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2026 FPR ETS 4 · https://firstprecedent.org/tests/amendment-of-pleadings
TS-0087Tests · Civil Procedure · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ETS 4
FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 4,990 words
Amendment of Pleadings
Under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 a court may at any stage allow such amendments as are necessary to determine the real questions in controversy, and before trial the approach is liberal; but after the trial has commenced the proviso takes away the court's jurisdiction unless it concludes that, in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter earlier.
Abstract
Amendment lets a party correct a pleading so that the real dispute can be decided. Since 2002 the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has drawn a sharp line at the commencement of trial. This entry sets out Order VI Rule 17 and its proviso; the general principles in Revajeetu Builders v. Narayanaswamy & Sons, including the older test in Kisandas Rupchand, as quoted in Life Insurance Corporation v. Sanjeev Builders; when a trial commences under Vidyabai v. Padmalatha; the meaning of due diligence in Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand; the treatment of an omitted fact and a new cause of action in Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram; and practical guidance for both sides.
I. The test
The rule and the proviso
1Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has two parts. The body of the rule says:
The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties:Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, O. VI r. 17.
2The proviso was added in its present form by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002:
Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, O. VI r. 17, proviso, as set out in Vidyabai v. Padmalatha, (2009) 2 SCC 409.
3The history explains the form. As Revajeetu Builders & Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons records, to curtail delay the Legislature in 1999 altogether deleted Rule 17. There was “widespread uproar”, and in 2002 the Rule was restored with the proviso.Revajeetu Builders & Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons, (2009) 10 SCC 84 (Dalveer Bhandari J.). Revajeetu Builders explains the result: “That proviso applies only after the trial has commenced. Prior to that stage, the situation remains as it was.” The law therefore has two stages, with different approaches.
II. Before the trial
The older test
4The classic approach is that of Batchelor J. in Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba Shilwant, quoted in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders (P) Ltd.:
All amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the partiesKisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba Shilwant, ILR (1909) 33 Bom 644, as quoted in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders (P) Ltd. (Supreme Court, 1 September 2022) (Bench: the Chief Justice and S. Ravindra Bhat J.).
5It adds that amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause an injury that cannot be compensated in costs. Sanjeev Builders is a recent and important decision that collects the principles, and any applicant should begin there.
The two conditions in practice
6The first condition looks at prejudice. Delay alone is not ordinarily a reason to refuse at this stage, but delay that causes real unfairness can be. Loss of a defence that has accrued to the other side may be injustice in that sense. Costs usually compensate for inconvenience. The second looks at necessity. An amendment that does not bear on any real issue has no reason to be allowed.
Revajeetu Builders
7Revajeetu Builders set out a list of considerations for the court. They include whether the amendment is necessary for the decision of the real controversy, the reasons for it, whether it is bona fide, and whether the other side can be compensated in costs. Costs are not an automatic answer. The Court said that the court “must scientifically evaluate the reasons, purpose and effect of the amendment and all these factors must be taken into consideration while awarding the costs.”
8The decision is commonly summarised as identifying these further considerations: whether refusal would lead to injustice or to multiple litigation, whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case, and whether a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. Since these are factors for an overall judgment, it would be wrong to treat them as a mechanical checklist. They do, however, tell counsel what the application needs to show. A short application that says nothing more than that the amendment is necessary gives the court no material for this exercise, and a careful one will deal with each consideration. The prospect of multiple litigation will often favour the applicant, since refusing an amendment may simply lead to a fresh suit, with all the waste that entails. The risk of changing the nature of the case will often favour the respondent, and the court then has to ask whether the case as amended is still the same dispute.
An omitted fact and a new cause of action
9An amendment is often resisted on the ground that it introduces a new cause of action. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram shows how that argument is handled. A firm sued through a partner on a promissory note. It later applied to amend because it had inadvertently omitted to mention the essential fact that the firm had been dissolved before the suit. The High Court, in revision, refused the amendment on the ground that it would introduce a new time-barred cause of action. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It said that the mere specification of the capacity in which the suit was filed could not change the character of the suit, and it added: “Even where an essential fact is lacking from averments in the plaint, the cause of action will be defective but this does not, by itself, necessarily constitute a new cause of action”.Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, (1978) 2 SCC 91, AIR 1978 SC 484 (M. Hameedullah Beg J.), reported headnote.
10The decision does not say that a new cause of action can always be introduced. It shows that the court must ask what the plaintiff’s real case was, and that supplying a fact omitted by inadvertence need not be a new case. The point usually comes down to the fairness of the change, including whether the new claim would by then be barred by limitation.
