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2026 FPR EDC 18 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/feeding-the-grant

DC-0067Doctrines · Property · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 18

FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 11,510 words

Feeding the Grant by Estoppel

Under section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents authority to transfer immovable property and professes to transfer it for consideration, the transfer operates at the transferee's option on any interest the transferor later acquires while the contract subsists, provided the transferee acted on the representation; a transferee who knew the truth does not benefit, and a void transfer cannot be fed.

Abstract

A person who sells land without owning it may later come to own it. Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 lets the buyer claim the benefit of that later acquisition. This entry sets out the section and its background in the rule of feeding the estoppel, as stated in Rajapakse v. Fernando and Renu Devi v. Mahendra Singh; the effect of Jumma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah on the relationship with section 6(a); the requirement of acting on the representation in Ram Pyare v. Ram Narain and Jharu Ram Roy v. Kamjit Roy; the requirement of a subsisting contract in Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh; and the rule that an invalid transfer cannot be fed in Ram Bhawan Singh v. Jagdish.


I. The rule

Section 43

1Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides:

Where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists.Transfer of Property Act, 1882, s. 43, as set out in The Jumma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, AIR 1962 SC 847, and in Jharu Ram Roy v. Kamjit Roy, (2009) 4 SCC 60.

2The second paragraph adds that nothing in the section shall impair the right of transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option. The illustration describes a person who sells three fields as if authorised, one of which in fact belongs to his father, and who later becomes entitled on the father’s death. The buyer can claim the field, if the contract has not been rescinded.

3The section reflects simple fairness. A seller who has taken money on the footing of owning the property cannot, on later becoming its owner, say to the buyer that the sale meant nothing.

The English background

4The name for the rule comes from English law. Renu Devi v. Mahendra Singh describes it this way:

The doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel which is in essence a principle of equity stands statutorily recognised in India by Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act.Renu Devi v. Mahendra Singh, (2003) 10 SCC 200, AIR 2003 SC 1608 (R.C. Lahoti J.).

5The Court then referred to the rule “as recognized in English law and set out in Rajapakse v. Fernando, (1920) AC 892, 897”, under which a grantor who purports to grant an interest in land which the grantor does not yet possess, but later acquires, finds the later acquisition going to the grantee automatically. Renu Devi itself concerned a deed that was not a transfer for consideration, and the Court noted that section 43 did not in terms apply. It cited the section only as an illustration of the doctrine.

6The Indian section differs from the English form in one respect. It does not say the benefit passes automatically. It says the transfer operates “at the option of the transferee”. That reflects the fact that a buyer who discovers the defect may prefer to rescind and recover the price.

II. The conditions

The two conditions

7Kartar Singh v. Harbans Kaur reduces the provision to two conditions:

A reading clearly shows that for application of Section 43 of the Act, two conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, that there is a fraudulent or erroneous representation made by the transferor to the transferee that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and in the purported exercise of authority, professed to transfer such property for consideration.Kartar Singh v. Harbans Kaur, (1994) 4 SCC 730 (K. Ramaswamy J.).

8The second condition is the discovery of the defect and the later acquisition, as the same judgment explains, during the subsistence of the contract. Taking these with the rest of the section, the elements are a representation of authority to transfer, a professed transfer of immovable property for consideration, the acquisition of an interest by the transferor, and a contract of transfer that is still in existence.

Fraudulent or erroneous

9The seller’s state of mind does not matter. Ram Pyare v. Ram Narain says this directly:

Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act embodies a rule of estoppel and enacts that a person who makes a representation shall not be heard to allege the contrary as against a person who acts on that representation. It matters not whether the transferor acted fraudulently or innocently in making the representation. What is material is that he did make a representation and the transferee has acted on it.Ram Pyare v. Ram Narain, AIR 1985 SC 694, (1985) 2 SCC 162 (O. Chinnappa Reddy J.), reported headnote.

Acting on the representation

10This last point is the most litigated. The same passage continues:

Where the transferee knew as a fact that the transferor did not possess the title which he represents he has, then he cannot be said to have acted on it when taking a transfer. Section 43 would then have no application and the transfer will fail under s 6(a). But where the transferee does act on the representation, there is no reason why he should not have the benefit of the equitable doctrine embodied in s. 43, however, fraudulent the act of the transferor might have been.Ram Pyare, AIR 1985 SC 694, reported headnote.

11So the buyer must have believed what was said. A party who knew the truth has no complaint. Jharu Ram Roy v. Kamjit Roy is a stark example. The transferor had claimed a right of succession when the true owner was alive. The courts found that the appellant “was a party to the fraud” because he “was, at all material times, aware” that the person was alive and not dead. On those facts, a three-judge Bench said that the provisions of section 43 “cannot be said to have any application”, and the appeal was dismissed.Jharu Ram Roy, (2009) 4 SCC 60.

Section 43 and section 41 compared

12Section 43 should be contrasted with section 41, on the ostensible owner. Section 41 protects a transferee only if, in terms of the proviso, the transferee has taken “reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer”. Section 43 has no such proviso. It requires the transferee to have acted on the representation. A buyer who failed to make searches may still have believed the seller. Actual knowledge defeats the claim, but a lack of diligence as such is not in the words of the section. That does not mean a buyer can ignore what the deed itself discloses, as the discussion of Kartar Singh below explains. Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh notes that the two provisions are distinct, in a case where a High Court had denied the benefit of section 41 but upheld a claim under section 43.Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh, (2007) 2 SCC 404, AIR 2007 SC 1058 (S.B. Sinha J.).

III. Section 6(a) and Jumma Masjid

The conflict

13Section 6(a) of the Act provides that the chance of an heir apparent succeeding to an estate, or any other mere possibility of a like nature, cannot be transferred. If a person with only a hope of inheritance sells the land as if owner, and later inherits, should section 6(a) void the transfer, or does section 43 feed it? The High Courts had differed.

The decision

14The Jumma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah settled the matter. Persons claiming to be reversioners to the estate of one Nanjundappa sold the property, reciting that it had devolved on them. In truth it was held by another widow, Gangamma, and they had only a hope of succeeding her. On her death one of the vendors released his half to the appellant mosque, which sued for possession, saying the earlier vendors had only a spes successionis, so the sale was void. Venkatarama Aiyar J., for a Bench of four judges, rejected the argument. The facts are set out more fully below. The reported headnote gives the holding:

Held, that where a person transfers property representing that he has a present interest therein, whereas he has, in fact, only a spes successionis, the transferee is entitled to the benefit of s. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, if he has taken the transfer for consideration and on the faith of the representation.Jumma Masjid, AIR 1962 SC 847, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 554, reported headnote.

15It added that apart from the exception for good-faith transferees, section 43 “is absolute and unqualified in its operation”. It “applies to all transfers which fulfil the conditions prescribed therein”, and “it makes no difference in its application whether the defect of title in the transferor arises by reason of his having no interest in the property, or of his interest therein being that of an expectant heir.”

