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2026 FPR EDC 19 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/functus-officio

DC-0130Doctrines · Civil Procedure · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 19

FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 4,280 words

Functus Officio

An adjudicator who has finally decided a matter has exhausted that authority: a court cannot reopen its judgment except as a statute allows, a judge becomes functus officio on pronouncing, signing and dating the judgment subject to section 152 and review of the Code of Civil Procedure, a quasi-judicial authority becomes so when its order is pronounced, published or communicated, and a power of substantive review must be conferred by law, though a procedural error or an order that is a nullity may be recalled.

Abstract

Functus officio, having performed the office, describes the point at which an adjudicator's authority over a decided matter ends. This entry sets out when that point is reached, from Surendra Singh v. State of U.P. and State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal; the civil rule and the correction of errors under section 152 (Jayalakshmi Coelho); the bar in section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and section 403 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Ram Chander Agarwala, Hari Singh Mann, Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar); the rule that review on merits needs a statute and its distinction from procedural review (Patel Narshi Thakershi, Grindlays Bank, Kapra Mazdoor, Kalabharati Advertising); and two settings in which authority continues, Kinnari Mullick on section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Phoolchand on preliminary decrees.


I. The doctrine

What the phrase means

1Functus officio means having performed one’s office. Applied to a court or tribunal, it marks the end of the authority to decide a particular matter. An adjudicator who has finally decided a dispute cannot reconsider it because of second thoughts or a better argument. The remedy of the disappointed party lies elsewhere: in appeal, or in such power of review as the law gives.

2The rule serves finality, and it also protects the structure of adjudication. A decision that could be altered at any time by its maker would not settle anything, and the parties would have reason to keep lobbying the decision-maker. The law therefore picks a moment at which the power is spent. Two questions then follow. When exactly does that moment arrive? And what remains possible after it?

The English background

3The usual English statement is that of Fry L.J. in In re Suffield and Watts, Ex parte Brown:

In re St. Nazaire Co. (1879) 12 Ch. D. 88 shows that, when an order or judgment of the High Court has once been perfected, the court has no jurisdiction to alter it. So long as the order has not been perfected the Judge has a power of re-considering the matter, but, when once the order has been completed, the jurisdiction of the Judge over it has come to an end.In re Suffield and Watts, Ex parte Brown, (1888) 20 QBD 693, 697 (Fry L.J.), as quoted in Nanalal M. Varma & Co. v. Gordhandas Jerambhai, AIR 1965 Cal 547.

4The English test thus turns on perfection or entry of the order. As the next part shows, Indian law has a different reference point, tied to what the Indian procedural codes require.

II. When the authority ends

Courts: Surendra Singh

5Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh came to the Supreme Court because a judge of a two-judge High Court Bench had signed a judgment and then died, and the other judge delivered it later. Was it a judgment of both? The Court, speaking through Bose J., held that it was not. A judge may change his mind at any moment before delivery:

The final operative act is that which is formally declared in open court with the intention of making it the operative decision of the court. That is what constitutes the “judgment”. Now up to the moment the judgment is delivered Judges have the right to change their mind.Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 194, 1954 SCR 330 (Vivian Bose J.).

6Drafts, even signed ones, are not judgments. The Court said that “however, much a draft judgment may have been signed beforehand, it is nothing but a draft” until the moment of delivery. The decision establishes the outer limit: until delivery, the matter is still open.

Pronouncement, signature and date

7State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal gave the most precise modern statement. The respondent argued, relying on an English decision, that the appointing authority in a disciplinary matter became functus officio as soon as it noted its agreement with a proposed penalty. Raveendran J. observed that the English decision spoke of an order having been entered, which is a formal procedure peculiar to English civil practice, and turned to the Indian position. A judge may make corrections after an open-court dictation, before signing and dating:

Therefore, a Judge becomes functus officio when he pronounces, signs and dates the judgment (subject to section 152 and power of review).State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal, (2008) 8 SCC 92 (R.V. Raveendran J.).

8Order XX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 reflects this. A judgment once signed cannot afterwards be altered or added to, save as provided by section 152 or on review.

Quasi-judicial authorities

9The same judgment explains why the rule differs for bodies that do not sit in open court:

A quasi judicial authority will become functus officio only when its order is pronounced, or published/notified or communicated (put in the course of transmission) to the party concerned. When an order is made in an office noting in a file but is not pronounced, published or communicated, nothing prevents the Authority from correcting it or altering it for valid reasons.S.N. Goyal, (2008) 8 SCC 92.

10So an internal note did not end the authority’s power in S.N. Goyal. The authority’s later order was within its competence, since no earlier order had gone out. The decision is often relied on in service matters, where such file notes are common.

