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2026 FPR EDC 21 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/nullity-of-a-decree-without-jurisdiction

DC-0126Doctrines · Civil Procedure · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 21

FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 5,591 words

Nullity of a Decree without Jurisdiction

A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter is a nullity whose invalidity can be raised wherever it is relied on, and neither consent nor waiver can cure it; but defects of territory and valuation are treated differently by section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, which bar such objections unless taken early and accompanied by a failure of justice, and a wrong decision within jurisdiction is not a nullity at all.

Abstract

Jurisdiction is central to a court's authority, but not every jurisdictional error has the same consequence. This entry sets out the principle of nullity in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan; the classification of jurisdiction in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal; the statutory rules on place and valuation in section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act; section 16 of the Code in Sneh Lata Goel v. Pushplata; waiver in Bahrein Petroleum v. Pappu; the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and error within it in Ujjam Bai and Balvant N. Viswamitra; the interaction with res judicata in Mathura Prasad; and the arbitration analogue in Bharat Broadband.


I. The principle

Kiran Singh

1The principle is usually stated in the words of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan:

It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decreeKiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340, (1955) 1 SCR 117.

2The passage continues that such a defect cannot be cured even by the consent of parties. Its words deserve attention. It speaks of territorial and pecuniary defects as well as defects of subject matter. Yet the actual decision in Kiran Singh went against the party relying on a jurisdictional defect. A suit had been undervalued, so that an appeal lay to a wrong court, and the Supreme Court refused to treat the decree as void because of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. The general statement of principle thus needs to be read with the statutes which cut it down.

The policy

3Kiran Singh explains the policy of those statutes:

The policy underlying section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act,as also of sections 21 and 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is that when a case has been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless a failure of justice has resulted.Kiran Singh, AIR 1954 SC 340, reported headnote.

4The reported headnote adds that prejudice in this sense is not a mere change of form or a mere error in the decision on the merits. It must be directly attributable to over-valuation or under-valuation, and whether it occurred is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case.

II. Three kinds of jurisdiction

The classification

5Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. sets out the modern classification:

The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) Territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) Pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) Jurisdiction over the subject matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing.Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 791 (C.K. Thakker J.).

6The case concerned an agreement fixing Delhi courts as the forum, in a suit relating to immovable property outside Delhi. The defendants had admitted jurisdiction in their written statement and later amended it. The Supreme Court held that the amendment could be allowed, since a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit for immovable property situated outside its territory, in terms of section 16 of the Code. Consent could not create it. The later discussion of Sneh Lata Goel shows that this part of the reasoning has to be read with care.

The role of consent

7The Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu puts the general rule and its limit together:

As a general rule, neither consent nor waiver nor ,acquiescence can confer jurisdiction upon a Court, otherwise incompetent to try the suit. But s. 21 of the Code provides an exception, and a defect as to the place of suing, that is to say, the local venue for suits cogniscible by the Courts under the Code may be waived under this section.Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu, AIR 1966 SC 634, (1966) 1 SCR 461 (R.S. Bachawat J.).

8The waiver under section 21, the Court added, is limited to objections in appellate and revisional courts, but the section recognises the principle that a defect in the place of suing can be waived. In the case itself, a defendant who had protested at the jurisdiction, sought a stay, lost, and then had to contest the suit did not thereby waive the objection.

III. Statutory limits on the objection

Section 21 of the Code

9Section 21 sets out conditions for an objection. As restated in Sneh Lata Goel v. Pushplata, section 21(1) provides that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by an appellate or revisional court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. Sub-section (2) applies a similar rule to objections as to pecuniary limits, and sub-section (3) applies it to objections as to the local limits of the executing court.Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 21, as set out in Sneh Lata Goel v. Pushplata, (2019) 3 SCC 594 (D.Y. Chandrachud J.).

10The conditions are cumulative. An objector must have been prompt and must also show that the defect caused a failure of justice. A party who won or lost on the merits and then discovers a venue problem will normally not succeed.

Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act

11Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 does the same for over-valuation or under-valuation. Kiran Singh is the leading application. Koopilan Uneen’s Daughter Pathumma v. Koopilan Uneen’s Son Kuntalan Kutty shows how the principle is applied where a final decree in a partition suit was made by a court with changed limits, more than two decades after the preliminary decree.Koopilan Uneen’s Daughter Pathumma v. Koopilan Uneen’s Son Kuntalan Kutty, (1981) 3 SCC 589 (A.D. Koshal J.). The focus there is on the conditions in section 21 and not on whether the decree was void.

Section 16 and Sneh Lata Goel

12An apparently harder question concerns section 16, which says that suits for immovable property are to be instituted where the property is situate. Is a decree on property outside the court’s limits a nullity, as a defect in the subject matter? Sneh Lata Goel v. Pushplata dealt with a decree for partition passed by a court said to have no territorial jurisdiction over the property. The first respondent objected in execution that the decree was a nullity. The High Court accepted the objection, and the Supreme Court reversed.

13The Court considered Kiran Singh and Harshad Chiman Lal Modi. Its reasoning treats an objection on the ground of section 16 as an objection to territorial jurisdiction. Section 21 therefore applies. The objection does not go to the inherent competence of the court and must be taken as the section requires. The result is that a decree in such a case is not void merely for that reason, and cannot be challenged in execution. Any reader relying on the wider language of Harshad Chiman Lal Modi should read that decision alongside Sneh Lata Goel.

IV. Lack of jurisdiction and error within it

Authority to decide

14Not every wrong decision is a jurisdictional one, however serious the mistake. The Constitution Bench in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh framed the issue this way:

Jurisdiction means authority to decide. Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered or required to enquire into a question of law or fact for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an application for certiorari but are binding until reversed on appeal.Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1621, (1963) 1 SCR 778 (S.K. Das J.).

15And it added: “Where a quasi-judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion whether it is wrong in law or in fact.” A court does not act without jurisdiction merely because it has decided wrongly, even as to a matter within the statute that gave it its power.

Void and wrong

16Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule takes up the same line in the civil context:

Where a court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree or making an order, a decree or order passed by such court would be without jurisdiction non est and void ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of the court to pass a decree or make an order.Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706 (C.K. Thakker J.).

17It says that the distinction “between a decree which is void and a decree which is wrong, incorrect, irregular or not in accordance with law cannot be overlooked or ignored”. This sets the practical importance of the classification. A decree that is merely wrong stands until it is reversed, and a collateral attack fails. A decree that is void can be resisted anywhere.

Facts going to jurisdiction

18A decree passed on an erroneous finding on a jurisdictional fact sits between the two. Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman decides the matter at the stage of execution. Where the objection “does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial”, the executing court cannot entertain it, “even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction”.Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670, AIR 1970 SC 1475 (J.C. Shah J.), reported headnote. So a nullity in principle may be unavailable in practice to a party who failed to raise it in time.

V. Nullity and res judicata

Mathura Prasad

19Can an erroneous decision on jurisdiction bind in a later proceeding? Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy considered a landlord and tenant dispute where a High Court had held that the Rent Act did not cover open land let for construction. A different view of the law was later taken. The Court held that the earlier judgment did not operate as res judicata: “A question relating. to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the decision will not, operate as res judicata.”Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613, AIR 1971 SC 2355 (J.C. Shah J.), reported headnote. The same goes where, by an erroneous decision, the court assumes jurisdiction that it does not have. The reason is that parties should not be able to create or deny a jurisdiction by an erroneous decision.

20The contrast with Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi is only apparent. Mathura Prasad concerns a pure question of law on jurisdiction, between one proceeding and a later one. Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi concerns a decree and its execution, where the objection would need a re-examination of facts.

VI. Beyond the civil courts

Arbitration

21The same vocabulary is now used in arbitration. Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 makes a person whose relationship falls within the Seventh Schedule ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. considered whether participation could cure such a defect, in light of the proviso which requires an express agreement in writing after the dispute has arisen.Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd., (2019) 5 SCC 755 (R.F. Nariman J.). The Court’s approach treats such ineligibility as going to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, removable only in the manner the statute prescribes. This shows that the distinction between curable and incurable jurisdictional defects continues to be relevant wherever adjudication is created by statute.