Why there is no conflict

16The Court explained why the two sections are compatible: they operate in different fields and under different conditions. “There is no necessary conflict between them, and the ambit of one cannot be cut down by reference to the other. Section 6(a) enacts a rule of substantive law, while s. 43 enacts a rule of estoppel which is one of evidence.” A sale that is openly a sale of a hope is caught by section 6(a), and section 43 cannot help since there is no representation of a present title. A sale made as if with present title is within section 43.

17The illustration to section 43 had been used to argue for a narrower meaning, since it describes a son who becomes entitled on his father’s death. The Court said that if the language of a section clearly excludes certain matters, an illustration cannot be used to enlarge it. It also said that an illustration is not to be readily assumed to be repugnant to the section and rejected. Later cases cite this holding when the section’s scope is argued.

IV. Limits

A subsisting contract

18The later acquisition must arise “at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists”. A contract that has been rescinded by the buyer or otherwise brought to an end cannot be fed. This is the second limb referred to in cases on the section. In Hardev Singh the Court quoted from an earlier decision the point that if the transferor later acquires the property, “the transferee becomes entitled to it, if the transfer has not meantime been thrown up or cancelled and is subsisting”.

Void transfers

19The section operates on a transfer that is otherwise effective except for the lack of title. Kartar Singh says this of a transfer of a minor’s share:

A void contract is no contract in the eye of law and was never in existence so the second limb of Section 43 is not satisfied.Kartar Singh, (1994) 4 SCC 730, quoted in Hardev Singh, (2007) 2 SCC 404, which distinguished it because the sale before it was not void.

20Similarly, the catchwords of Ram Bhawan Singh v. Jagdish state: “Estoppel by deed doctrine inapplicable if the transfer is invalid.”Ram Bhawan Singh v. Jagdish, (1990) 4 SCC 309 (M. Fathima Beevi J.), reported headnote. The question there arose from a mortgage and claims to tenancy rights under the Uttar Pradesh consolidation law. The point is that the doctrine remedies the defect of a want of title. It does not validate what the law forbids.

Statutory prohibitions

21The same reasoning limits the doctrine where a statute prohibits a transfer on public grounds. Ram Pyare shows a careful application. A person holding sirdari rights in Uttar Pradesh deposited an amount under section 134 of the State’s land law, in order to obtain bhumidhari rights, and on that same day executed a sale deed, before the certificate was issued. The certificate came later. It was argued that he had no right to transfer when he did so. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and applied section 43, since the requirement had been complied with, and the transferor had in that sense acted on what was permitted, with the title then being acquired.

22The contrast is with a transfer by someone whose land law forbids alienation outright, or where a protective statute would be defeated if the buyer could claim. Courts are not likely to use the rule to give effect to what the statute prohibits. Each statute must be examined on its terms.

The rights of later purchasers

23The second paragraph of section 43 protects a later transferee “in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option”. A person who buys from the now-true owner, without knowing about the earlier sale, takes free of the first buyer’s option. Registration of the earlier deed may be relevant on the question of notice, in view of the definition of notice in section 3. A first buyer who wishes to protect the option should therefore assert it promptly, by a suit and, if appropriate, by steps that give notice.

Hereditary rights and representations

24Kartar Singh illustrates how these limits can combine. A mother sold land acquired by herself and her minor son, and the marginal note of the deed recorded that she was selling her own share and acting as guardian of the son for his. She later succeeded to the estate under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The buyer claimed the benefit of section 43 when the sale was declared void as to the son’s share. The High Court refused it, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, leaving open any cause of action the buyer might have under the contract against her. The deed itself told the buyer what the facts were. The reader should note how much such a recital can matter.

V. How the remedy works

The option

25The right belongs to the transferee. The transferor cannot insist that the buyer accept the later interest. A buyer who prefers to rescind and sue for the price may do that. Once the option is exercised, the transfer operates on the interest acquired. A suit may be needed if the transferor resists. The court then decides whether the conditions are satisfied, and whether the later acquisition is covered by the transfer.

Parties and evidence

26The plaintiff should plead the representation, its terms and where it appears, usually in the deed, together with the consideration paid, the buyer’s belief, the later acquisition and its date, the subsistence of the contract, and the exercise of the option. The most usable evidence of a representation is often the recital in the deed that the seller is the owner. Evidence of what the buyer knew will be central. A defendant will seek to show that the buyer knew the seller’s true position, for example from family relationships or from a recital that the buyer has misunderstood.

Part of the property

27Where the transferor acquires only a share of what was sold, the transfer can operate only on that share. A person who sold land believing the whole to be owned, when the seller’s interest later turns out to be a fraction, can pass only what the seller acquires. The Act speaks of “any interest which the transferor may acquire”.

VI. The reason for the rule

The problem the section answers

28The ordinary rule of conveyancing is that nobody can pass a better title than they hold. A deed by a person with no interest in the land carries nothing, however solemn its form. Section 43 does not disturb that rule at the date of the deed. On the day of the sale the buyer still has no title. What the section does is decide what happens if the seller later comes to hold what was sold. Without it, the seller would be free to keep the price, take the land, and tell the buyer that the deed had been empty from the start. With it, the seller is held to the words of the deed.

29The clearest modern statement of that purpose is in Tanu Ram Bora v. Promod Ch. Das, a two-judge decision of 2019 written by M.R. Shah J. The Court first restated the effect of the section:

Thus, if at the time of transfer, the vendor/transferor might have a defective title or have no title and/or no right or interest, however subsequently the transferor acquires the right, title or interest and the contract of transfer subsists, in that case at the option of the transferee, such a transfer is valid. In such a situation, the transferor cannot be permitted to challenge the transfer and/or the transferor has no option to raise the dispute in making the transfer.Tanu Ram Bora v. Promod Ch. Das, (2019) 4 SCC 173, AIR 2019 SC 927 (M.R. Shah J.).

30It then gave the reason:

The intention and objects behind Section 43 of the T.P. Act seems to be based on the principle of estoppel as well as the equity. The intention and objects seems to be that after procuring the money (sale consideration) and transferring the land, thereafter the transferor is estopped from saying that though he has sold/transferred the property/land on payment of sale consideration, still the transfer is not binding to him. That is why Section 43 of the T.P. Act gives an option to the transferee and not the transferor. The intention of Section 43 of the Act seems to be that no body can be permitted to take the benefits of his own wrong. In the facts and circumstances of the case, Section 43 of the Act would come into play and protect the rights of the original plaintiff.Tanu Ram Bora, (2019) 4 SCC 173.

31Two things in that passage matter later in this entry. The first is that the option belongs to the transferee and not to the transferor. The second is that the rule is put on two grounds, estoppel and equity, and the two do not always lead to the same place. A rule of estoppel asks what the buyer was led to believe. A rule of equity asks what the seller may fairly keep. Most of the hard cases on the section arise from the space between those two questions.

