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2026 FPR EPR 4 · https://firstprecedent.org/principles/limitation-bars-the-remedy

PR-0089Principles · Civil Procedure · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EPR 4

FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 3,424 words

Limitation Bars the Remedy, Not the Right

Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 bars the remedy and not the right: a time-barred debt continues to exist and may be met by any means other than suit, such as an adjustment, a voluntary payment or a written promise under section 25(3) of the Contract Act; the exception is section 27, which extinguishes the right to property when the period for a suit for possession ends; and the surviving debt does not support coercive statutory recovery or a late insolvency application.

Abstract

Time-barred debts are in an odd position: the law will not enforce them, yet they still exist. This entry sets out section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the statement of the principle in Bombay Dyeing, Khadi Gram Udyog Trust and Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, including the English source in Curwen v. Milburn; what can still be done with a surviving debt, including adjustment and fresh promise under section 25(3) of the Contract Act (A.V. Murthy); the exception in section 27 (Ravinder Kaur Grewal); and the limits of the principle in coercive revenue recovery (State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty) and insolvency (B.K. Educational Services).


I. The principle

Remedy and right

1Rights are one thing, and the means of enforcing them are another. Limitation law operates on this distinction. A creditor who waits too long loses access to the courts, but the debt, in the eye of the law, continues. The statute says nothing to the contrary: it is written in terms of dismissing proceedings, and does not speak of ending obligations.

2Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is the operative rule. Subject to sections 4 to 24, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. The last words matter in their own way. Limitation is not a defence that a defendant must plead. The court is bound to apply it. Yet even that strong command is directed to the suit, the appeal and the application.

Why the distinction exists

3The reasons are not hard to see. A rule of limitation exists to protect defendants against stale claims, where evidence has gone, and to protect society’s interest in settled affairs. Those purposes are served by closing the courts. They do not require the law to say that an honest debtor who pays a long-overdue sum has made a gift, or that a creditor who receives it must return it. The law therefore takes only the step that its purpose requires.

II. The authorities

The English source

4The Supreme Court has adopted the English statement in Curwen v. Milburn. In Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Ram Chandraji Virajman Mandir, it relied on Halsbury and on the Court of Appeal: Cotton L.J. said that “Statute-barred debts are dues, though payment of them cannot be, enforced by action.”Curwen v. Milburn, (1889) 42 Ch D 424 (Cotton L.J.), as quoted in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Ram Chandraji Virajman Mandir, (1978) 1 SCC 44, AIR 1978 SC 287 (P.S. Kailasam J.).

5The Halsbury passage quoted in the same judgment says the Limitation Act “only takes away the remedies by action or by set off”. It leaves the right otherwise untouched, and a creditor with any means of enforcing a claim other than by action or set-off may use them.

Bombay Dyeing

6The Indian foundation is Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay. The case was not about a private debt. It concerned a State labour welfare law that required employers to pay over unclaimed wages to a Board, including wages for which claims had become time-barred. The employer said this was a taking of property. The Court’s starting point was that “the law of limitation only bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt”.Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328, 1958 SCR 1122 (recording the principle in the State’s argument, which the Court addressed). A later Bench records the same case as holding “that the statute of limitation only bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt, except in cases provided for by section 28 of the Limitation Act, which does not apply to a debt.”Khadi Gram Udyog Trust, (1978) 1 SCC 44. Section 28 of the 1908 Act is the predecessor of section 27 of the 1963 Act.

7The Court in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust then applied this to a tenant. The tenant had deposited rent under a provision relieving tenants from eviction, and the question was whether the arrears included rent for which recovery was time-barred. The answer turned on the same principle: a time-barred debt is still “a debt due though not recoverable, the relief being barred by limitation.”

Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha

8The clearest statement is in a case about a bank’s adjustment. A guarantor complained that the bank had appropriated his deposit towards a debt that was barred by limitation, and alleged criminal breach of trust. He argued that since the debt was barred against the principal debtor, his co-extensive liability as surety was gone. The Supreme Court rejected the complaint. In the words of the reported headnote:

The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. Section 3 of the Limitation Act only bars the remedy, but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. The right to the debt continues to exist notwithstanding the remedy is barred by the limitation.Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 499, AIR 1992 SC 1815 (K. Ramaswamy J.), reported headnote.

