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2026 FPR EFC 1 · https://firstprecedent.org/fictions/corporate-personality

FC-0002Fictions · Corporate · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EFC 1

FPR Editors18 October 2026 · 5,063 words

The Company as a Person

Indian law treats a company as a juristic person capable of owning property, suing, and claiming equal protection, but denies it citizenship under Article 19, leaving its fundamental freedoms to be exercised through the borrowed standing of its natural-person shareholders.

Abstract

The fiction of corporate personality creates an independent legal entity separate from its incorporators, an idea received into Indian law from Salomon and codified across successive Companies Acts. This entry examines the constitutional status of this fiction: why a nine-judge Bench in State Trading Corporation held that corporations cannot be citizens under Article 19, the strict bar against piercing the veil imposed in TELCO, and the subsequent doctrinal bypass engineered by an eleven-judge Bench in R.C. Cooper and developed in Bennett Coleman. It explores the rights a corporation holds in its own right under Articles 14 and 300A, the refusal to extend Article 21's biological liberties, the mechanics of corporate criminal liability through attribution, and the contemporary restatement of corporate personality under the Companies Act, 2013.


I. The Fiction of the Body Corporate

1In Indian law, an incorporated company is an independent person. The proposition is a pure legal fiction. The law does not pretend that an incorporation is an organism of flesh and blood; it invents an artificial persona, attaches to it a corporate name, and clothes it with legal capacities distinct from the human beings who incorporate it, manage its business, or subscribe to its capital.

2The fiction endows the corporate person with several standard attributes: perpetual succession, the capacity to acquire, hold, and dispose of property, the capacity to enter into binding contracts, and the ability to sue and be sued in its own name. Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides the statutory baseline, enacting that the word “person” shall include “any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.”General Clauses Act, 1897, § 3(42). Successive Indian companies statutes have codified this fiction in identical terms. Under Section 9 of the Companies Act, 2013—mirroring Section 34(2) of the Companies Act, 1956—the certificate of incorporation brings into existence a “body corporate” capable forthwith of exercising all the functions of an incorporated company.Companies Act, 2013, § 9; Companies Act, 1956, § 34(2).

3In private law, the utility of this fiction is unmatched. It pools capital without exposing investors to limitless personal ruin; it permits assets to be dedicated to a commercial enterprise indefinitely, immune from the death, bankruptcy, or whimsical withdrawal of individual shareholders; and it creates a singular legal target against which creditors may assert contractual claims.

4Yet the transition of this commercial device into public law has generated persistent constitutional tension. When the State takes over a business, confiscates corporate property, restricts newspaper pagination, or taxes an undertaking, can the corporate person invoke the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution of India? The constitutional text sharpens the dilemma by drawing an unyielding line between rights guaranteed to “any person” and rights reserved exclusively to “citizens.” Because an incorporated company is undeniably a “person” but manifestly artificial, Indian courts spent two decades determining whether the company could claim the fundamental freedoms of trade, speech, and association under Article 19. The answer—settled through a sequence of monumental Benches—is that the company cannot be a citizen, but its citizen-shareholders may use their own constitutional standing to shield the corporate vehicle through which their freedoms are exercised.

II. Origins: From Salomon to British India

The English Foundation

5The common law doctrine of separate corporate personality received its canonical modern formulation in 1897 in Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd.Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd., [1897] AC 22 (HL). Aron Salomon, a London leather merchant and boot manufacturer, converted his sole proprietorship into a limited liability company. To satisfy the statutory requirement of seven subscribers under the Companies Act, 1862, Salomon allotted one share each to his wife, daughter, and four sons, while retaining 20,007 shares for himself. The company purchased Salomon’s business, paying him partly in shares and partly in £10,000 of secured debentures creating a floating charge over corporate assets. When the company subsequently fell into liquidation, the unsecured creditors argued that the company was a mere sham or agent for Salomon.

6The English Court of Appeal agreed with the creditors. The House of Lords unanimously reversed. Lord Halsbury LC held that once the statutory conditions of incorporation were formally met without fraud, the court could not inquire whether the subscribers were independent:

The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum; and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them.Ibid., at 30–31 (per Lord Halsbury LC).