Estoppel in the general law

32The general rule of estoppel in India was for a long time found in section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and is now in section 121 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. It says that when one person has, by a declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another to believe a thing to be true and to act on that belief, neither that person nor their representative may deny the truth of the thing in a suit or proceeding between them. Section 43 has a family resemblance to that rule, and Jumma Masjid calls it a rule of estoppel. But it goes further than the Evidence Act in two ways.

33First, the Evidence Act only prevents a denial. It shuts a party’s mouth. It does not of itself pass any interest in land. Section 43 does more, since the transfer is said to “operate on” the interest later acquired. The language of the Supreme Court in Jumma Masjid is that the transfer “shall fasten itself on the title which the transferor subsequently acquires”. Second, section 43 reaches a representation that was merely erroneous, whereas the Evidence Act speaks of a person who has intentionally caused or permitted the belief. These differences are why the section has an independent life and why it is not treated as a mere application of the general rule.

Common law and equity

34Indian judgments describe the section as drawing on two distinct English sources. Renu Devi v. Mahendra Singh set out the classic account from Mulla’s commentary:

The Principle is based partly on the common law doctrine of estoppel by deed and partly on the equitable doctrine that a man who has promised more than he can perform must make good his contract when he acquires the power of performance. In Tilakdhari Lal v. Khedan Lal, Lord Buckmaster stated the rule of estoppel by deed as follows- “If a man who has no title whatever to property grants it by a conveyance which in form would carry the legal estate, and he subsequently acquires an interest sufficient to satisfy the grant, the estate, the instantly passes”.Renu Devi, (2003) 10 SCC 200, quoting Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act (9th edn, 2000) and Tilakdhari Lal v. Khedan Lal. The final phrase is as printed in the report.

35The Court recorded that “there is some doubt expressed by Indian scholars and authorities if the common law doctrine of ‘the estate instantly passes’ is applicable in India but there is no doubt that the doctrine of feeding the estoppel applies in India.” It added that “Equity treates that as done which ought to be done.”

36The doubt is easy to understand from the wording of section 43. Estoppel by deed, as Lord Buckmaster stated it, works by itself. The estate passes at once and the grantee need do nothing. The Indian section instead uses the words “at the option of the transferee”. An estate that passes only if the transferee chooses to take it cannot be said to pass instantly in the common law sense.

37The equitable strand has a separate source, often traced to Holroyd v. Marshall. A Patna High Court judgment gives this summary:

In Holroyd v. Marshall, (1860-62) 10 H. L. C. 191 : (33 L. J. Ch. 193) the House of Lords decided that if the future goods which were to form the subject of a future sale or mortgage were sufficiently earmarked at the time of the contract and were such that equity might decree specific performance of it, equity will place the property in a state of anticipatory isolation so as to give the beneficial interest therein to the intended transferee, directly the property comes into existence or falls into the hands of the intending transferor.Abdul Kabir v. Mt. Jamila Khatoon, AIR 1951 Pat 315. The English decision was not read directly for this entry.

38The difference between the two sources explains the second paragraph of section 43. At common law the legal estate went straight to the grantee, so a later purchaser from the grantor would find nothing left to buy. In equity the first buyer’s right was an equity only, and a good-faith purchaser of the legal estate without notice could take free of it. The Indian section keeps the direct operation of the deed on the later title, so that no fresh conveyance is needed, but it also keeps the protection of the later purchaser. In that sense it takes something from each source. That account of the drafting is an inference from the words of the section and from what the courts have said about its sources, and not a holding of any one case.

The illustration

39The whole of the illustration deserves reading, since Jumma Masjid gave it such weight:

A, a Hindu, who has separated from his father B, sells to C three fields, X, Y and Z, representing that A is authorized to transfer the same. Of these fields Z does not belong to A, it having been retained by B on the partition; but on B’s dying A as heir obtains Z. C, not having rescinded the contract of sale, may require A to deliver Z to him.Transfer of Property Act, 1882, s. 43, illustration, as set out in Jumma Masjid, AIR 1962 SC 847.

40Three points come out of it. The seller’s title to field Z was bad from the first. The later right to it came by inheritance and not by any further dealing with the buyer. And the buyer’s right is conditional on not having rescinded. The illustration also shows the sale being good for the fields X and Y in any event, so that section 43 is needed only for the part of the sale that failed.

VII. Jumma Masjid in detail

The facts

41The facts of the leading case are more intricate than the headnote suggests, and they are worth setting out because they show how the section operates against third parties who claim through the seller.

42There was a joint family of three brothers, Santhappa, Nanjundappa and Basappa. Santhappa died unmarried. Basappa died in 1901, leaving a widow, Gangamma. Nanjundappa died in 1907, leaving a widow, Ammakka, who succeeded to the family properties as his heir. When Ammakka died in 1910, the estate went to three sister’s grandsons of Nanjundappa, as his next reversioners. These were another Basappa, Mallappa and another Santhappa.

43By a sale deed of 18 November 1920, these three reversioners sold the properties to Ganapathi for Rs. 2,000. The deed recited that the properties had belonged to the joint family of Nanjundappa and his brother Basappa, that Ammakka had inherited them on Nanjundappa’s death, and that on her death they had devolved on the vendors as next reversioners of the last male owner. A rectification deed of March 1921 added some items that had been left out. The respondents claimed under Ganapathi.

44Ganapathi sued for possession, and Gangamma contested the suit. She said that the properties were the self-acquisitions of her husband Basappa and that she held them as his heir. The courts in Coorg accepted that. If she was right, the recital in the deed was wrong, and the vendors had no present title in 1920. They had only a hope of succeeding if they outlived her, as the reversioners to her husband’s estate.

45Gangamma died on 17 February 1933, before the second appeal was finally disposed of. Ganapathi applied to have the patta transferred to his name. At that point the mosque intervened. It claimed under a gift said to have been made by Gangamma in September 1932, and under a deed of release of 3 March 1933, by which the reversioner Santhappa gave up his half share to the mosque for Rs. 300. The revenue authorities rejected the claim and entered Ganapathi’s name, and he took possession.

46In 1945 the appellant, as Muthavalli of the mosque, sued for a half share and mesne profits. The District Judge found that the gift had not been established, and that ground was abandoned in the High Court. So the contest came down to two documents from the same man. In 1920 Santhappa had sold to Ganapathi, representing a present title. In 1933, having by then actually acquired title on Gangamma’s death, he had released to the mosque. The mosque’s argument was that the 1920 sale was void because in 1920 Santhappa had only a spes successionis, so that the only effective document was the release.

