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2026 FPR EDC 20 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/lis-pendens
DC-0018Doctrines · Property · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 20
FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 3,913 words
Lis Pendens
Under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a party to a non-collusive suit in which a right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question cannot, without the court's authority, deal with that property so as to affect another party's rights under the eventual decree; the transfer is not void, but it yields to the decree, binds the transferee whether or not the transferee knew of the suit, and leaves the transferee without the protection given to strangers in execution.
Abstract
Lis pendens stops a litigant defeating a suit by selling its subject matter. This entry sets out section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and its English source in Bellamy v. Sabine; the conditions for its operation, including the meaning of a collusive suit in Nagubai Ammal; the rule that a transfer pendente lite is good between its parties but subservient to the decree (Nagubai Ammal, Thomson Press, A. Nawab John); the period of pendency, which continues through appeal and even into the time allowed for appeal (Jagan Singh); court sales (Samarendra Nath Sinha); and the transferee's position on impleadment (Amit Kumar Shaw, Sanjay Verma, Thomson Press) and in execution under Order XXI Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Silverline Forum, Usha Sinha).
I. The doctrine
Why the rule exists
1A suit about land would be worth little if the defendant could sell the land while the suit was pending. The plaintiff would win against someone who no longer held the property, sue the buyer, and meet another sale. The doctrine of lis pendens prevents this. It takes its maxim from the phrase pendente lite nihil innovetur, which the Supreme Court has rendered as meaning that pending litigation, nothing new should be introduced.G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju, (2022) 12 SCC 321 (K.M. Joseph J.).
2In India the doctrine is statutory. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that during the pendency of
any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose.Transfer of Property Act, 1882, s. 52, as reproduced in Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon, (2005) 11 SCC 403. The opening words of the section, which describe the courts to which it applies, have been left out here.
3The Explanation, added in 1929, fixes when the pendency begins and ends. It begins on the date the plaint is presented or the proceeding is instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction. It continues until the suit or proceeding is disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge has been obtained, or has become unobtainable because the limitation period for execution has run out.Transfer of Property Act, 1882, s. 52, Explanation, set out in Jagan Singh v. Dhanwanti, (2012) 2 SCC 628.
The English source
4The usual starting point is Bellamy v. Sabine, decided in 1857. Two passages have been repeated in Indian judgments. The first states the reason for the rule. It would, the court said,
plainly be impossible that any action or suit could be brought to a successful termination, if alienations pendente lite were permitted to prevail.Bellamy v. Sabine, (1857) 1 De G & J 566, as quoted in A. Nawab John v. V.N. Subramaniyam, (2012) 7 SCC 738. BAILII could not be consulted for this entry, so the English passages are given as Indian courts reproduce them.
5The plaintiff, the passage goes on, would be liable to be defeated by the defendant’s alienating before the judgment or decree, and would have to begin again, subject to being defeated in the same way.
6The second passage, from Lord Cranworth, separates the rule from the law of notice:
It is scarcely correct to speak of lis pendens as affecting a purchaser through the doctrine of notice, though undoubtedly the language of the Courts often so describes its operation. It affects him not because it amounts to notice, but because the law does not allow litigant parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute, so as to prejudice the opposite party.Bellamy v. Sabine, (1857) 1 De G & J 566, as quoted in Prakash Chand v. Satish Chand (decided 15 June 2024), citing Mulla’s Transfer of Property Act.
7The consequence matters in practice. A buyer who is bound because the law says so cannot escape by proving ignorance of the suit. Section 52 itself contains no exception for a purchaser in good faith.
8Indian judgments have not always kept to Lord Cranworth’s framing. In Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, C.K. Thakker J. said that “’Lis pendens’ itself is treated as constructive notice to a purchaser that he is bound by a decree to be entered in the pending suit.”Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, (2008) 7 SCC 144 (C.K. Thakker J.). In G.T. Girish, K.M. Joseph J. said that the section “is based on equity and public policy.”G.T. Girish, (2022) 12 SCC 321. Neither statement alters the result. On either explanation, the buyer’s state of mind does not decide whether the decree binds the buyer.
