FPR · First Precedent Research
2026 FPR PLC 1 · https://firstprecedent.org/lacunae/no-torture-law
LC-0003Lacunae · Human Rights · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR PLC 1
FPR Editors18 October 2026 · 4,501 words
No Law against Torture
In the absence of a standalone statute criminalising torture and the non-ratification of the 1984 UN Convention, Indian criminal law subsumes custodial violence under ordinary penal provisions, relying on a patchwork of judicial guidelines and constitutional tort that leaves state-inflicted torture structurally under-enforced.
Abstract
India signed the United Nations Convention against Torture in 1997 but has never ratified it, leaving a foundational lacuna in its domestic penal architecture. This entry examines the international obligations arising under the Convention and the constitutional obstacles to their self-execution. It traces the legislative history of aborted reform, from the Law Commission's 113th, 152nd, and 273rd Reports to the lapsed Prevention of Torture Bill, 2010 and the Supreme Court's refusal in Ashwani Kumar (2019) to mandamus Parliament. It analyses the existing statutory patchwork under the Indian Penal Code and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, the procedural shield of official sanction, the evidentiary crisis born of closed-door interrogation, and the Supreme Court's surrogate regime of arrest guidelines and public law compensation from D.K. Basu to Paramvir Singh Saini. Finally, it assesses the domestic and geopolitical consequences of the vacuum, concluding with seven propositions that define the law as it stands.
I. The gap
1Indian criminal law contains no offence named torture. A police officer who beats a suspect to extract a confession, subjects a detainee to waterboarding, or uses prolonged sleep deprivation and humiliation behind locked lockup doors is charged, if charged at all, under ordinary penal provisions governing simple hurt, grievous hurt, or wrongful confinement.Indian Penal Code, 1860, §§ 319, 320, 330, 331, 348; Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, §§ 114, 115, 120, 127(8). If the victim dies, the charge is culpable homicide or murder.Indian Penal Code, 1860, §§ 300, 302, 304; Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, §§ 101, 103, 105. This statutory framing treats state violence as indistinguishable from a private brawl, obscuring the defining vice of torture: the deliberate deployment of sovereign coercive power against a captive human being whose custody the State monopolises.
2This domestic vacuum exists alongside an unfulfilled international commitment. On 14 October 1997, India signed the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter UNCAT]. More than a quarter of a century later, India has neither ratified the treaty nor enacted the municipal legislation that ratification demands. When the Supreme Court was petitioned under Article 32 to compel the Union to pass an anti-torture statute, it declined, holding that the constitutional separation of powers forbids issuing a writ of mandamus to Parliament to enact a law.Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 585. In 2023, when Parliament overhauled the criminal codes, it re-enacted the colonial-era provisions without adding a standalone offence of torture or shifting the evidentiary burden of proof for custodial injuries. The result is a structural gap where constitutional guarantees of human dignity coexist with institutional impunity.
II. The international obligation
The architecture of UNCAT
3The Convention against Torture was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1984 and entered into force on 26 June 1987.G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). It was designed not merely to declare torture unlawful—a status it already held as a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)—but to create an apparatus of municipal criminalisation, universal jurisdiction, and procedural accountability that would deny torturers safe haven anywhere on earth.
4Article 1(1) defines torture as any act by which severe physical or mental pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted on a person for purposes such as obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or discrimination, when inflicted by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official.UNCAT, art. 1(1). The definition contains four essential elements: severe physical or mental suffering; intentionality; specific illicit purposes; and state complicity.