The history in the High Courts

47The Madras High Court had given conflicting answers. In Alamanaya Kunigari Nabi Sab v. Murukuti Papiah, a son had mortgaged property belonging to his living father, and the father died during the suit. The argument that section 43 could not validate what section 6(a) made void was rejected on the ground that it neglected the distinction between purporting to transfer the chance of an heir apparent and erroneously representing an authority to transfer immovable property. The Supreme Court drew the lesson that “if a transfer is statedly of an interest of the character mentioned in s. 6(a), it would be void, whereas, if it purports to be of an interest in praesenti, it is within the protection afforded by s. 43”.

48The Official Assignee, Madras v. Sampath Naidu went the other way. The Madras court there refused to distinguish a transfer that was openly of a chance of succession from one that purported to be of a present interest:

“If such a distinction were allowed”, observed Bardswell, J., delivering the Judgment of the Court, “the effect would be that by a clever description of the property dealt with in a deed of transfer one would be allowed to conceal the real nature of the transaction and evade a clear statutory prohibition.”Official Assignee, Madras v. Sampath Naidu, 65 MLJ 588 (Bardswell J.), as quoted in Jumma Masjid, AIR 1962 SC 847.

49That argument has real force. It says that the prohibition in section 6(a) can be evaded by the simple drafting device of describing an expectancy as a present estate. The Allahabad High Court, in Shyam Narain v. Mangal Prasad, took the opposite view. A daughter’s son had sold in 1910 while the property was vested in the daughter, succeeded on her death in 1926, and sold again in 1927 to others. Sulaiman C.J. and Rachhpal J. drew the line that the Supreme Court would later adopt:

Section 6(a) would, therefore, apply to cases where professedly there is a transfer of a mere spes successionis, the parties knowing that the transferor has no more right than that of a mere expectant heir. The result, of course, would be the same where the parties, knowing the full facts, fraudulently clothe the transaction in the garb of an out and out sale of the property, and there is no erroneous representation made by the transferor to the transferee as to his ownership.
But where an erroneous representation is made by the transferor to the transferee that he is the full owner of the property transferred and is authorized to transfer it and the property transferred is not a mere chance of succession but immovable property itself, and the transferee acts upon such erroneous representation, then if the transferor happens later, before the contract of transfer comes to an end, to acquire an interest in that property, no matter whether by private purchase, gift, legacy or by inheritance or otherwise, the previous transfer can at the option of the transferee operate on the interest which has been subsequently acquired, although it did not exist at the time of the transfer.Shyam Narain v. Mangal Prasad, (1935) ILR 57 All 474, as quoted in Jumma Masjid, AIR 1962 SC 847. Stray punctuation in the printed report has been corrected.

50That second paragraph answers the objection in Sampath Naidu. A sham description by parties who both know the truth is not protected, because there is then no erroneous representation at all. The evasion the Madras court feared requires both parties to be in on it, and section 43 gives such parties nothing. The Bombay, Patna and Nagpur High Courts took the same view as Allahabad, and the Supreme Court recorded that the preponderance of judicial opinion lay with Alamanaya.

The reasoning on the section

51Venkatarama Aiyar J., writing for four judges, began with the words of the section:

Considering the scope of the section on its terms, it clearly applies whenever a person transfers property to which he has no title on a representation that he has a present and transferable interest therein, and acting on that representation, the transferee takes a transfer for consideration. When these conditions are satisfied, the section enacts that if the transferor subsequently acquires the property, the transferee becomes entitled to it, if the transfer has not meantime been thrown up or cancelled and is subsisting. There is an exception in favour of transferees for consideration in good faith and without notice of the rights under the prior transfer. But apart from that, the section is absolute and unqualified in its operation. It applies to all transfers which fulfil the conditions prescribed therein, and it makes no difference in its application, whether the defect of title in the transferor arises by reason of his having no interest whatsoever in the property, or of his interest therein being that of an expectant heir.Jumma Masjid, AIR 1962 SC 847. Obvious scanning errors in the online report have been corrected.

52The appellant’s argument was that this general language must be read down so as not to nullify section 6(a). The Court saw that as an attempt to add words:

In effect, this argument involves importing into the section a new exception to the following effect; “Nothing in this section shall operate to confer on the transferee any title, if the transferor had at the date of the transfer an interest of the kind mentioned in s. 6 (a).” If we accede to this contention we will not be construing s. 43 but rewriting it.

53It then quoted Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers v. Evans, that courts are not entitled “to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself.” The passage that follows is the one most often quoted from the judgment:

But section 6(a) and s. 43 relate to two different subjects, and there is no necessary conflict between them. Section 6 (a) deals with certain kinds of interests in property mentioned therein, and prohibits a transfer simpliciter of those interests. Section 43 deals with representations as to title made by a transferor who had no title at the time of transfer, and provides that the transfer shall fasten itself on the title which the transferor subsequently acquires. Section 6 (a) enacts a rule of substantive law, while s. 43 enacts a rule of estoppel which is one of evidence. The two provisions operate on different fields, and under different conditions, and we see no ground for reading a conflict between them or for cutting down the ambit of the one by reference to the other. In our opinion, both of them can be given full effect on their own terms, in their respective spheres. To hold that transfers by persons who have only a spes successionis at the date of transfer are not within the protection afforded by s. 43 would destroy its utility to a large extent.

54The last sentence is the practical one. The usual person who sells land to which they have no title, and who later acquires it, is very often someone who expected to inherit it. A rule excluding expectant heirs would remove from the section many of the cases it was most likely to meet. The illustration itself is such a case.

Estoppel against a statute

55The second argument was that there can be no estoppel against a statute. The Court’s answer is often overlooked, and it is the key to later cases on land reform and protective laws:

It is also contended that as under the law there can be no estoppel against a statute, transfers which are prohibited by s. 6(a) could not be held to be protected by s. 43. There would have been considerable force in this argument if the question fell to be decided solely on the terms of s. 6 (a). Rules of estoppel are not to be resorted to for defeating or circumventing prohibitions enacted by Statutes on grounds of public policy. But here the matter does not rest only on s. 6 (a). We have in addition, s. 43, which enacts a special provision for the protection of transferees for consideration from persons who represent that they have present title, which, in fact, they have not. And the point for decision is simply whether on the facts the respondents are entitled to the benefit of this section. If they are, as found by the courts below, then the plea of estoppel raised by them on the terms of the section is one pleaded under, and not against the statute.Jumma Masjid, AIR 1962 SC 847.

56So the general proposition survives. Estoppel cannot be used to defeat a prohibition enacted on grounds of public policy. Jumma Masjid escapes it only because section 6(a) and section 43 are in the same Act, and the Act itself provides for the estoppel. That reasoning gives no help to a transferee who wants to use section 43 against a prohibition in some other enactment. There the plea would be against that statute, and the reasoning about two sections of one Act would not apply in the same way.

