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2026 FPR EPR 8 · https://firstprecedent.org/principles/risk-follows-ownership

PR-0095Principles · Contract · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EPR 8

FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 4,814 words

Risk Follows Ownership

Under section 26 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, unless otherwise agreed the goods remain at the seller's risk until property passes to the buyer, and then they are at the buyer's risk whether delivery has been made or not, subject to two provisos concerning delay through a party's fault and the duties of a party as bailee; risk therefore depends on the passing of property, which depends in turn on intention, and the parties may separate the two.

Abstract

When goods are lost before they reach the buyer, the question is who must bear the loss. Section 26 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 answers that risk generally follows property, a rule expressed in the maxim res perit domino. This entry sets out the section and its provisos; the rules on the passing of property, as explained in Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works; the point that risk and property can be separated, including Martineau v. Kitching as quoted in Bajaj Trading Company v. Union of India; the operation of the phrase 'unless otherwise agreed' in State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills; and commercial terms such as FOB, with Contship Container Lines v. D.K. Lall.


I. The rule

Section 26

1Section 26 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 provides that, unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller’s risk until the property therein is transferred to the buyer, but when the property therein is transferred to the buyer, the goods are at the buyer’s risk whether delivery has been made or not. The first proviso says that where delivery has been delayed through the fault of either buyer or seller, the goods are at the risk of the party in fault as regards any loss which might not have occurred but for such fault. The second says that nothing in the section shall affect the duties or liabilities of either seller or buyer as a bailee of the goods of the other party.

2State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. summarises the effect of the main part:

Under section 26 of the Sale of Goods Act when the property is transferred to the buyer, the goods are at the buyer’s risk whether delivery had been made or not; but this section is qualified by the phrase “unless otherwise agreed.”State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 1293, (1985) 3 SCR 26 (D.P. Madon J.), reported headnote.

The maxim

3The rule has an old name, res perit domino: a thing perishes at the owner’s expense. The Supreme Court recently quoted Lord Blackburn’s statement in Martineau v. Kitching, in a passage reproduced from The Parchim:

As a general rule, Res perit domino, the old civil law maxim, is a maxim of our law; and when you can show that the property passed the risk of the loss, prima facie, is in the person in whom the property is. If, on the other hand, you go beyond that, and show that the risk attached to one person or the other, it is a very strong argument for showing that the property was meant to be in him. But the two are not inseparable.Martineau v. Kitching, (1872) LR 7 QB 436, as quoted through The Parchim in Bajaj Trading Company v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 711 (Sanjay Karol J.). The quoting text gives the page as LR 7 QB 453, 454.

4Three propositions appear in that one passage. Risk follows property as a general rule. Risk may be used as evidence of where the property is intended to lie. And the two do not have to go together.

Why risk and possession differ

5Section 26’s words “whether delivery has been made or not” are the surprising element for most lay people. A seller may hold goods after property has passed, and a buyer who has yet to see them bears their loss. The reason is that the Act treats a sale as a transaction about ownership. Who holds the goods is a separate question from who owns them. An owner may lose what the owner owns, whether or not it is in that owner’s hands.

II. When property passes

The gateway

6Because risk generally depends on property, the first question is when property has passed. Sections 18 to 24 of the Act provide the rules. Property in unascertained goods cannot pass until they are ascertained (section 18). Property in specific or ascertained goods passes when the parties intend it to pass, and the court looks to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and the circumstances to find that intention (section 19). Section 20 provides that in an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, the property passes when the contract is made, whether or not payment or delivery is postponed. Sections 21 and 22 postpone it where something remains to be done to make the goods deliverable or to weigh or measure them to fix the price. Section 23 deals with unascertained goods and unconditional appropriation.

7The Supreme Court has examined these provisions in Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd., a case about where a sale of copra took place. It says:

Under these Acts, namely, the English Sale of Goods Act, the American Uniform Sales Act and the Indian Sale of Goods Act, the relevant factor for determining where the sale takes place, is the intention of parties.Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 516, AIR 1997 SC 2502 (S. Saghir Ahmad J.).

8The judgment adds that a contract of sale, like any other contract, is a consensual act, and that section 19 gives effect to the principle that the parties may fix the time when the property in the goods shall be treated as having passed. The case also records the principle that a delivery to a carrier for a buyer may amount to delivery to the buyer under section 23(2), which treats a seller as unconditionally appropriating goods when delivering them to a carrier for transmission to the buyer without reserving the right of disposal.

