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2026 FPR EDC 24 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/part-performance

DC-0019Doctrines · Property · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 24

FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 4,677 words

Part Performance

Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 protects a transferee in possession under a written contract to transfer immovable property against the transferor and those claiming under the transferor, if the transferee has acted in furtherance of the contract and has performed or is willing to perform; it is a shield against the transferor and not a source of title, limitation on specific performance does not bar the plea, and for contracts made on or after 24 September 2001 the writing must be registered.

Abstract

Ownership of land passes only by a registered instrument, yet buyers often pay and move in before any deed is made. Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 protects them. This entry sets out the section and its six conditions as stated in Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi; the protection's character as a shield, from Prabodh Kumar Das and Delhi Motor Co. to Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra; the requirement of willingness to perform in Nathulal v. Phoolchand; limitation; the registration requirement of 2001 in Ameer Minhaj v. Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar; and the limited title that Suraj Lamp & Industries v. State of Haryana allows.


I. The rule

The problem

1Under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a sale of immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards can be made only by a registered instrument. An agreement to sell does not create any interest in the property. That is a sound rule for securing certainty of title. It would nevertheless produce injustice if an owner who took the price and gave possession could later evict the buyer because no deed had been registered.

2Section 53A, inserted in 1929, addresses this. Where a person contracts to transfer immovable property for consideration by writing signed by that person or on that person’s behalf, from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession or, being already in possession, continued in possession, and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and has performed or is willing to perform the transferee’s part, the transferor and those claiming under the transferor are debarred from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of that property, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract. The proviso protects a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or its part performance.

The six conditions

3Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi gives the conditions a convenient statement:

The necessary conditions are 1) there must be a contract to transfer for consideration any immovable property; 2) the contract must be in writing, signed by the transferor, or by someone on his behalf; 3) the writing must be in such words from which the terms necessary to construe the transfer can be ascertained; 4) the transferee must in part performance of the contract take possession of the property, or of any part thereof; 5) the transferee must have done some act in furtherance of the contract; and 6) the transferee must have performed or be willing to perform his part of the contract.Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi, (2002) 3 SCC 676, AIR 2002 SC 960 (V.N. Khare J.).

4The statement should be read with the section itself, which also covers a transferee already in possession who continues in possession in part performance.

The writing

5The Indian section is deliberately stricter than the English doctrine of part performance on which it draws. Equity in England came to treat conduct as sufficient to take an oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds. Section 53A requires a writing signed by or for the transferor, from which the terms can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. An oral agreement, however clearly proved, does not qualify. A receipt or informal note may do so if it contains the essential terms. Whether it does is a question of construction.

II. A shield

Not a source of title

6The protection is defensive. It stops the owner from enforcing certain rights. It does not make the transferee owner. The Privy Council’s decision in Prabodh Kumar Das v. Dantmara Tea Co. Ltd., AIR 1940 PC 1, is cited as holding that the section gives a defence and no right of action. The Delhi High Court has summarised its effect in these words: it provides “a defense but does not give any right to the lessee on the basis of an unregistered lease”.Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. v. I.K. Malik (Delhi High Court, 17 May 2002), referring to Prabodh Kumar Das v. Dantmara Tea Co. Ltd., AIR 1940 PC 1. The Supreme Court took the same view of a lessee in Delhi Motor Co. v. U.A. Basrurkar, AIR 1968 SC 794, as another High Court decision has explained: the section is only available as a defence and “does not confer rights on the lessee sought to be derived from an unregistered agreement”.Singer India Ltd. v. Amita Gupta, 88 (2000) DLT 186 (Delhi High Court), referring to Delhi Motor Co. v. U.A. Basrurkar, AIR 1968 SC 794.

Against the transferor

7Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra states the limits of the section clearly:

Protection provided under Section 53-A of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by executing a registered sale deed in favour of the transferee.Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra, (2004) 8 SCC 614, AIR 2004 SC 4342 (Bench: Ashok Bhan and S.H. Kapadia JJ.).

8The Court also quoted the observation that the section cannot be relevant against a third party like the State in that case, and has “nothing to do with the ownership” of the land. In Rambhau itself, the plaintiff, who was the owner, had sued for possession and the appellant resisted, relying on the defence.

