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2026 FPR EDC 37 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/pre-incorporation-contracts

DC-0166Doctrines · Corporate · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 37

FPR Editors21 November 2026 · 2,024 words

Pre-Incorporation Contracts

At common law a company cannot ratify or adopt a contract made by its promoters before it existed, and is bound or benefited only by a new contract made after incorporation; Indian law departs from that rule through sections 15(h) and 19(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, under which a contract made by promoters for the purposes of the company and warranted by the terms of its incorporation may be enforced by or against the company if, after incorporation, it accepts the contract and communicates its acceptance to the other party, and Indian courts have extended the same reasoning to property acquired by promoters for the company.

Abstract

A company that does not yet exist cannot make a contract, and a promoter who contracts for it cannot be its agent. Kelner v. Baxter (1866) held that such a contract cannot be ratified after incorporation, and Natal Land and Colonization Co. v. Pauline Colliery Syndicate (1904) that a company can take its benefit only by a new contract. This entry explains that rule and the promoter's own position under it, and the statutory exception made in India by the Specific Relief Act of 1877 and continued in sections 15(h) and 19(e) of the Act of 1963, with its three conditions: a contract for the purposes of the company, warranted by the terms of incorporation, and accepted by the company with the acceptance communicated. It then considers the extension of the reasoning to land bought by promoters in Weavers Mills v. Balkis Ammal (1967), Vali Pattabhirama Rao (1983) and Jai Narain Parasurampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf (2006).


I. The Doctrine

1A company comes into existence on incorporation. Before then there is no person who can contract, own property or be sued. Yet a company’s business often has to be prepared in advance: premises found, machinery ordered, agreements with suppliers and staff made. The persons who do this are its promoters, and the contracts they make for the company before it exists are pre-incorporation contracts.

2Two questions arise. Can the company, once formed, enforce the contract, and can the other party enforce it against the company? And what is the position of the promoter who made it? The common law gave restrictive answers. Indian law, through the Specific Relief Act, gives a more practical one.

II. The Common Law

Kelner v. Baxter

3The common law rule was laid down in Kelner v. Baxter in 1866. Promoters of a proposed hotel company agreed, on behalf of the company, to buy a stock of wine. The company was later formed, purported to ratify the contract, and used the wine, but then failed before paying. The seller sued the promoters. They argued that the contract was the company’s, ratified after incorporation. The Court of Common Pleas held them personally liable. As Willes J. put it, in a passage later quoted by the Madras High Court:

“I apprehend the company could only become liable, upon a new contract. It would require the assent of the plaintiff to discharge the defendants. Could the company become liable by a mere ratification? Clearly not. Ratification can only be by a person ascertained at the time of the act done---by a person in existence either actually or in contemplation of law.”Kelner v. Baxter, (1866) LR 2 CP 174, as quoted in Weavers Mills Ltd. v. Balkis Ammal, AIR 1969 Mad 462.

4The reasoning follows from the law of agency. Ratification makes an act done without authority as good as if it had been authorised from the start, but only a principal who existed when the act was done can ratify it. A company not yet formed was no principal at all.

Natal Land

5The Privy Council applied the rule to a company seeking the benefit of a pre-incorporation contract in Natal Land and Colonization Co. Ltd. v. Pauline Colliery and Development Syndicate Ltd. Lord Davey, as the Madras High Court later summarised, “stated that a company could not by adoption or ratification obtain the benefit of a contract purporting to have been made on its behalf before the company came into existence and that in order to do so a new contract must be made with it after its incorporation on the terms of the old one.”Natal Land and Colonization Co. Ltd. v. Pauline Colliery and Development Syndicate Ltd., [1904] AC 120, as summarised in Weavers Mills.

The promoter’s position

6The consequence for the promoter depends on how the contract was made. In Kelner v. Baxter the promoters signed as agents for a company that did not exist, and were held personally bound, since otherwise no one would have been bound at all. Later English decisions treated the question as one of construction, asking whether the parties intended the promoter to be a party. Where the promoter is personally bound, he remains liable unless the other party agrees to release him and accept the company in his place by a new contract.

III. The Indian Statutory Rule

The Specific Relief Act

7The Indian legislature departed from the common law in the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and the departure was continued in the Act of 1963. Section 15(h) allows the company to enforce such a contract, and section 19(e) allows it to be enforced against the company. The Supreme Court set out both in Jai Narain Parasurampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf:

“15. Who may obtain specific performance. - Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, the specific performance of a contract may be obtained by ... (h) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation, entered into a contract for the purposes of the company, and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation, the company : Provided that the company has accepted the contract and has communicated such acceptance to the other party to the contract.”Specific Relief Act, 1963, s. 15(h), as set out in Jai Narain Parasurampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf, AIRONLINE 2006 SC 576, decided 24 August 2006.

8Section 19(e) is in corresponding terms: specific performance may be enforced against the company where its promoters, before incorporation, entered into a contract for its purposes that is warranted by the terms of the incorporation, provided the company has accepted the contract and communicated its acceptance to the other party.

The origin of the Indian rule

9The Madras High Court suggested in Weavers Mills that the Indian provisions drew on an older strand of English authority. Lord Cottenham had said in Edwards v. Grand Junction Railway Co. that if the company and its projectors could not be identified, still the company had succeeded to all that the projectors had before, with their rights and liabilities. That view was not followed in England after Kelner v. Baxter. But the Court thought that the provisions of the Act of 1877, sections 21(f), 23(h) and 27(e), “were perhaps based on the doctrine of Lord Cottenham that a company after its incorporation was a successor to and took the place of the promoters in relation to contracts entered into by them for the purposes of the company and warranted by the terms of the incorporation.”Weavers Mills. To that extent, it said, the Indian legislature had departed from the English view. Section 23(h) of the old Act became section 15(h) of the Act of 1963, and section 27(e) became section 19(e).