The classic example

9The English authority generally cited is Tarling v. Baxter, (1827) 6 B & C 360. A stack of hay had been sold, and was burned before removal. The buyer was held to bear the loss, because property had passed. A later Madras decision describes it as showing that “by 1893 it was well established that the passing of property was not conditional on payment or tender of the price”.National Mineral Development Corporation v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1987) 67 STC 1 (Madras High Court), referring to Tarling v. Baxter, (1827) 6 B & C 360. The same judgment points out that “passing of the property and the right to possession are two different things”. The fact of unpaid price or an unexercised right to retain goods therefore does not by itself prevent risk passing.

III. “Unless otherwise agreed”

Freedom to separate

10Section 26 starts with these words for good reason. Titaghur Paper Mills shows their effect. The respondent had bought timber under forest contracts that, as the State pointed out, placed risk on the contractor after the contract was concluded. The issue was a sales tax one. The Court referred to section 26 and its qualifying phrase, and it found that the timber contracts were subject to an agreement to the contrary. It drew on rule 44 of the applicable rules, under which “all forest produce removed from a contract area in accordance with these rules shall be at the absolute disposal of the forest contractor”. The case shows that the risk rule will not decide when property passes if the contract treats the two differently. The reverse is also true: the presence of a risk term does not, on its own, decide the location of property.

Terms in practice

11In commercial practice, parties usually deal with risk in express terms. Standard terms may say that risk passes on delivery, or on dispatch, or on loading, or at some other moment, regardless of property. A retention of title clause is the common example in which risk passes to the buyer, while title remains with the seller until payment. This is entirely within what section 26 allows. It has practical consequences for insurance.

IV. Shipping terms

FOB and insurable interest

12Contship Container Lines Ltd. v. D.K. Lall shows how this can matter. An Indian exporter shipped goods to a buyer in Spain on FOB terms, and a carton failed to arrive. The Court recorded the argument:

It was argued that in a FOB transaction the property in goods stands transferred to the purchaser no sooner the goods are entrusted to the carrier or at least when the same cross the customs barrier for shipment. This implies that all the risks relating to such goods are that of the purchaserContship Container Lines Ltd. v. D.K. Lall, (2010) 4 SCC 256, AIR 2010 SC 1704 (T.S. Thakur J.).

13The case also quotes a general statement to the effect that a contract for goods to be supplied on board a vessel may be framed in such a way that property and risk pass only when a complete cargo has been loaded, or so that property and risk pass on shipment. The seller’s insurable interest depends on which it is. On the facts, the Court concluded that the exporter’s failure to disclose the FOB basis meant that the insurer was absolved, for want of disclosure in a contract of utmost good faith. The case therefore demonstrates the commercial consequences of the risk question, even though the final decision turned on the insurance contract.

CIF, FOB and similar terms

14Terms such as FOB and CIF are common shorthand, with an accepted international meaning, and parties often refer to published sets of terms for this. They typically say something about when risk passes, and they may say little about property. It is common for risk to pass when the goods pass the agreed point on loading, while the property remains in the seller until the shipping documents are handed over against payment. Such a contract falls within the words “unless otherwise agreed”. The first question should be what the contract, read with any incorporated terms, actually provides.

V. The provisos

Delay through fault

15The first proviso covers losses caused by one party’s delay. Where a party is at fault for a delay in delivery, the goods are at that party’s risk “as regards any loss which might not have occurred but for such fault”. The proviso requires causation: the loss must be one which might not have occurred without the delay. A buyer who fails to collect goods on time and then finds they were damaged by a storm during the period of delay bears the loss, even if the seller still has them. Conversely, a seller who delays delivery cannot place on the buyer a loss that would not have happened if the seller had performed on time, even if property has passed. The fault-based risk is limited: a loss that would have occurred anyway is not within it.

The bailee

16The second proviso preserves the duties of a party as bailee. A seller who holds goods after property has passed is the buyer’s bailee, and must take care of them as sections 151 and 152 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 require. A negligent seller-bailee is liable for loss, despite risk having passed to the buyer. A buyer who holds goods before property has passed, for example on approval, is in the same way a bailee for the seller.

17So section 26 only allocates loss in the absence of fault. Risk is not an immunity from liability for negligence. A party on whom risk rests can still claim from a negligent custodian, or from a negligent third party, under the general law.