5To give this definition practical force, the Convention imposes six affirmative duties upon State Parties: 1. Absolute non-derogability: Under Article 2(2), no exceptional circumstances—war, internal instability, or public emergency—may be invoked to justify torture. Under Article 2(3), superior orders provide no defence. 2. Mandatory domestic criminalisation: Article 4 requires State Parties to ensure that all acts of torture, attempts, and complicity are punishable offences under municipal penal law with penalties reflecting their grave nature. 3. Universal jurisdiction: Under Article 5, each State must establish jurisdiction over offences committed in its territory, by its nationals, or by foreign offenders present within its territory whom it chooses not to extradite (aut dedere aut judicare). 4. Non-refoulement: Article 3 prohibits expelling, returning, or extraditing a person to another State where substantial grounds exist for believing he would be in danger of torture. 5. Investigation and redress: Articles 12 and 13 mandate prompt and impartial investigations ex officio, while Article 14 guarantees victims an enforceable right to fair compensation and full rehabilitation. 6. The exclusionary rule: Article 15 commands that any statement established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceeding, except against an accused torturer.
The dualist barrier
6India follows a strictly dualist model of international law. Under Article 253 of the Constitution, Parliament has the exclusive power to make laws implementing any treaty, agreement, or convention.India Const. art. 253. In the absence of enabling legislation enacted under Article 253, international conventions signed by the executive branch do not automatically become part of municipal law, nor do they create enforceable causes of action in domestic courts.State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201, ¶ 71; Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, (1980) 2 SCC 360, ¶ 9.
7While courts may look to international conventions to interpret fundamental rights where there is no domestic legislative conflict,See Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438. judicial interpretation cannot create a criminal offence where Parliament has enacted none. Article 20(1) commands that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged.India Const. art. 20(1). Consequently, although India signed the UNCAT in 1997, the treaty remains unincorporated. India cannot ratify the Convention without first enacting domestic legislation fulfilling Articles 4, 5, and 14; yet Parliament has consistently declined to pass such legislation.
III. The aborted legislative journey
8The failure to enact an anti-torture law is not the product of legislative inadvertence. Over forty years, the Supreme Court, three Law Commission reports, and a parliamentary select committee have repeatedly confronted the lacuna, drafted specific statutory texts, and seen each attempt stall.
The early alarms: Reports No. 113 and 152
9The earliest judicial call for legislative reform came in 1985. In State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, police officers beat a villager to death inside a police station after he refused to pay a bribe. Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud observed that because custodial crimes occur in secrecy, the ordinary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt creates an insurmountable obstacle for the prosecution: police personnel alone witness what occurs in the lockup, rarely depose against colleagues, and maintain a wall of silence.State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, (1985) 1 SCC 552, ¶ 20. The Court urged the legislature to amend the law of evidence to shift the burden of proof onto the police.
10Prompted by Ram Sagar Yadav, the Law Commission produced its 113th Report in July 1985, recommending the insertion of Section 114B into the Evidence Act: if bodily injury was caused to a person in police custody, the court would presume that the injury was caused by the police officer having custody.Law Commission of India, Report No. 113, Injuries in Police Custody (Suggested amendment to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872) (1985). In its 152nd Report (1994) on Custodial Crimes, the Commission reiterated the necessity of Section 114B, proposed creating specific custodial offences under a dedicated chapter in the Indian Penal Code, and urged the mandatory grant of interim compensation to victims.Law Commission of India, Report No. 152, Custodial Crimes (1994). Successive Central Governments took no action on either report.
The Prevention of Torture Bill, 2010
11In 2010, spurred by scrutiny ahead of India’s Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council, the government introduced the Prevention of Torture Bill, 2010 in the Lok Sabha. The bill was explicitly presented as enabling the ratification of the UNCAT, and the Lok Sabha passed it on 6 May 2010 without debate.
12The 2010 Bill was, however, deeply flawed. Section 3 defined torture only as acts causing “grievous hurt” or “danger to life, limb or health”, excluding mental suffering and psychological abuse. Section 5 barred courts from taking cognizance after six months from the alleged offence. Section 6 made previous government sanction under Section 197 CrPC mandatory. The bill omitted any presumption of custodial injury and provided a lenient minimum punishment of three years imprisonment.