The three conditions

10The provisions impose three conditions. The contract must have been made by the promoters for the purposes of the company. It must be warranted by the terms of the incorporation, which means that the company’s constitution, its objects and powers, must permit such a contract. And after incorporation the company must have accepted the contract and communicated its acceptance to the other party. When those conditions are met, the company stands in the position of a party to the contract, for the purpose of specific performance, without any new contract being made.

11The Andhra Pradesh High Court described the effect in Vali Pattabhirama Rao v. Sri Ramanuja Ginning and Rice Factory. After noting the common law rule, K. Jayachandra Reddy J. said that “in India, both the Specific Relief Acts 1 of 1877 and 47 of 1963, made provisions making the pre-incorporation contracts binding on the company”, so that Lord Davey’s statement in Natal Land “cannot be invoked in our country.”Vali Pattabhirama Rao v. Sri Ramanuja Ginning and Rice Factory (P) Ltd., AIR 1984 AP 176.

12The acceptance must be the company’s own act after incorporation, done through its board or general meeting, and it must be communicated. Merely acting on the contract, without accepting it and telling the other party, may not be enough. The requirement of communication protects the other party, who is entitled to know whether the company has taken the promoter’s place.

13The contrast with the common law is sharpest on the question of conduct. As the Andhra Pradesh High Court noted, quoting Palmer’s Company Law, at common law “the mere acting after incorporation on the preliminary contract does not in itself constitute sufficient evidence of the creation of a new contract.”Vali Pattabhirama Rao, quoting Palmer’s Company Law, 22nd edn, vol. 1, p. 271. Under the Specific Relief Act no new contract is needed; what is needed is the company’s acceptance of the old one, communicated to the other party.

IV. Property Acquired by Promoters

The limit of the statute

14The Specific Relief Act deals with contracts that are still to be performed. It does not, by its terms, deal with a completed conveyance, as where promoters buy land for the company and take the sale deed in their own names. In Weavers Mills Ltd. v. Balkis Ammal the Madras High Court accepted that the sections “are concerned with executory contracts and cannot possibly be applied to conveyances of immoveable properties in favour of promoters of a company under incorporation.”Weavers Mills.

Weavers Mills

15In that case two promoters had bought land in 1945, describing themselves as representatives of the company to be formed, with funds that were not their own. The company was incorporated in 1948, took possession and began building a mill. Later a creditor of one promoter, holding a decree for a personal debt, attached the land and bought it at the execution sale. The question was whether the land belonged to the company, although there had been no registered conveyance from the promoters to it.

16The Court held that it did. It relied on section 9 of the Transfer of Property Act, which allows a transfer without writing in every case in which writing is not expressly required by law, and on the promoter’s fiduciary position towards the company being formed. It saw no reason why that principle “should not, in justice and equity, be invoked to clothe the promoter with the mantle of fiduciary position with respect to the company under incorporation with the implication that when incorporated the company will succeed to the beneficial acts transacted on its behalf by the promoter.”Weavers Mills. Because the promoters had bought for the company, with its funds, and the company had taken possession and built on the land, it had adopted the purchase, and the land was the company’s.

Jai Narain Parasurampuria

17The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Jai Narain Parasurampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf. Two promoters, who had applied to register a company, bought a property in February 1979 by a registered sale deed in their own names, describing themselves as promoters or directors of the proposed company. The company was incorporated in June 1979, reimbursed them the price, and showed the property as its own in its balance sheets, directors’ reports and tax returns. Later, as its directors, the promoters agreed to sell the property to the appellants on the company’s behalf, and then disputed the sale, contending among other things that title had never passed to the company.

18S.B. Sinha J., for himself and P.P. Naolekar J., set out sections 15(h) and 19(e) and held that they applied: the promoters had contracted for the purposes of the company, and “The said provision is subject to the proviso that the company should accept the said transaction. In the instant case, indisputably it was done.”Jai Narain Parasurampuria. The Court relied on Weavers Mills, observed that the English rule that an unincorporated company could not own property did not represent the law in India, and held that the company was the owner. On the facts the appellants were refused specific performance of the later agreement but awarded refund of their advance with compensation.

V. Why the Indian Rule Is Different

19The English rule follows logically from agency, but it produces inconvenient results. A company that has received and used the benefit of a contract can avoid its burden, and a promoter who acted in good faith may be left personally liable. The Indian legislature preferred to let the company step into the contract if it chose to, while protecting the other party by requiring the contract to be within the company’s constitution and the acceptance to be communicated.

20The courts have treated the statutory rule as reflecting a principle, not merely an exception. Where promoters acquire property for the company and the company accepts and acts on the acquisition, the company is treated as the owner in equity, and a creditor or purchaser claiming through the promoters personally takes subject to its rights.

VI. The Position Today

21A company cannot ratify a contract made before it existed in the sense the law of agency requires, because it was not then a person. But under sections 15(h) and 19(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a contract made by its promoters before incorporation, for the purposes of the company and warranted by the terms of its incorporation, may be specifically enforced by or against the company if, after incorporation, the company accepts the contract and communicates its acceptance to the other party.

22The promoter remains personally bound where the contract makes him a party, unless the other party releases him. Where promoters acquire property for the company, with its money or for its purposes, and the company after incorporation accepts the acquisition and acts on it, the courts treat the property as the company’s, even without a conveyance from the promoters to it.


History

  • Published · 21 November 2026

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