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2026 FPR EDC 15 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/executing-court-cannot-go-behind-the-decree

DC-0127Doctrines · Civil Procedure · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 15

FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 6,005 words

An Executing Court Cannot Go behind the Decree

A court executing a decree must take it according to its tenor and cannot entertain an objection that it was wrong in law or on the facts; it may refuse execution only if the decree is a nullity, including where want of inherent jurisdiction appears on the face of the record, and it may still construe an ambiguous decree and give effect to events, such as supervening legislation, that affect its executability.

Abstract

Execution is often where a defeated party tries again. This entry sets out the rule, confirmed in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, that an executing court cannot go behind the decree, and its basis in section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It then examines the rule's limits: nullity and the requirement that a jurisdictional defect appear on the face of the record, with Kiran Singh and Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash; fraud, with Chengalvaraya Naidu; the executing court's duty to construe the decree, in Bhavan Vaja v. Solanki Hanuji; and supervening legislation, in Haji Sk. Subhan v. Madhorao.


I. The rule

Adjudication and enforcement

1A civil dispute goes through two distinct stages. In the first, a court decides who is right, subject to appeal and revision. In the second, a court gives effect to that decision. The second stage would be endless if it allowed the first to be reopened. A decree-holder would have to prove the same case again, and the judgment-debtor would have a further unwarranted chance after losing in every appeal.

2Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that a decree may be executed by the court which passed it or by the court to which it is sent for execution. Section 47 provides that all questions arising between the parties to the suit, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the executing court, and not by a separate suit. That section is wide in the questions it covers, but its subject is execution. It is not a further appeal.

The statement in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi

3The classic statement comes from Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, decided by three judges:

A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree: between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties.Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670, AIR 1970 SC 1475 (J.C. Shah J.).

4The decree in that case had been passed by the Court of Small Causes in a suit for possession and had been confirmed on appeal. The judgment-debtor raised for the first time in execution the objection that the court had no jurisdiction. The High Court accepted the objection. The Supreme Court reversed. Whether the Court of Small Causes had jurisdiction depended, it said, upon the interpretation of the terms of the agreement of lease and the user to which the land was put at the date of the lease. Those questions could not be raised in execution.

What the rule covers

5The rule is straightforward in operation. An objection that the trial court misread a document, disbelieved the right witness, applied the wrong precedent or overlooked a defence cannot be made in execution. It makes no difference that the objection may be correct, and it makes no difference that it seems serious. Those complaints belong in appeal or revision. Once the time for those remedies is gone, the decree binds.

II. Nullity

The first exception

6The rule protects decrees, and it does not protect what is not a decree at all. Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi identifies the exception:

When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution.Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi, (1970) 1 SCC 670, reported headnote.

7The reason lies in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan: “It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings.”Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340, (1955) 1 SCR 117. The companion entry on the nullity of a decree without jurisdiction takes up that principle in more detail.

The face of the record

8The significant contribution of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi is how it limits that exception. A jurisdictional objection is available only where the defect is apparent:

where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction.Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi, (1970) 1 SCC 670, reported headnote.

9The rule creates a practical line. Suppose a statute bars a civil suit on a particular matter, and the decree on its face shows that the suit concerned that matter. The objection can be taken in execution. Suppose instead that the bar depends on a disputed fact, such as whether a landlord and tenant relationship existed or whether premises had a certain character. The executing court cannot go into that fact, even if the correct answer would mean the original court lacked jurisdiction. A party who wanted the point decided should have raised it at the trial.

10The point often goes against an objector who feels the injustice of it, but the reason is plain. An executing court exploring disputed jurisdictional facts would in substance be conducting the original trial once more.

Territorial and pecuniary defects

11The nullity exception does not ordinarily extend to defects of place or valuation. The Supreme Court’s decision in Hira Lal Patni v. Kali Nath concerned an objection in execution that an earlier compromise decree had been made in a court without territorial jurisdiction. Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd., referring to Hira Lal, draws the line in terms of categories: “So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues.” Jurisdiction over the subject matter, it continues, “is totally distinct and stands on a different footing”.Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 791 (C.K. Thakker J.). Section 21 of the Code gives legislative form to the rule on place and valuation.