VII. Practice

For a party facing a suit

22Raise any objection to place or value at the first opportunity, and at the latest before the settlement of issues. A plea left for later will be met with section 21. A plea of inherent lack of jurisdiction can be raised later, but it should still be raised early, because the facts on which it relies may otherwise never be established, and without them the point may not appear on the record.

For a party challenging a decree

23Identify the kind of defect. A statutory bar on civil jurisdiction may be a nullity. A venue defect ordinarily is not. A wrong decision on the merits is neither, and must go on appeal. The strength of the plea then depends on whether the record itself shows the defect.

VIII. What Kiran Singh decided

The facts and the question

24The principle is often quoted without the rest of the judgment, which limits it. In Kiran Singh, a suit had been valued at Rs. 2,950, made up of Rs. 1,950 for possession and Rs. 1,000 for past mesne profits, and a first appeal went to the District Court of Monghyr. On further appeal it was argued that on a true valuation the first appeal should have been to the High Court, so that the District Court’s decree was a nullity. Venkatarama Ayyar J., speaking for four judges, began with the general rule, and then turned at once to the question of how far statute cut it down:

If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its judgment and decree would be nullities.

25That sentence is the turning point of the judgment. Its opening words show that the Court regarded the general principle as open to statutory modification. It then described the drafting of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act in unflattering terms:

The drafting of the section has come in, and deservedly, for considerable criticism; but amidst much that is obscure and confused, there is one principle which stands out clear and conspicuous. It is that a decree passed by a Court, which would have had no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for over-valuation or under-valuation, is not to be treated as, what it would be but for the section, null and void, and that an objection to jurisdiction based on over-valuation or undervaluation should be dealt with under that section and not otherwise. The reference to section 578, now section 99, of the Civil Procedure Code, in the opening words of the section is significant. That section, while providing that no decree shall be reversed or varied in 16 122 appeal on account of the defects mentioned therein when they do not affect the merits of the case, excepts from its operation defects of jurisdiction. Section 99 therefore gives no protection to decrees passed on merits, when the Courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of over-valuation or undervaluation. It is with a view to avoid this result that section 11 was enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a Court based on over-valuation or under-valuation shall not be entertained by an appellate Court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section.Kiran Singh, AIR 1954 SC 340, (1955) 1 SCR 117. The words as printed have been corrected for obvious scanning errors.

26It then stated the principle about territorial objections and the common policy:

It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on over-valuation or under-valuation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the Legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits.

Why the general statement remains useful

27The result is that one of the most quoted statements in the law of civil procedure was made in a case where it did not decide the issue. Despite that, it has been accepted as a correct general principle. Sneh Lata Goel puts the matter this way:

Far from helping the case of the respondent, the judgment in Kiran Singh (supra) holds that an objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction is different from an objection to jurisdiction over the subject matter. An objection to the want of territorial jurisdiction does not travel to the root of or to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the suit.Sneh Lata Goel v. Pushplata, (2019) 3 SCC 594.

28In other words, Kiran Singh now stands for the very distinction that its opening words might be thought to deny.

IX. Jurisdiction in the older cases

Consent and acquiescence

29Harshad Chiman Lal Modi quoted Halsbury’s Laws of England on consent and waiver:

Where, by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, a court is without jurisdiction to entertain any particular claim or matter, neither the acquiescence nor the express consent of the parties can confer jurisdiction upon the court, nor can consent give a court jurisdiction if a condition which goes to the jurisdiction has not been performed or fulfilled.Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th edn, Reissue), vol. 10, para 317, as quoted in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi, (2005) 7 SCC 791.

30The Court’s own conclusion in that case was that “Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is nullity.” Ledgard v. Bull is the older source for the same point: “When the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction, over the subject matter of a suit, the parties cannot by their mutual consent, convert it into a proper judicial process”.Ledgard v. Bull, (1886) 13 IA 134, as quoted in Chandra Bhushan Khanna v. Brij Nandan Singh, AIR 1978 All 459.

