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2026 FPR EDC 5 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/frustration

DC-0021Doctrines · Contract · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 5

FPR Editors27 October 2026 · 2,917 words

Frustration

Under section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a contract becomes void when, after it is made, its performance becomes impossible or unlawful through an event the promisor could not prevent; "impossible" means not only physically impossible but impracticable and useless for the object the parties had in view, where a supervening event upsets the very foundation of their bargain; but a contract is not frustrated because performance has become more onerous or less profitable, where the contract itself provides for the event, where the impossibility is self-induced, or where the transaction is a completed transfer such as a lease.

Abstract

The doctrine of frustration releases parties from a contract when an event after it was made destroys the basis on which they contracted. This entry sets out section 56 of the Indian Contract Act and its English background, from the absolute rule of Paradine v. Jane through Taylor v. Caldwell, the coronation cases, and Davis Contractors. It then examines Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur (1953), which held that section 56 is exhaustive and that "impossible" is to be read in a practical sense; the line between section 56 and contractual provisions under section 32 (Satyabrata Ghose, Energy Watchdog); the exclusion of mere hardship and of self-induced impossibility (Alopi Parshad, Naihati Jute Mills, Energy Watchdog); the inapplicability of section 56 to leases (Raja Dhruv Dev Chand); restitution under section 65; and applications in the partition, the Suez crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.


I. The doctrine

Section 56

1The doctrine of frustration is stated in India in section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The first paragraph provides that an agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void. The second, which governs frustration, provides:

A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.

2The third paragraph provides that where a promisor knew, or with reasonable diligence might have known, that the promised act was impossible or unlawful, and the promisee did not know it, the promisor must compensate the promisee for loss sustained through non-performance.

The idea

3The law ordinarily holds parties to their bargains. A party who agrees to do something must do it or pay damages, even if events make performance harder than expected. Frustration is the exception. Where an event after the contract is made, for which neither party is responsible, makes performance impossible, or so changes the circumstances that performance would be something different from what was agreed, the contract comes to an end and both parties are discharged.

II. The English background

Paradine v. Jane (1647)

4The early common-law rule was strict. In Paradine v. Jane, a lessee was held liable for rent although he had been driven off the land by an invading army.Paradine v. Jane, (1647) Aleyn 26, 82 ER 897. The court distinguished a duty imposed by law, from which a party disabled without default is excused, from a duty a party creates by contract, which he must perform, since he might have provided against the accident in the contract.

Taylor v. Caldwell (1863)

5The modern doctrine began with Taylor v. Caldwell.Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 3 B & S 826, 122 ER 309. A music hall hired for a series of concerts burned down before the first concert. Blackburn J. held that neither party was liable. Where the contract shows that the parties contracted on the basis of the continued existence of a particular thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from its perishing shall excuse performance. In his words:

in contracts in which the performance depends on the continued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the performanceTaylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 3 B & S 826; quoted in Saurabh Garg v. Shiv Valet Cabs and Services Pvt. Ltd. (District Court, Saket, Delhi, 18 October 2025).

The coronation cases

6The doctrine was extended to the frustration of a common purpose. In Krell v. Henry, rooms were hired to view the coronation procession of Edward VII. When the procession was cancelled because of the King’s illness, the Court of Appeal held the contract discharged, because viewing the procession was the foundation of the contract for both parties.Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 KB 740 (C.A.). In Herne Bay Steam Boat Co. v. Hutton, decided by the same court, a boat had been hired to view the naval review and cruise round the fleet; the review was cancelled, but the fleet remained, and the contract was held not frustrated, because the hirer’s purpose was his own and not the foundation of the contract for both sides.Herne Bay Steam Boat Co. v. Hutton, [1903] 2 KB 683 (C.A.).