Retrospective statutes

12Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash shows the exception applied to a change in the law. A landlord obtained a decree for eviction in a civil court. A retrospective proviso to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 then made the Act apply to the tenancy, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court. The executing court held that it could not go into the matter. The High Court in second appeal reversed and held the decree was a nullity and could not be executed.Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash, (1977) 2 SCC 662, AIR 1977 SC 1201 (P.N. Bhagwati J.). The Supreme Court upheld the High Court. The retrospective legislation was to be carried to its logical conclusion, and the jurisdictional defect was thereby apparent. The case shows that the defect need not exist in fact at the time of the decree in order to be treated as appearing on the record. A valid legislative fiction may supply it.

III. Fraud

13A decree obtained by fraud on the court is also treated as a nullity. S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath says such a decree “has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior” and that it “can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings”.S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 (Kuldip Singh J.). That case itself arose on an application for a final decree, when the defendants resisted the application on the ground that the preliminary decree had been obtained by fraud. The executing court is therefore not closed to the plea.

14But this does not reopen the merits under another name. The fraud must be a deception of the court and must be pleaded with particulars. A claim that the other side’s witnesses lied on an issue actually tried will not usually suffice. The separate entry on the principle that fraud vitiates everything discusses that line.

IV. Construing the decree

The duty to find its meaning

15The rule against going behind a decree does not mean the executing court is limited to the literal words. A decree must be read, and sometimes it is unclear. Bhavan Vaja v. Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang draws the distinction clearly:

It is true that an executing court cannot go behind the decree under execution. But that does not mean that it has no duty to find out the true effect of that decree. For construing a decree it can and in appropriate cases, it ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading up to the decree.Bhavan Vaja v. Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang, (1973) 2 SCC 40, AIR 1972 SC 1371 (K.S. Hegde J.).

16The Court added that to find the meaning of the words used in a decree, a court “often has to ascertain the circumstances under which those words came to be used”. That, it said, is “the plain duty of the execution court”. The difference is between finding what the decree means and asking whether it should have been made. A court looking at pleadings in order to identify the property covered by an unclear schedule is construing the decree. A court asking whether the plaintiff truly owned that property is going behind it.

Keeping within the limit

17The duty has an obvious limit. A court cannot use construction to add to or reduce what was decided. Where the decree is clear, the pleadings have no further role to play. And an objector who uses ambiguity as a pretext to re-argue the case should meet the first rule.

V. Events after the decree

Discharge and satisfaction

18Section 47 expressly covers discharge and satisfaction. Payment after the decree or an agreement that discharges it are matters within section 47, subject to the Code’s rules on recording such adjustments. These objections do not go behind the decree. They accept it and say that it has been met.

Supervening law

19Legislation enacted after the decree can also affect whether it can be executed. Haji Sk. Subhan v. Madhorao concerned a decree for possession of land, confirmed on appeal after the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 had come into force. The High Court in that appeal had not considered the effect of the Act. When the decree was sought to be executed, the judgment-debtor objected that the Act had taken away the decree-holder’s proprietary rights. The Court held:

the principle that the executing court cannot question the decree and has to execute the decree has no operation on the facts of the present case because the objection of the appellant was based not with respect to the invalidity of the decree but on the effect of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950Haji Sk. Subhan v. Madhorao, AIR 1962 SC 1230, 1962 Supp (1) SCR 123 (Raghubar Dayal J.), reported headnote.

20The distinction is exact. The objector was not saying that the decree was wrong when passed. He was saying that it could not now be carried out because the law had changed the rights on which it depended. The executing court can consider that, as a question relating to the execution of the decree.

Parties and representation

21A decree may also be open to attack as a nullity where a necessary legal step was not taken. A decree against a dead person without bringing the legal representatives on record is the example given in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi. On the other hand, in Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University, the objection in execution was that during the suit a College had become a constituent unit of a University, which was not a party.Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University, (2001) 6 SCC 534 (B.N. Agrawal J.). The Court held that the omission to bring the University on record did not make the decree void, as discussed below. Not all defects of that kind make a decree void.

VI. Practice

For the judgment-debtor

22The first question is whether the objection can really be framed as one that the rule allows. Is the decree a nullity on its face, or is it just wrong? Does the objection depend on evidence that should have been led at trial? Has there been a discharge? Has a statute intervened? An objection that survives these questions should be stated narrowly and tied to the record. An objection that fails them should have been taken at trial or on appeal, and if the time for that remains open, or delay can be excused, those remedies should be pursued instead.

