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2026 FPR EDC 16 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/facts-especially-within-knowledge
DC-0119Doctrines · Evidence · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 16
FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 4,446 words
Facts Especially within Knowledge
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, now section 109 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, places on a person the burden of proving a fact especially within that person's knowledge, but it does not relieve the prosecution of proving guilt; it applies only to facts pre-eminently or exceptionally within the accused's knowledge and only once the prosecution has proved facts from which a reasonable inference arises, whereupon a failure to explain may supply an additional link but cannot fill a gap in the prosecution's case.
Abstract
Who must prove what when the crucial facts are known only to the accused? Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 gives a limited answer. This entry sets out the provision and the classic explanation in Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer; its use where the prosecution has proved surrounding facts, in State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab; deaths within a home in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra; the limits stated in Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar; its relation to the last-seen circumstance; and the section's place alongside the right to silence.
I. The rule
The provision
1Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 lays down the general rule that whoever desires a court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts must prove those facts. Section 106 then provides:
When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 106, as set out in State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar, (2000) 8 SCC 382. Section 109 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 carries the provision forward.
2The first illustration is that a person doing an act with an intention other than that which its character and circumstances suggest must prove that intention. The second is the person charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket: the burden of proving the ticket lies on that person.
3A provision so short carries a risk. Read broadly, it could shift the burden to the accused in any case, since an accused knows what the accused did. The case law exists largely to prevent this.
The classic statement
4The modern law starts from Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer. A passage from Vivian Bose J. has been quoted in many decisions:
This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404, 1956 SCR 199 (Vivian Bose J.), as quoted in Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725.
5Three limits are visible here. First, the section is an exception for particular cases, and does not replace the general rule. Second, the difficulty must be real: it must be impossible or disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to prove the fact. Third, the fact must be especially, pre-eminently or exceptionally within the accused’s knowledge, and it must be one that the accused could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The railway ticket shows the type of case in which the section works.
II. When the prosecution has laid a foundation
Mir Mohammad Omar
6State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar illustrates how the section applies when the prosecution has proved other facts. The accused had abducted a person who was later found dead. The Court considered how section 106 bore on what happened between the abduction and the death:
The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the Section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference.Mir Mohammad Omar, (2000) 8 SCC 382 (Bench: K.T. Thomas and R.P. Sethi JJ.).
7The structure is important. The prosecution proves facts. From those, a reasonable inference arises. The accused, who has special knowledge of what happened, then has an opportunity to explain. If no explanation is offered, the inference stands. Section 106 does not produce a conviction by itself: it allows an inference to remain unanswered.
Sucha Singh
8That reasoning was tested in Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab. Counsel asked the Court to reconsider Mir Mohammad Omar, arguing that an accused “is entitled to keep his tongue inside his mouth as the burden is always on the prosecution”. He also argued that section 106 “is not intended for the purpose of filling up the vacuum in prosecution evidence”, and relied on the Privy Council in Attygalle v. The King and Stephen Seneviratne v. The King. The Court looked at those observations and at their treatment in Shambhu Nath Mehra, and it continued to apply the principle.Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 4 SCC 375, AIR 2001 SC 1436 (Bench: K.T. Thomas and R.P. Sethi JJ.).
III. Inside the home
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan
9The most familiar application is a death inside a house. Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra concerned the death of a young wife in her matrimonial home, against the background of alleged dowry harassment. The Court recognised the difficulty of proof in such a case:
Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanationTrimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 (G.P. Mathur J.).
10The final clause of the passage concerns how the crime was committed. This is the strongest form of the doctrine. Its practical importance is clear: those who were in the house are usually the only people who know what happened, and an unexplained death inside the home with a persistent history of ill-treatment calls for an answer.
11The passage must still be read with care. It says “comparatively lighter character”, not that there is no burden. The initial burden is still on the prosecution. The inmates’ burden is to give an explanation. Later decisions apply the idea to cases where the deceased was last in the company of the accused in a home. Sabitri Samantaray v. State of Odisha, where the appellants contended that section 106 was being used to supplant the prosecution’s burden, is a three-judge example of that later use.Sabitri Samantaray v. State of Odisha (Supreme Court, 20 May 2022) (Krishna Murari J.).
IV. The limits
Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar
12Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar is the most useful modern statement of the limit. It considers Shambhu Nath Mehra and states:
When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all.Nagendra Sah, (2021) 10 SCC 725 (Ajay Rastogi J.; Bench: Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka JJ.). The online author field is followed; the point should be checked against the report.
13The Court’s statement sets out both the use of the section and its limit. The failure to explain can add a link. It cannot itself supply a chain, or complete one which is otherwise broken. The prosecution must first show a case that calls for explanation. Where it has not done so, the accused’s silence is irrelevant.