7Lord Macnaghten reinforced the point: “The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers... It has a legal existence with, as it were, a soul and mind of its own.”Ibid., at 51 (per Lord Macnaghten).

Reception in India

8Indian company law anticipated Salomon. British India introduced corporate registration through Act 43 of 1850 and limited liability through the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1857. Eleven years before the House of Lords decided Salomon, the Calcutta High Court confronted the identical conceptual puzzle in In re Kondoli Tea Co. Ltd.In re Kondoli Tea Co. Ltd., (1886) ILR 13 Cal 43.

9In Kondoli Tea, eight individual owners of a tea plantation transferred their estate to a newly incorporated company, holding all shares and debentures in exact proportion to their prior ownership. Resisting ad valorem stamp duty on the conveyance deed, they contended that the transaction was not a taxable sale: the property was theirs before incorporation, and it remained theirs under another name. Chief Justice Sir W. Comer Petheram rejected the plea:

I think that is a fallacy. Whoever the shareholders in the Kondoli Tea Company, Limited, were, I think the Kondoli Tea Company, Limited, was a separate person, a separate body, and a conveyance to the Kondoli Tea Company, Limited, of property which was the property of the sharers in their individual capacity, was just as much a conveyance, a transfer of the property as if the shareholders in the Company had been totally different persons.Ibid., at 47.

10The principle was codified in the Indian Companies Act, 1882, the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and the post-independence Companies Act, 1956.

11The Supreme Court gave this separation its sharpest proprietary application in 1954 in Bacha F. Guzdar v. CIT, Bombay.Bacha F. Guzdar v. CIT, (1955) 1 SCR 876 : AIR 1955 SC 74. A shareholder in tea companies claimed that sixty percent of her dividend income was agricultural income exempt from tax under Section 4(3)(viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, since sixty percent of corporate profits arose from agriculture. Speaking for a unanimous Constitution Bench, Justice Gulam Hasan rejected the claim. A shareholder owns no part of corporate property:

A shareholder has undoubtedly a right to participate in the profits of the company if and when the company declares... that the profits or any part thereof should be distributed by way of dividend, but he is not the owner of the assets of the company. The company is a juristic entity distinct from the shareholders, and the property of the company is not the property of the shareholders.Ibid., at 882–883.

12Bacha F. Guzdar established that the veil of incorporation was not a transparent film through which ownership of corporate assets could be claimed by investors. In corporate law, the holding was impeccable; in constitutional law, it threatened to strip commercial enterprise of fundamental rights.

III. The Constitutional Fracture: “Person” Versus “Citizen”

13When the Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950, the drafting committee engineered a deliberate textual divide across Part III.

14Certain fundamental rights were guaranteed broadly to “any person”: 1. Article 14 (equality before the law and equal protection of the laws). 2. Article 20 (protections against ex post facto penal laws, double jeopardy, and self-incrimination). 3. Article 21 (protection of life and personal liberty). 4. Article 22 (protection against arrest and detention). 5. Article 27 (freedom from taxes for religious promotion). 6. Former Article 31 and its successor, Article 300A (protection against deprivation of property save by authority of law).

15In sharp contrast, other fundamental rights were explicitly restricted to “citizens”: 1. Article 15 (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth). 2. Article 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment). 3. Article 19 (the fundamental freedoms of speech and expression, peaceful assembly, association, movement, residence, and trade or business). 4. Article 29 (cultural and educational rights of minority sections).

16The constitutional machinery for acquiring citizenship made this divide unbridgeable for corporations. Part II of the Constitution (Articles 5 to 11) defines citizenship at commencement solely by biological and geographic criteria: domicile coupled with birth in India, parentage, migration from Pakistan, or residence.Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 5, 6. These concepts contemplate natural human beings alone.

17When Parliament enacted the Citizenship Act, 1955 to regulate citizenship prospectively under Article 11, it made the corporate exclusion express. Section 2(1)(f) commands that:

“person” does not include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.Citizenship Act, 1955, § 2(1)(f).