For the decree-holder

23Oppose any objection that invites evidence on matters already decided or that should have been raised. Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi supports summary rejection of such objections, because the court has no jurisdiction to entertain them. The Supreme Court has also been concerned about delay at this stage. In Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi, (2021) 6 SCC 418, it gave directions to speed up execution and to limit obstruction. The decision should be consulted for current practice, and a party seeking expedition can rely on it.

VII. The reasoning of the leading cases

Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi in full

24The facts of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi show how hard the rule can be. Modi owned a plot in Ahmedabad. Munshi had been a tenant of the land since 1948 at Rs. 411 a year. Modi sued in the Court of Small Causes for ejectment and arrears, alleging default. Munshi deposited an amount that he said satisfied the arrears, and the suit was dismissed. The District Court reversed and passed a decree in ejectment, and a revision to the High Court of Bombay failed. A special leave petition was granted but later vacated, when it was found that Munshi had made false statements in the petition.

25Only when Modi applied for execution did Munshi say that the Court of Small Causes had had no jurisdiction, because the Bombay Rent Act of 1947 did not apply to the land. The Rent Act does not cover land used for agricultural purposes, and the Court accepted that a court under it “has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for possession of land used for agricultural purposes.” The objection therefore might have been right, in the sense that if the land was agricultural, the decree could not have been made. It was not considered at any earlier stage. As the Court noted, “No objection was raised that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The objection was not raised even in appeal, nor before the High Court.”

26The Gujarat High Court, on a petition under Article 227, accepted the point and ordered the execution petition to be dismissed. J.C. Shah J., with K.S. Hegde and A.N. Grover JJ., reversed. The central statement is in the passage already quoted, and the working out of it is in what follows:

In the present case the question whether the Court of Small Causes had jurisdiction to entertain the suit against Munshi depended upon the interpretation of the terms of the agreement of lease, and the user to which the land was put at the date of the grant of the lease. These questions cannot be permitted to be raised in an execution proceeding so as to displace the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree. If the decree is on the face of the record without jurisdiction and the question does not relate to the territorial jurisdiction or under s. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to make the decree may be raised; where it is necessary to investigate facts in order to determine whether the Court which had passed the decree had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit, the objection cannot be raised in the execution proceeding.Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi, (1970) 1 SCC 670, AIR 1970 SC 1475, 1971 SCR (1) 66.

27And the Court said of the High Court’s approach:

The High Court was of the view that where there is lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Court which passed the decree, the executing Court must refuse to execute it on the ground that the decree is a nullity. But, in our judgment, for the purpose of determining whether the Court which passed the decree had jurisdiction to try the suit, it is necessary to determine facts on the decision of which the question depends, and the objection does not appear on the face of the record, the executing Court cannot enter upon an enquiry into those facts.

28The Court contrasted the Privy Council’s decision in Jnanendra Mohan Bhaduri v. Rabindra Nath Chakravarti. There a decree had been passed upon an award under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, which made no provision for such a decree. Nobody needed to find any fact to see the defect. “That was a case in which the decree was on the face of the record without jurisdiction.”

29This produces the working test. An executing court may ask: looking only at the decree and the record, can I see that the court had no power at all to pass it? If yes, it may act. If the answer requires it to find what the land was used for, what the lease said, or what the parties’ relationship was, it may not.

Topanmal and the limits of the decree

30An earlier three-judge decision shows the rule cutting against a decree-holder. In Topanmal Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram, the decree had been so framed as to confine execution to the assets of a firm in the hands of the partners. The decree-holder sought to execute it against the partners’ personal properties. Subba Rao J. said:

It is a well-settled principle that a Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree: it must take the decree as it stands, for the decree is binding and conclusive between the parties to the suit. If the contention of the appellant were to be accepted, it would contravene the said principle; for, while the decree as construed by us, has directed that it should not be executed against the personal properties of the partners, the executing Court would be directing execution against the said partners. While the decree excluded personal liability, the executing Court would be imposing the same. This cannot obviously be done.Topanmal Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram, AIR 1960 SC 388 (K. Subba Rao J., with B.P. Sinha C.J. and P.B. Gajendragadkar J.).