31The rule has an obvious explanation. Jurisdiction is conferred by the State. Private parties cannot grant to a court a power that the legislature has not given it. An agreement to go to one of several courts that each have jurisdiction is a different thing, and the argument in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi on section 20 of the Code proceeded on that distinction. The parties there could not rely on such an agreement, because the court they chose had no jurisdiction on the view of section 16 taken in that case.

Court has jurisdiction to decide wrong

32Malkarjun Bin Shidramappa Pasare v. Narhari Bin Shivappa provides the phrase that is the reverse of Kiran Singh: “a court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decides wrong, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right; and if that course is not taken, the decision however wrong, cannot be disturbed.”Malkarjun Bin Shidramappa Pasare v. Narhari Bin Shivappa, (1900) 27 IA 216, as quoted in Balvant N. Viswamitra, (2004) 8 SCC 706.

33Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey applies that to limitation. Balvant N. Viswamitra collects all of these, and concludes: “From the above decisions, it is amply clear that all irregular or wrong decrees or orders are not necessarily null and void. An erroneous or illegal decision, which is not void, cannot be objected in execution or collateral proceedings.”

The meaning of the Ujjam Bai passage

34The Constitution Bench in Ujjam Bai gave several examples of the limits of jurisdiction:

The question, whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable “at the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the enquiry”. (Rex v. Bolton). Thus, a tribunal empowered to determine claims for compensation for loss of office has jurisdiction to determine all questions of law and fact relating to the measure of compensation and the tenure of the office, and it does not exceed its jurisdiction by determining any of those questions incorrectly but it has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for reinstatement or damages for wrongful dismissal, and it will exceed its jurisdiction if it makes an order in such terms, for it has no legal power to give any decision whatsoever on those matters.Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1621, (1963) 1 SCR 778, reported headnote.

35That passage is the source of an idea that recurs in the civil cases. The jurisdiction of a court is settled by the nature of the question put before it at the outset and not by the correctness of its later answer.

X. Section 21 in detail

The sub-sections

36As set out in Sneh Lata Goel, the section has three limbs. The first deals with the place of suing, the second with pecuniary limits, and the third with the local limits of the executing court. The Court explained the first of these:

Sub-section (1) of Section 21 provides that before raising an objection to territorial jurisdiction before an appellate or revisional court, two conditions precedent must be fulfiled: i) The objection must be taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity; and ii) There has been a consequent failure of justice. This provision which the legislature has designedly adopted would make it abundantly clear that an objection to the want of territorial jurisdiction does not travel to the root of or to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the suit. Hence, it has to be raised before the court of first instance at the earliest opportunity, and in all cases where issues are settled, on or before such settlement. Moreover, it is only where there is a consequent failure of justice that an objection as to the place of suing can be entertained. Both these conditions have to be satisfied.Sneh Lata Goel, (2019) 3 SCC 594.

37Sneh Lata Goel adds further statements of the reasoning. One is from Hasham Abbas Sayyad v. Usman Abbas Sayyad:

We may, however, hasten to add that a distinction must be made between a decree passed by a court which has no territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the light of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction in regard to the subject-matter of the suit. Whereas in the former case, the appellate court may not interfere with the decree unless prejudice is shown, ordinarily the second category of the cases would be interfered with.Hasham Abbas Sayyad v. Usman Abbas Sayyad, (2007) 2 SCC 355, as quoted in Sneh Lata Goel, (2019) 3 SCC 594.

38The other is from Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.:

A distinction, however, must be made between a jurisdiction with regard to the subject-matter of the suit and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas in the case falling within the former category the judgment would be a nullity, in the latter it would not be.Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 244, as quoted in Sneh Lata Goel, (2019) 3 SCC 594.