18This created a constitutional dilemma for Indian enterprise. Trade, manufacturing, banking, and the press were organised primarily through joint-stock companies. If an incorporated company could not be a “citizen,” it could not invoke Article 19(1)(g) to resist arbitrary regulatory prohibitions or confiscatory licensing regimes. And if Bacha F. Guzdar dictated that shareholders owned none of the company’s property or business, individual shareholders could not sue to protect corporate assets. If neither could sue, the act of incorporation resulted in the forfeiture of the constitutional freedom of trade.

19Early decisions touched on the problem without resolving it. In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, Justice B.K. Mukherjea observed that fundamental rights were available to corporate bodies where the language of the provision permitted, confirming that Article 14 applied to companies.1950 SCR 869, at 898 : AIR 1951 SC 41. But whether a company could claim the citizen-only protections of Article 19 remained undecided until the State Trading Corporation challenged the sales tax authorities of Andhra Pradesh.

IV. The Nine-Judge Wall: State Trading Corporation and TELCO

State Trading Corporation v. CTO

20The issue reached a special Nine-Judge Constitution Bench in State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer.State Trading Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1963 SC 1811 : (1964) 4 SCR 99.

21The State Trading Corporation (STC) was incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 as a private limited company, with its shares held entirely by the President of India and two senior civil servants in the Ministry of Commerce. Assessed to sales tax by the Commercial Tax Officers of Visakhapatnam, STC petitioned under Article 32, alleging an infringement of its freedom of trade under Article 19(1)(g). The tax authorities raised a threshold objection: STC was a company; Article 19 protects only “citizens”; therefore, the petition was incompetent.

22By a 7:2 majority, the Nine-Judge Bench upheld the objection. Chief Justice B.P. Sinha, writing for himself and Justices S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, held that a corporation is not, and cannot be, a citizen under the Constitution: 1. Nationality is distinct from citizenship. Corporations possess nationality and domicile under private international law, determined by place of incorporation and central management. But nationality is an external status governing international relations; citizenship is a municipal political status conferring civil and political rights. 2. Part II is an exhaustive code for natural persons. Part II (Articles 5 to 11) is an exhaustive code governing citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution, confined to natural persons capable of birth, descent, and human domicile. 3. The Citizenship Act excludes corporations. Section 2(1)(f) explicitly excludes companies from the category of persons capable of acquiring citizenship by birth, descent, registration, or naturalisation. 4. The text of Part III is conclusive. The Framers deliberately used “person” in Articles 14, 20, and 21, and restricted Article 19 to “citizens.” Expanding “citizen” to include artificial persons would render the textual distinction meaningless.

23Justice M. Hidayatullah concurred, observing that citizenship entails political allegiance, franchise, and duties that an artificial entity cannot perform:

A corporation is not a citizen in the ordinary sense of the term, nor is it a citizen under our Constitution or the Citizenship Act... It has no soul, it has no body, it cannot take an oath of allegiance, it cannot be a traitor, and it cannot be a patriot.Ibid., AIR at 1836 (per Hidayatullah J).

24Justices K.C. Das Gupta and J.C. Shah dissented. Justice Das Gupta argued that Part II was not an exhaustive code of citizenship for all time and that where all members of a company are citizens, their corporate vehicle should share their citizenship. Justice Shah warned that denying citizenship to Indian companies would leave modern commercial enterprise stripped of constitutional protection against legislative overreach under Article 19.

The Bar Against Piercing: TELCO

25Barred by State Trading Corporation, corporate litigants sought an alternative route: piercing the corporate veil. In Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (TELCO) v. State of Bihar, two public companies and two citizen-shareholders approached the Supreme Court under Article 32.Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1964) 6 SCR 885 : AIR 1965 SC 40. They urged the Court to look behind the corporate structure, recognise the Indian citizens holding the shares, and protect their underlying Article 19(1)(f) and (g) rights.

26Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, writing for the Constitution Bench, rejected the argument. Lifting the corporate veil is an exceptional doctrine confined to fraud, tax evasion, or unmasking enemy character in wartime. It cannot be used to circumvent the Constitution:

If the company cannot claim the fundamental rights under Art. 19 because it is not a citizen, it would not be open to the shareholders to claim that the rights of the company should be protected by lifting the veil... What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly by adopting such a device.Ibid., SCR at 904–905.