13When the bill reached the Rajya Sabha, protests forced a reference to a Select Committee chaired by Dr. Ashwani Kumar. The Committee’s Report, presented on 7 December 2010, dismantled the Lok Sabha draft.Rajya Sabha Secretariat, Report of the Select Committee on the Prevention of Torture Bill, 2010 (presented 7 Dec. 2010). The Committee noted that the bill was “neither in consonance with the spirit of the UN Convention nor did it adequately address the grim ground reality of custodial violence in India.” It recommended expanding the definition to cover mental suffering, introducing ten years to life imprisonment for custodial death, creating a statutory right to compensation, establishing an independent investigation agency, and dispensing with prior sanction under Section 197 CrPC.
14The Select Committee’s amended bill was never brought back to the floor. Upon the dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha in May 2014, the bill lapsed under Article 107(5) of the Constitution.
The 273rd Law Commission Report (2017)
15Following the lapse of the 2010 Bill, Dr. Ashwani Kumar petitioned the Supreme Court under Article 32, seeking directions to the Union to enact an anti-torture statute. In July 2017, the Union informed the Court that it had referred the matter to the Law Commission of India.
16In October 2017, the Law Commission, chaired by Justice B.S. Chauhan, delivered its 273rd Report, appending a draft statute: The Prevention of Torture Bill, 2017.Law Commission of India, Report No. 273, Implementation of the ‘United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ through legislation (2017). The draft proposed an expansive definition mirroring Article 1 UNCAT; life imprisonment and fine for custodial death, up to ten years for grievous hurt, and up to five years for other torture; a statutory presumption that custodial injuries were caused by the custodian; a victim compensation fund; the express exclusion of Section 197 CrPC sanction; and extraterritorial jurisdiction over torture committed abroad by or against Indian citizens or by foreigners present in India.
17The Central Government circulated the draft bill to the States on the ground that “Police” and “Public Order” fall under Entries 1 and 2 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. The bill stalled amid non-responsive state home departments and was never introduced in Parliament.
Ashwani Kumar and the separation of powers
18On 5 September 2019, the Supreme Court delivered judgment in Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India. A three-judge Bench comprising Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, and Justice Sanjiv Khanna dismissed the petition. (2020) 13 SCC 585; 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1144.
19Writing for the Bench, Khanna J. held that despite the horror of custodial torture, the Supreme Court could not issue a writ of mandamus commanding Parliament to enact a statute:
“The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, which is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, prohibits the courts from issuing directions to the legislature to enact a law. Law-making is an exclusive legislative function which involves policy choices, prioritization of societal needs, balancing of competing interests, and fiscal considerations... The Court can declare a law unconstitutional, it can interpret the law to protect fundamental rights... but it cannot direct the legislature to enact a specific statute or ratify an international treaty.”Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 585, ¶¶ 28–34.
20The Court noted that while the executive had stated that the 273rd Report was under active consideration, the timing, substance, and manner of legislation belonged entirely to the political departments. The judicial route to compelling an anti-torture statute was closed.
The 2023 recodification
21In 2023, Parliament enacted the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) to replace the IPC, CrPC, and Evidence Act, bringing them into force on 1 July 2024. This total overhaul presented an unencumbered legislative opportunity to address the forty-year-old gap.
22Parliament chose not to do so. The BNS contains no offence of torture, transferring Sections 330 and 331 IPC into Section 120 BNS. The BSA omitted the proposed Section 114B presumption entirely. The BNSS re-enacted the sanction requirement in Section 218 (formerly Section 197 CrPC), adding only a 120-day “deemed sanction” rule that does not apply when the executive actively refuses sanction. The recodification confirmed that the legislative vacuum was a deliberate legislative choice.
IV. What partially fills the gap
23Because Parliament has never enacted a standalone statute, the regulation of custodial violence has been left to a patchwork of colonial penal provisions, procedural checks, and judge-made constitutional tort.