9Two points follow. The transferee can use the section to keep possession against the transferor and persons claiming under the transferor. The transferee cannot use it as a title to sue a stranger. A transferee in possession who is dispossessed may have other remedies on the basis of possession, but those are not derived from section 53A.

The proviso

10The proviso protects a later transferee for consideration who has no notice of the earlier contract or of the part performance. Possession itself is often a form of notice, as a purchaser is expected to inquire about who is in occupation of the land. A later buyer from the owner who knew of the first buyer’s possession is, in principle, a person claiming under the transferor, and is therefore bound.

III. Performance and willingness

Nathulal v. Phoolchand

11Nathulal v. Phoolchand gives important guidance on the last condition. The appellant agreed in writing to sell a ginning factory and the land on which it stood, for Rs. 43,077. The land was entered in the revenue records in the name of the appellant’s brother. The respondent made part payment and promised to pay the balance by a fixed date. On the ground that the balance had not been paid, the appellant later claimed possession, and the respondent relied on section 53A.

12The Supreme Court rejected the objection and said the respondent was entitled to rely on the doctrine. It recorded that “There was no sale in the present case and the respondent was not relying on any sale. He was relying upon a contract of sale and the equity for defending his possession against the claim made by the appellant.”Nathulal v. Phoolchand, (1969) 3 SCC 120, AIR 1970 SC 546 (J.C. Shah J.), reported headnote. The headnote also treats the sequence in which the parties must act as relevant in deciding whether a defendant is deemed to be ready and willing. A transferee is not in default for failing to do what the contract required only after the transferor’s prior act.

What must be shown

13Readiness and willingness must be real. The transferee who has paid only a token and has shown no intention of paying the rest will find the claim difficult. In the ordinary case the transferee should have tendered or be able to pay the balance. Where the contract requires something of the transferor first, the transferee’s duty is to show that the transferee stood ready to perform when that happened.

An act in furtherance

14Taking possession under the contract is the central act. Where the transferee was already in possession, for example as a tenant, the section requires continuing in possession in part performance, and something more, as an “act in furtherance of the contract”. This is because the prior possession may be explained without reference to the contract. Paying further sums, making improvements of a kind inconsistent with the earlier status, or stopping rent may all be relevant, depending on the case.

IV. Limitation

Shrimant Shamrao

15A major issue was whether a buyer could keep relying on section 53A after the right to sue for specific performance had become time-barred. Courts had differed. Shrimant Shamrao resolved the point in favour of the buyer. The Court’s reasoning was this:

We are, therefore, of the opinion that if the conditions enumerated above are complied with, the law of limitation does not come in the way of a defendant taking plea under Section 53-A of the Act to protect his possession of the suit property even though a suit for specific performance of a contract has barred by limitation.Shrimant Shamrao, (2002) 3 SCC 676.

16The reason given is that the law of limitation generally does not apply to a plea taken in defence unless expressly so provided. The Limitation Act bars the remedy by way of suit, and section 53A provides a defence. The Court allowed the appeals and sent the matters back to the High Court on any other question of law, since the High Court had decided them solely on limitation.

17The result is that a buyer in possession can stay there even after losing the right to compel a conveyance, while the owner remains owner but cannot evict. It is an unstable state of affairs, and each party has an incentive to settle it.

V. The 2001 change

Registration

18The Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 made a major change. Ameer Minhaj v. Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar reproduces the new provision:

The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said section 53A.Registration Act, 1908, s. 17(1A), as set out in Ameer Minhaj v. Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar, (2018) 7 SCC 639 (A.M. Khanwilkar J.).

19The commencement date of that provision was 24 September 2001. The practical effect is substantial. For a contract executed on or after that date, an unregistered agreement gives no protection under section 53A. Many informal sale agreements have therefore lost the protection that buyers would have assumed they had. The Court in Ameer Minhaj said that “On a plain reading of this provision, it is amply clear” what its effect is. The proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act continues to allow an unregistered document to be received in evidence for some purposes, such as a suit for specific performance. It does not extend the benefit under section 53A.