27TELCO completed the formalist closure: the company could not sue because it was not a citizen, and the shareholders could not sue because the business was not theirs.

V. The Jurisprudential Pivot: R.C. Cooper and the Direct Effect Doctrine

28The impasse was broken in 1970 by an Eleven-Judge Bench in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (the Bank Nationalisation Case).R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 : (1970) 3 SCR 530.

The Challenge to Bank Nationalisation

29Under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1969, the Central Government nationalised fourteen major commercial banks, transferring their entire undertakings, assets, and liabilities to newly created banking entities, while prohibiting the existing corporate banks from carrying on any future banking business.

30Rustom Cavasjee Cooper, a shareholder, director, and depositor in the Central Bank of India Ltd. and the Bank of Baroda Ltd., challenged the Act under Article 32 for violating Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g), and 31(2). Attorney General Niren De raised a preliminary objection grounded on State Trading Corporation, TELCO, and Bacha F. Guzdar: the property acquired belonged to the corporate banks, not to Cooper; the business prohibition bound the banks; and Cooper, as a shareholder, could not claim an infringement of his own fundamental rights when the company suffered injury.

The Breakthrough of Justice J.C. Shah

31The Eleven-Judge Bench rejected the objection by a 10:1 majority. Justice J.C. Shah, who had dissented in State Trading Corporation, delivered the majority opinion.

32Instead of attempting to overrule State Trading Corporation by declaring the company a citizen, Justice Shah altered the locus of constitutional enquiry. The Court must look not at the formal object or statutory title of the measure, but at its direct operation and effect upon the fundamental rights of the citizen.

33A shareholder’s rights are not confined to a piece of paper; they include the right to receive dividends, to have corporate capital managed according to law, and to carry on trade through the chosen medium of the company:

Jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief cannot be denied, when by State action the rights of the individual shareholder are impaired, if that action impairs the rights of the company as well... If the State action impairs the rights of the shareholders as well as to the company, the Court will not, concentrating merely upon the technical position of the company and shareholders, deny himself the jurisdiction to grant relief to the shareholders.Ibid., (1970) 1 SCC at 273, para 43.

34The nationalisation had reduced the banks to empty corporate shells, destroyed the value of Cooper’s investment, extinguished his dividends, and barred him from conducting banking business through his shares. R.C. Cooper did not make the corporation a citizen; it decoupled shareholder standing from asset ownership. Where State action directly impairs the economic rights of citizen-investors, those investors may maintain an Article 19 petition under Article 32.

VI. Consolidation: The Newspaper Cases and Co-Extensive Standing

Bennett Coleman and the Press

35In Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court extended R.C. Cooper to civil liberties.Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788 : (1973) 2 SCR 757.

36Under the Newsprint Control Order, 1962 and the Import Policy for Newsprint for 1972–73, the Central Government imposed a ten-page ceiling on daily newspapers, banned new editions, and prohibited the interchange of newsprint quotas between papers of the same publisher. Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd., publisher of The Times of India, challenged the policy under Article 32 alongside a shareholder, an editor, and a reader. The Union of India objected to the invocation of Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression), arguing that R.C. Cooper applied only to property rights under Article 19(1)(f) and (g).

37Chief Justice A.N. Ray rejected the objection. Freedom of speech and expression of a shareholder, editor, or journalist is exercised through the medium of the corporate press:

The rights of shareholders with regard to article 19(1)(a) are projected and manifested through the newspapers. When companies are the vehicles of the exercise of freedom of speech by the editors, journalists and printers, the shareholders have a right to challenge measures which restrict that freedom... The corporate form cannot be made a handicap to the exercise of fundamental rights.Ibid., (1972) 2 SCC at 806–807, paras 22–27.

38Bennett Coleman established the convention of the “joint petition”: by joining a citizen-shareholder or director as co-petitioner, a company could challenge State action under Article 19 without colliding with State Trading Corporation.

The Limits of Standing: Shri Ambica Mills

39In State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., the Supreme Court prevented this procedural device from working in reverse.State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656 : (1974) 3 SCR 760. Under the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund (Gujarat Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961, employers were required to surrender unpaid accumulations of wages to a statutory welfare board. Ambica Mills Ltd., a corporate employer, challenged the statute on the ground that it violated the Article 19(1)(f) rights of citizen-employers, and argued that under Article 13(2) a law violating Part III was void in rem for all purposes.