II. The conditions
A pending suit or proceeding
9The section needs a suit or proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, and it speaks of “any suit or proceedings”, not only of suits for title.
Not collusive
10The word “collusive” has a narrow meaning. In Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, the appellants’ title was extinguished by a sale in execution of a charge decree, and they argued that the suit in which the decree was passed had been collusive. The Court distinguished collusion from fraud:
there is a fundamental distinction between a proceeding which is collusive and one which is fraudulent.Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593, 1956 SCR 451 (Venkatarama Ayyar J.).
11Collusion, it said, adopting Wharton’s definition, is “a secret arrangement between two persons that the one should institute a suit against the other in order to obtain the decision of a judicial tribunal for some sinister purpose”. In such a proceeding the claim is fictitious and the contest unreal. A proceeding that is real but brought for a fraudulent purpose is a different thing. The Court’s discussion shows why a transferee cannot avoid section 52 merely by calling the earlier litigation dishonest. The suit must be a sham.
A right to immovable property directly and specifically in question
12The right must be directly and specifically in question. A money claim does not qualify merely because the defendant owns land and a decree could eventually be executed against it. The words of the section require that the suit itself put a right to the property in issue. A suit for partition, as in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami, is a clear example.Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami, (1972) 2 SCC 200, AIR 1973 SC 569 (M.H. Beg J.).
A transfer or dealing by a party
13The section reaches a transfer or other dealing “by any party to the suit or proceeding”. It does not forbid the transfer absolutely. It forbids it only “so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto” under the decree, and it permits the court to authorise a transfer on terms.
III. The effect of a transfer
Subservient, not void
14The most frequently repeated proposition about section 52 is that it does not annul the transfer. In Nagubai Ammal the Court explained the statutory words:
The words “so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein”, make it clear that the transfer is good except to the extent that it might conflict with rights decreed under the decree or order. It is in this view that transfers pendente lite have been held to be valid and operative as between the parties thereto.Nagubai Ammal, AIR 1956 SC 593, as quoted by T.S. Thakur J. in Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397.
15Thomson Press is the leading modern application. The owners of a property in Connaught Place, New Delhi had been sued for specific performance and restrained by an injunction of 1991 from transferring it. Years later they sold it to the appellant by registered sale deeds, and the appellant applied under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be added as a defendant. The High Court refused. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. There are two judgments, one by M.Y. Eqbal J. and a concurring one by T.S. Thakur J. Eqbal J. said that the section “does not indeed annul the conveyance or the transfer otherwise, but to render it subservient to the rights of the parties to a litigation.”Thomson Press, (2013) 5 SCC 397 (M.Y. Eqbal J.). Thakur J. said that such a transfer “is not illegal ipso jure but remains subservient to the pending litigation.”Thomson Press, (2013) 5 SCC 397 (T.S. Thakur J.).
16The practical result in a suit for specific performance follows Durga Prasad v. Deep Chand. The form of decree there approved is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the plaintiff and to “direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff.”Durga Prasad v. Deep Chand, AIR 1954 SC 75, 1954 SCR 360, as quoted in Thomson Press, (2013) 5 SCC 397.
The purpose: status quo
17The Privy Council described the broad purpose of the section as being “to maintain the status quo unaffected by the act of any party to the litigation pending its determination.”Gouri Dutt Maharaj v. Sukur Mohammed, AIR 1948 PC 147, as quoted in Thomson Press, (2013) 5 SCC 397. The same passage adds that the section’s application “cannot depend on matters of proof or the strength or weakness of the case on one side or the other in bona fide proceedings.” So a buyer cannot resist it by showing that the plaintiff’s case looked weak at the time of the purchase.
18That width has a cost, which Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj illustrates. A plaintiff can file a weak suit, seek no interim relief, and still place a cloud over the defendant’s property, because third parties avoid land under litigation. The High Court there tried to meet the problem by ordering the plaintiff to undertake to pay damages of Rs. 25 lakhs if the suit failed. The Supreme Court set that direction aside, and instead permitted the defendants, under section 52, to deal with the property despite the suit, on furnishing security of Rs. 3 lakhs.Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1 (R.V. Raveendran J.). The doctrine protects honest plaintiffs and dishonest ones alike until the suit is decided, but the court’s authority under the section can relieve the hardship in a suitable case.