Sale agreement transactions

20The registration requirement fits with the Supreme Court’s broader views in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana. The Court condemned the practice of “SA/GPA/WILL” transfers. It said that “there cannot be a sale by execution of a power of attorney nor can there be a transfer by execution of an agreement of sale and a power of attorney and will”. And it stated:

Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of sections 54 and 55 of TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under section 53A of TP Act).Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656, AIR 2012 SC 206 (R.V. Raveendran J.).

21The parenthetical is the point here. Section 53A is itself described as a limited right, and it remains the only such exception. A party who has an agreement with possession, but who has not met the conditions of the section, has neither title nor protection.

VI. Practice

For a transferee in possession

22Establish the date of the contract first. If it is after 24 September 2001, confirm that it is registered, because otherwise the section is unavailable. Plead each of the conditions and prove them with documents. Evidence of payment and possession should be in order. Keep a record of readiness to perform. If the right to specific performance remains, consider a suit, because section 53A does not give title.

For an owner

23Examine whether the contract meets the conditions, including the requirement of registration, certainty and an act of part performance. Examine whether the defendant has really performed or is willing to perform. Check whether the proposed plaintiff is the transferor, or claims under the transferor, because this limits the defence available.

For a purchaser from the owner

24Inspect the land and ask who is in possession and on what basis. A possession under an earlier contract may be a source of notice. A later purchaser who ignores it will not be protected by the proviso.

VII. The history of the section

Before the section

25Section 53A did not appear in the Act as passed in 1882. The courts were divided on whether the English doctrine could operate in India. The Privy Council dealt with the position before the amendment in Ariff v. Jadunath Majumdar, decided in 1931, which arose from a claim to hold land as a permanent tenant under an oral agreement, followed by possession and building. The Munsif had held “that, by means of the equitable doctrine of part performance, the case was taken out of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act”. The High Court judge relied on what he called “the principle of Maddison v. Alderson”, under which the defendant was to be held as holding under the lease that the plaintiff agreed to grant “and which equity will regard as having been so granted”.G.F.C. Ariff v. Rai Jadunath Majumdar Bahadur, (1931) 33 Bom LR 913 (Privy Council).

26The Board refused to apply that approach. The decision is generally understood to mean that an Indian court could not use an English equity to get around the statutory requirement of a registered instrument. On that view there was a real gap. A person in possession under an oral bargain had nothing. The Legislature had by then addressed the problem in the amending Act of 1929, which inserted section 53A. But it did so on its own terms, and the section is narrower than the English doctrine in the respects described above. In particular, it requires a writing.

What the Indian legislature chose

27Rambhau gives this account of what the section does:

Section 53-A was enacted in 1929 by the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929, and imports into India in a modified form the equity of part performance as it developed in England over the years. Doctrine of part performance as stated in Section 53-A of the Act is an equitable doctrine which creates a bar of estoppel in favour of the transferee against the transferor. It is seen that many a times a transferee takes possession of the property in part performance of the contract and he is willing to perform his part of the contract. However, the transferor some how or the other does not complete the transaction by executing a registered deed in favour of the transferee, which is required under the law. At times, he tries to get back the possession of the property. In equity the Courts in England held that it would be unfair to allow the transferor to take advantage of his own fault and evict the transferee from the property. The doctrine of part performance aims at protecting the possession of such transferee provided certain conditions contemplated by Section 53-A are fulfilled.Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra, (2004) 8 SCC 614.

28This passage gives a helpful statement of the basis. The transferor is at fault in not completing the transaction. It would be unfair to let that person use the failure to evict. That reasoning supports the limits on the section. It explains why the benefit is directed against the transferor and those claiming under the transferor, and why the transferee who has not been willing to perform cannot claim it.

VIII. Rambhau on its facts

29The facts of Rambhau show why the defence cannot be passed along so easily. The owner and a brother agreed on 16 June 1961 to sell land to Pishorrilal, who paid the price and was put in possession. Pishorrilal, in turn, agreed on 1 September 1961 to sell the land to the appellant, who paid Pishorrilal and took possession. In a later suit by the owner for possession, the appellant relied on section 53A. The High Court asked whether a person could claim the benefit in that situation, and it answered in the negative. “Title in the suit property had not been conveyed in favour of Pishorrilal by executing a registered sale deed. In the absence of title in the property Pishorrilal could neither enter into an agreement of sale nor transfer possession of the property to the appellant in part performance of the agreement under Section 53-A of the Act.” The appellant, it added, “failed to take due care and pre-caution to ascertain the title of Pishorrilal”. The Supreme Court upheld that conclusion.