9It goes on: “Though the right to enforce the debt by judicial process is barred, the right to debt remains. The time barred debt does not cease to exist by reason of s.3. That right can be exercised in any other manner than by means of a suit.” So an adjustment made under a contractual authority was not a crime.

10The decision also shows the principle’s relationship with the rest of the law. The adjustment in that case rested on the terms under which the creditor held the security, and it was this that took the case outside section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. Time-bar alone did not make the adjustment wrongful, because it left the debt in place.

III. What survives

A fresh promise

11The most important consequence is that a time-barred debt can support a new contract. Under section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agreement without consideration is valid if it is a promise made in writing and signed by the person to be charged, or an agent, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits.

12A.V. Murthy v. B.S. Nagabasavanna applied this in a cheque case. The respondent argued that a loan made about four years before the cheque was barred, and that the cheque therefore could not relate to a legally enforceable debt under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Sessions Judge accepted that view. The Supreme Court referred to the presumption under section 139 and observed that, under section 25(3), a promise in writing to pay a debt that the creditor could have enforced “but for the law for the limitation of suits” is a valid contract.A.V. Murthy v. B.S. Nagabasavanna, (2002) 2 SCC 642 (K.G. Balakrishnan J.). It was also relevant that the debt had been shown in the respondent’s balance sheets. The prosecution could not be shut out at the threshold. The Explanation to section 138 means that a debt must be legally enforceable, but the issue whether it was so could not be settled against the complainant at that stage.

Adjustment and voluntary payment

13A debtor who pays a time-barred debt cannot recover the money as paid without obligation, since the debt existed. Section 60 of the Contract Act allows a creditor to apply a payment to any lawful debt due where the debtor gives no direction, and on the principle considered here, that can include a debt barred by limitation. In State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty the Court summarised the position: a creditor’s “right to make adjustment against time-barred debts exists”.State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657, AIR 1999 SC 1305 (Sujata V. Manohar J.).

14Those words were spoken about adjustments of what the debtor has voluntarily paid, or what a creditor lawfully holds. They cannot be stretched to cover self-help outside the law. The creditor must have some lawful means: payment by the debtor, a contractual authority such as that in Surendra Prasad Sinha, or a possession or lien that arose by right.

Lien

15A lien is one means by which a right can be exercised without a suit. Whether a banker has such a lien over given property depends on the facts and the agreement. Syndicate Bank v. Vijay Kumar, for example, concerned the nature of a banker’s lien over deposits on terms that authorised retention.Syndicate Bank v. Vijay Kumar, (1992) 2 SCC 330, AIR 1992 SC 1066 (K. Jayachandra Reddy J.). That decision concerned the lien itself and not limitation. It does however illustrate the kind of right a creditor may hold independently of any action in court, and the Halsbury passage in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust confirms that the bar on an action leaves such means unaffected.

Eviction and other statutory consequences

16Khadi Gram Udyog Trust shows a statutory consequence. A rent statute that speaks of arrears “due” could include rent that is barred, because barred rent remains due. Whether a statutory phrase has this meaning is, however, a question of the particular statute, as Kalliyanikutty illustrates.

IV. The exception: section 27

Extinguishment of the right to property

17The principle has a statutory exception. Section 27 of the Limitation Act provides:

At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.Limitation Act, 1963, s. 27.

18The Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur relied on earlier authority in saying that “Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 operates to extinguish the right to property of a person who does not sue for its possession within the time allowed by law.”Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729 (Arun Mishra J.), quoting an earlier decision. Here limitation has a substantive effect, because property has to belong to someone. If the owner’s remedy were barred but the title lingered, the person in possession could never be secure and the owner could never recover. The law resolves the deadlock by ending the title.

19The principal question in Ravinder Kaur Grewal went further: could a person who has perfected title by adverse possession use that title as a plaintiff? A three-judge Bench held that such a person can, and the plea is available as a sword as well as a shield. The significance for present purposes is that extinguishment under section 27 changes the rights themselves, whereas section 3 does not.

20The contrast explains why section 27 does not apply to debts. A debt is not property of the kind for which a suit for possession lies. The earlier case law on the corresponding section of the old Act says this expressly: section 28 of the 1908 Act “does not apply to a debt”.