The statutory fragments
24The Indian Penal Code, and now the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, address state violence through narrow offences designed around private interpersonal harm: Causing hurt to extort confession: Section 330 IPC / Section 120(1) BNS (simple hurt, punishable up to 7 years and fine) and Section 331 IPC / Section 120(2) BNS (grievous hurt, punishable up to 10 years and fine). Wrongful confinement to extort confession: Section 348 IPC / Section 127(8) BNS (punishable up to 3 years and fine). Custodial rape by a police officer: Section 376(2)(a) IPC / Section 64(2)(a) BNS (rigorous imprisonment for not less than 10 years, extending to life).
25These provisions suffer from severe conceptual limitations. Sections 330 and 331 require proof of “hurt” (bodily pain, disease, or infirmity). Mental torture, sensory deprivation, prolonged isolation, forced nudity, verbal degradation, and sleep deprivation fall outside their scope unless they manifest as physical disease. Furthermore, the provisions require proof of a specific purpose: extorting a confession or compelling the restoration of property. Violence inflicted for other custodial purposes—punishment, intimidation, extraction of bribes, or communal and caste discrimination—is not covered by Section 120 BNS and must be prosecuted as ordinary assault.
26A further statutory perversity exists in the law of evidence. Under Section 25 of the Evidence Act (now Section 23(1) BSA), confessions to police officers are inadmissible. But Section 27 (now Section 23(2) BSA) creates an exception: when any fact is discovered in consequence of information received from a person in police custody, that discovery may be proved. This “recovery” exception creates a structural incentive for investigating officers to use third-degree methods to force disclosures that lead to weapons or physical evidence, knowing that the physical recovery will cure the coercive interrogation in court.
Procedural safeguards
27Procedural law provides four threshold protections against unrecorded custody: 1. Mandatory production within 24 hours: Section 57 CrPC (now Section 58 BNSS) commands that no police officer shall detain an arrestee without a warrant for longer than twenty-four hours, exclusive of travel time to the Magistrate. 2. Mandatory medical examination: Section 54 CrPC (now Section 53 BNSS) entitles an arrested person to an examination by a registered medical practitioner, providing a contemporaneous record of injuries. 3. Mandatory judicial inquiry into custodial death: Section 176(1A) CrPC (now Section 196 BNSS), inserted in 2005, mandates an inquiry by a Judicial Magistrate, alongside any police investigation, in every case of death, disappearance, or rape occurring in police custody. 4. Recording of arrest: Sections 41B and 41D CrPC (now Sections 36 and 40 BNSS), inserted in 2008, require an arresting officer to prepare an arrest memo countersigned by a witness and permit the arrestee to consult an advocate during interrogation.
The constitutional surrogate: D.K. Basu and beyond
28Faced with statutory inaction, the Supreme Court developed an extensive constitutional surrogate regime under Article 21.
29In Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Admn., the Court struck down the solitary confinement of a death-row prisoner as a violation of Article 21, holding that convicted prisoners retain all fundamental rights not stripped by lawful incarceration.Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Admn., (1978) 4 SCC 494. In Sunil Batra (II), Krishna Iyer J. treated a letter reporting the torture of an inmate as a habeas corpus petition, establishing that physical violence by jail officials violates Article 21.Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Admn., (1980) 3 SCC 488. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, Bhagwati J. expanded Article 21 to human dignity, holding that any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment offensive to human dignity infringes Article 21, extending to mental torture as well as physical violence.Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608, ¶ 8. In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Admn., the Court declared routine handcuffing of undertrial prisoners unconstitutional,Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Admn., (1980) 3 SCC 526. and in Selvi v. State of Karnataka, it held that involuntary administration of narco-analysis, polygraph tests, and brain-mapping violated both the privilege against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) and the right to mental privacy under Article 21.Selvi v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263.