Davis Contractors (1956)

7The English courts explained the doctrine at first by an implied term, and later as a matter of construction. In Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council, contractors who had agreed to build houses for a fixed price found that a shortage of labour made the work much longer and costlier. The House of Lords held that the contract was not frustrated. Lord Radcliffe stated the test that has been followed since:

frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that without default of either party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contractDavis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council, [1956] AC 696 (H.L.) (Lord Radcliffe); quoted in Industrial Finance Corporation of India v. Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., (2002) 5 SCC 54.

8He summed up the idea in a Latin phrase: “Non haec in foedera veni. It was not this that I promised to do.” Hardship, inconvenience or loss do not of themselves frustrate a contract; there must be such a change in the significance of the obligation that performance would be a different thing from what was contracted for.

III. Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur (1953)

The case

9The leading Indian authority is Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., decided by a Bench of B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose and N.H. Bhagwati JJ., in a judgment of Mukherjea J.Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 SC 44, (1954) SCR 310 (Mukherjea J.). A company had undertaken a scheme to develop land in Calcutta into plots, with roads and drains, and had agreed to sell plots to purchasers, taking earnest money. During the Second World War, part of the land was requisitioned by the Government for military purposes. The company told a purchaser that it could not make the roads and drains while the requisition lasted, and that the contract was cancelled. The purchaser’s successor sued for a declaration that the contract still subsisted.

Section 56 is exhaustive

10Mukherjea J. began by placing the doctrine within the Act. The English courts had used different theories to explain frustration, but in India the question was governed by statute:

to the extent that the Indian Contract Act deals with a particular subject, it is exhaustive upon the same and it is not permissible to import the principles of English law dehors these statutory provisions.Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 SC 44.

11The English theories, he said, “really do not concern us so long as we have a statutory provision in the Indian Contract Act”. In deciding cases in India, the only doctrine to go by is that of supervening impossibility or illegality under section 56. English decisions may help in understanding the section, but they are of persuasive value only.

The meaning of “impossible”

12Mukherjea J. then explained the key word:

This much is clear that the word “impossible” has not been used here in the sense of physical or literal impossibility. The performance of an act may not be literally impossible but it may be impracticable and useless from the point of view of the object and purpose which the parties had in view; and if an untoward event or change of circumstances totally upset the very foundation upon which the parties rested their bargain, it can very well be said that the promisor finds it impossible to do the act which he promised to do.Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 SC 44.

13The passage reconciles the statutory wording with the English doctrine. Section 56 is the only source of the rule, but “impossible” is read in a practical sense, so that the section covers what English law calls frustration of the adventure.

The result

14On the facts, the contract was not frustrated. No time had been fixed for making the roads and drains, and the company had not undertaken to finish them within a particular period. The requisition was temporary in nature:

the requisition orders, it must be remembered, were by their very nature of a temporary character and the requisitioning authorities could in law occupy the position of a licensee in regard to the requisitioned property.Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 SC 44.

15The delay might be inconvenient, but it did not destroy the basis of the bargain. The company remained bound.

Section 56 and section 32

16The Court also distinguished two situations. Where the contract itself, expressly or by implication, provides for the contract to come to an end on the happening of an event, the case is one of a contingent contract under section 32, which provides that a contingent contract becomes void if the event on which it depends becomes impossible. Where the contract makes no such provision, the case is governed by section 56. In the first, the parties have allocated the risk; in the second, the law intervenes because they did not.

IV. Limits

Hardship is not frustration

17The commonest argument for frustration is that performance has become far more expensive or less profitable. The courts have consistently rejected it. In Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, agents who had contracted to supply ghee to the army at fixed rates claimed higher rates because of the rise in prices during the war.Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 588, (1960) 2 SCR 793 (Shah J.). J.C. Shah J. held:

The Indian Contract Act does not enable a party to a contract to ignore the express covenants thereof, and to claim payment of consideration for performance of the contract at rates different from the stipulated rates, on some vague plea of equity.Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 588.