31The rule thus restrains both sides. A judgment-debtor cannot escape what the decree has ordered, and a decree-holder cannot obtain what the decree has withheld. Meenakshi Saxena v. ECGC Ltd. shows the same limit under the consumer protection law. An order had been passed for payment of an amount. An interpretation by the executing forum that went beyond its terms was described by the National Commission in words the Supreme Court upheld, as “contrary to the terms of the agreement and amounts to drawing a new decree which is not permissible.”Meenakshi Saxena v. ECGC Ltd., (2018) 7 SCC 479, AIR 2018 SC 2831 (N.V. Ramana J.). The passage is quoted by the Supreme Court from the order under appeal.

The narrow window in Dhurandhar and Pradeep Mehra

32The Supreme Court has more recently spoken of how narrow the power is. Pradeep Mehra v. Harijivan J. Jethwa was a landlord’s case. An order of 12 February 2013 had allowed execution of an eviction decree and had become final. Objections were later filed under section 47. The Court, with Sudhanshu Dhulia J. writing for himself and Sanjay Kishan Kaul J., said:

The executing court can never go behind the decree. Under Section 47, CPC the executing court cannot examine the validity of the order of the court which had allowed the execution of the decree in 2013, unless the court’s order is itself without jurisdiction. More importantly this order (the order dated 12.02.2013), was never challenged by the tenants/judgment debtors before any forum. The multiple stages a civil suit invariably has to go through before it reaches finality, is to ensure that any error in law is cured by the higher court. The appellate court, the second appellate court and the revisional court do not have the same powers, as the powers of the executing court, which are extremely limited.Pradeep Mehra v. Harijivan J. Jethwa, Supreme Court, 30 October 2023 (Sudhanshu Dhulia J.).

33It then relied on Dhurandhar Prasad Singh, which said:

The exercise of powers under Section 47 of the Code is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole. Thus it is plain that executing Court can allow objection under Section 47 of the Code to the executability of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab initio and nullity, apart from the ground that decree is not capable of execution under law either because the same was passed in ignorance of such a provision of law or the law was promulgated making a decree inexecutable after its passing.Dhurandhar Prasad Singh, (2001) 6 SCC 534 (B.N. Agrawal J., with G.B. Pattanaik J.).

34The picture is a helpful one. Section 47 appears to be broad, as it speaks of “all questions” relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction. What the Court is saying is that those broad words are looking only at a small area. On the facts of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh, the Court applied this directly:

In the case on hand, the decree was passed against the governing body of the College which was defendant without seeking leave of the Court to continue the suit against the University upon whom the interest of the original defendant devolved and impleading it. Such an omission would not make the decree void ab initio so as to invoke application of Section 47 of the Code and entail dismissal of execution.

35The University’s remedy, the Court said, was a properly constituted suit or another available remedy, on the ground for example that the original defendant had lost interest in the suit or colluded with the other side. The appeal was allowed, and the order of the executing court, which had rejected the objection, was restored.

VIII. Void, irregular and wrong

Rafique Bibi

36The word “nullity” has to be kept within its proper limits if the rule is to mean anything. Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin is the case most often used for that purpose. R.C. Lahoti J. said, as later quoted in Balvant N. Viswamitra:

What is ‘void’ has to be clearly understood. A decree can be said to be without jurisdiction, and hence a nullity, if the court passing the decree has usurped a jurisdiction which it did not have; a mere wrong exercise of jurisdiction does not result in a nullity. The lack of jurisdiction in the court passing the decree must be patent on its face in order to enable the executing court to take cognizance of such a nullity based on want of jurisdiction, else the normal rule that an executing court cannot go behind the decree must prevail.

37And later in the same passage:

A distinction exists between a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction and consequently being a nullity and not executable and a decree of the court which is merely illegal or not passed in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. A decree suffering from illegality or irregularity of procedure, cannot be termed inexecutable by the executing court; the remedy of a person aggrieved by such a decree is to have it set aside in a duly constituted legal proceedings or by a superior court failing which he must obey the command of the decree. A decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be denuded of its efficacy by any collateral attack or in incidental proceedings.Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin, (2004) 1 SCC 287, as quoted in Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706.

38Rafique Bibi also quoted from Wade and Forsyth on administrative law, to the effect that “the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances”, and that the terms ‘nullity’ and ‘void’ have no absolute sense. That passage warns against thinking of a nullity as something that disappears of itself. Somebody still has to persuade a court, in a proper proceeding, not to act on it.