IV. How long the pendency lasts
Appeals and the gap before an appeal
19An appeal continues the suit for this purpose. Jagan Singh v. Dhanwanti went further and dealt with a sale made after the suit had failed and before any further appeal had been filed. The Court, referring to a Bombay decision, said that “Even after the dismissal of a suit, a purchaser is subject to lis pendens, if an appeal is afterwards filed”, and held that a sale made until the period of limitation for second appeal is over is covered by section 52.Jagan Singh v. Dhanwanti, (2012) 2 SCC 628 (Bench: P. Sathasivam and H.L. Gokhale JJ.), following Krishanaji Pandharinath v. Anusayabai, AIR 1959 Bom 475. It repeated the reason from Bellamy: on any other view it would be impossible to bring a suit to a successful end.
20A buyer therefore takes a real risk in purchasing from a party who has just won at first instance. The first-instance result does not end the risk until the time for appeal has passed.
Court sales
21The section speaks of a transfer by a party, which would naturally suggest a voluntary act. A court sale is not such an act, but the principle has been applied to it. In Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna Kumar Nag, the reported headnote records that “The principle of lis pendens applies even to involuntary alienations like court sales”, and a purchaser who bought while an appeal against a preliminary decree was pending was held bound by the result.Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna Kumar Nag, AIR 1967 SC 1440, (1967) 2 SCR 18 (J.M. Shelat J.). A later decision, quoted in Thomson Press, put the point precisely: section 52 strictly speaking does not apply to involuntary alienations such as court sales, but the principle of lis pendens does.Thomson Press, (2013) 5 SCC 397, quoting a decision of the Court reported at AIR 1970 SC 1717.
22A sale in execution of a mortgage older than the suit raises a separate question, because the purchaser’s rights are said to date back to the mortgage. Jayaram Mudaliar records authorities to that effect but left the question undecided on its facts, as no such sale was before the Court. The appeal, which concerned a sale to satisfy decretal debts and a revenue sale made during a partition suit, was dismissed.Jayaram Mudaliar, (1972) 2 SCC 200.
V. The transferee in the suit
Is the transferee entitled to be joined?
23A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree and may therefore want to defend the suit. Order XXII Rule 10 of the Code allows a suit to continue by or against a person to whom an interest has come by assignment during its pendency, with the court’s leave. Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon states the general position:
An alienee pendente lite is bound by the final decree that may be passed in the suit. Such an alienee can be brought on record both under this rule as also under O 1 Rule 10. Since under the doctrine of lis pendens a decree passed in the suit during the pendency of which a transfer is made binds the transferee, his application to be brought on record should ordinarily be allowed.Amit Kumar Shaw, (2005) 11 SCC 403 (Ar. Lakshmanan J.).
24Other decisions stress that this is not a right. In Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb, the Court said that a transferee without the court’s leave “cannot, as of right, seek impleadment as a party”, though it accepted that a transferee “should ordinarily be joined as party to enable him to protect his interest.” Joinder was refused there because the suits had been pending since 1983 and the alienation did not appear to be bona fide.Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb, (2004) 1 SCC 191 (Bench: Shivaraj V. Patil and D.M. Dharmadhikari JJ.). Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy takes the same line.Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy, (2006) 13 SCC 608 (Arijit Pasayat J.).
25These statements can be read together. Joinder is discretionary, the ordinary course favours it, and delay or an evidently improper purchase can justify refusal. Thomson Press joined the purchaser even though the sale was made while an injunction stood.
A purchase with the court’s authority
26Section 52 ends with the words “except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose.” A party who needs to sell can therefore apply to the court, which decides on what terms the sale may go ahead. Vinod Seth is an example: the terms there were security of Rs. 3 lakhs. A buyer in this position acts under the statute’s own exception, which an unauthorised buyer cannot claim.
VI. The transferee in execution
27Order XXI of the Code gives strangers to a decree a way to resist its execution and have their claims adjudicated. Rule 102 takes this protection away from a transferee pendente lite:
Nothing in rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person.Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, O. XXI r. 102, as set out in Usha Sinha, (2008) 7 SCC 144.