V. The limits of the principle

Coercive statutory recovery

21The most important limit was set in Kalliyanikutty. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 allowed certain institutions, through a notification, to recover “amounts due” in the manner of land revenue. The question was “whether a debt which is barred by the law of limitation can be recovered by resorting to recovery proceedings” under that Act. A Full Bench of the High Court had said the procedure was available because the right survives.

22A three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered what “amounts due” meant, with the observation that an amount “due” normally refers to an amount which the creditor has a right to recover. It accepted the general principle: under section 3 the right subsists, and it can be exercised in any manner other than by a suit. But it drew a line between a voluntary payment and compulsion:

There is no question, however, in the present case of any payment voluntarily made by a debtor being adjusted by his creditor against a time-barred debt. The provisions in the present case are statutory provisions for coercive recovery of “amounts due”.Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657.

23The summary procedure, the Court concluded, was a substitute for a suit and the creditor could not use it to recover what no suit could recover. The result is that the principle does not create a side door to enforcement. A right that survives is not a right to be enforced by any machinery the State provides, if that machinery is in substance a replacement for the barred remedy.

Insolvency

24The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 raised the same issue on a large scale. B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates held that the Limitation Act applies to applications under sections 7 and 9 from the inception of the Code, by reason of section 238A:

“The right to sue”, therefore, accrues when a default occurs. If the default has occurred over three years prior to the date of filing of the application, the application would be barred under Article 137 of the Limitation ActB.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633 (R.F. Nariman J.).

25The reasoning prevents a time-barred debt being revived through insolvency proceedings. It is therefore no answer for a creditor that the debt still exists. The application is itself subject to limitation, whatever the status of the debt. Section 5 of the Limitation Act may apply to condone delay in an appropriate case, as the Court said, but that requires an explanation.

26Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Kew Precision Parts (P) Ltd. says, in the same context, that proceedings under the SARFAESI Act or any other recovery law do not affect the right of a financial creditor to initiate insolvency proceedings unless its debt is repaid.Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Kew Precision Parts (P) Ltd., (2022) 9 SCC 364 (Indira Banerjee J.). Both statements show the Court keeping apart the existence of the debt and the time limit on a particular proceeding.

VI. How the principle is applied

Punjab National Bank on the facts

27The facts of Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha show how far the principle goes. On 5 May 1984 the Bank lent Rs. 15,000 to one S.N. Dubey. The respondent and his wife gave a security bond as guarantors and handed over a fixed deposit receipt. The principal debtor defaulted. When the deposit matured on 1 November 1988, at Rs. 41,292, the Bank adjusted Rs. 27,037.60 towards what was due and credited the balance to the respondent’s account. The respondent filed a private complaint alleging criminal breach of trust. He said that the debt had become barred on 5 May 1987, that his liability being co-extensive with that of the debtor had ended on the same date, and that the adjustment was therefore an embezzlement.Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 499, AIR 1992 SC 1815, reported headnote.

28The answer, as set out above, was that the debt had not ceased to exist. So a creditor who holds a security, or who has a fund of the debtor’s in its hands, is in a strong position even when it could no longer sue. It need not go to court, because it does not need a decree. Its adjustment stands on the right, and not on the remedy.

The special procedure cases

29The limit in Kalliyanikutty depends on a line of reasoning that goes back to the Privy Council’s decision in Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. The Court there explained the question in these terms:

Interpreting the words “money due”, the Privy Council said that the phrase would only refer to those claims which were not time-barred. It noted that the section is concerned only with moneys due from a contributory. A debtor who is not a contributory is not affected by it. Moneys due from him can be recovered only by a suit in the Company’s name. Secondly, the section creates a special procedure for obtaining payment of moneys. It is not a section which purports to create a foundation upon which to base a claim for payment. It creates no new rights.State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657, describing Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., AIR 1933 PC 63.

30That reasoning gives a test for any new statutory procedure. Does the statute create a fresh right to recover, or does it merely give a quicker way of enforcing an existing claim? If it only provides a procedure, then a claim which could no longer be enforced by suit will not usually be enforceable by that procedure either. Kerala’s Revenue Recovery Act was of that kind. A statute may provide otherwise, but it has to say so.

