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2026 FPR EDC 8 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/severability
DC-0003Doctrines · Constitutional · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 8
FPR Editors27 October 2026 · 2,713 words
Severability
When part of a law is invalid, the rest stands if it can be separated from the invalid part and the legislature would have enacted it on its own; the whole falls where the valid and invalid parts are inextricably mixed, form a single scheme, or leave a remainder so truncated that enforcing it would require the court to rewrite the law; and a provision whose general words cover both permissible and impermissible restrictions on a fundamental right cannot be saved by severance.
Abstract
The doctrine of severability decides how much of a law survives when part of it is held unconstitutional. This entry sets out its basis in the words "to the extent of" in Article 13, and its comparative sources in American, Canadian and Australian law. It traces the doctrine in the Supreme Court from A.K. Gopalan (1950), where section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act was severed, and F.N. Balsara (1951), to Romesh Thappar (1950), which held that a provision cast in terms wide enough to cover both valid and invalid restrictions cannot be severed. It sets out the seven rules stated in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla (1957) and the related idea of severance in application, and follows the doctrine through constitutional amendments (Kesavananda Bharati, Kihoto Hollohan, the NJAC case), the reading down of section 377 in Navtej Singh Johar (2018), the electoral bonds case (2024), and Shreya Singhal (2015). It closes with criticisms and the propositions that state the law today.
I. The doctrine
The rule
1A court that finds part of a law unconstitutional must decide what happens to the rest. The doctrine of severability supplies the answer. If the invalid part can be separated from the valid part, and the legislature would have enacted the valid part on its own, the valid part stands. If the two are so bound together that they cannot be separated, or the remainder would not be the law the legislature made, the whole falls.
The constitutional text
2Article 13 provides that an existing law inconsistent with Part III is void “to the extent of such inconsistency”, and that a law made in contravention of Part III is void “to the extent of the contravention”. The words “to the extent of” mean that a law is not wholly void merely because some part of it is unconstitutional. The doctrine of severability gives effect to those words. The Supreme Court has also applied it to laws invalid for want of legislative competence and to constitutional amendments.
Comparative sources
3The doctrine came to India largely from the United States, where courts have long asked whether the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the invalid ones, and whether what remains is fully operative as a law.Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987). The Privy Council stated a similar test in a Canadian appeal, asking whether what remains is so inextricably bound up with the invalid part that it cannot independently survive.Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1947] AC 503 (P.C.). The High Court of Australia has applied the same idea.Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth, (1945) 71 CLR 29.
II. The early cases
A.K. Gopalan (1950)
4The Supreme Court first applied the doctrine in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras.A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27, (1950) SCR 88. Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 prohibited a detenu from disclosing to a court the grounds of his detention communicated to him, and made disclosure an offence. The Court held section 14 invalid, because it prevented the court from examining whether the detention was lawful. But it held that the rest of the Act survived. As M.C. Mahajan J. put it:
It is not disputed, however, that this section can be severed from the rest of the Act without affecting the other provisions of the Act in any way. The whole Act cannot, therefore, be held to be ultra vires.A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 (Mahajan J.).
F.N. Balsara (1951)
5In State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 defined “liquor” to include spirits, wine, beer and toddy, and also medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol, and prohibited their possession and use.State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318, (1951) SCR 682. The Court held the prohibition invalid as an unreasonable restriction in so far as it applied to medicinal and toilet preparations. It held that the provisions were not wholly void on that ground, because the other categories in the definition of liquor, “namely, spirits of wine, methylated spirit, wine, beer and toddy are distinctly separable items”. The prohibition stood as regards them.
Romesh Thappar (1950): no severance of overbroad words
6Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras concerned a different situation.Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124, (1950) SCR 594 (Patanjali Sastri J.). Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 authorised restrictions on the circulation of documents “for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order”. Article 19(2), as it then stood, permitted restrictions on speech only for matters that undermined the security of the State or tended to overthrow it. The State argued that, in so far as public safety and public order included the security of the State, the provision was valid. Patanjali Sastri J., for the majority, rejected the argument:
Where a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void.Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124; as quoted in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
7The point is that there was nothing to sever. The invalid and valid applications were not in separate words or provisions; they were covered by the same general words. To uphold the provision for the valid applications only, the court would have had to rewrite it.
III. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla (1957)
The case
8The Prize Competitions Act, 1955 defined “prize competition” in section 2(d) widely enough to cover competitions involving substantial skill as well as those depending on chance.R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628, (1957) SCR 930 (Venkatarama Aiyar J.). The petitioners, who ran prize competitions, argued that the Act was an unreasonable restriction on their trade, and that, since competitions of skill could not be prohibited, the Act must fall as a whole. T.L. Venkatarama Aiyar J., for a Constitution Bench, held that the Act, read in the light of its history and object, applied only to competitions of a gambling character, and that if it was wide enough to include competitions of skill, it was severable in its application to them.
The seven rules
9Venkatarama Aiyar J. first stated the general position:
When a statute is in part void, it will be enforced as regards the rest, if that is severable from what is invalid. It is immaterial for the purpose of this rule whether the invalidity of the statute arises by reason of its subject-matter being outside the competence of the legislature or by reason of its provisions contravening constitutional prohibitions.R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628.
10He then summarised, from American authorities, the rules of construction to be applied. They have been followed ever since:
1.In determining whether the valid parts of a statute are separable from the invalid parts thereof, it is the intention of the legislature that is the determining factor. The test to be applied is whether the legislature would have enacted the valid part if it had known that the rest of the statute was invalid.R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628.
2.If the valid and invalid provisions are so inextricably mixed up that they cannot be separated from one another, then the invalidity of a portion must result in the invalidity of the Act in its entirety. On the other hand, if they are so distinct and separate that after striking out what is invalid, what remains is in itself a complete code independent of the rest, then it will be upheld notwithstanding that the rest has become unenforceable.R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628.
3.Even when the provisions which are valid are distinct and separate from those which are invalid, if they all form part of a single scheme which is intended to be operative as a whole, then also the invalidity of a part will result in the failure of the whole.R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628.
4.Likewise, when the valid and invalid parts of a statute are independent and do not form part of a scheme but what is left after omitting the invalid portion is so thin and truncated as to be in substance different from what it was when it emerged out of the legislature, then also it will be rejected in its entirety.R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628.
5.The separability of the valid and invalid provisions of a statute does not depend on whether the law is enacted in the same section or different sections; ... it is not the form, but the substance of the matter that is material, and that has to be ascertained on an examination of the Act as a whole and of the setting of the relevant provisions therein.R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628.
6.If after the invalid portion is expunged from the statute what remains cannot be enforced without making alterations and modifications therein, then the whole of it must be struck down as void, as otherwise it will amount to judicial legislation.R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628.
11The seventh rule is that, in determining the legislative intent on the question of separability, it is legitimate to take into account the history of the legislation, its object, its title and its preamble.
Severance in application
12The case also illustrates a second kind of severance. In Balsara, the invalid part was a distinct item in a list. In R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla, nothing was struck out of the text; the Court held that the general words of the definition, so far as they might reach competitions of skill, did not apply to them. This is severance in application, rather than severance of text. It is distinct from Romesh Thappar, where the general words were held incapable of such limitation, because there the provision’s permissible and impermissible applications could not be separated without rewriting it.
IV. Exemptions and statutes
13The doctrine may produce a wider law rather than a narrower one. In Motor General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, section 32(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 exempted all buildings constructed on or after 26 August 1957 from the Act.Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., (1984) 1 SCC 222, AIR 1984 SC 121. The Court held that the exemption, justified when the Act was passed as an incentive to build, had become arbitrary with the passage of time, and struck it down. The rest of the Act survived, and applied to all buildings.
V. Constitutional amendments
14The doctrine applies to amendments of the Constitution as well as to statutes.
15In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, the Court upheld the first part of Article 31C, which protected laws giving effect to certain directive principles from challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 31, but struck down the second part, which provided that a law containing a declaration that it gave effect to that policy could not be questioned on the ground that it did not.Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225. The two parts were severable.
16In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985 added the Tenth Schedule on disqualification for defection.Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651. Paragraph 7 of the Schedule barred the jurisdiction of all courts in disqualification matters. The majority held that paragraph 7 changed the operation of Articles 136, 226 and 227 and so required ratification by the States under the proviso to Article 368(2), which it had not received. It held that paragraph 7 was severable:
Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule contains a provision which is independent of, and stands apart from, the main provisions of the Tenth Schedule which are intended to provide a remedy for the evil of unprincipled and unethical political defection and, therefore, is a severable part.Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 (headnote, majority view).