40Justice K.K. Mathew reversed the High Court’s ruling. The word “void” in Article 13(2) does not render a statute non-est for all persons; it is void only qua those who possess the fundamental right in question. Because a company is not a citizen, the law is not void against it:

As the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 19(1)(f) was not possessed by the company, the law was not void as against the company, and the company cannot take the plea that the law is void as against it.Ibid., (1974) 4 SCC at 670, paras 38–40.

41A company cannot weaponise the Article 19 rights of third-party citizens to avoid its own statutory liabilities.

Godhra Electricity and Express Newspapers

42In Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, Justice Mathew applied the R.C. Cooper rule to an electrical undertaking.Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 1 SCC 199 : (1975) 2 SCR 42. The Gujarat Electricity Board exercised an option to compulsorily purchase an electricity company under Section 6(6) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, demanding immediate surrender of possession while deferring compensation. Sustaining the shareholder’s petition under Article 19(1)(f) and (g), the Court held that requiring surrender of a running undertaking without contemporaneous payment or interest placed an unconstitutional restriction on shareholder rights.

43In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, heavy customs duties on newsprint and executive re-entry notices were subjected to substantive Article 19(1)(a) review on joint petitions filed by publishing companies and their shareholders.Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641; Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 133.

44In Daman Singh v. State of Punjab, a Constitution Bench under Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy held that once a co-operative society is registered under statute, it becomes a “corporation” in the generic constitutional sense under Article 31-A(1)(c), insulating laws providing for its compulsory amalgamation from challenges under Articles 14 and 19.Daman Singh v. State of Punjab, (1985) 2 SCC 670.

VII. What Rights Can the Corporate Person Hold?

45Because an incorporated company is a “person,” it holds extensive fundamental rights in its own right, independent of shareholder joinder. The scope of those rights depends strictly on whether the guarantee attaches to legal personality or to human biology.

Article 14: Equality and Non-Arbitrariness

46A company is fully protected by Article 14. In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, Justice B.K. Mukherjea held that the guarantee of equal protection is available to any person, including a corporation.1950 SCR 869, at 898 : AIR 1951 SC 41. While Article 14 forbids hostile class legislation, it permits reasonable classification; a single corporation may constitute a “class by itself” if unique circumstances of mismanagement and public interest distinguish it from others. With the development of the doctrine against arbitrariness, corporate bodies routinely invoke Article 14 against discriminatory tender conditions, arbitrary blacklisting, and irrational licence revocations.

Article 300A: The Right to Property

47Under Article 300A, “no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.”Constitution of India, 1950, art. 300A. Because a company can own and dispose of property, it is a complete right-holder under Article 300A. The State cannot seize or freeze corporate assets by executive fiat. In Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, the Supreme Court held that deprivation under Article 300A mandates seven procedural sub-rights—including notice, hearing, reasoned decision, and fair compensation—which fully protect corporate land and undertakings.2024 SCC OnLine SC 968.

Article 20: Protections in Penal Proceedings

48Article 20 applies to “any person.” A company enjoys protection against retrospective criminal liability under Article 20(1) and double jeopardy under Article 20(2).

49However, Article 20(3) (protection against self-incrimination) has restricted application. While corporate officers cannot be compelled to give self-incriminating oral testimony, a company cannot resist a subpoena for its books, registers, or audited accounts. In M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, the Supreme Court held that the compulsory production of corporate records does not violate Article 20(3), because statutory books are not testimonial statements compelled from a living accused.AIR 1954 SC 300 : 1954 SCR 1077.

Article 21: The Biological Frontier

50Article 21 guarantees that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”Constitution of India, 1950, art. 21.

51Indian courts have consistently held that corporate bodies cannot claim Article 21. “Life” and “personal liberty” are biological concepts: 1. Bodily liberty: A company has no body to arrest, detain, or imprison. It cannot invoke remedies against custodial detention. 2. Biological life: Corporate dissolution or winding up is a statutory process governed by company law, not a deprivation of “life.” 3. Privacy and human dignity: In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, a Nine-Judge Bench held that the fundamental right to privacy is rooted in human dignity and bodily autonomy.K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1. Addressing corporate entities, Dr D.Y. Chandrachud J observed:

Juristic persons are not the bearers of human dignity. Their privacy rights, therefore, can never be as intense as those of human beings.Ibid., at 443, para 284.