28In Silverline Forum (P) Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust, the Court explained that the executing court must determine whether the person resisting is such a transferee; if the finding is in the affirmative, it “has to hold that he has no right to resist in view of the clear language contained in Rule 102.”Silverline Forum (P) Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust, (1998) 3 SCC 723 (Bench: K.T. Thomas and S. Rajendra Babu JJ.). The exclusion, it said, rests on the principle of section 52. So there is an inquiry, but it is confined to that one question. The transferee cannot use it to raise a claim of independent title.
29Usha Sinha restated the rule: “a purchaser of suit property during the pendency of litigation has no right to resist or obstruct execution of decree passed by a competent Court.”Usha Sinha, (2008) 7 SCC 144. The rule, Thakker J. said, refuses to extend a helping hand to purchasers of property in respect of which litigation is pending, since a transferee should be careful before buying the subject matter of a suit.
VII. Further questions
The elements restated
30Amit Kumar Shaw sets out what must be present for a lis pendens. There must be a suit or proceeding pending in a court of competent jurisdiction. It must not be collusive. The litigation must be one in which a right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question. There must be a transfer of or other dealing with the property in dispute by a party to the litigation. And the transfer must affect the rights of the other party under the eventual decree. The Court described the section as “based on equity and good conscience” and “intended to protect the parties to litigation against alienations by their opponent during the pendency of the suit”.Amit Kumar Shaw, (2005) 11 SCC 403.
31The list helps because each element can be examined in turn. A money suit fails the third. A sale by a stranger to the suit fails the fourth. In practice the third is the element most often in dispute. A plaint should identify the property with enough precision to show that a right to that very property is in question, by boundaries, survey numbers or municipal numbers as the case requires. Order VII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires a description sufficient to identify it.
Between transferor and transferee
32G.T. Girish adds two points to the statement that the transfer is not void. First, “as between the transferor and the transferee, it does not lie in the mouth of the transferor to set up the plea of lis pendens to defeat the disposition of property”. The doctrine protects the other party to the suit. It gives the seller no way to escape the seller’s own sale. Second, “the Principle of Lis Pendens is, not to be confounded with the aspect of good faith or bonafides. In other words, the transferee or the beneficiary of the property, which is disposed of by a party, cannot set up the case that he acted bonafide or in good faith.”G.T. Girish, (2022) 12 SCC 321. The second passage settles in clear terms a point that follows from Bellamy.
33A. Nawab John states the consequence for the buyer: “The pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor as may be eventually determined by the Court.”A. Nawab John, (2012) 7 SCC 738. The buyer steps into the seller’s position in the litigation, for better or worse. If the seller wins, the buyer’s title is secure. If the seller loses, the buyer loses with the seller.
Why execution is treated strictly
34Usha Sinha gives the practical reason for Rule 102. If protection were given to a transferee pendente lite, it said, “a decree holder will never be able to realize the fruits of his decree. Every time the decree holder seeks a direction from a Court to execute the decree, the judgment debtor or his transferee will transfer the property and the new transferee will offer resistance or cause obstruction.”Usha Sinha, (2008) 7 SCC 144.
35Silverline Forum makes clear how far an executing court must go. A third party who offers resistance falls within Rule 101 if adjudication is warranted, but where the resistance is by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor, “the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is such transferee”.Silverline Forum, (1998) 3 SCC 723. This is why the date of the transfer and the date of the institution of the suit are often the only facts that matter at that stage.
Joinder refused
36Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh is a strong application of the view against joinder. Sale deeds had been executed during the suit. The Court said that the defendants “were prohibited by operation of Section 52 to deal with the property” and that since no authority of the court had been obtained, the alienation “obviously would be hit by the doctrine of lie pendens”. It held that the purchasers could not be considered to be necessary or proper parties, and it dismissed their application under Order I Rule 10.Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh, (1996) 5 SCC 539 (K. Ramaswamy J.). This decision and Amit Kumar Shaw are often put forward on opposite sides. A court deciding such an application should consider the reasoning of both, the stage of the suit and whether the purchaser’s interest is in real danger of going by default.