Sales on approval and conditional sales

18Sale on approval or return, under section 24, and sales subject to a condition affect the passing of property, and therefore the risk unless otherwise agreed. A seller who reserves the right of disposal under section 25 retains property until the conditions are met. These rules often decide the question when goods are lost in transit, particularly when the bill of lading or railway receipt is taken in the seller’s name.

VI. Practice

For the seller

19If goods are lost before delivery and the price is claimed, begin with the contract, including any incorporated terms. If it is silent, show that property had passed under sections 18 to 24, for example by the fact that the goods were specific and in a deliverable state, or that they had been unconditionally appropriated. Be ready to answer any allegation of fault in causing delay or negligence as a bailee.

For the buyer

20Ask whether property had in fact passed. Goods that were not ascertained, or that needed something more to be done, or for which the right of disposal was reserved, remain at the seller’s risk. If the contract’s risk term is unclear, argue from the provisions of the Act and the parties’ conduct. If the seller held the goods, examine the seller’s care for them.

Insurance

21Both sides should think about insurance when drafting. Risk and insurable interest may not sit where the parties assume. Contship shows that non-disclosure of the sale terms in a proposal can leave a party without cover.

VII. The rules on passing of property

The text of the sections

22Since risk depends on property, the rules on when property passes are the working part of the law on risk. They are short enough to be read in full. Section 18 provides: “Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods, no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained.” Section 19 then states the governing idea. As set out by the Supreme Court in Shalimar Chemical Works, it says:

Where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred. (2) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case.Sale of Goods Act, 1930, s. 19, as set out in Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 516.

23Sub-section (3) adds that, unless a different intention appears, the rules in sections 20 to 24 are rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass. So sections 20 to 24 are not rules of law that bind regardless of the parties’ wishes. They are presumptions as to what the parties intended, and they give way to evidence of a different intention. That is important for risk, since section 26 will follow wherever those rules lead.

Section 20 and the Supreme Court’s analysis

24Shalimar Chemical Works gives a helpful explanation of section 20:

This indicates that as soon as a contract is made in respect of specific goods which are in a deliverable state, the title in the goods passes to the purchaser. The passing of the title is not dependent upon the payment of price or the time of delivery of the goods. If the time for payment of price or the time for delivery of goods, or both, is postponed, it would not affect the passing of the title in the goods so purchased.Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 516, AIR 1997 SC 2502.

25And it sets out the two conditions:

In order that Section 20 is attracted, two conditions have to be fulfilled : (i) the contract of sale is for specific goods which are in a deliverable state; and (ii) the contract is an unconditional contract. If these two conditions are satisfied, section 20 becomes applicable immediately and it is at this stage that it has to be seen whether there is anything either in the terms of the contract or in the conduct of the parties or in the circumstances of the case which indicates a contrary intention.

26The Court added that “Section 19 attempts to give effect to the elementary principle of the law of Contract that the parties may fix the time when the property in the goods shall be treated to have passed. It may be the time of delivery, or the time of payment of price or even the time of the making of contract. It all depends upon the intention of the parties.” It referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Hoe Kim Seing v. Maung Ba Chit, that the intention of the parties was the decisive factor, and that if the contract is silent, intention has to be gathered from the conduct and circumstances of the case.

27It follows that section 20 can produce a surprising result. A buyer who has signed a contract for a specific item, in a deliverable state, on an unconditional basis, may own it, and bear the risk of it, before paying a rupee or seeing it. That is the exact point of Tarling v. Baxter. Its effect in practice is reduced by the ease with which an intention to the contrary may be found, since many contracts make payment or delivery a condition.

Sections 21 and 22

28Section 21 applies where the seller is bound to do something to the goods to put them into a deliverable state. Property does not pass until the thing is done and the buyer has notice of it. Section 22 applies where the goods are in a deliverable state but the seller is bound to weigh, measure, test or do some other act to ascertain the price. Again property does not pass until the act is done and the buyer has notice. The effect for risk is clear. Goods at a mill awaiting a final process, or sitting in a warehouse awaiting weighing by the seller to fix the price, remain at the seller’s risk if the section applies, and if they are destroyed, the seller bears the loss. Two points deserve attention. Both sections refer to acts that the seller is bound to do. If the buyer is to do the weighing, or if the weighing is only for the buyer’s own purposes, the section does not apply on its terms. And both require notice to the buyer, so the seller who finishes the work and says nothing keeps the risk.