30The practical lesson is that a chain of agreements does not build up into protection for the last person in the chain. Each link depends on the title of the person making the agreement. This has obvious importance for those who buy land through several successive unregistered agreements, which remains common.

IX. Section 53A and adverse possession

Mohan Lal

31Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar deals with the incompatibility between the plea under section 53A and a plea of adverse possession. K. Ramaswamy J. said:

As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., upto completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi nec clam nec precario. Since the appellant’s claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1996) 1 SCC 639, AIR 1996 SC 910.

32The reasoning is clear. Section 53A presupposes that the possession is under the contract, and so with the owner’s consent. Adverse possession presupposes that it is hostile to the owner. A person cannot truthfully say both of the same period. A transferee can plead them in the alternative in the sense of arguing one and then the other, but the court will want to know which case is true on the facts, and evidence of one tends to destroy the other.

33The Court went on to consider the effect of an earlier dismissal of the suit for specific performance:

Even otherwise, a transferee can avail of Section 53-A only as a shield but not as a sword. It contemplates that where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, he should be entitled to retain possession and to continue in possession which he has already received from the transferor so long as he is willing to perform his part of contract. Agreement does not create title or interest in the property. Since the agreement had met with dismissal of the suit his willingness to perform his part of the contract does not arise.Mohan Lal, (1996) 1 SCC 639.

34And it added that “in a suit for possession filed by the respondent, successor-in-interest of the transferor as a subsequent purchaser, the earlier transferee must plead and prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract so as to enable him to retain his possession of the immovable property held under the agreement.”

Dismissal contrasted with expiry of time

35Mohan Lal and Shrimant Shamrao can be read together. In Shrimant Shamrao, the buyer’s right to sue had been lost by time. That was held not to matter, since the Limitation Act takes away the remedy and does not extinguish a defence. In Mohan Lal, a suit for specific performance had actually been brought and dismissed, and the dismissal had become final. The Court held that the buyer’s willingness did not arise. A dismissal on the merits is thus a much more serious event for the buyer than mere lapse of time. The transferee who has sued and lost faces a finding against him, and it may be that a claim of willingness can no longer be maintained. The transferee who has simply not sued can still raise the plea. Counsel should therefore think hard before bringing a weak suit for specific performance, if the client is in possession. Losing such a suit may also cost the client the shield.

X. The limitation reasoning in Shrimant Shamrao

36The judgment repays reading for how it reaches its conclusion. It takes the point that the section does not expressly bar the plea:

A perusal of Section 53-A shows that it does not forbid a defendant transferee from taking a plea in his defence to protect his possession over the suit property obtained in part performance of a contract even though the period of limitation for bringing a suit for specific performance has expired. It also does not expressly provide that a defendant transferee is not entitled to protect his possession over the suit property taken in part performance of the contract if the period of limitation to bring a suit for specific performance has expired.Shrimant Shamrao, (2002) 3 SCC 676.

37It then examines the history of the section, including the recommendations of the Special Committee that preceded the 1929 amendment, which it treats as a permissible aid. And it goes on to the general principle:

The established rule of limitation is that law of limitation is not applicable to a plea taken in defence unless expressly a provision is made in the statute. The law of limitation applies to the suits and applications. The various articles of the Limitation Act show that they do not apply to a defence taken by a defendant in a suit. Thus, the law of limitation bars only an action in a court of law. In fact, what the Limitation Act does is, to take away the remedy of a plaintiff to enforce his rights by bringing an action in a court of law, but it does not place any restriction to a defendant to put forward any defence though such defence as a claim made by him may be barred by limitation and cannot be enforced in a court of law. On the said principle, a defendant in a suit can put forward any defence though such defence may not be enforceable in a court of law, being barred by limitation.