III. After the trial has commenced
A mandatory limit
11The approach after the trial begins is very different. Vidyabai v. Padmalatha puts it firmly. The proviso, the Court said:
It is couched in a mandatory form. The court’s jurisdiction to allow such an application is taken away unless the conditions precedent therefor are satisfied, viz., it must come to a conclusion that in spite of due diligence the parties could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial.Vidyabai, (2009) 2 SCC 409 (S.B. Sinha J.).
12The language is jurisdictional. A court that allows such an amendment without recording the required conclusion is acting outside its power. In Vidyabai the order of the trial judge showed that the respondents had not met this precondition, and the Supreme Court set the order aside.
When a trial commences
13The trigger therefore matters a great deal. Vidyabai states:
Filing of an affidavit in lieu of examination in chief of the witness, in our opinion, would amount to ‘commencement of proceeding’.
14The Court distinguished the date of first hearing, which is the date for different purposes under the Code. Since evidence is now commonly filed by affidavit under Order XVIII Rule 4, this can happen earlier than many litigants expect. The practical effect is that a party should review its pleadings before the affidavit stage. After that date, an application needs to meet the proviso.
Due diligence
15Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand examined the meaning of due diligence, which the Code does not define. Referring to dictionaries, it said that “diligence” means careful and persistent application or effort, and that as per Black’s Law Dictionary it means a continual effort to accomplish something, or the attention and care required from a person in a given situation.Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117 (P. Sathasivam J.). In the Court’s account, the proviso limits the power to allow amendment after the commencement of trial, but it gives the court discretion where the party could not have raised the matter earlier.
16The practical test is therefore whether the party knew or ought to have known the fact before trial. A fact in the party’s own knowledge from the start seldom meets the test. A fact that emerged only from documents obtained during the trial, or an event that occurred after it began, may do so.
Counsel’s errors
17The argument that the omission was the mistake of earlier counsel is common and usually weak. In Mohinder Kumar Mehra v. Roop Rani Mehra, where a plaintiff sought to add pleadings and a prayer after trial had commenced, the defendants made this very argument against the plaintiff’s reliance on a mistake of earlier counsel, along with the argument that the claim was time-barred.Mohinder Kumar Mehra v. Roop Rani Mehra, (2018) 2 SCC 132, AIR 2017 SC 5822 (Ashok Bhushan J.). Practitioners should read the decision for its outcome and treatment of those objections on its particular facts, and should not assume counsel’s error will meet the proviso.
IV. Recurring disputes
Limitation
18Where a claim added by amendment would be barred on the date of amendment, a court will weigh that heavily. It is the classic example of the other party’s accrued right. Courts have not, however, treated it as an absolute bar in every setting. A court may allow the amendment where the case requires and leave the question of limitation to be decided, or it may refuse the amendment, depending on whether the new matter is truly a new claim. An applicant should expect close attention to the point, and should plead the facts about when the claim arose.
Withdrawing an admission
19Courts distinguish between a plaint and a written statement. A defendant has generally been given more latitude to take alternative pleas in a written statement, including inconsistent ones, because the plaintiff has the burden. An attempt to withdraw a clear admission, however, is viewed critically, since the other party has acted on it. Revajeetu Builders adds the factor of bona fides, and a party seeking to go back on a formal admission must explain why. A plaintiff seeking to change the entire nature of the suit is in a harder position.
Statutory rights to amend
20Some provisions contemplate amendment expressly. Section 21(5) and the proviso to section 22(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 permit a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance to add certain claims, and the latter says the court “shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just”. Those provisions must be considered along with the general rule. The application of the Order VI Rule 17 proviso in those cases depends on the particular statute and the stage reached, and should be examined carefully.
Commercial suits
21The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 amended the Code as it applies to commercial disputes, including by introducing Order XV-A on case management. A case management order fixes dates, and the court’s approach to amendments after those dates is likely to be stricter still. A party to a commercial suit should treat the first case management hearing as a practical deadline for pleadings, and should consult the statute and the current case law.
V. Practice
For the applicant
22File early, and before the affidavit of evidence if at all possible. Set out precisely what is to be added, and why it is needed to decide the real dispute. Explain why it was not pleaded and when the fact became known. If trial has begun, the application must address the proviso head-on, with the facts that show diligence. Offer costs.
For the respondent
23Check the date of commencement of trial first. If it has commenced, require the applicant to prove due diligence and to meet the proviso as a jurisdictional condition. If it has not, identify real prejudice: a lost defence, a limitation bar or a change in the nature of the case. A general complaint of delay will not achieve much at that stage.