Want of title and want of capacity

57The third argument relied on cases holding that a minor who falsely represented being of full age could not be met with estoppel, and that section 43 did not apply to the minor’s transfer. The Court’s reply drew a line that remains important:

The appellant also sought to rely on the decisions wherein it has been held that a plea of estoppel could not be raised against a minor who had transferred property on a representation that he was of age, and that s. 43 was inapplicable to such transfers, vide Sadiq Ali Khan v. Jai Kishori, Gadigeppa v. Balanagauda, Ajudhia Prasad v. Chandan Lal. But the short answer to this contention is that s. 43 deals with transfers which fail for want of title in the transferor and not want of capacity in him at the time of transfer. It may further be observed in this connection that the doctrine of estoppel has been held to have no application to persons who have no contractual capacity where the claim is based on contract, vide Mahomed Syedol Ariffin v. Yeoh Ooi Gark; Levine v. Brougham; Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill; Khan Gul v. Lakha Singh. Decisions on transfers by minors therefore are of no assistance in ascertaining the true scope of s. 43.Jumma Masjid, AIR 1962 SC 847. The English and Privy Council authorities are cited here as the Court cited them. They were not read directly for this entry.

58The section therefore has nothing to say about a minor’s deed. The minor’s transfer fails because of who the transferor is, not because of what the transferor held. Attaining majority is not the acquisition of an interest in property in any case, so the terms of the section would not fit even if the first objection were absent.

The illustration as an aid

59The appellant had argued that the illustration was repugnant to the section and should be rejected. The Court accepted that an illustration cannot enlarge plain words, but held that the section was general enough to cover the case. It then relied on the observations of the Judicial Committee in Mahomed Syedol Ariffin v. Yeoh Ooi Gark:

It is the duty of a court of law to accept, if that can be done, the illustrations given as being both of relevance and value in the construction of the text. The illustrations should in no case be rejected because they do not square with ideas possibly derived from another system of jurisprudence as to the law with which they or the sections deal. And it would require a very special case to warrant their rejection on the ground of their assumed repugnancy to the sections themselves. It would be the very last resort of construction to make any such assumption. The great usefulness of the illustrations, which have, although no part of the sections, been expressly furnished by the Legislature as helpful in the working and application of the statute, should not be thus impaired.Mahomed Syedol Ariffin v. Yeoh Ooi Gark, (1916) LR 43 IA 256, as quoted in Jumma Masjid, AIR 1962 SC 847.

60This passage has a life well outside the Transfer of Property Act, in the general law on the construction of illustrations to Indian statutes.

61The Court also disposed of the use made in Sampath Naidu of the Privy Council’s decision in Ananda Mohan Roy v. Gour Mohan Mullick, and of Sri Jagannada Raju v. Sri Rajah Prasada Rao. Those cases concerned contracts by presumptive reversioners to sell property then held by a widow. It was held that such a contract could not be enforced, as the prohibition in section 6(a) would be futile if agreements to transfer could be enforced. The Supreme Court said that these decisions “have no bearing on the question now under consideration, as to the right of a person who for consideration takes a transfer of what is represented to be an interest in praesenti.”

62The result was that Santhappa had represented an entitlement in the present, and the purchaser had been found to act on that. The purchaser acquired title when Santhappa came into title on Gangamma’s death on 17 February 1933, and “the subsequent dealing with them by Santhappa by way of release” gave the mosque nothing. The appeal was dismissed.

The 1929 amendment

63Jumma Masjid also records a small but useful piece of legislative history. When the Madras decision was given, the operative words were “where a person erroneously represents”. As amended by Act 20 of 1929, they read “where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents”. The Court’s treatment of this should be read in full:

This reasoning is open to the criticism that it ignores the principle underlying s. 43. That section embodies, as already stated, a rule of estoppel and enacts that a person who makes a representation shall not be heard to allege the contrary as against a person who acts on that representation. It is immaterial whether the transferor acts bona fide or fraudulently in making the representation. It is only material to find out whether in fact the transferee has been misled. It is to be noted that when the decision under consideration was given, the relevant words of s. 43 were, “where a person erroneously represents”, and now, as amended by Act 20 of 1929, they are “where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents”, and that emphasises that for the purpose of the section it matters not whether the transferor acted fraudulently or innocently in making the representation, and that what is material is that he did make a representation and the transferee has acted on it. Where the transferee knew as a fact that the transferor did not possess the title which he represents he has, then he cannot be said to have acted on it when taking a transfer. Section 43 would then have no application, and the transfer will fail under s. 6(a). But where the transferee does act on the representation, there is no reason why he should not have the benefit of the equitable doctrine embodied in s. 43, however fraudulent the act of the transferor might have been.Jumma Masjid, AIR 1962 SC 847.

64The amendment answers a question that the old text left open. A seller who knowingly lied could have argued that the representation was not “erroneous”, because the seller was not in error. After 1929 that argument is not open. The section now covers the honest and the dishonest alike.

VIII. The later cases on acquisition

Ram Pyare and the two dates

65Ram Pyare v. Ram Narain is a three-judge decision that turned on a gap of two days. Matbar Mal held sirdari rights under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Section 134 entitled a sirdar who deposited ten times the land revenue to a declaration that the sirdar had acquired the rights in section 137. Section 137(2), as it then stood, said that upon the grant of the certificate the sirdar “shall from the date thereof” become a bhumidhar. Matbar Mal made the deposit on 28 October 1961 and sold the land the same day. The certificate was issued on 30 October 1961. His sons then sued to cancel the sale.

66The Allahabad High Court had been divided on when bhumidhari rights arose. The legislature resolved the conflict in 1962 by substituting the words “from the date on which the amount referred to in sec. 134 has been deposited”, but it did not make that change retrospective. So, as the Supreme Court noted, for deposits made before the amendment the tenure holder acquired the rights only from the date of the certificate. A Division Bench had so held in Dhani Ram v. Jokhu, and the single judge in the case followed it and decreed the sons’ suit.

67The Supreme Court accepted the premise and reversed the result. It agreed with the opinion in Ram Swarup v. Deputy Director, Consolidation that recourse could be had to section 43 “to feed the title as it were”. It saw no need to remand:

It is clear that Matbar Mal erroneously represented to the vendee that he was authorised to transfer the property and professed to transfer such property for consideration. The very execution of the sale deed on the same day as the deposit of the requisite amount under sec. 134 is significant enough to establish that the sale deed was the result of an erroneous representation by Matbar Mal. It is also clear that the present plaintiffs who are the sons of the vendor, Matbar Mal cannot possibly claim to be transferees in good faith which indeed they do not claim to be. Section 43 clearly applies to the situation.Ram Pyare v. Ram Narain, (1985) 2 SCC 162, AIR 1985 SC 694 (O. Chinnappa Reddy J., with E.S. Venkataramiah and Sabyasachi Mukharji JJ.).