Section 23 and appropriation

29Unascertained goods raise the question of appropriation. Section 23(1) provides that where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained or future goods by description, and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to the contract, either by the seller with the assent of the buyer or by the buyer with the assent of the seller, the property in the goods then passes to the buyer. The assent may be express or implied, and may be given either before or after the appropriation is made. Section 23(2) gives the most common case: where the seller delivers the goods to the buyer or to a carrier or other bailee for transmission to the buyer, and does not reserve the right of disposal, the seller is deemed to have unconditionally appropriated the goods to the contract.

30Appropriation in this sense is more than setting goods aside. A seller may put aside a parcel with a view to delivering it to a buyer, and may still change their mind and deliver a different parcel. In that case nothing has been appropriated unconditionally. The act must be one that fixes those goods irrevocably to the contract. Delivery to a carrier does so, unless the seller has reserved the right of disposal. In Shalimar Chemical Works, the High Court had found that the sale of copra was complete in Kerala on the delivery to the carrier. The Supreme Court recorded that view, under which “the carrier becomes the agent of the vendee and such a delivery amounts to delivery to the vendee section 23(2) of the Sale of Goods Act”.

31A further consequence is the fate of goods lost in transit. Where the carrier has the goods under section 23(2), the buyer has both property and risk, and the buyer will usually have to pay for goods that never arrive. Section 39 adds a relevant protection. A seller who sends goods by a route involving sea transit, in circumstances in which it is usual to insure, must give the buyer such notice as may enable the buyer to insure them during their sea transit. If the seller fails to do so, the goods are deemed to be at the seller’s risk during that transit.

Section 24 and goods on approval

32Section 24 deals with goods delivered on approval or on sale or return. The property passes to the buyer when the buyer signifies approval or acceptance, or does any other act adopting the transaction. If the buyer simply keeps the goods without giving notice of rejection, then property passes on the expiry of any fixed time for return, or, if no time has been fixed, on the expiry of a reasonable time. So a person who keeps goods on approval beyond the time allowed may find that they are at that person’s risk.

Section 25 and reservation of disposal

33Section 25 is the means by which the seller holds on to property despite shipment. Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, or where goods are subsequently appropriated to the contract, the seller may, by the terms of the contract or appropriation, reserve the right of disposal of the goods until certain conditions are fulfilled. In such a case, notwithstanding delivery to a buyer or a carrier, the property does not pass until the conditions imposed by the seller are fulfilled. Sub-section (2) says that where goods are shipped and by the bill of lading are deliverable to the order of the seller or the seller’s agent, the seller is prima facie deemed to reserve the right of disposal. Under this section, then, a seller who takes the bill of lading to the seller’s own order keeps both property and, if nothing else is agreed, risk. The seller’s protection against non-payment is purchased at the cost of carrying the risk in transit.

VIII. Delivery, title and modern sales

Property without possession and possession without property

34The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that title and possession are different questions. In Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, a three-judge Bench considered whether a dealer who received petroleum under an agreement with Caltex was an agent or a buyer, for sales tax. It said that “In a contract of sale title to property in the goods passes on to the buyer on delivery of the goods for a price paid or promised. Once this happens the buyer becomes owner of the property and the seller has no vestige of title left in the property.” It also said that “Having regard to the complexities of modern times the concept of sale has undergone a change”, and that a seller’s restrictions on a buyer’s use of the goods do not by themselves prevent there being a sale.Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1977 SC 1275, (1977) 3 SCR 578, reported headnote.

35That statement should not be read as making delivery the universal test, which section 20 plainly excludes. What it shows is the importance of what the parties in fact did. In a contract calling for delivery as the moment of sale, delivery will carry property. The case is useful as a reminder that many restrictions imposed by manufacturers on distributors, such as price or territory terms, do not stop property and risk passing to the distributor.

Risk as evidence of property

36Lord Blackburn’s statement that the two “are not inseparable” has a further application. The passage in The Parchim, as quoted in Bajaj Trading Company, says this:

According to the authorities, it is beyond doubt that the fact that the cargo was at the buyer’s risk from the moment it was placed on board points to the property having been intended to pass at that time.The Parchim, as quoted in Bajaj Trading Company v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 711.

37So the risk term can be used as evidence for the location of property, just as the location of property provides a default rule for risk. A court trying to find the parties’ intention under section 19 may treat a clause placing risk on the buyer as evidence that the parties intended property to pass at the same time. This is only evidence. The final words of Lord Blackburn’s passage are: “It may be very well that the property shall be in the one and the risk in the other.”