III. Correction after the event

Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure

11The first exception is correction. Section 152 allows clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders, or errors arising from accidental slips or omissions, to be corrected by the court at any time. In Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho, the Court explained the provision’s basis:

The principle behind the provision is that no party should suffer due to mistake of the court and whatever is intended by the court while passing the order or decree must be properly reflected therein, otherwise it would only be destructive to the principle of advancing the cause of justice.Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho, (2001) 4 SCC 181 (Brijesh Kumar J.).

12The power’s limit lies in that word “intended”. The Court there refused to treat an application for modification as a correction under section 152, since it was not said that the court had intended to order the transfer of a flat and had failed to do so through a clerical error or accidental slip. The question is whether the order as written fails to capture what the court meant at the time, not whether the court should have meant something else.

Review on merits needs a statute

13The second exception is review, but only where the law gives the power. The Supreme Court stated the general rule in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji:

It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication.Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844, AIR 1970 SC 1273 (K.S. Hegde J.).

14In that case, an official’s order amounted to a review of a Government order, without any power to do so under the Act. Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania repeats the point for judicial and quasi-judicial orders: “unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable”, and a review made without such power is “ultra-vires, illegal and without jurisdiction”.Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437 (B.S. Chauhan J.).

Procedural review

15The law distinguishes such substantive review from correcting a procedural mistake. Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal drew the line, and Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. quotes it:

The expression ‘review’ is used in the two distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a mis-apprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record.Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, 1980 Supp SCC 420, as quoted in Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., (2005) 13 SCC 777 (B.P. Singh J.).

16It is in the second sense that no review lies without a statute. In the first sense, the correction of an inadvertent error is done ex debita justitiae, the Court said, and the power inheres in every court or tribunal. A classic example is an ex parte award made without notice, which Grindlays Bank treated as open to being set aside.

17Kapra Mazdoor also shows the limit. Having decided a reference, a tribunal cannot call an examination of a further issue on the merits a procedural matter. The Court rejected the submission that a mere illegality could justify the tribunal’s exercise of review, because it did not take notice of “the difference between a procedural review and a review on merits.”

IV. Criminal courts

The statutory bar

18The rule is stricter in criminal proceedings, because the Code says so. Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides that, save as otherwise provided by the Code or any other law, no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review it, except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. Section 403 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 now carries the same rule.

19State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala concerned the predecessor provisions. A High Court had reviewed its judgment and replaced a sentence of imprisonment with a fine, relying on its inherent power and on the argument that the old section 369 did not bind it. The Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal.State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala, (1979) 2 SCC 305, AIR 1979 SC 87 (P.S. Kailasam J.). Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa was blunter, in a case of a miscellaneous petition filed after the disposal of a main petition: “No review of an order is contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure.” After disposal there was “no lis pending in the High Court”.Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, (2001) 1 SCC 169 (Bench: K.T. Thomas and R.P. Sethi JJ.).

Bhullar and the exception for nullities

20State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar is the fullest statement. It said:

There is no power of review with the Criminal Court after judgment has been rendered. The High Court can alter or review its judgment before it is signed. When an order is passed, it cannot be reviewed. Section 362 Cr.P.C. is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a Court, the said Court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officioState of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770 (B.S. Chauhan J.).

21The Court added a qualification. If a judgment has been pronounced without jurisdiction, or in violation of natural justice, or without giving an opportunity of being heard to a party affected by it, or where it was obtained by abuse of process, “inherent powers can be exercised to recall such order”. The reason it gives is that in such an eventuality the order becomes a nullity. So the bar in section 362 applies to a valid decision, and a court recalling an order on those grounds is not reviewing on the merits.

22The dividing line matters in practice. An application under section 482 of the 1973 Code (now section 528 of the 2023 Sanhita) that rehearses the merits under the heading of recall will fail. One that shows a party was never heard stands on a different footing.

V. Where authority continues

Arbitration

23Section 32 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ends the proceedings with the final award and, with limited exceptions, the mandate of the tribunal with them. Section 33 gives the tribunal only a limited power to correct errors, give an interpretation or make an additional award, within stated times.

24The same concept applies to the court hearing a challenge. Kinnari Mullick v. Ghanshyam Das Damani concerned the limited power under section 34(4), by which the court may adjourn a challenge to allow the tribunal to eliminate the grounds for setting aside the award. The Court held that this cannot be done of the court’s own motion, and that it requires a written application made before the award is set aside. Once the main proceeding is disposed of, the court “would become functus officio”.Kinnari Mullick v. Ghanshyam Das Damani, (2018) 11 SCC 328 (A.M. Khanwilkar J.).