Evidential and persuasive burdens
14The case law is best understood by distinguishing two kinds of burden. The legal burden of proving guilt stays on the prosecution throughout, as Woolmington v. DPP, [1935] AC 462, states for English criminal law. Section 106 can place on the accused an evidential burden in respect of a particular fact. The accused does not have to prove innocence. The accused has to give an explanation of what is within that person’s special knowledge, and the court then assesses the whole of the evidence.
Last seen
15The last-seen circumstance provides the most common setting. If the prosecution proves that the deceased was last seen alive with the accused, and the interval before the death is short, the accused may be expected to explain what happened. Anjan Kumar Sarma v. State of Assam provides an example of a case where the prosecution relied on such a circumstance, with others, including failure to give a definite reply to relatives.Anjan Kumar Sarma v. State of Assam, (2017) 14 SCC 359 (L. Nageswara Rao J.). The circumstance is not usually sufficient in itself, and much depends on how narrow the gap is between when the deceased was last seen and when death occurred. A longer interval makes it less likely that the accused has any special knowledge, and it opens up other possibilities. Courts look for corroborating circumstances, and section 106 does not remove that need.
Silence and self-incrimination
16Article 20(3) of the Constitution provides that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The accused’s right to silence is usually said to be untouched by section 106, because no one is forced to speak: the accused merely faces an inference if a fact within that person’s special knowledge goes unexplained. Sucha Singh shows how the argument was framed. The result is that an accused may stay silent, but the court can take the failure to explain into account in the limited way that Nagendra Sah describes.
17The questioning of the accused under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (section 351 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) is a natural occasion to give an explanation. A false explanation given at that stage has also been treated as an additional circumstance in some decisions, subject to the same limit: it cannot substitute for proof.
V. Other settings
Custody
18Deaths or injuries in custody are the strongest case for the rule. The prosecution seldom has access to independent witnesses. The people who know what happened are the officers and those present. The reasoning of Shambhu Nath Mehra applies directly. It is disproportionately difficult for the prosecution, and the officers could give an account without much inconvenience.
What the fact must be
19The fact said to be especially within a person’s knowledge must be identified with some precision. It is not enough to say in general terms that the accused knows what happened, since that could be said of every accused who is in truth guilty, and it assumes the very matter to be proved. The question is whether this particular fact, such as how a person in the accused’s custody came by an injury or where a person last in the accused’s company went, lies within the accused’s peculiar knowledge, and whether the prosecution has a real difficulty in proving it by other means.
Civil cases
20The section is not confined to criminal law. In civil matters, it can be used to require a party who alone knows a fact to prove that fact. A court is less concerned with the presumption of innocence here. But the general rule still applies, and section 106 does not relieve a claimant from proving the claim’s foundation.
VI. Practice
For the prosecution
21Do not treat section 106 as a substitute for evidence. Identify the fact said to be especially within the knowledge of the accused, and show why the accused could easily prove it. Lay the foundation with evidence, and put the circumstances to the accused in the section 313 examination. Be ready to show the chain is otherwise complete.
For the defence
22Hold the prosecution to its initial burden, citing Nagendra Sah. Question whether the fact is really especially within the accused’s knowledge, or whether others also could know it. If the case is one of last seen, attack the interval and the identification. Where an explanation is available, consider offering it, as a plausible explanation may well be enough. The accused need not prove it to the standard the prosecution must meet.
VII. The last-seen cases in detail
Kashi Ram
23State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram gave the section what is probably its strongest statement. A woman, Kalawati, and her daughters were found dead inside a locked house on 6 February 1998. The accused had last been seen with her in his house on 3 February, and the house was found locked on the next morning. He was then not seen by anyone. The High Court had acquitted. B.P. Singh J. said:
The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categoric in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the Court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. It lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the Court can consider his failure to adduce any explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain.State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 254, AIR 2007 SC 144 (B.P. Singh and Tarun Chatterjee JJ.).
24The Court added in the same judgment that whether an inference ought to be drawn “is a question which must be determined by reference to” the facts proved, and that “It is ultimately a matter of appreciation of evidence and, therefore, each case must rest on its own facts.” The acquittal was set aside, and the accused was sentenced to imprisonment for life.
25It is worth noticing the language of the passage. It does say that “Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution.” It also says that the failure to explain can be an “additional link which completes the chain”. This is the version that Nagendra Sah refines. The accused’s silence can complete a chain that is otherwise close to complete. It cannot make up for a chain that was never there.