68The counsel for the sons tried to use Jumma Masjid against the buyer. The Court said it was “unable to see in what manner these observations can possibly assist the respondents”. It said that the provisions of the section “are clearly attracted and that is sufficient to non-suit the plaintiffs”. Two features of the decision stand out. The representation was found by inference from the date of the deed alone. And the sons were bound, because they were not transferees in good faith, and they claimed through the very person who had made the representation.

Tanu Ram Bora and ceiling land

69Tanu Ram Bora carried the reasoning into a different kind of defect. The plaintiff bought the suit land by a registered sale deed of 6 January 1990. The land had been declared ceiling surplus in 1988 and, in the words of the admitted facts, “the government was the owner” on the date of the sale. On 14 September 1990 it was declared ceiling free. The plaintiff’s name was mutated in the revenue record in December 1991. The original first defendant, a former police officer, entered on the land in April 1995 and later relied on a prior agreement to sell. All three courts below dismissed the suit on the ground that the vendor had no title on the date of the sale.

70The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It noted that the heirs of the vendor were not contesting, and had never tried to have the deed cancelled. There was nothing on record to show that the plaintiff had been told at the time of the sale that the land was ceiling surplus. The first appellate court had already held, with finality, that the first defendant had no right on the basis of the agreement. The rights of the plaintiff under the sale deed “would be protected by operation of Section 43 of the Act”, and the suit was decreed in full, including possession and an injunction.

71The decision is useful for what it treats as an acquisition. The vendor did not inherit or buy anything. The land became free of a ceiling declaration, and the Court treated the seller’s position as having been cured for the purposes of the section. It is also useful for the party who was denied the point. The defendant in possession was a stranger to the vendor’s title, with no right of his own. He could not use the vendor’s original lack of title as a shield.

Which modes of acquisition count

72The section speaks of “any interest which the transferor may acquire”. It does not limit the source. The passage in Shyam Narain that the Supreme Court approved says “no matter whether by private purchase, gift, legacy or by inheritance or otherwise”. The cases above show inheritance, the opening of a reversion, the issue of a certificate under a land law, and the release of land from a ceiling declaration. In Hardev Singh the seller’s interest came by succession to a half share of the property of his wife. A later partition decree could play the same part, as in the reasoning in Renu Devi described below. The common feature is that the transferor’s own position has improved, by whatever route, so as to supply what the deed promised.

73The interest acquired may be less than the interest professed. Since the transfer operates on “any interest”, a transferor who sold the whole and acquires a half has the deed fastened on the half. That was the position in Hardev Singh, where the claim was to a half of what had been sold.

IX. Knowledge, notice and the deed

Kartar Singh in its own words

74Kartar Singh is the case that most limits the protection of the buyer, and it is a short order that requires close reading. Harbans Kaur sold land on 19 April 1961, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son, Kulwant Singh. A marginal note in the deed recorded that the land had been acquired “by her and by her minor son by exercising the right of pre-emption” and that she was selling her own share and acting as guardian for his. On attaining majority Kulwant Singh sued, and obtained a declaration that the sale was void as against him. He died before taking possession, and his mother succeeded to his estate as his Class-I heir. The buyer then claimed under section 43. The Court said of the duty on a person who buys from a guardian:

It is settled law that the transferee must make all reasonable and diligent enquiries regarding the capacity of the transferor and the necessity to alienate the estate of the minor. On satisfying those requirements, he is to enter into and have the sale deed from the guardian or manager of the estate of the minor. Under the Guardian and Wards Act, the estate of the minor cannot be alienated unless a specific permission in that behalf is obtained from the district court. Admittedly, no such permission was obtained. Therefore, the sale of the half share of the interest of Kulwant Singh made by his mother is void.Kartar Singh v. Harbans Kaur, (1994) 4 SCC 730 (K. Ramaswamy and B.L. Hansaria JJ.).

75Then came the central passage:

Section 43 feeds its estoppel. The rule of estoppel by deed by the transferor would apply only when the transferee has been misled. The transferee must know or put on notice that the transferor does not possess the title which he represents that he has. When note in the sale deed had put the appellant on notice of limited right of the mother as guardian, as a reasonable prudent man the appellant is expected to enquire whether on her own the mother as guardian of minor son is competent to alienate the estate of the minor. When such acts were not done the first limb of Section 43 is not satisfied. It is obvious that it may be an erroneous representation and may not be fraudulent one made by the mother that she is entitled to alienate the estate of the minor. For the purpose of Section 43 it is not strong material for consideration. But on declaration that the sale is void, in the eye of law the contract is non est to the extent of the share of the minor from its inception. The second limb of Section 43 is that the contract must be a subsisting one at the time of the claim. A void contract is no contract in the eye of law and was never in existence so the second limb of Section 43 is not satisfied.Kartar Singh, (1994) 4 SCC 730.

76The passage contains two separate reasons, and it matters to keep them apart. The first limb of the section failed because the buyer had been put on notice by the deed. The second limb failed because, after the declaration that the sale was void as regards the minor’s share, there was no subsisting contract. The second reason is narrow and fits a transfer that has been set aside. The first is much wider, and it is hard to square with the language of the older cases. Jumma Masjid speaks of a transferee who “knew as a fact”. Kartar Singh speaks of a transferee who is put on notice and expected to enquire. The difference could decide many cases.

77The Court also made clear what the decision did not do. The declaration was “only qua the right of the minor”, and it was conceded that the decree had no effect on the half share conveyed by the mother. Any independent cause of action under the contract was left open.

Actual knowledge or constructive notice

78How far then does a buyer’s carelessness defeat the section? There are three possible positions, and the reported cases touch all of them. The strictest reading is that only actual knowledge defeats the buyer. That is the language of Jumma Masjid and of Ram Pyare. A middle reading is that a buyer who is put on inquiry by the document itself cannot say that the representation misled them. That is the most natural reading of Kartar Singh, in which a note on the deed disclosed the facts that made the transfer defective. The widest reading would import the requirement in section 41 of reasonable care, and that reading was expressly rejected in Hardev Singh:

We have noticed hereinbefore that the transaction was not void. It was not contrary to any provision of law. It was not hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. We, therefore, do not accept the submission of the learned counsel that the ingredients of Section 41 would also be applicable in a case falling under Section 43 of the Act.Hardev Singh, (2007) 2 SCC 404.

79The result is that a buyer need not conduct the searches that section 41 requires, but also cannot ignore what the deed itself says. The representation has to be one that a person could believe in the circumstances the deed discloses. This is the position taken in this entry, as a reading of the two decisions together. No larger Bench has been found that reconciles them.