Koopilan in detail

39Koopilan Uneen’s Daughter Pathumma shows the three conditions at work. A suit for partition was filed in 1938 in the Court of the Munsiff at Parappanangadi, and a preliminary decree was passed in February 1940. Nobody took the matter further for over two decades. In the meantime the High Court redefined local limits by an order of December 1956, and the property fell within the Munsiff’s Court at Manjeri. The plaintiff applied in January 1966 to Manjeri for a final decree. Defendant No. 12 objected at once, was overruled, and a final decree was passed in July 1968. The appellate courts held that Manjeri had no territorial jurisdiction and set the decree aside. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal:

In order that an objection to the place of suing may be entertained by any appellate or revisional Court, the fulfilment of the following three conditions is essential, according to the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure: (i) The objection was taken in the Court of first instance; (ii) it was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in case where issues are settled, at or before such settlement; (iii) there has been a consequent failure of justice.Koopilan Uneen’s Daughter Pathumma, (1981) 3 SCC 589, reported headnote.

40The first two conditions were fully satisfied. The party objected on the first occasion. But “before the two appellate Courts below could allow the objection to be taken, it was further necessary that a case of failure of justice on account of the place [of] suing having been wrongly selected was made out.” None was shown. The significance of the case is that promptness is not enough. Even an objector who raises the point at the first moment needs to show actual prejudice.

Bahrein Petroleum on protest

41Bahrein Petroleum looks at the other side of it, which is what amounts to waiver. The respondent had sued in a court in Kerala. The appellant protested and also applied under section 34 of the Arbitration Act for a stay of the suit, lost, and appealed. The respondent said that this was a waiver, and that a failure of justice had to be shown. The Court held otherwise:

A defendant may waive the objection as to jurisdiction and may subsequently be precluded from taking it. But the appellants lodged their protest at the earliest opportunity and persisted in their objection. An application to the court before which the suit is pending for stay of the suit under s. 34 of the Arbitration Act, is in no way a recognition that court has jurisdiction to try the suit, nor can an appeal from an order of the Court, under s. 39(1), have that effect, because the general definition of “Court” in s. 2(c) cannot be imported into s. 34. The appellants need not allege nor prove a failure of justice in consequence of the order of the High Court, because, S. 21, Civil Procedure Code, does not preclude the objection as to the place of suing, if the trial court has not given a verdict on the merits at the time when the objection is taken in the appellate or revisional court.Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu, AIR 1966 SC 634, (1966) 1 SCR 461, reported headnote.

42Two lessons follow. A protest at the earliest moment, persisted in, preserves the point. And the requirement in section 21 for proof of a failure of justice does not arise where the objection reaches a higher court before any verdict on the merits has been given by the trial court. The policy behind the section is to save a decision on the merits that has already been reached, so the condition has nothing to bite on when no such decision exists.

XI. Sneh Lata Goel in detail

The facts and the reasoning

43A partition suit was decreed by a civil court at Ranchi. The respondents, in execution, said that the property on the basis of which jurisdiction had been founded at Ranchi did not belong to the common ancestor, and that the Ranchi court lacked territorial jurisdiction. They relied on Kiran Singh and Harshad Chiman Lal Modi. The High Court directed the executing court to entertain the objection. D.Y. Chandrachud J. reversed:

This provision which the legislature has designedly adopted would make it abundantly clear that an objection to the want of territorial jurisdiction does not travel to the root of or to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the suit. Hence, it has to be raised before the court of first instance at the earliest opportunity, and in all cases where issues are settled, on or before such settlement.Sneh Lata Goel, (2019) 3 SCC 594.

44The respondents said that they had raised the objection in their written statement. But the suit had been decreed ex parte after they stopped participating, and the Court held that the objection could not be taken in execution. It said that the objection “did not relate to the subject matter of the suit” and that an executing court “cannot go behind the decree and must execute the decree as it stands”. The High Court was held to have acted in excess of jurisdiction in reversing the executing court. A first appeal by the respondent on the jurisdiction point was pending, and the Court said that its findings would not affect that appeal. So the objection still had a proper forum, and that forum was the appeal.