Preliminary decrees

25Not every decision that appears final ends the court’s authority over the suit. In a suit for partition, a preliminary decree settles shares, and a final decree follows. Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal recognised what can happen between the two. The Court said it was of opinion “that there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits the passing of more than one preliminary decree if circumstances justify the same”. It reasoned that “the suit is not over till the final decree is passed and the court has jurisdiction to decide all disputes that may arise after the preliminary decree”.Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1470, (1967) 3 SCR 153, as quoted in Ganduri Koteshwaramma v. Chakiri Yanadi, (2011) 9 SCC 788. Ganduri Koteshwaramma applied the same thinking, on the footing that a partition suit remains pending until then. A court in that position has not spent its authority, because its task is not finished.

VI. The criminal rule in more detail

Hari Singh Mann

26The strongest statement of the criminal rule appears in Hari Singh Mann:

Section 362 of the Code mandates that no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. The Section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a Court, the said Court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or arithmetical error.Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, (2001) 1 SCC 169, AIR 2001 SC 43.

27The Court also rejected reliance on Talab Haji Hussain, in which the inherent powers of the High Court had been discussed. It said that those powers have “to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.”

Simrikhia and inherent power

28Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee shows how section 482 relates to the bar. A complaint had been made under sections 323 and 452 of the Penal Code. The first petition under section 482 was dismissed. A second was then filed, on the same material, saying that the case had not been taken cognizance of before transfer, and the High Court quashed the proceedings. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal:

The inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and to secure ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. If any consideration of the facts by way of review is not permissible under the Code and is expressly barred, it is not for the Court to exercise its inherent power to reconsider the matter and record a conflicting decision. If there had been change in the circumstances of the case, it would be in order for the High Court to exercise its inherent power in the prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. Where there is no such changed circumstance and the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that existed as on the date of earlier order, the exercise of the power to reconsider the same materials to arrive at different conclusion is in effect a review, which is expressly barred under section 362.Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, (1990) 2 SCC 437, AIR 1990 SC 1605, reported headnote.

29Two points are important here. The bar operates whatever label is given to the application, because the Court looks at the substance. A second application on the same materials is treated as a review. And there is an exception for changed circumstances. A later application based on a real change in the facts is not a review of the earlier order, because the court is being asked to decide a different question.

Vishnu Agarwal and non-appearance

30Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U.P. tests the rule on a sympathetic set of facts. A criminal revision had been decided when counsel for the revisionist was not present, because the case had not been noted. The High Court, on an application alleging that the case had been shown in a different list, recalled the order and listed the matter for fresh hearing. The order of recall was challenged by reference to Hari Singh Mann. Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra JJ. noted that “It often happens that sometimes a case is not noted by the Counsel or his clerk in the cause list, and hence, the Counsel does not appear. This is a human mistake and can happen to anyone.” The appellant relied on Hari Singh Mann. The Court declined to agree, saying that “Section 362 cannot be considered in a rigid and over technical manner to defeat the ends of justice.” It added that the application was one for recall and not for review, and it relied on Asit Kumar v. State of West Bengal:

There is a distinction between ...... a review petition and a recall petition. While in a review petition, the Court considers on merits whether there is an error apparent on the face of the record, in a recall petition the Court does not go into the merits but simply recalls an order which was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to an affected party.Asit Kumar v. State of West Bengal, 2009 (1) SCR 469, as quoted in Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U.P., Supreme Court, 2011 (Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra JJ.).

31The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court’s recall stood. This fits the distinction made in Bhullar between a review on the merits and the recall of an order passed without hearing a party. There is some tension with the firmness of Hari Singh Mann, and the line between a party who was never given a chance and a party who failed to use one is likely to matter. Counsel should not assume that every non-appearance will be treated as a ground for recall.

VII. The administrative side

Bachhittar Singh and communication

32The rule on administrative and quasi-judicial orders has a well-known older source, which S.N. Goyal carries forward. In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, a Revenue Minister in Pepsu had noted on the file, in an appeal by a dismissed public servant, that dismissal would be too hard and that he should be reverted as a qanungo. No order to that effect was served. After the merger with Punjab, the file reached the Chief Minister, who confirmed the dismissal, and that order was communicated. The public servant argued that the Chief Minister could not sit in review of the Revenue Minister’s order. The Court rejected this:

Until the order was so communicated it was only of a provisional character and could be reconsidered over and over again. Before communication the order was binding neither on the appellant nor on the State Government.Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 713, reported headnote.

33The reasoning connected this with Article 166(1) of the Constitution, which requires executive action of the Government of a State to be expressed in the name of the Governor. It gives a second reason why a file noting is not an order. It may be only an internal stage in reaching a decision.

34The same passage also contains a further statement. “Any action decided to be taken against a public servant found guilty misconduct is a judicial order and as such it cannot be varied at-the will of the authority.” So once an order has become final by being communicated, the authority cannot simply change its mind. The law is thus in two parts. Before communication, an authority can change its mind as much as it likes. Afterwards, it has only such power as the statute gives.