The cases it relied on
26Kashi Ram relied on a series of decisions. From a case on the abduction of a boy who was not seen alive again, it quoted the following:
In the absence of an explanation, and considering the fact that the appellants were suspecting the boy to have kidnapped and killed the child of the family of the appellants, it was for the appellants to have explained what they did with him after they took him away. When the abductors withheld that information from the court, there is every justification for drawing the inference that they had murdered the boy. Even though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not be intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases like the present, where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. The appellants by virtue of their special knowledge must offer an explanation which might lead the Court to draw a different inference.The passage is as quoted in State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 254, referring to the decision on abduction it was discussing.
27And in Sahadevan v. State, the Court said:
Therefore, it has become obligatory on the appellants to satisfy the court as to how, where and in what manner Vadivelu parted company with them. This is on the principle that a person who is last found in the company of another, if later found missing, then the person with whom he was last found has to explain the circumstances in which they parted company. In the instant case the appellants have failed to discharge this onus. In their statement under Section 313 CrPC they have not taken any specific stand whatsoever.Sahadevan v. State, (2003) 1 SCC 534, as quoted in State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 254.
28These passages go further than a cautious reader of Shambhu Nath Mehra might expect. They speak of an obligation, and of an onus. They need to be read with Nagendra Sah, and with the point that the prosecution has first to establish the facts. In each of them, the prosecution had already proved a close association between the accused and the deceased, followed by the death within a short time.
Rishi Pal: where suspicion stops
29Rishi Pal v. State of Uttarakhand shows the other side. The case turned on whether a person who had been last seen with the appellant, on a journey by car, had in fact been killed by him. T.S. Thakur J. said:
It is true that the tell-tale circumstances proved on the basis of the evidence on record give rise to a suspicion against the appellant but suspicion howsoever strong is not enough to justify conviction of the appellant for murder. The trial Court has, in our opinion, proceeded more on the basis that the appellant may have murdered the deceased-Abdul Mabood. In doing so the trial Court over looked the fact that there is a long distance between ‘may have’ and ‘must have’ which distance must be traversed by the prosecution by producing cogent and reliable evidence.Rishi Pal v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2013 SC 3641 (T.S. Thakur and Gyan Sudha Misra JJ.).
30The phrase about the distance between “may have” and “must have” is often repeated, and it is the right counterweight to the broader language of Kashi Ram. The Court there noted that the charge of murder rested “on a rather tenuous ground” of the two having been last seen together, and that there was no evidence of motive. A case of that kind does not call for an explanation. Section 106 cannot be used to fill the gap.
VIII. Custody
Shyamsunder Trivedi
31The classic discussion of the problem of proof in custody is in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamsunder Trivedi. Nathu Banjara, picked up in connection with the murder of a woman, died from a beating at a police station. The police tried to have the body cremated as unclaimed. Local residents and members of the Bar followed the jeep to the hospital. The High Court had said that “direct” evidence of the complicity of some of the respondents was not available. The Supreme Court said:
rarely in cases of police torture or custodial death, direct ocular evidence of the complicity of the police personnel would be available, when it observed that ‘direct’ evidence about the complicity of these respondents was not available. Generally speaking, it would be police officials alone who can only explain the circumstances in which a person in their custody had died. Bound as they are by the ties of brotherhood, it is not unknown that the police personnel prefer to remain silent and more often than not even pervert the truth to save their colleagues, and the present case is an apt illustration, as to how one after the other police witnesses feigned ignorance about the whole matter.State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamsunder Trivedi, (1995) 4 SCC 262.
32And:
The exaggerated adherence to and insistence upon the establishment of proof beyond every reasonable doubt, by the prosecution, ignoring the ground realities, the fact situations and the peculiar circumstances of a given case, as in the present case, often results in miscarriage of justice and makes the justice delivery system a suspect.
33Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P. later repeated this in similar terms, and said that “The courts must not lose sight of the fact that death in police custody is perhaps one of the worst kind of crimes in a civilized society, governed by the rule of law”.Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P., (2005) 9 SCC 631, AIR 2005 SC 402 (Arijit Pasayat J.).
34These cases do not state a rule of law that the police always bear a burden. Section 114B, which the Law Commission proposed for the Evidence Act, was not enacted, as far as could be determined for this entry. What they do is state the factual reasoning behind the use of section 106 in such cases. Only the officers can say how a person in their custody came to die. And they explain why the standard of proof is not to be applied in a way that ignores those realities. A defence lawyer may also point out that the reasoning does not reduce the standard itself. The courts’ concern is with an over-rigid approach to the evidence, and the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt remains.
IX. Comparison with statutory presumptions
35Section 106 can be usefully contrasted with statutory presumptions that do reverse a burden.