45The decision matters for how it uses Harshad Chiman Lal Modi. That case was quoted for the statement that territorial and pecuniary objections must be taken early, and that subject matter is different. A reader preparing an argument about an objection raised in execution should work from the later case. The point remains that a statute that withdraws a whole class of suit from the civil court, as distinct from one that says where a suit belongs, still produces a nullity.

XII. Void or voidable in the Code’s scheme

46The classification in Subhash Mahadevasa Habib gives a useful general statement:

Whereas, an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make a decree passed by that court one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void. At best it is voidable in the sense that it could be challenged in appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied.Subhash Mahadevasa Habib v. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas, AIR 2007 SC 1828 (P.K. Balasubramanyan J., with S.B. Sinha J.).

47The Court added that section 21A, introduced in 1976 with effect from 1 February 1977, bars the institution of a suit challenging the validity of a decree passed in a former suit between the same parties “on any ground based on an objection as to the place of suing”. So a territorial objection has three walls in front of it: in the first court, in the appellate court, and in a fresh suit.

48Several classes of decree are commonly treated as void. Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi gives two examples, namely one passed without bringing on record the legal representatives of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, and one against a ruling prince without a certificate. Dhurandhar Prasad Singh considered an argument that a decree against a predecessor, without bringing on record a successor on whom interest had devolved during the suit, was akin to a decree against a dead person. The Court held that “Such an omission would not make the decree void ab initio”. Balvant N. Viswamitra shows that a decree against heirs whose names could not be found, after real efforts at service, is not void either. The Court said that “such a decree, by no stretch of imagination, can be described nullity.” Whether a defect in parties is a defect that can make a decree void thus depends on the kind of defect, and not on the seriousness of its consequences.

XIII. Acting on a void decree

49A further limit on the doctrine is one of procedure. Since a void decree does not cease to look like a decree, a party affected by it should still take steps. Rafique Bibi’s reference to Wade and Forsyth, set out in Balvant N. Viswamitra, says that nullity is “relative, depending upon the court’s willingness to grant relief in any particular situation”, and adds that “the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances.” A litigant who sits on a void order may therefore find that it has come to be acted on, and that the rights of others have grown up around it. The right course is to resist at once, in execution or by appeal, and if necessary to seek a declaration.

XIV. Why the classification matters

50It may help to set out the consequences that depend on where a defect lies.

51If the defect is that the court lacked authority over the subject matter, the objection may be taken at any time, and in any proceeding. Consent and waiver will not cure it. Res judicata will not protect a wrong decision on it, on the reasoning in Mathura Prasad. The executing court may entertain the objection if it appears on the face of the record.

52If the defect is in the place of suing, section 21 applies. The objection is waived if it is not taken early. It fails in appeal without proof of a failure of justice. It cannot be taken in execution, or in a fresh suit under section 21A.

53If the defect is in pecuniary jurisdiction, section 21(2) and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act apply. Kiran Singh requires that prejudice be shown on the merits, and that it be attributable to the undervaluation.

54If the defect is a wrong decision, on a jurisdictional fact or otherwise, the decree stands until it is reversed. Ittyavira Mathai and Malkarjun control, and neither the executing court nor a collateral court may question it.

55The practical advice follows from this. Parties should identify the defect precisely before deciding what to do, because the same set of facts can sometimes be described in more than one way. A plea that a rent court had no power because the land was agricultural sounds like a plea about subject matter, and in principle it is. But, as Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi shows, if the fact has to be found, the objection is lost by the time of execution.

XV. The position today

56A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter is a nullity, and its invalidity may be set up wherever it is relied on, including in execution or collateral proceedings. Consent, waiver or acquiescence cannot generally confer jurisdiction. Section 21 of the Code and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, however, restrict objections as to place and valuation, which must be taken at the earliest opportunity and accompanied by a failure of justice. Following Sneh Lata Goel, a defect under section 16 is treated as a defect of territorial jurisdiction falling under section 21. A court having authority to decide does not lose it by deciding wrongly, and a wrong decree stands until reversed. In execution, a jurisdictional defect can be raised only if it appears on the face of the record. A decision on a pure question of law about jurisdiction does not operate as res judicata.


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  • Published · 31 October 2026

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