Registered notice and other systems
37The Indian central rule does not depend on registration of any notice of the suit. G.T. Girish quotes a commentary contrasting this with “the case in England, or in Gujarat and Maharashtra, where the doctrine only affects transactions pendente lite if the lis has been duly registered.”G.T. Girish, (2022) 12 SCC 321, quoting a commentary on the Transfer of Property Act. So a practitioner in those two States must check the local amendment to section 52 and whether its registration requirement was met. Where the central section applies, a buyer has no register that will reveal every pending suit, which is the main practical criticism of the rule. Many other systems tie the effect of a pending action to an entry in a land register or a recorded notice, which protects the purchaser who searches. Indian law, outside the amended States, puts that risk on the purchaser.
Practice for each side
38A plaintiff should describe the property exactly, should present the plaint with the section in mind and should still apply for an injunction, for the reasons given below. A plaintiff faced with a purchaser who resists execution should rely on Rule 102 and ask the court to confine the inquiry. A purchaser who discovers a pending suit should apply promptly to be joined under Order XXII Rule 10, since a compromise or default by the seller will otherwise bind the purchaser without a hearing. A buyer doing diligence should search court records in the places where suits about the property could be filed, along with the registers, and should ask the seller for a declaration about pending litigation.
VIII. The concern about abuse
39The strength of section 52 also gives it a capacity for abuse, because a suit filed against a property may cloud its title for years without any interim order. The High Court in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj described the problem in these terms:
It is an ingenious method of keeping a suit alive without claiming interlocutory relief and creating a cloud over a property in view of the provisions of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act. We do think that the courts cannot look helplessly at such tactics and ignore the problem of huge docket, which arises on account of meritless claims being filed. The heavy docket does not permit early disposal of suits and thus parties may take advantage of keeping frivolous claims alive.The Delhi High Court’s order, as set out in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1 (R.V. Raveendran J.).
40The High Court had therefore imposed conditions on the plaintiff. The conditions were considered by the Supreme Court in the same decision, and the report should be read for the outcome and for what the Court said about the limits of a court’s power to impose such terms. The practical point remains. The section gives no remedy against a suit that is weak but not frivolous, so a defendant who wants to deal with the property may have to seek leave of the court under the closing words of the section, or to press for an early trial, or to apply for the rejection of the plaint where the conditions of Order VII Rule 11 are met. Where the plaint makes no real claim to a right in the property, the section does not apply at all, since the right must be “directly and specifically in question”.
IX. How a purchaser can respond
41A prospective purchaser should do what the law does not require for the protection of the party in suit. There is no general requirement in the Act, except by local amendment, to register a notice of a pending suit. The section therefore operates whether or not anyone could have found out. It is therefore prudent to make enquiries beyond the registers, including a search of the records of the courts in the district where the land lies. A purchaser who has been told of a suit, and who goes ahead, cannot claim any surprise. A purchaser who was not told should seek a warranty and an indemnity from the seller, because the section’s effect will not depend on what the purchaser knew.
X. The position today
42The following propositions are supported by the decisions discussed above. Section 52 applies to a non-collusive suit or proceeding in which a right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question. A transfer by a party during the suit, without the court’s authority, is valid between transferor and transferee but cannot affect the rights of the other parties under the decree. The transferee’s knowledge of the suit does not control this result. The pendency lasts from presentation of the plaint until satisfaction of the decree or the end of the period for execution, and includes appeals and the time allowed for filing them. The principle extends to court sales. A transferee should ordinarily be joined on application, but has no absolute right to be. In execution of a decree for possession, a person found to be a transferee from the judgment-debtor after the suit was instituted has no right to resist.
43For a buyer, the lesson is to search for pending suits and, if one is found, to obtain the court’s authority for the sale. For a plaintiff, section 52 protects the final decree, but it does not stop a sale from happening or the complications that follow one. An interim injunction is still worth seeking, because disobeying one has its own consequences under the Code.
History
- Published · 31 October 2026
© 2026 First Precedent Research. Free to share and adapt with credit, for non-commercial use, under CC BY-NC 4.0. A published piece is changed only to correct an error, and each correction is listed under History. If the law changes, we add a linked afterword. Nothing on FPR is legal advice.