VI. The modern statement in Sanjeev Builders
The final conclusions
24Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders (P) Ltd. ended with a summary that is now the first reference on the subject. The suit concerned a claim for damages, and the plaintiffs sought to increase the amount claimed. The High Court allowed the amendment and left the question of limitation open, with the defendant free to raise it in an additional written statement. The Supreme Court upheld this. It stated:
(i) Order II Rule 2 CPC operates as a bar against a subsequent suit if the requisite conditions for application thereof are satisfied and the field of amendment of pleadings falls far beyond its purview. The plea of amendment being barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC is, thus, misconceived and hence negatived. (ii) All amendments are to be allowed which are necessary for determining the real question in controversy provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is apparent from the use of the word “shall”, in the latter part of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC. (iii) The prayer for amendment is to be allowed (i) if the amendment is required for effective and proper adjudication of the controversy between the parties, and (ii) to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided (a) the amendment does not result in injustice to the other side, (b) by the amendment, the parties seeking amendment does not seek to withdraw any clear admission made by the party which confers a right on the other side and (c) the amendment does not raise a time barred claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of a valuable accrued right (in certain situations). (iv) A prayer for amendment is generally required to be allowed unless (i) by the amendment, a time barred claim is sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that the claim would be time barred becomes a relevant factor for consideration, (ii) the amendment changes the nature of the suit, (iii) the prayer for amendment is malafide, or (iv) by the amendment, the other side loses a valid defence. (v) In dealing with a prayer for amendment of pleadings, the court should avoid a hypertechnical approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs.Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders (P) Ltd. (Supreme Court, 1 September 2022), a Bench of the Chief Justice and S. Ravindra Bhat J. in the report as found online.
25Several points stand out in this list.
26The second conclusion gives weight to the word “shall” in the latter part of the rule, treating it as making the allowance of necessary amendments mandatory, subject to prejudice. That view is taken from the older decision in Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal v. K.K. Modi, where it was said that the rule’s first part is discretionary and that its second part “is imperative (shall) and enjoins the Court to allow all amendments which are necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties.”Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal v. K.K. Modi, (2006) 4 SCC 385 (Ar. Lakshmanan J.).
27The third conclusion gives the exceptions, which include the withdrawal of a clear admission that confers a right on the other side, and the raising of a time-barred claim that would divest the other side of a valuable accrued right. The qualifying words “in certain situations” are significant, and they connect with the older cases set out below.
28The fourth restates the same ideas in a different order. The time bar is described as “a relevant factor for consideration”, not as an absolute bar. To this are added a change in the nature of the suit, mala fides and the loss of a valid defence.
29The first conclusion disposes of an argument based on Order II Rule 2, which deals with the omission to sue for part of a claim. The Court said that this rule “operates as a bar against a subsequent suit” and that “the field of amendment of pleadings falls far beyond its purview”. An applicant does not have to fear that rule in a pending suit.
The Privy Council in Charan Das
30The treatment of limitation has an old source. Sanjeev Builders relies on Charan Das v. Amir Khan, in which the Privy Council said:
That there was full power to make the amendment cannot be disputed, and though such a power should not as a rule be exercised where its effect is to take away from a defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time, yet there are cases: see for example Mohummud Zahoor Ali v. Rutta Koer, where such considerations are outweighed by the special circumstances of the case, and their Lordships are not prepared to differ from the Judicial Commissioner in thinking that the present case is one.Charan Das v. Amir Khan, AIR 1921 PC 50, as quoted in Sanjeev Builders.
31That passage is the source of both halves of the modern law. The power exists. It should not as a rule be used to take away an accrued right. There are nevertheless cases in which special circumstances outweigh that consideration.
VII. The English statement
32The object of the power was described in the judgment usually cited in this area, that of Bowen L.J. in Cropper v. Smith, which Revajeetu Builders quotes:
It is a well established principle that the object of the courts is to decide the rights of the parties and not punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct in their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights ... I know of no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the court ought not to correct if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy, and I do not regard such amendment as a matter of favour or grace.Cropper v. Smith, (1884) 26 Ch D 700, as quoted in Revajeetu Builders, (2009) 10 SCC 84.
33This language is generous. It treats amendment as something that a party is close to having as of right, where the mistake can be corrected without injustice. Indian courts cite it as a starting point. But they now stress the limit that Revajeetu Builders adds, drawing on Ganga Bai v. Vijai Kumar: “The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the court.”