38The principle is one of general application beyond section 53A. The Court noted that “the Limitation Act does not extinguish a defence”. The entry on limitation barring the remedy deals with this rule more generally. It is one of the reasons why a person in possession is in a stronger position than a person out of possession, even when both have stale claims.

XI. The sequence of obligations under Nathulal

39Nathulal also gave a reasoned account of how readiness is judged where one party must act first:

In considering whether a person is willing to perform his part of the contract the sequence in which the obligations under a contract are to be performed must be taken into account. By virtue of s. 4 of the Transfer of Property Act the chapters and sections of the Transfer of Property Act which relate to contracts are to be taken as part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. If therefore under the terms of the contract obligations of the parties have to be performed in a certain sequence, one of the parties to the contract cannot require compliance with the obligations by the other party without in the first instance performing his own part of the contract which in the sequence of obligation is performable by him earlier.Nathulal v. Phoolchand, (1969) 3 SCC 120, AIR 1970 SC 546, reported headnote.

40On the facts, the appellant had undertaken to have the revenue records rectified by securing the deletion of his brother’s name, and it was an implied condition of the contract that he would secure the sanction of the Collector to the transfer under section 70(4) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. The Court said that “The first condition was not fulfilled in due time and the second condition was never fulfilled”. The respondent had made the necessary arrangements to pay. The respondent’s willingness was therefore established, and the appellant could not complain that the balance had not been paid.

41Section 4 of the Transfer of Property Act is also relevant to this reasoning. It says that the chapters and sections of the Act which relate to contracts are to be taken as part of the Contract Act. So the rules on reciprocal promises in sections 51 to 54 of the Contract Act apply to the same analysis. A court considering this requirement should therefore start from the contract’s sequence of performance, as Nathulal did.

XII. Registration in detail: Ameer Minhaj

42The facts in Ameer Minhaj show why the 2001 rule matters. A registered power of attorney had been given in 1996. An agreement of sale, for Rs. 1 crore, was made on 9 July 2003 through the attorney holder, with Rs. 25 lakh paid and possession given. The agreement was not registered. The plaintiff sued, and the defendants applied for a ruling on the admissibility of the unregistered agreements. It was against that background that the Court set out section 17(1A). The agreement was dated after 24 September 2001, so an unregistered agreement could have no effect for the purposes of section 53A. In the same way as Suraj Lamp, the decision is a warning that the old practice of informal agreements coupled with possession cannot be relied on any more.

43An agreement made before the commencement date is not affected. So a court may find itself dealing with old agreements that are protected, and with newer ones that are not, even on the same land. The date of execution has to be proved, and a party relying on an unregistered agreement should expect to be challenged if its date is close to the commencement of the provision.

44The stamp and registration consequences also differ. Under the proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act, an unregistered document may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance, or as evidence of a collateral transaction. A buyer who has an unregistered agreement therefore has a route to enforce it by suit for specific performance within the limitation period, but no shield under section 53A. In a State where the stamp law treats an agreement with possession as a conveyance, there will also be questions of adequate stamp duty.

XIII. Third parties

45The words “the transferor or any person claiming under him” define the people against whom the plea is good. They cover the transferor’s heirs and those who buy from the transferor with notice. The list does not include third parties with an independent title. As Rambhau says, section 53A is not available against “a third party like the State”. A trespasser who has no title and does not claim under the transferor is outside the section, but the transferee may rely on possession against such a person under the general law, including under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which gives a summary remedy to a person dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law.

XIV. The position today

46Section 53A provides a shield and not a sword. It protects a transferee in possession under a written contract to transfer immovable property against the transferor and persons claiming under the transferor. The six conditions are a contract to transfer for consideration, in writing signed by or for the transferor, with ascertainable terms, possession taken or continued in part performance, an act in furtherance of the contract, and performance or willingness to perform. The protection does not confer title, and the transferor remains owner until a registered deed passes title. It does not operate against a transferee for consideration without notice. Under Shrimant Shamrao, the bar of limitation on a suit for specific performance does not prevent the plea being taken in defence. For contracts executed on or after 24 September 2001, the document must be registered, or it has no effect for the purposes of the section.


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  • Published · 31 October 2026

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