17The rest of the Tenth Schedule was valid. L.M. Sharma and J.S. Verma JJ. dissented, holding that the whole amendment failed for want of ratification.
18In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, the Court took the opposite view of the Ninety-ninth Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014, holding that the provisions on the composition of the Commission were central to the scheme, and striking down both the amendment and the Act.Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1.
VI. Recent applications
Section 377: Navtej Singh Johar (2018)
19Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code punished “carnal intercourse against the order of nature”. In Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, a Bench of two judges had upheld it.Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1. In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench overruled Koushal and held section 377 unconstitutional in so far as it criminalised consensual sexual conduct between adults.Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1, AIR 2018 SC 4321. The section continued to apply to non-consensual acts, acts involving minors, and bestiality. Nothing was struck out of the text; the Court limited the application of the general words, in the manner of R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla. Section 377 has since been omitted from the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which replaced the Code.
The electoral bonds case (2024)
20In Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench struck down the Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 and the amendments made by the Finance Act, 2017 to the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Companies Act, 2013 that enabled anonymous political donations and removed the limit on corporate contributions.Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 1. The amendments and the scheme worked together to make anonymous donations possible, and the Court treated them as a whole, rather than severing parts of them.
Shreya Singhal (2015)
21In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the Court struck down section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which punished sending offensive messages through a computer or communication device.Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, AIR 2015 SC 1523 (Nariman J.). The Additional Solicitor General argued that the doctrine of severability might be applied to save part of the section. R.F. Nariman J. called the submission vague, since it did not indicate which part could be saved, and applied Romesh Thappar: section 66A, like the provision in that case, was in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of Article 19(2), and could not be severed.
Bail under the PMLA
22In Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, the Court struck down the “twin conditions” for bail in section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, which then applied only to offences under Part A of the Schedule punishable with more than three years’ imprisonment.Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1, AIR 2017 SC 5500 (Nariman J.). The classification, which tied the bail conditions to the sentence for the scheduled offence rather than to money-laundering itself, was held arbitrary, and the conditions were struck down as a whole. Parliament amended section 45 in 2018, and in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India the Court upheld the amended provision.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (Supreme Court, 27 July 2022).
VII. Criticisms
23The doctrine has been criticised on three grounds.
24The first is that the central test, whether the legislature would have enacted the valid part alone, asks a hypothetical question about a body that never considered it. The courts answer it by looking at the history, object and scheme of the law, as rule 7 in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla permits, but the answer is often a judicial judgment presented as a finding of intent.
25The second is that the line between severance in application and judicial rewriting is thin. Reading general words as not applying to certain cases can save a law, as in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla and Navtej Singh Johar; but it can also produce a law the legislature did not make. Romesh Thappar and Shreya Singhal show the Court refusing that course where the general words are the source of the vice.
26The third is that the doctrine may encourage overbroad drafting. A legislature that knows the courts will cut down its words to their valid core may have less reason to draft them carefully. Romesh Thappar limits that risk for laws restricting fundamental rights, by refusing to save provisions that could be applied to purposes the Constitution does not sanction.
VIII. The position today
27The law on severability in India may be stated in seven propositions.
281. A law that is invalid in part is enforced as regards the rest, if the rest is severable from what is invalid; it does not matter whether the invalidity arises from lack of competence or from a constitutional prohibition (R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla; A.K. Gopalan).
292. The determining factor is the intention of the legislature: whether it would have enacted the valid part if it had known that the rest was invalid. History, object, title and preamble may be considered (R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla, rules 1 and 7).
303. Where the valid and invalid parts are inextricably mixed, or form a single scheme intended to operate as a whole, or the remainder is so thin and truncated as to be in substance a different law, the whole fails (R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla, rules 2 to 4; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association).
314. Severability depends on substance, not form; it is immaterial whether the valid and invalid parts are in the same section or different sections (R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla, rule 5).
325. If what remains cannot be enforced without alterations and modifications, the whole must be struck down, since otherwise the court would be legislating (R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla, rule 6).
336. A law may be severed in its application, so that general words are held not to apply to cases they cannot validly reach (R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla; Navtej Singh Johar). But a provision restricting a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover both permissible and impermissible restrictions cannot be saved in this way, and is wholly void (Romesh Thappar; Shreya Singhal).
347. The doctrine applies to constitutional amendments as well as to statutes (Kesavananda Bharati; Kihoto Hollohan).
History
- Published · 27 October 2026
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