Fraud and the power of recall

35Another qualification arises from fraud. Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. dealt with a Consumer Commission’s order that had been obtained, it was alleged, on the basis of a forged letter. It said:

the Authorities, be they Constitutional, Statutory or Administrative, (and particularly those who have to decide a lis) possess the power to recall their judgments or orders if they are obtained by fraud as Fraud and Justice never dwell together (Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant).Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550, AIR 1996 SC 2592 (S. Saghir Ahmad J.).

36This is a major exception, and it is not a matter of review. It rests on the idea that a judgment obtained by fraud on the court cannot stand. The companion entry on fraud deals with this subject in more detail. In relation to functus officio, it means that an authority that has discovered it was deceived does not need any statutory power of review in order to act. The fraud must be established with care, and a mere allegation of wrong evidence does not meet the test.

VIII. What is the difference between an appeal and a return to the same forum?

37The cases draw attention to the different roles of different proceedings. An appeal is to another forum, on a broad range of grounds. A review goes back to the same forum, on narrow grounds, and it exists only by statute. Recall goes back to the same forum where the order is a nullity or was obtained by fraud. Correction goes back to the same forum to give effect to what was actually decided. Execution is not a return to adjudication at all. The entry on the executing court discusses that in more detail.

38The practical difficulty is that a party often does not know which route to use. Three rules of thumb may help. If the party disagrees with the reasoning or the result, the only route is an appeal, or a statutory review where its conditions are met. If the party was never heard, or if the court had no power at all, recall or a challenge for nullity may be available. And if what is written is not what was decided, section 152 or the equivalent is the answer.

IX. Timing issues

Reserved judgments

39Surendra Singh raises one further practical question. If a judge has heard a case and has reserved judgment, then retires or dies before delivering it, the case must be reheard. A draft found among the judge’s papers has no effect. The Court there said that “A judgment is the final decision of the court intimated to the parties and the world at large by formal ‘pronouncement or ‘delivery’ in open court and until a judgment is delivered the judges have a right to change their mind.” The case was therefore ordered to be reheard.Surendra Singh, AIR 1954 SC 194, reported headnote.

40That raises the question of a judge who has pronounced the operative part, with reasons to follow. A court in that position has given a decision. The order and the reasons are then expected to follow without delay, and such a judge cannot later change the operative part. A judge who has pronounced an order and then dies before giving reasons presents a real difficulty, and reports of cases on the point should be consulted.

Between pronouncement and signature

41S.N. Goyal states that a judge becomes functus officio when the judge “pronounces, signs and dates the judgment”. It follows that between dictation in open court and signature, a judge retains some power to make changes. The practical significance is limited, because such changes are not meant to be changes in substance. Where the operative part has been pronounced in open court and the parties have acted on it, a later and different written order will be regarded with great suspicion. A party in that position would have a good ground of appeal.

X. Arbitration: the 2021 and later decisions

42A further point concerns the court hearing a challenge under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. A court may set aside an award, but the question of whether it can modify an award has been the subject of later decisions, including Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem, (2021) 9 SCC 1, and Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., a 2025 decision of a Constitution Bench. Those decisions could not be read in full for this entry, and the current position should be confirmed in the reports. They are mentioned here because they are concerned with the same basic issue: how far a body whose task has ended, or a court supervising that body, can alter a decision that has been made.

XI. The effect of a later change in the law

43A later change in the law does not usually reopen a final judgment. A party who lost on the law as it stood cannot go back to the same court when a later decision changes the view of the law. Finality would have no meaning otherwise. The Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure says so in respect of a review: the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. That is a clear statement of the same policy.

44A retrospective statute stands on a different footing, as the entry on the executing court notes in discussing Sunder Dass. There the change comes from the legislature, and the effect on a decided case depends on what the statute says. It is the legislature’s act that operates, and the court that made the decree is not reconsidering it.

XII. The position today

45A court’s authority over a matter is at an end when the judgment has been pronounced, signed and dated, subject to section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure and to any power of review. A quasi-judicial authority’s power ends when its order is pronounced, published, notified or communicated, and an unpublished file note does not have that effect. Clerical errors and accidental slips can be corrected, so long as the correction records what was intended. Review on the merits exists only if a statute confers it. Procedural review, to undo an error of procedure or an order made without notice, is treated as inherent or implied. A criminal court has no power to alter a signed judgment except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error, but an order that is a nullity because of a lack of jurisdiction or a failure of hearing can be recalled. A court continues to have jurisdiction where the proceeding remains open, as in the interval between a preliminary and a final decree.

46The practical question for a litigant who wishes to return to the same forum is therefore what power is being invoked. The answer must be a specific one: section 152, a statutory review, or recall of a nullity. A request for the court simply to look again has no foundation once the office has been performed.


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