The comparison in Hardev Singh

80Hardev Singh sets out the comparison between the two sections in terms that are often cited:

Section 43, on the other hand, embodies a ‘rule of feeding the estoppel’ and enacts that a person who makes a representation shall not be heard to allege the contrary as against a person who acts thereupon and it is immaterial whether the transferor acts bona fide or fraudulently in making the representation. [See Jumma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, AIR 1962 SC 847 : 1962 Supp.2 SCR 554.] In order to get the benefit of the said provision, the conditions which must be satisfied are : (1) the contract of transfer was made by a person who was competent to contract; and (2) the contract would be subsisting at the time when a claim for recovery of the property is made. However, the provisions would have no application if the transfer was invalid as being forbidden by law or contrary to public policy, as envisaged under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Thus, no estoppel can be pleaded contrary to the provisions of a statute. The ‘rule of feeding the estoppel’ shall apply in absence thereof.
The doctrine of feeding the estoppel envisages that ‘where a grantor has purported to grant an interest in land which he did not at the time possess, but subsequently acquires, the benefit of his subsequent acquisition, goes automatically to the earlier grantee, or as it is usually expressed, feeds the estoppel’. The principle is based on an equitable doctrine that a person who promised to perform more than he can perform must make good his contract when he acquires the power of performance.
The difference between the ambit of Section 41 and 43 of the Act is apparent. Whereas Section 41 provides that a transfer by an ostensible owner cannot be avoided on the ground that the transferor was not authorised therefor, subject to the condition that the transferee should take reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer and to act in good faith before a benefit thereof is claimed by him. Section 43, on the other hand, enables the transferee to whom a transferor has made a fraudulent or erroneous representation to lay hold, at his option, of any interest which the transferor may subsequently acquire in the property, unless the right of any subsequent purchaser for value without notice is in effect.Hardev Singh, (2007) 2 SCC 404, AIR 2007 SC 1058 (S.B. Sinha and Markandey Katju JJ.).

81The facts are also instructive. Harcharan Singh sold land by a deed of 17 March 1982, during the pendency of a suit by his wife, Udham Kaur, who claimed to be its absolute owner. The courts found that she was the owner and that the purchase was caught by the doctrine of lis pendens. On her death, half of her estate devolved on Harcharan Singh as her heir, and the buyer claimed the benefit of section 43 for that half. The appellant, her son, argued that the buyer had known of the litigation and that a buyer who was denied section 41 could not succeed under section 43. The Court answered:

It is one thing to say that the respondent was aware of the litigation, but it is another thing to say that he did not purchase the property on representation of Harcharan Singh. In fact, from the judgment of the courts below, it does not appear that any finding has been arrived at to the effect that the respondent herein was aware that the said Harcharan Singh had no title over the property.

82So knowing of a dispute is not knowing that the seller has no title. A buyer may know that the seller’s title is under challenge and may still believe the seller’s account of it. Section 52 itself, the Court added, “merely prohibits a transfer. It does not state that the same would result in an illegality.” A purchaser during the pendency of a suit is bound by the result of the litigation, and the transaction is not void on that account. So there was a subsisting contract on which section 43 could operate.

83There was a further point against the appellant, of general interest. His own claim rested on a will that had not been proved:

The plea of inapplicability of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act could have been taken by Harcharan Singh and not by the appellant, who has based his claim on the basis of the Will. The principle of feeding the estoppel will apply against Harcharan Singh and not against the appellant. He could not have, in our opinion, therefore, raised the said plea.

84That is a useful reminder of who may invoke the limits of the section. As Ram Pyare and Tanu Ram Bora also show, the estoppel is directed at the transferor and those claiming through the transferor. A stranger who is not protected by the second paragraph, and has no title of their own, gets little from showing that the transferor’s title was bad.

Jharu Ram Roy and collusion

85Jharu Ram Roy shows the opposite extreme. Nakho Ram owned the property. His son Rajiv Lochan sold about 4 bighas of it in 1982, when Nakho Ram was alive, on the basis of a statement that the father had died. Nakho Ram in fact died in 1990, and Rajiv Lochan in 1992. Rajiv Lochan’s brother sued for title and for the deeds to be set aside. The purchaser invoked section 43. A finding of fact stood against him:

Indisputably, therefore, the appellant entered into the aforementioned transaction knowing fully well that Nakho Ram was alive in the year 1992, Rajiv Lochan could not have executed the deeds of sale and only with a view to obviate the legal difficulties, Nakho Ram was shown to have expired. Appellant was furthermore aware that although Rajiv Lochan did not inherit the property of Nakho Ram, he executed the aforementioned deeds of sale. Rajiv Lochan, thus, having no title to the property, by said deeds of sale or otherwise, evidently could not have derived any title thereover.Jharu Ram Roy v. Kamjit Roy, (2009) 4 SCC 60.

86The section could not apply, since the deed’s statement about the father was a device agreed between the parties and not a representation that deceived the buyer. This is the case foreseen in Shyam Narain, where the parties “knowing the full facts, fraudulently clothe the transaction”. The answer to the fear expressed in Sampath Naidu is seen working in practice.

X. Illegality and statutory limits

The test in Hardev Singh and Srinivasa Rao

87Hardev Singh states that the provisions “would have no application if the transfer was invalid as being forbidden by law or contrary to public policy, as envisaged under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act”. It distinguished, on that ground, N. Srinivasa Rao v. Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, where property had been transferred in violation of section 47 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950:

Even on the question of the applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, we agree with the view taken by the High Court that when the initial transfer itself between Uppari Ramaiah and Mir Riyasat Ali was invalid, the question of application of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act to such a transaction on account of subsequent acquisition of title by Uppari Ramaiah would not be available.N. Srinivasa Rao v. Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, (2006) 4 SCC 214, as quoted in Hardev Singh, (2007) 2 SCC 404.

88Hardev Singh also noted that in Jote Singh v. Ram Das Mahto, AIR 1996 SC 2773, it was held that sections 41 and 43 would not be available where the properties had been sold in auction. The transaction in Hardev Singh itself was not of that kind, since section 52 does not make a sale during litigation illegal.

Ram Bhawan Singh

89In Ram Bhawan Singh v. Jagdish, the appeals failed first on limitation. On the merits, the Court said that the appellants’ reliance on section 43 failed as well:

Even the contention of the appellants that they have a case under section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, which embodies the rule of estoppel by deed, is not applicable because the transfer under the deed of 23rd November, 1943 became inoperative because the settlement was invalid on account of the subsisting lease in respect of the Land and the landlord could not super impose a second lease in respect of the tenanted property, so no interest could be created in favour of the appellants under that document of 2nd August, 1945 and therefore, there is no question of feeding the estoppel.Ram Bhawan Singh v. Jagdish, (1990) 4 SCC 309 (M. Fathima Beevi J.), reported headnote.

90The case illustrates a further category. The second lease failed for a reason other than a lack of title in the sense of the section, since the land was held under a subsisting lease and the landlord could not lay a second lease over it. That was a defect in the transaction itself.