30The high-water mark of judicial intervention came in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. (1997) 1 SCC 416. Treating letters regarding lockup deaths as a public interest petition, a Bench comprising Justice Kuldip Singh and Justice Dr. A.S. Anand laid down eleven mandatory procedural requirements for every arrest and detention: 1. Accurate, visible identification tags with designations for all arresting and interrogating personnel; 2. An arrest memo prepared at arrest, witnessed by a family member or respectable local citizen, and countersigned by the arrestee; 3. The right of the arrestee to have a friend or relative informed of his arrest within 8 to 12 hours; 4. Entry in the police station diary of the arrest and the names of custodial officers; 5. An “inspection memo” recording pre-existing injuries upon the arrestee’s request; 6. Mandatory medical examination by a trained doctor every 48 hours in custody; 7. Transmission of all arrest documents to the Illaqa Magistrate; 8. Right of the arrestee to consult an advocate during interrogation; 9. Police control rooms at district and State headquarters to display arrest data within 12 hours; 10. Departmental proceedings and contempt of court for non-compliance; and 11. Universal application across India as declared law under Article 141.
31In D.K. Basu (2015), a Bench of Justices T.S. Thakur and Kurian Joseph monitored compliance nationwide, ordering CCTV cameras in prisons and police stations, the establishment of State Human Rights Commissions, and the appointment of non-official visitors.D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., (2015) 8 SCC 744. In Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh, a three-judge Bench led by Nariman J. directed that every police station install CCTV cameras with audio and night-vision capabilities covering all lockups, interrogation rooms, corridors, and entryways, with footage preserved for at least one year, extending the mandate to central agencies including the CBI, ED, and NIA. (2021) 1 SCC 835.
Public law compensation: Strict state liability
32Alongside preventive guidelines, the Court fashioned a compensatory remedy in public law. In Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, the Court awarded compensation under Article 32 for fourteen years of unlawful detention after acquittal.Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141. In Bhim Singh v. State of J&K, compensation was awarded for the malicious detention of an elected legislator.Bhim Singh v. State of J&K, (1985) 4 SCC 677.
33The doctrine of sovereign immunity—historically invoked by the State under P. & O. Steam Navigation Co. (1861) 5 Bom HCR App I 1. and Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P.Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 1039. to escape liability for the torts of police officers—was decisively rejected in public law in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa. (1993) 2 SCC 746. Suman Behera died in police custody, his lacerated body found on a railway track. J.S. Verma J. held that public law remedies for fundamental rights violations stand on a completely different footing from private law torts:
“The defense of sovereign immunity is alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights and there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is a remedy in public law based on strict liability for contravention of guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen... based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply.”Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746, ¶ 10.
34Anand J. concurred, stressing that this liability is the direct constitutional obligation of the State to protect citizens in its custody.Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746, ¶ 35 (Anand, J., concurring).
The National Human Rights Commission
35Under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (PHRA), the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and State Commissions inquire into human rights violations by public servants.Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, §§ 3, 12, 21. The NHRC mandates that State Governments report every custodial death or rape within 24 hours, accompanied by post-mortem videography and magisterial reports. While the Commission has recommended compensation in hundreds of cases, it remains an advisory body: under Section 18 PHRA, its findings are recommendations to the government, possessing no power to initiate prosecutions directly or penalise errant officers.
V. Why the patchwork fails
36The surrogate system—penal sections for hurt, procedural guidelines, CCTV mandates, and monetary compensation—fails to stop custodial torture because it leaves three structural fortresses intact: conceptual misclassification, an insurmountable evidentiary standard, and a statutory procedural shield.
The conceptual category mistake
37Torture is not merely aggravated assault. Assault is a violation of bodily integrity between legal equals; torture is an abuse of the sovereign monopoly on coercive force against a captive individual stripped of the capacity to resist or escape.