52While companies enjoy statutory confidentiality (trade secrets, contractual nondisclosure, and procedural protections against unauthorized search), they hold no fundamental right to personal privacy under Article 21.

Horizontal Duty-Bearer

53In Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, a Constitution Bench ruled that fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21 can be enforced horizontally against private entities and corporations.Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 4 SCC 1. While a corporation cannot claim Article 21 to shield itself, it operates as a duty-bearer bound to respect the Article 21 rights of natural persons.

VIII. The Penal Person: Corporate Criminal Liability and Attribution

54The common law maxim was absolute: societas delinquere non potest—a corporation cannot commit a crime. An incorporeal entity has neither a mind to form mens rea nor a body to undergo imprisonment.

The Velliappa Textiles Impasse

55In India, this dilemma created a statutory crisis. Numerous economic statutes—including the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA), and the Essential Commodities Act, 1955—prescribed mandatory sentences of imprisonment and fine for grave offences.

56In Assistant Commissioner v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd., a three-judge Bench held by a 2:1 majority that a company could not be prosecuted where the statute mandated a sentence of imprisonment.Assistant Commissioner v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd., (2003) 11 SCC 405. Criminal statutes must be strictly construed: where Parliament mandates imprisonment and fine, a court cannot rewrite the section by omitting the custodial term. Because a company cannot be imprisoned, it was immune from prosecution.

Overruling in Standard Chartered Bank

57Two years later, a Five-Judge Constitution Bench in Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement overruled Velliappa Textiles.Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530. Justice K.G. Balakrishnan, writing for the majority, held that corporate immunity from penal law would defeat public policy:

There is no dispute that a company is liable to be prosecuted and punished for criminal offences... We hold that there is no immunity to the companies from being prosecuted merely because the prosecution is in respect of offences for which the punishment is mandatory imprisonment and fine.Ibid., at 541, paras 27–28.

58Applying the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia, the Court held that the custodial sentence is omitted and the sentence of fine is imposed.

Attribution and Its Limits

59In Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., the Supreme Court imported the English doctrine of attribution.Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74. Justice B.N. Srikrishna adopted the “directing mind and will” test from Lennard’s Carrying Co. and Meridian Global: [1915] AC 705 (HL); [1995] 2 AC 500 (PC).

The criminal intent of the ‘alter ego’ of the company, that is the personal group of persons that guide the business of the company, would be imputed to the company itself... The mens rea of the person, or body of persons, who are the ‘directing mind and will’ of the company... will be attributed to the company.Ibid., (2011) 1 SCC at 98–99, paras 59–64.

60However, the alter ego doctrine operates only upwards—from the individual to the company—and not in reverse. In Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, Justice A.K. Sikri held that a director cannot be held vicariously liable for the company’s crime on the theory of alter ego without express statutory provision or proof of active personal participation.Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609, at 632.

IX. Modern Pressures: The Companies Act, 2013 and Political Speech

61The Companies Act, 2013 introduced structural changes that both deepened and restricted the corporate fiction.

The One Person Company

62Section 2(62) introduced the “One Person Company” (OPC), defined as a company with only one person as a member.Companies Act, 2013, § 2(62). This marks the statutory culmination of Salomon. A sole trader is expressly permitted by statute to obtain the advantages of separate legal personality and limited liability without assembling nominal co-subscribers.

Statutory Lifting of the Veil

63While courts maintain the corporate veil in private law, Parliament has enacted aggressive statutory exceptions: 1. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC): Section 29A disqualifies wilful defaulters from submitting resolution plans. In ArcelorMittal India (P) Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, the Supreme Court held that Section 29A requires piercing the corporate veil to discover the ultimate controllers of corporate debtors. (2019) 2 SCC 1. 2. Significant Beneficial Ownership: Section 90 of the Companies Act, 2013 mandates the disclosure of natural persons holding ultimate beneficial interests of ten percent or more, piercing multi-layered shell entities.Companies Act, 2013, § 90. 3. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA): Section 70 imposes direct vicarious liability on corporate controllers for money laundering conducted through corporate structures.