Temporary restrictions on transfer

91The hardest cases are those in which the land law restricts transfer for a period or until some condition is met, and the restriction later ends. The seller then acquires, not a new title, but the power to transfer. Two lines of reasoning press in different directions. Hardev Singh, Srinivasa Rao and the general statement in Jumma Masjid point towards refusal, if the first transfer was forbidden by law on grounds of public policy. Ram Pyare and Tanu Ram Bora point towards relief, at least where the defect was in the seller’s present title, and where the law itself contemplates that the land may later become transferable.

92The cases do not supply a single test. A reader might start with three questions. Does the statute declare the transfer void or merely restrict it? Is the purpose of the statute to protect the class to which the seller belongs, so that holding the seller to the deed would defeat that protection? And does the statute provide for the land to be forfeited or to be resumed by the State on a breach, so that the seller’s later position does not flow from the original holding at all? The more the answers suggest a protective purpose, the less likely it is that the section will help. This is a suggested approach only, and each enactment has to be read on its own terms.

XI. Consideration, later purchasers and proof

Why consideration matters

93Section 43 applies only to a person who “professes to transfer such property for consideration”. A donee therefore cannot rely on it. The point arose in Renu Devi, in which the donors had made a gift of property on 22 March 1979 and obtained a final partition decree on 24 May 1979. The Court held that they already had title, but it went on to consider what would have followed if they had not:

Assuming it for a moment that on 22.3.1979 the donors had not actually acquired title to the property and yet they had gifted this property to their daughter-in-law and grandsons it cannot be denied that they had a pre-existing interest in the suit property by virtue of their being members of the Joint Hindu Family and their interest and right to partition having been upheld by the so-called preliminary decree dated 13.2.1978. By the subsequent decree dated 24.5.1979 they did acquire a clear and complete title in the same property which they had gifted on 22.3.1979. On the principle of the feeding the grant by estoppel the subsequent acquisition of title under the decree dated 24.5.1979 shall ensure to the benefit of the donee under the deed of gift dated 22.3.1979 for whatever infirmity there was (though we have held that there was none) in the title of Rameshwar Singh and Dhaneshwari Devi stood cured by the final decree 24.5.1979.Renu Devi, (2003) 10 SCC 200.

94The Court then said that section 43 “does not in terms apply to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as the deed dated 22.3.1979 is not a transfer for consideration”. It added: “The doctrine may not apply if the deed of transfer itself was invalid or if the third party has acquired title bona fide, for consideration and without notice.” It then held: “The rule of estoppel by deed would clearly apply.” So Renu Devi shows a court reaching a donee through the general doctrine, although it could not do so through the section. The passage is not the ratio, since the Court’s primary holding was that the donors already had title. It should not be read as extending section 43 to every gift. A reader should treat the words of the section as the safer guide.

The second paragraph and notice

95A later transferee is protected if the later transfer is “in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option”. The burden of showing the three elements will fall in practice on the person claiming that protection. The contest will usually centre on notice.

96Notice has a defined meaning in section 3 of the Act. A person has notice of a fact on actually knowing it, or when, but for wilful abstention from an inquiry or search which the person ought to have made, or gross negligence, the person would have known it. The Explanations to the definition add registration and possession. As to possession, Ram Niwas v. Bano explains the effect of Explanation II:

Thus, it is seen that a statutory presumption of notice arises against any person who acquires any immovable property or any share or interest therein of the title, if any, of the person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof. The principle of constructive notice of any title which a tenant in actual possession may have, was laid down by Lord Eldon in Daniels Vs. Davison [(1809) 16 Ves. 249 at P.254]. The learned law Lord observed, Upon one point in this cause there is considerable authority for the opinion I hold; that, where there is a tenant in possession under a lease or an agreement, a person, purchasing part of the estate, must be bound to inquire, on what terms that person is in possession.Ram Niwas v. Bano, (2000) 6 SCC 685, AIR 2000 SC 2921 (S.S.M. Quadri and Shivaraj V. Patil JJ.), a case under section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, on an earlier tenant’s claim, cited here for the general effect of Explanation II.

97So a first buyer who has actually taken possession under the deed has done much to protect the option. A later purchaser is presumed to have notice of the title of the person in actual possession. A first buyer who took a registered deed may likewise rely on Explanation I, within its terms. Ram Niwas itself was concerned with notice of a contract to sell, not with an option under section 43, and the wording of the second paragraph refers to notice of “the existence of the said option”. But it is hard to see how a later purchaser who knows of the earlier sale could claim not to know of the rights that flow from it by operation of the statute.

98The transferor’s heirs cannot generally claim this protection. In Ram Pyare, the sons were said to be persons who “cannot possibly claim” to be transferees in good faith. An heir takes by succession and not for consideration, so the paragraph does not in terms apply.

Burden and proof

99The buyer who claims under section 43 will ordinarily carry the burden on the facts that create the right. These are the representation, the consideration, the acting on the representation, the later acquisition by the transferor, and the subsistence of the contract. The courts do not, however, always insist on direct evidence. In Ram Pyare, the date of the deed was treated as enough to establish the representation. In Tanu Ram Bora, the Court noted that nothing on record showed that the plaintiff had been told about the defect. In Jumma Masjid, the finding that the buyer had acted on the representation was taken from the recital in the deed and the concurrent findings.

100The question whether the buyer acted on the representation is one of fact, and it is commonly decided by the courts below and left undisturbed. Jharu Ram Roy and Hardev Singh both show the Supreme Court treating the presence or absence of such a finding as decisive. Counsel should therefore ask for a specific issue on the point at the trial. A finding that the buyer knew of a dispute is not enough, as Hardev Singh shows. A finding that the buyer knew the seller had no title is fatal, as Jharu Ram Roy shows.

Limitation and the deed

101Section 43 gives an option but does not set a time for its exercise. It speaks of an interest acquired “at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists”. Where the buyer is already in possession, as in the end in Jumma Masjid, the point is likely to arise by way of defence, and no question of limitation may arise against the buyer. Where the buyer is out of possession, a suit will be needed, and the ordinary law of limitation will apply to it. No Supreme Court decision on this point was found in preparing this entry, and it should be approached with care on the facts of each case.

XII. The position today

102A person who represents authority to transfer immovable property and professes to transfer it for consideration is bound, at the option of the transferee, by the transfer as regards any interest acquired while the contract subsists. It does not matter whether the representation was fraudulent or innocent. The transferee must have acted on it, and a transferee who knew the truth does not benefit. Section 43 applies even where the transferor had only a spes successionis at the time, provided the transfer was for consideration and on the faith of the representation, as Jumma Masjid holds. Section 6(a) is a rule of substantive law and section 43 a rule of estoppel, and they operate in different fields. The section cannot validate an invalid or void transfer, or one that the law prohibits on public grounds, and it does not impair the rights of a later transferee in good faith for consideration without notice of the option.


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  • Published · 31 October 2026

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