34Revajeetu Builders also gives the test in the English case of Steward v. North Metropolitan Tramways Co., as a contrast. A tramway company sued for negligence had waited until more than six months after filing its defence to plead that a local authority was liable for maintenance. By then the plaintiff’s claim against the authority was out of time. The amendment was refused. The test was “whether or not the defendants can amend without placing the plaintiff in such a position that he cannot be recouped, as it were, by any allowance of costs, or otherwise.” The example is a good one for showing how a later plea can do damage that no order for costs can cure.
VIII. The Revajeetu factors in their own words
35The list of considerations from Revajeetu Builders is best read as the Court set it out:
On critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment. (1) Whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case? (2) Whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide? (3) The amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) Refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) Whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case? and (6) As a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application.Revajeetu Builders & Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons, (2009) 10 SCC 84.
36The Court’s list of factors on costs is less well known, and it is of real use. It said that these parameters must be taken into consideration:
(i) At what stage the amendment was sought? (ii) While imposing the costs, it should be taken into consideration whether the amendment has been sought at a pre-trial or post-trial stage; (iii)The financial benefit derived by one party at the cost of other party should be properly calculated in terms of money and the costs be awarded accordingly. (iv) The imposition of costs should not be symbolic but realistic; (v) The delay and inconvenience caused to the opposite side must be clearly evaluated in terms of additional and extra court hearings compelling the opposite party to bear the extra costs. (vi) In case of appeal to higher courts, the victim of amendment is compelled to bear considerable additional costs.
37It added that the purpose of imposing costs is to “Discourage malafide amendments designed to delay the legal proceedings”, to compensate the other party for delay, inconvenience and avoidable expenses, and “To send a clear message that the parties have to be careful while drafting the original pleadings”. A respondent who opposes an amendment should have an alternative submission on costs ready, in those terms. Revajeetu Builders insists that “The imposition of costs should not be symbolic but realistic”. Too few respondents use this passage.
IX. Time-barred claims
Pankaja and L.J. Leach
38The law on time-barred amendments is set out in Pankaja v. Yellappa. The plaintiffs applied, nearly six years after filing the suit, to add a prayer for a declaration, and the respondents argued that a declaratory suit could be brought only within three years under the Limitation Act. The Court said:
The law in this regard is also quite clear and consistent that there is no absolute rule that in every case where a relief is barred because of limitation an amendment should not be allowed. Discretion in such cases depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. The jurisdiction to allow or not allow an amendment being discretionary the same will have to be exercised in a judicious evaluation of the facts and circumstances in which the amendment is sought. If the granting of an amendment really subserves the ultimate cause of justice and avoids further litigation the same should be allowed. There can be no straight jacket formula for allowing or disallowing an amendment of pleadings. Each case depends on the factual background of that case.Pankaja v. Yellappa, (2004) 6 SCC 415, AIR 2004 SC 4102 (Bench: N. Santosh Hegde and S.B. Sinha JJ.).
39It then quoted the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Messrs. Jardine Skinner and Co.:
It is no doubt true that Courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice.L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357, as quoted in Pankaja, (2004) 6 SCC 415.
40In Pankaja itself the amendment was allowed, because there was an arguable question about which article of the Limitation Act applied, and the trial court was directed to frame an issue on it. So a time bar is a strong factor against amendment. It does not take away the power. Revajeetu Builders says much the same: “The fact that the claim is barred by law of limitation is but one of the factors to be taken into account by the court in exercising the discretion”. A court that does allow a time-barred amendment can do so by keeping the question of limitation open, as the High Court did in Sanjeev Builders, so that the defendant can raise it in an additional written statement.
41Different kinds of amendment call for different treatment. An amendment that adds to the reliefs on facts already pleaded raises a different concern from one that introduces a new cause of action. An amendment that merely enhances a sum in a claim already made, as in Sanjeev Builders, is in a different position from one that adds a new party.
X. Withdrawing an admission
Modi Spinning
42The rule on admissions comes from Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co., a three-judge decision. In a suit for Rs. 1,30,000, the defendants pleaded that an agreement of 7 April 1967 applied only where the plaintiff worked as a stockist-cum-distributor, and not where it acted as principal. Alternatively, they said that the plaintiff was merely an agent. About three years after filing the written statement, they applied to delete these paragraphs and substitute new ones saying that the plaintiff acted throughout as an agent and had no locus standi. Ray C.J. said:
The High Court rightly rejected the application for amendment and agreed with the trial court. We are told that the defendants proposed amendments to two other paragraphs of written statement. These are paragraphs 4 and 19 of the written statement. These amendments were also rightly rejected.Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co., (1976) 4 SCC 320, AIR 1977 SC 680.