18Parties to an executory contract, he continued, are often faced with events they did not anticipate, such as “a wholly abnormal rise or fall in prices, a sudden depreciation of currency, an unexpected obstacle to execution, or the like”, but this does not in itself affect the bargain. Only if the terms of the contract, read in the light of the circumstances when it was made, show that the parties never agreed to be bound in the fundamentally different situation that has arisen, does the contract cease to bind.

19In Naihati Jute Mills Ltd. v. Khyaliram Jagannath, the Court said that “The Courts have no general power to absolve a party from the performance of his part of the contract merely because its performance has become onerous on account of an unforeseen turn of events.”Naihati Jute Mills Ltd. v. Khyaliram Jagannath, AIR 1968 SC 522, (1968) 1 SCR 821. The buyers of jute to be imported from Pakistan, who had undertaken to obtain the import licence, were not discharged when they failed to obtain it, since the contract itself provided what was to happen in that event.

Energy Watchdog (2017)

20The same principles were applied in Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission.Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2017) 14 SCC 80, AIR 2017 SC (Supp) 43 (Nariman J.). Power companies that had agreed to supply electricity at tariffs based on imported Indonesian coal claimed relief after a change in Indonesian law raised the price of coal. R.F. Nariman J., for the Court, explained the two routes to discharge. In so far as discharge is relatable to an express or implied clause in a contract, such as the power purchase agreements, it is governed by section 32; otherwise, by section 56. On the merits, he held:

it is clear that an unexpected rise in the price of coal will not absolve the generating companies from performing their part of the contract for the very good reason that when they submitted their bids this was a risk they knowingly took.Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2017) 14 SCC 80.

21The force majeure clause in the agreements did not apply, and the contracts were not frustrated. The Court held, however, that a change in Indian law affecting the supply of domestic coal was within the change-in-law clause, and remitted that question to the Commission.

Alternative modes of performance

22A contract is not frustrated if it can still be performed in another way, even if that way is more difficult or expensive. The House of Lords so held in Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd. v. Noblee Thorl GmbH, where the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 lengthened the voyage around the Cape of Good Hope but did not frustrate a contract for the shipment of groundnuts.Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd. v. Noblee Thorl GmbH, [1962] AC 93 (H.L.).

Self-induced impossibility

23Section 56 requires an event “which the promisor could not prevent”. A party whose own act or election brings about the impossibility cannot rely on it; in English law, the party alleging that frustration was self-induced must prove it.Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd., [1942] AC 154 (H.L.).

V. Leases and completed transfers

24Section 56 applies to contracts to do an act in the future. It does not dissolve a transaction that has already transferred an interest in property. In Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v. Raja Harmohinder Singh, a lessee of agricultural land in what became Pakistan sought a refund of rent, on the ground that communal riots before the partition had made it impossible for non-Muslims to stay and cultivate the land.Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v. Raja Harmohinder Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1024, (1968) 3 SCR 339 (Shah J.). The Court held that where the property leased is not destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit, the lessee cannot avoid the lease even if he is unable to use the land for the purpose for which it was let, because a lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy the land:

There is a clear distinction between a completed conveyance and an executory contract, and events which discharge a contract do not invalidate a concluded transfer.Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v. Raja Harmohinder Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1024.

25The rule is subject to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, under which a lessee may avoid a lease if the property is wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit by fire, tempest or other irresistible force. The distinction was applied in commercial leases during the COVID-19 pandemic.Ramanand v. Dr. Girish Soni, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 635.

VI. Consequences

26When a contract becomes void under section 56, section 65 requires any person who has received an advantage under it to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. Indian law thus avoids the rule once applied in England, under which money paid before frustration could not be recovered, a rule the House of Lords later abandoned.Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 KB 493 (C.A.); Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd., [1943] AC 32 (H.L.).