38By subsuming torture under Section 120 BNS (formerly Sections 330 and 331 IPC), Indian law reduces a crime against humanity to an evidence dispute. An officer who flogs an undertrial for insolence, subjects a minority suspect to abuse, or extracts bribes through electrocution commits no offence under Section 120 BNS unless the violence was aimed at extorting a confession or recovering property.
39Furthermore, because existing provisions require physical hurt, they ignore non-contact torture: solitary confinement, stress positions, sleep deprivation, hooding, white noise, mock executions, and threats against family members. In international law, these constitute torture in its purest form; under Indian municipal law, they leave no marks, satisfy no definition of “grievous hurt”, and cannot be prosecuted under the penal code.
The evidentiary black hole
40Torture occurs behind locked doors in interrogation cells without independent witnesses. The only witnesses are fellow police officers bound by professional loyalty.
41In State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Trivedi, the Supreme Court noted that police personnel alone witness what happens inside a police station and close ranks to maintain a “conspiracy of silence”.State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Trivedi, (1995) 4 SCC 262, ¶ 17. In Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P., the Court observed that exaggerated adherence to proof beyond reasonable doubt in custodial crimes is fatal to justice: if the prosecution must lead direct evidence of lockup torture, no police officer will ever be convicted.Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P., (2005) 9 SCC 631, ¶ 8.
42Where a deceased person was last seen alive in police custody, courts have occasionally invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act (now Section 109 BSA)—placing the burden of proving facts especially within knowledge upon that person—to sustain convictions.Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 1 SCC 10, ¶ 53. But Section 106 does not relieve the prosecution of proving unlawful custody beyond reasonable doubt; it is an aid in evaluation, not a statutory presumption of guilt. Because Parliament has refused to enact proposed Section 114B, the prosecution must prove specific acts of individual officers beyond reasonable doubt. In the face of altered general diaries, missing lockup registers, and silent constables, trials end in routine acquittals.
The procedural fortress: Sanction
43Section 197 CrPC, re-enacted as Section 218 BNSS, bars courts from taking cognizance of an offence committed by a public servant “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”, except with previous government sanction.
44The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that torture and custodial murder can never form part of official duty, and that no sanction is necessary where an act has no reasonable connection to official functions.Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2016) 12 SCC 255; Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan, (1973) 2 SCC 701; Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44. Yet trial courts routinely entertain preliminary objections under Section 197, staying proceedings or discharging officers for want of sanction.
45The executive is structurally conflicted: it cannot dispassionately decide whether to permit the prosecution of its own police machinery. While Section 218 BNSS introduced a 120-day “deemed sanction” rule for executive inaction, it does not prevent the government from actively refusing sanction, nor does it abolish the requirement itself.
The empirical reality: Deaths without convictions
46Every year, over one hundred individuals die in police custody across India, alongside over two thousand deaths in judicial custody. According to National Crime Records Bureau data, between 2001 and 2020, over 1,800 custodial deaths were recorded in police custody nationwide. Yet chargesheets were filed in fewer than a third of these cases, and convictions of police personnel remained in single digits per year—frequently falling to absolute zero.
47Even in cases that provoke national outrage—such as the June 2020 custodial deaths of P. Jayaraj and his son J. Bennix at Sathankulam in Tamil Nadu—convictions require extraordinary intervention by High Court suo motu orders, transfer to the CBI, and sustained civil society pressure. Where such scrutiny is absent, the system’s baseline operation is impunity.
48Furthermore, compensation awarded under Nilabati Behera is paid from the public exchequer. While the Court in D.K. Basu held that the State may recover compensation from errant officers, State Governments rarely do so. Errant officers face neither civil bankruptcy nor criminal punishment; the financial burden is borne entirely by the taxpayer.