43The reasoning immediately before that passage is that the amendment “is seeking to displace the plaintiff completely from the admissions made by the defendants in the written statement. If such amendments are allowed the plaintiff will be irretrievably prejudiced by being denied the opportunity of extracting the admission from the defendants.”
Usha Balashaheb Swami
44Usha Balashaheb Swami v. Kiran Appaso Swami draws an important line on this. Defendants who had admitted a half share in a partition suit sought to add further facts to the written statement. The trial court allowed this. The High Court, relying on Modi Spinning and Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal, set it aside. The defendants argued in the Supreme Court that they were not withdrawing the admission, and had kept it intact but only added certain additional facts. The Court quoted an earlier statement that “It is settled law that even the admission can be explained and even inconsistent pleas could be taken in the pleadings”. It held that it could not sustain the High Court’s view that the amendment would seriously prejudice the plaintiff, and it added that the High Court ought not to have reversed the trial court’s exercise of discretion. The appeal was allowed, and the amendment stood. So there is a distinction between a true withdrawal and an explanation that leaves the admission standing. The latitude ends where the amendment would displace the plaintiff’s case completely.
45The rule can be stated in three parts. A defendant may add to or qualify a defence. A defendant may take alternative pleas, even inconsistent ones. But a defendant cannot use an amendment to take away a clear admission on which the plaintiff is entitled to rely. A party seeking to do so should either explain how the admission was made in error, with material to support that, or should keep the admission and put its case in some other way.
XI. The object of the 2002 change
46Vidyabai sets out a passage on the history of the proviso:
The amended Order 6 Rule 17 was due to the recommendation of the Law Commission since Order (sic Rule) 17, as it existed prior to the amendment, was invoked by parties interested in delaying the trial. That to shorten the litigation and speed up disposal of suits, amendment was made by the amending Act, 1999, deleting Rule 17 from the Code. This evoked much controversy/hesitation all over the country and also leading to boycott of courts and, therefore, by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2002, provision has been restored by recognising the power of the court to grant amendment, however, with certain limitation which is contained in the new proviso added to the rule.Vidyabai v. Padmalatha, (2009) 2 SCC 409, in a passage it quotes.
47The result is a statute built around a compromise. It preserves the power, whose total abolition produced protest. But it fixes the proviso at the moment when the amendment does the most harm to the speedy conduct of a trial. It therefore should not be read as disapproving of amendments at the earlier stage.
XII. Applications that should be refused
48The cases show several types of application that will usually fail.
49An application that seeks to introduce a claim that the party knew of from the start, without explanation, after trial has begun, will fail the proviso. Vidyabai was such a case.
50An application whose only purpose is to delay, such as one filed on the eve of a final hearing with nothing new, will fail on the question of bona fides, and it should attract real costs.
51An application that changes the suit into a wholly different one will often fail, on the fifth Revajeetu factor. A suit based on title cannot usually become a suit based on a contract for a different claim.
52An application that seeks to raise a claim now out of time, and in which the time bar would divest the other side of a real defence, will often fail, unless it merely enhances or adds a relief on the facts already pleaded.
53An application by a defendant that seeks to withdraw a clear admission will fail on Modi Spinning.
54Conversely, an application made before trial, by a party with a real explanation, in order to bring before the court the real question between the parties, and in a case where costs can meet the prejudice, should ordinarily succeed. Ganesh Trading and Sanjeev Builders show this. Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal made the further point that an amendment should have been allowed where it was permissible for the appellants to file an independent suit, asking why “the same relief which could be prayed for in the new suit cannot be permitted to be incorporated in the pending suit”.
XIII. The position today
55The court may at any stage allow amendments necessary to determine the real questions in controversy, on just terms. Before trial begins, the approach is liberal: amendments ought to be allowed where they do not work injustice to the other side and are necessary for determining the real questions in controversy. Costs may compensate for delay, though the court should consider the reasons, purpose and effect of the amendment. Once trial has commenced, the proviso makes the conclusion of due diligence a condition for the court’s jurisdiction. Trial commences, on Vidyabai, on the filing of an affidavit in lieu of examination in chief. Due diligence means careful and persistent effort, and it is judged by what the party knew or could have known. Limitation, withdrawal of admissions and statutory provisions on amendment each raise special considerations.
History
- Published · 31 October 2026
© 2026 First Precedent Research. Free to share and adapt with credit, for non-commercial use, under CC BY-NC 4.0. A published piece is changed only to correct an error, and each correction is listed under History. If the law changes, we add a linked afterword. Nothing on FPR is legal advice.