38Bajaj Trading Company also shows how risk language is used in a different sense, in carriage. Goods booked on the railways at owner’s risk rate are subject to section 97 of the Railways Act, 1989, under which the railway administration is not responsible for loss in transit except upon proof that the loss was due to negligence or misconduct on its part or on the part of its servants. That is a rule about the liability of the carrier. Between the seller and the buyer, the question remains who owns the goods, and the party who bears the loss under section 26 is the party who has the claim against the railway.

IX. Fault under the first proviso

39The first proviso says that where delivery has been delayed through the fault of either party the goods are at the risk of the party in fault “as regards any loss which might not have occurred but for such fault”. Three features of this wording deserve attention.

40First, it is limited to delay in delivery. Other kinds of fault fall to be dealt with under the general law of contract. Second, the test is expressed in terms of what “might not have occurred”. This is not a strict “but for” requirement of showing that the loss would certainly have been avoided. It is enough that the loss might not have occurred without the fault. This puts a burden of a light kind on the party trying to shift the risk. Third, the risk moves only as regards that loss. A delay does not put all later risks on the party at fault. The loss must be connected to the delay.

41The English case usually cited for the first proviso is Demby Hamilton & Co. Ltd. v. Barden, [1949] 1 All ER 435, where apple juice had been made and held ready for a buyer who delayed in accepting deliveries, and it went bad. That case is described here in general terms, as the English report has not been read for this entry. Its practical lesson is sound. A seller who has set goods aside for a buyer who is delaying should tell the buyer so, and should consider what to do to mitigate.

X. Insurance and the Contship decision

42Contship deserves closer attention, because the point on insurance is the one most often missed. The exporter had insured goods on the statement that they were going on CIF terms, while they were in fact on FOB terms. The argument against the shipper was stated by the Court in the following way:

The terms of the transaction between the shipper and the purchaser did not in the instant case reserve in favour of the shipper any right or interest in the goods so as to constitute an insurable interest within the meaning of Section 7 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1963.Contship Container Lines Ltd. v. D.K. Lall, (2010) 4 SCC 256.

43The second argument was that the shipper “had not, however, observed utmost good faith”, because the policy was taken out “on the representation that the goods were being dispatched on CIF (cost insurance and freight basis) while in reality the goods had been sent by the shipper on FOB basis which constituted a material non-disclosure”. The lesson goes beyond the shipping trade. A party who insures goods should ask at what moment its insurable interest ends. If risk has passed and property has passed, and the price has been paid, that party may have no insurable interest left. If the price has not been paid, the seller may keep some interest in the goods, for example as an unpaid seller, but the insurer must be told the true terms.

44The statement of terms in an insurance proposal is therefore a matter for care. It should match the sale contract. In a transaction where risk and property pass at different moments, the proposal should say so.

XI. Common errors

45Four errors recur in practice.

46The first is treating the invoice or delivery note as deciding the matter. Those documents may be evidence of intention under section 19, but they are not the contract. A term printed on an invoice after the contract has been made may not bind the buyer at all.

47The second is treating payment as the moment risk passes. Under section 20, payment is irrelevant unless the parties intended it to matter. A buyer who has not paid may bear the risk, and a buyer who has paid in full may not.

48The third is assuming that a retention of title clause keeps risk with the seller. Unless the contract says otherwise, it does, because risk follows property. For this reason, a retention clause in a commercial contract is usually paired with an express term moving risk to the buyer on delivery. If that term is missing, the seller who kept title for security may find that it also kept the risk of the goods in the buyer’s warehouse. That is a drafting trap.

49The fourth is confusing the risk of the goods being lost with the risk of the carrier or buyer failing. The former is the subject of section 26. Insolvency of a buyer is met by the unpaid seller’s rights in the Act, including lien and stoppage in transit, not by section 26.

XII. The position today

50Unless otherwise agreed, goods remain at the seller’s risk until property passes to the buyer, and then they are at the buyer’s risk, whether delivery has been made or not. Property passes according to the intention of the parties and the rules in sections 18 to 24 of the Act. The parties may agree a different allocation, and risk and property can be separated, as Lord Blackburn observed. Where delivery has been delayed through a party’s fault, that party bears any loss which might not have occurred but for the fault. Section 26 does not affect the duties of a party as bailee. Shipping and trade terms frequently deal with risk expressly, so the first question in any dispute is what the contract provides.


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