Insolvency as an illustration of the same reasoning

31B.K. Educational Services put a similar thought in strong words:

The Code cannot be triggered in the year 2017 for a debt which was time-barred, say, in 1990, as that would lead to the absurd and extreme consequence of the Code being triggered by a stale or dead claim, leading to the drastic consequence of instant removal of the present Board of Directors of the corporate debtor permanently, and which may ultimately lead to liquidation and, therefore, corporate death. This being the case, the expression “debt due” in the definition sections of the Code would obviously only refer to debts that are “due and payable” in law, i.e., the debts that are not time-barred.B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633.

32The words “dead claim” should not be misread. In the sense discussed in this entry, the debt continues to exist. But for the purpose of the Code, it is not a debt “due and payable in law”. This shows that the principle of a surviving right is not a general one. It answers some questions but not others. The word “due” takes its meaning from the statute in which it appears, as Kalliyanikutty also says: “In every case the exact meaning of the word ‘due’ will depend upon the context in which that word appears.”

VII. Keeping a claim alive

33Practitioners should distinguish three ways in which a debt that is out of time, or close to it, can be treated.

34An acknowledgment under section 18 of the Limitation Act gives a fresh period of limitation. It must be in writing and signed, and it must be made before the period has expired. Sesh Nath Singh restates that “the acknowledgment must be made before the period of limitation expires”.Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd., AIR 2021 SC 2637. An acknowledgment made after the period has run does not help under this section.

35A payment on account under section 19 also gives a fresh period, again if it is made before expiry, and if an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making it.

36A promise under section 25(3) of the Contract Act stands on a different footing. It can be made after the period has expired, and that is its point. It must be in writing and signed, and it must be to pay wholly or in part a debt which the creditor might have enforced but for the law of limitation. Such a promise forms a new contract, on which a new suit may be filed, and the suit is then on the promise. The surviving debt is the consideration that the section accepts in place of any fresh consideration.

37A.V. Murthy shows a connected point, about a cheque given for an old debt. The Court said that the proceedings should not have been quashed at the threshold, referring to sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and to the acknowledgment in the balance sheet. It said that it did not “propose to express any opinion” on the merits of the point about limitation, since the complaint had been rejected at the threshold.A.V. Murthy v. B.S. Nagabasavanna, (2002) 2 SCC 642, AIR 2002 SC 985. The usual reading of the decision, which relies on section 25(3), should therefore be used with care.

VIII. Section 27 and the plaintiff in possession

38Ravinder Kaur Grewal began by framing the issue left open by the earlier law:

whether Article 65 of the Act only enables a person to set up a plea of adverse possession as a shield as a defendant and such a plea cannot be used as a sword by a plaintiff to protect the possession of immovable property or to recover it in case of dispossession. Whether he is remediless in such a case? In case a person has perfected his title based on adverse possession and property is sold by the owner after the extinguishment of his title, what is the remedy of a person to avoid sale and interference in possession or for its restoration in case of dispossession?Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729, AIR 2019 SC 3827 (Arun Mishra J., for three judges).

39The answer, as is now generally stated, is that a person who has perfected title by adverse possession can use it as a plaintiff also. That follows from the principle in section 27 that the former owner’s right is extinguished, so that the possessor’s title is a real one and not merely a defence. It marks the contrast with a time-barred debt. A debtor gets no new right when a debt becomes time-barred. A possessor does.

IX. The position today

40Section 3 of the Limitation Act directs the dismissal of a suit, appeal or application presented out of time, even where limitation is not pleaded. It does not extinguish the debt. The debt continues to exist, and the creditor may use any lawful means other than a suit to obtain payment. A written and signed promise to pay a barred debt is a valid contract under section 25(3) of the Contract Act. A payment voluntarily made can be applied to a barred debt, and a lawful contractual adjustment against it is not wrongful. The exception is section 27, which extinguishes the right to property when the period for a suit for possession expires.

41The principle has limits that are just as firm. It does not support statutory coercive recovery that takes the place of a suit, and the statutory definition of an amount due is read accordingly. Nor does it allow a late application under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, to which the Limitation Act applies in terms. Creditors holding old debts should therefore concentrate on what the principle actually offers: acknowledgement, a fresh written promise, and lawful retention. Debtors who are presented with a demand should know that the law does not wipe out the debt, but also that the courts will not compel them to pay it.


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  • Published · 31 October 2026

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