The international friction: Extradition and diplomatic embarrassment
49The domestic vacuum has created serious geopolitical costs for India in two distinct arenas:
501. Extradition proceedings: When India seeks the extradition of fugitive offenders from European nations or the United Kingdom, defense counsel routinely argue that the absence of an anti-torture law and poor prison conditions create a real risk of ill-treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or Article 3 of UNCAT. In 2011, Danish courts refused to extradite Niels Holck (Kim Davy), the accused in the Purulia arms drop case, on the specific ground that he faced a real risk of torture in Indian prisons.High Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre Landsret), Prosecution v. Niels Holck, Judgment of 30 June 2011. In the United Kingdom, extradition proceedings involving Sanjeev Chawla,Sanjeev Kumar Chawla v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2018] EWHC 1050 (Admin). Vijay Mallya,Vijay Mallya v. Government of India, [2020] EWHC 924 (Admin). and Nirav ModiNirav Deepak Modi v. Government of India, [2022] EWHC 2878 (Admin). were delayed while courts evaluated whether Indian assurances regarding Arthur Road Jail and Tihar Jail satisfied Article 3 ECHR standards. India was repeatedly forced to submit intrusive sovereign diplomatic undertakings and cell video footage to overcome the suspicion generated by the absence of an anti-torture framework.
512. Scrutiny at the Universal Periodic Review: At every cycle of the Universal Periodic Review before the UN Human Rights Council—in 2008, 2012, 2017, and 2022—dozens of nations have called on India to ratify the UNCAT and criminalise torture. Indian representatives have consistently maintained that domestic laws are sufficient and that ratification is “under active consideration”. After nearly three decades, this explanation has become hollow diplomatic boilerplate, leaving India alongside a dwindling handful of non-ratifying states.
VI. The position today
52The law governing torture in India today may be stated in seven propositions:
531. Torture is not an independent crime: There is no standalone offence of torture in Indian penal law. Acts of custodial torture must be prosecuted as ordinary offences of causing hurt to extort confession under Section 120 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Sections 330 and 331 IPC), wrongful confinement under Section 127(8) BNS (formerly Section 348 IPC), or culpable homicide/murder under Sections 103 and 105 BNS (formerly Sections 302 and 304 IPC).
542. The UN Convention is unincorporated: The 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture, signed by India in 1997, has not been ratified. Under the dualist doctrine embodied in Article 253 of the Constitution, its provisions cannot be invoked by citizens as an independent cause of action in domestic courts, nor can they alter statutory definitions of crimes.
553. Parliament cannot be compelled to legislate: Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Supreme Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to Parliament or the Union executive commanding the enactment of an anti-torture statute or the ratification of the UNCAT.Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 585.
564. Freedom from torture is an absolute constitutional right: Under Article 21, the right to life with human dignity includes an absolute guarantee against torture, custodial violence, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608; Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Admn., (1980) 3 SCC 488; Selvi v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263.
575. Procedural arrest safeguards are judicially mandatory: The eleven guidelines in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., supplemented by the mandatory CCTV installation regime in Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh, are declared law under Article 141 and govern every arrest and interrogation conducted by police and central investigative agencies. Failure to comply renders errant officials liable to disciplinary action and contempt of court.
586. The State is strictly liable in public law: Sovereign immunity is unavailable to the State in proceedings under Articles 32 and 226 for violations of Article 21. The constitutional courts have the power to award monetary compensation against the State for custodial death or torture as a public law remedy, independent of private tort claims.Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746.
597. The evidentiary and procedural shields remain intact: In the absence of a statutory presumption shifting the burden of proof (such as proposed Section 114B of the Evidence Act), the prosecution must prove custodial violence beyond reasonable doubt against specific officers. Prior government sanction under Section 218 of the BNSS (formerly Section 197 CrPC) continues to operate as a threshold procedural barrier to the criminal prosecution of public servants.
History
- Published · 18 October 2026
© 2026 First Precedent Research. Free to share and adapt with credit, for non-commercial use, under CC BY-NC 4.0. A published piece is changed only to correct an error, and each correction is listed under History. If the law changes, we add a linked afterword. Nothing on FPR is legal advice.