harassment in a particular case.
Part-payment and notice
33Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel also addressed a concern raised by the payee: that a drawer could evade prosecution by paying a small amount of the debt. Its answer was that section 56 provides the method. It said it “has already been concluded above that the offence under Section 138 arises only when a cheque that represents a part or whole of the legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment is returned by the bank unpaid.”Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel, (2023) 1 SCC 578. A payee who wishes to keep the remedy after receiving part of the money can endorse the payment on the cheque and negotiate it for the balance. Nothing prevents the payee from doing so. The practical advice to a payee is therefore to check the account of what has been paid before presenting any cheque that was given some time ago. The notice, too, should demand the correct sum, since it forms part of the statutory chain.
Compounding, costs and interim orders
34The Damodar S. Prabhu guidelines set out the stages. Compounding at the first or second hearing may be allowed without costs, and costs rise for later stages. Section 147 of the Act makes the offences compoundable in the first place. A drawer who means to settle should do so early, and a complainant should note that an accused who settles will usually need the complainant’s agreement. In Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava, the Court listed the broad parameters for an order under section 143A. The court, it said, “will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration.” A party should read those conclusions closely, since they govern the application.
Comparison
35Many countries treat a returned cheque as primarily a civil matter, with criminal liability only where there is fraud or an intent to deceive. Section 138 is unusual in dispensing with that intent. That is one reason why the procedural safeguards, the notice and the opportunity to pay within fifteen days are treated so strictly in India. Having removed the need to prove dishonesty, the statute insists on giving the drawer a fair chance to avoid the offence by paying.
VIII. The offence and the system
36Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. explains what kind of offence section 138 creates, and it also records the pressure that the provision has placed on the courts:
What must be remembered is that the dishonour of a cheque can be best described as a regulatory offence that has been created to serve the public interest in ensuring the reliability of these instruments. The impact of this offence is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. 4. Invariably, the provision of a strong criminal remedy has encouraged the institution of a large number of cases that are relatable to the offence contemplated by Section 138 of the Act. So much so, that at present a disproportionately large number of cases involving the dishonour of cheques is choking our criminal justice system, especially at the level of Magistrates’ Courts. As per the 213th Report of the Law Commission of India, more than 38 lakh cheque bouncing cases were pending before various courts in the country as of October 2008. This is putting an unprecedented strain on our judicial system.Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H., (2010) 5 SCC 663.
37The Court therefore issued guidelines that made compounding more expensive the later it was sought. The reasoning was that the fine in the section, which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, “serves a compensatory purpose”, and that litigants should be nudged to settle early. A party that wishes to compound should therefore do so at the earliest moment, and should check the current state of these guidelines, including any later modifications.
IX. Avoiding the notice
38C.C. Alavi Haji was decided by a three-judge Bench because of the difficulty in a case where the notice does not reach the drawer. It relied on the earlier reasoning that if a mere failure to receive notice were enough, “It would then be very easy for an unscrupulous and dishonest drawer of a cheque to make himself scarce”. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 gives rise to a presumption that a notice properly addressed and sent by post has been served, unless the addressee proves otherwise.C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed, (2007) 6 SCC 555. So a complaint does not have to allege that the drawer deliberately avoided service. It is enough to state that the notice was sent by post to the correct address.
39The Court added a practical safeguard. A drawer who claims not to have received the notice may, on receiving the summons, pay the cheque amount within fifteen days, and thereby avoid the complaint. A drawer who fails to do so cannot rely on the absence of notice. This reconciles the demand of the statute, which gives a drawer a chance to pay, with the need to avoid a defence that would be easy to manufacture.
X. The position today
40A complainant must be able to prove each link in the chain and the dates that connect them: presentation within the period of validity and six months, a written demand within thirty days of learning of the return, and a complaint filed after the fifteen days have expired and within one month from then. Where the drawer is a company, the company must be an accused and the role of each director must be pleaded.
41An accused who admits the cheque and signature starts with the presumption against them, including as to the existence of a legally enforceable debt. The presumption can be rebutted on a preponderance of probabilities, including through the complainant’s own evidence, and without entering the witness box. Part-payment and the absence of any debt on the date of presentation go to the heart of the offence. The label “security” and the fact that another person filled in the cheque do not, without more, provide a defence.
History
- Published · 31 October 2026
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