36Sections 113A and 113B of the Evidence Act, relating to abetment of suicide of a married woman and dowry death, and now carried into the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, allow or require a presumption once certain foundational facts have been shown. Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 contains a mandatory presumption as to consideration for a cheque, and other statutes such as those on narcotics, corruption and the like contain their own reverse burdens. In all those cases, the legislature has spoken specifically.
37Section 106 is different. It does not state that any presumption arises against the accused. It speaks about the burden of proving a particular fact, and only then if the fact is especially within the knowledge of that person. It is thus a much narrower provision, and it does not require a court to find guilt. That is why Shambhu Nath Mehra insisted on keeping it to exceptional cases. A court that treats the section as creating a general reverse burden in murder cases would be doing what the legislature has not done.
38The same contrast explains the comparison sometimes made with English law, where a defendant’s failure to answer has been treated by statute as allowing an inference in limited situations. The Indian rule has not been stated in that form. It operates through the ordinary reasoning from proved facts, with section 106 as a rule on which party must supply the explanation.
X. The nature of the explanation required
39An important point of detail is what the accused must do. The accused does not have to prove the explanation beyond reasonable doubt. Kashi Ram says that the accused “must furnish an explanation which appears to the Court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden.” That is a fair statement of the accepted position. An explanation need only be probable. If it raises a reasonable possibility consistent with innocence, the burden placed by the section is discharged, and the prosecution must then prove its case on the evidence as a whole.
40Several consequences follow.
41An explanation need not come from the witness box. The accused’s statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may provide it, as may cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, or a document on the record. Sahadevan shows the importance of that stage, in its comment that the appellants had “not taken any specific stand whatsoever” in the statement under section 313.
42An explanation that is false is worse than none. Courts have treated a demonstrably false explanation as a further circumstance. It should be remembered, however, that a false explanation does not show guilt by itself, and an innocent person may give a false account out of fear.
43Silence must be considered with care in cases where the accused may have other reasons for it. Age, illiteracy, fear of police, or the fact that the accused may have been absent, all bear on what the court can draw from it.
44The question has to be put. A circumstance not put to an accused under section 313 cannot ordinarily be used against the accused. In Kashi Ram, counsel argued that a witness’s statement had not been specifically put to the accused. The Court dealt with this on the facts. But an inference from silence on a point about which the accused has not been asked would be particularly unfair, and prosecutors and trial judges should put the circumstance expressly.
XI. The section in civil and commercial cases
45The section also operates in civil proceedings, where its use is less controversial. Where the law requires a party to show a fact that only the other party knows, section 106 can place the burden on the other party. Typical examples are the following.
46A bailee who has lost goods is the person who knows what happened to them. Sections 151 and 152 of the Contract Act set the standard of care, and the bailee is well placed to say what care was taken. It would be natural for a court to expect an explanation.
47A person who alleges payment, or who pleads the date of an act that only that person did, will commonly be called upon to prove it.
48A hospital whose records are in its own custody will be expected to say what treatment was given. Savita Garg v. Director, National Heart Institute placed on the institution the duty of showing who treated the patient, and why, in a case about negligence, reasoning from the fact that the patient cannot know such things, though it did not state the matter as an application of section 106 in the text examined for this entry.Savita Garg v. Director, National Heart Institute, (2004) 8 SCC 56, AIR 2004 SC 5088 (A.K. Mathur J.).
49In civil cases, the section remains subject to the general rule. A plaintiff must still make a case for relief. But the absence of the presumption of innocence means that a court has less hesitation in drawing an adverse conclusion from a party’s failure to explain what only it could explain. Section 114 of the Evidence Act, illustration (g), also allows a court to presume that evidence which could be produced and is not produced would be unfavourable to the person who withholds it, and it is usually relied on together with section 106 in such cases.
XII. Section 109 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam
50The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 carries the rule forward as section 109, in the same terms, and with the same illustrations. There is nothing in the new statute to suggest that the earlier decisions cease to apply. The practitioner should cite the new section for proceedings governed by the new law, and should rely on the existing decisions as interpreting the rule.
XIII. The position today
51The burden of proof in a criminal case is on the prosecution, and section 106 is not intended to relieve it of that duty. The section addresses exceptional cases in which it would be impossible or disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts especially within the accused’s knowledge. “Especially” means pre-eminently or exceptionally. The section applies once the prosecution has proved facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn. A failure to explain may then support that inference, and in a case of circumstantial evidence it may provide an additional link. It cannot be used to supply a chain that the prosecution has failed to establish. In a death occurring in secrecy inside a house, the prosecution’s initial burden remains, though it is of a comparatively lighter character, and those in the house have a corresponding burden of explanation.
History
- Published · 31 October 2026
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