Corporate Money Versus Citizen Speech: The Electoral Bonds Judgment

64The constitutional boundary of corporate personality was reaffirmed in 2024 in Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) v. Union of India, where a unanimous Five-Judge Constitution Bench struck down the Electoral Bonds Scheme and the amendments made to Section 182 of the Companies Act, 2013.Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 1.

65Section 182 previously capped corporate political contributions at 7.5 percent of average net profits. The Finance Act, 2017 removed this cap, permitting companies to make unlimited political donations anonymously. Invalidating the amendment as manifestly arbitrary under Article 14, Chief Justice Dr D.Y. Chandrachud distinguished corporate money from citizen speech under Article 19(1)(a):

The contribution of funds to a political party by a company cannot be treated at par with the contribution made by an individual. The business of a company is to make profit... The purpose of a company making a contribution to a political party is purely commercial, to secure a quid pro quo or commercial advantage... To allow corporations to make unlimited contributions is to permit corporate money to drown out the voices of ordinary citizens, violating the basic principle of free and fair elections.Ibid., at 96–97, paras 222–225.

66The ADR decision reaffirmed the boundary drawn in State Trading Corporation. An individual uses corporate forms to pool capital, but the corporate person itself remains a commercial entity, not a bearer of political conscience.

X. Assessment: The Position Today

67The fiction of the company as a person is an enduring piece of judicial craftsmanship. What began as a commercial convenience has become a cornerstone of public law. The Indian legal position today rests on eight propositions:

681. Independent juristic personality is absolute. Once incorporated under Section 9 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company is an autonomous legal entity separate from its members, directors, and shareholders. It alone owns its property (Salomon, Kondoli Tea, Bacha F. Guzdar). 2. A company is a person, not a citizen. A company possesses nationality and domicile under private international law, but it is not a “citizen” under Part II of the Constitution or Section 2(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 (State Trading Corporation). 3. Article 19 cannot be claimed directly by a corporation. Fundamental rights under Article 19 are reserved strictly to citizens. A writ petition brought solely by a corporate entity to enforce Article 19 is incompetent (State Trading Corporation, TELCO). 4. Shareholders may invoke Article 19 via direct effect. Where State action targeting a company directly impairs the fundamental rights of its citizen-shareholders—such as their freedom of speech through a corporate press, or their freedom of trade through their capital investment—the shareholders have full locus standi to petition under Article 32 or Article 226 (R.C. Cooper, Bennett Coleman, Godhra Electricity). 5. No inverse weaponisation of citizenship. A non-citizen company cannot challenge a statute on the ground that it violates the Article 19 rights of citizens. Qua the non-citizen company, a statute abridging Article 19 remains valid and enforceable (Shri Ambica Mills). 6. Full protection under Articles 14 and 300A. As a juristic person, a company enjoys complete constitutional protection against arbitrary State action, discriminatory classifications, and unfair tender conditions under Article 14 (Chiranjit Lal), and against expropriation of property without statutory authority and fair procedure under Article 300A (Bimal Kumar Shah). 7. Article 21 is confined to natural persons. The guarantees of life, personal liberty, and human dignity under Article 21 cannot be claimed by corporate bodies (Puttaswamy). Conversely, corporations are duty-bearers bound horizontally by Articles 19 and 21 to respect the fundamental rights of human beings (Kaushal Kishor). 8. Corporate criminal liability operates by attribution. Corporations can be prosecuted for offences requiring mens rea, even where the statute prescribes mandatory imprisonment and fine; courts omit the custodial term and impose the fine (Standard Chartered Bank). The criminal intent of the directing mind is attributed to the company (Iridium), but corporate mens rea cannot be attributed to directors in reverse without statutory vicarious liability (Sunil Bharti Mittal).


History

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SEEAlso in Corporate

Everything in Corporate

ELSEWHERECounterparts · the same question in other jurisdictions

No scholar has written on another country’s law here yet. Write a counterpart from your jurisdiction


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