27In Sushila Devi v. Hari Singh, a lease of land in a village that became part of Pakistan had been agreed before the partition, but possession had not been given. After the partition, it was impossible for the lessees to take possession or for the lessor to give it, and the Court held the agreement frustrated under section 56 and the lessees entitled to the return of the money they had paid.Sushila Devi v. Hari Singh, AIR 1971 SC 1756, (1971) 2 SCC 288 (Hegde J.). The case illustrates the line drawn in Dhruv Dev Chand: an executory agreement to lease can be frustrated; a completed lease, ordinarily, cannot.

VII. Recent applications

Export restrictions

28In National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India v. Alimenta S.A., the federation had contracted to export groundnut kernels, but the Government refused permission for the export.National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India v. Alimenta S.A., (2020) 19 SCC 260 (Arun Mishra J.). The Court held that “export became impossible due to Government’s refusal”, and that the federation was not liable in damages, since the contract, by its terms, provided for such an event. The case is an instance of the section 32 route described in Satyabrata Ghose and Energy Watchdog.

Delay caused by regulatory uncertainty

29In Delhi Development Authority v. Kenneth Builders & Developers Ltd., the Court held that the contract had become impossible of performance within the meaning of section 56, because it had taken years to obtain clarity, eventually provided by a report of the Central Empowered Committee, on whether the work could lawfully be done.Delhi Development Authority v. Kenneth Builders & Developers Ltd., (2016) 13 SCC 561.

The pandemic

30The COVID-19 pandemic produced many claims of frustration and force majeure. The High Courts generally held that the pandemic did not of itself frustrate contracts, that relief depended on the terms of force majeure clauses where they existed, and that section 56 did not apply to leases.Halliburton Offshore Services Inc. v. Vedanta Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 542; Standard Retail Pvt. Ltd. v. M.V. Trade Grace, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 704. The approach follows Satyabrata Ghose, Energy Watchdog and Dhruv Dev Chand.

VIII. Criticisms

31The doctrine has been criticised on two grounds. The first is that the reading of “impossible” in Satyabrata Ghose gives the courts a broad discretion. Whether an event has “totally upset the very foundation” of a bargain is a matter of judgment, and the line between a radical change and mere hardship is not always clear. The second is that the all-or-nothing result of section 56, which ends the contract altogether, is a blunt instrument for long-term contracts, where a court might do better to adjust the bargain. Indian law does not permit adjustment; as Alopi Parshad holds, a court cannot award rates different from those agreed on a plea of equity. Parties who want flexibility must provide for it in the contract, through force majeure, change-in-law or price-variation clauses, which will then be enforced under section 32.

IX. The position today

32The law on frustration in India may be stated in seven propositions.

331. Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act is exhaustive. English decisions may help in understanding it, but the question in India is whether the case falls within the section (Satyabrata Ghose).

342. “Impossible” in section 56 is not limited to physical or literal impossibility. It includes cases where performance has become impracticable and useless for the object the parties had in view, because a supervening event has totally upset the foundation of their bargain (Satyabrata Ghose).

353. Where the contract itself, expressly or by implication, provides for the event, the case is governed by the contract and section 32; section 56 applies where the contract makes no such provision (Satyabrata Ghose; Energy Watchdog; NAFED v. Alimenta).

364. A contract is not frustrated because performance has become more onerous, more expensive or less profitable, as by a rise in prices or a fall in the value of money (Alopi Parshad; Naihati Jute Mills; Energy Watchdog), or because an alternative mode of performance is more difficult (Tsakiroglou).

375. The impossibility must result from an event the promisor could not prevent; self-induced impossibility does not discharge the contract (section 56; Joseph Constantine).

386. Section 56 does not dissolve a completed lease or other transfer of property; a lessee’s remedies are under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Raja Dhruv Dev Chand). An executory agreement to lease may be frustrated (Sushila Devi).

397. When a contract becomes void, a party who has received an advantage under it must restore it or make compensation under section 65 (Sushila Devi).


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  • Published · 27 October 2026

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