Ittyavira Mathai and limitation

39A suit that was barred by time and was nevertheless decreed is the standard test. Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey held that such a decree is not a nullity. The passage has been repeatedly quoted:

If the suit was barred by time and yet, the court decreed it, the court would be committing an illegality and therefore the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set aside by preferring an appeal against it. But it is well settled that a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong; and that even though it decided wrong it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the jurisdiction over the subject matter and it had the jurisdiction over the party and, therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction. As has often been said, courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though they decide wrong, the decrees rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities.Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, AIR 1964 SC 907, as quoted in Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University, (2001) 6 SCC 534.

40The rule was repeated in Bhawarlal v. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises, in which it was said that “even if the decree was passed beyond the period of limitation, it would be an error of law, or at the highest, a wrong decision which can be corrected in appellate proceedings and not by the executing court which was bound by such decree.”Bhawarlal v. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises, (1999) 1 SCC 558, as quoted in Balvant N. Viswamitra, (2004) 8 SCC 706.

Malkarjun

41Behind all these decisions lies the well-known statement of the Privy Council in Malkarjun Bin Shidramappa Pasare v. Narhari Bin Shivappa. An executing court had wrongly held that a particular person represented the estate of a deceased judgment-debtor, and had put property to sale. The person protested. The Board said:

He contended that he was not the right person, but the Court, having received his protest, decided that he was the right person, and so proceeded with the execution. In so doing the court was exercising its jurisdiction. It made a sad mistake, it is true; but a court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decides wrong, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right; and if that course is not taken, the decision however wrong, cannot be disturbed.Malkarjun Bin Shidramappa Pasare v. Narhari Bin Shivappa, (1900) 27 IA 216, as quoted in Balvant N. Viswamitra, (2004) 8 SCC 706.

42That case applies the rule to an executing court itself. Its error of this sort is also within its jurisdiction.

Balvant and the heirs of a dead defendant

43Balvant N. Viswamitra gives a useful example of how a claim of nullity can fail on the facts. A tenant named Papamiya had died. The plaintiffs brought eviction proceedings against the heirs and legal representatives, and they made real attempts to find them. Notices were sent by registered post and came back, and a notice was fixed on the suit premises. An advocate appeared for the defendants, cross-examined a plaintiff in part, and later withdrew for want of instructions. The respondents, who did not claim to be heirs, resisted execution on the ground that they had not been parties. The Court said that “such a decree, by no stretch of imagination, can be described nullity”, and that those aggrieved would have to take appropriate proceedings.

IX. The historical line

Jurisdiction as a question of power

44The basic idea long predates the Code in its present form. Ledgard v. Bull, as quoted by the Allahabad High Court, states the two halves of the rule: “When the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction, over the subject matter of a suit, the parties cannot by their mutual consent, convert it into a proper judicial process”, but “when, in a cause which the Judge is competent to try, the parties without objection join issue, and go to trial upon the merits, the defendant cannot subsequently dispute his jurisdiction upon the grounds that there were irregularities in the initial procedure, which if objected to at the time, would have led to the dismissal of the suit.”Ledgard v. Bull, (1886) 13 IA 134, as quoted in Chandra Bhushan Khanna v. Brij Nandan Singh, AIR 1978 All 459. The decision of the Privy Council was not read directly for this entry.

45So the rule against going behind a decree rests on two ideas that come together at execution. A party who took the merits at trial without objecting has lost the procedural complaint. And a party who has lost on the merits has a remedy by way of appeal. Neither idea can apply where the court had no power at all, because in that case there is nothing to which either party could consent.

Hira Lal Patni

46The Supreme Court adopted the same line in Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath. It concerned a suit on the original side of the Bombay High Court for commission, which was referred to arbitration. The award resulted in a decree. In execution, the judgment-debtor said that no part of the cause of action had arisen in Bombay. A four-judge Bench said:

The objection to its [Bombay High Court] territorial jurisdiction is one which does not go to the competence of the court and can, therefore, be waived. In the instant case, when the plaintiff obtained the leave of the Bombay High Court on the original side, under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the correctness of the procedure or of the order granting the leave could be questioned by the defendant or the objection could be waived by him. When he agreed to refer the matter to arbitration through court, he would be deemed to have waived his objection to the territorial jurisdiction of the court, raised by him in his written statement. It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a court to try a case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199, as quoted in Sneh Lata Goel v. Pushplata, (2019) 3 SCC 594.

47The defendant had agreed to a reference to arbitration and was held to have waived the objection. The principle in the last two sentences is now often cited without reference to the facts.

X. Subhash Mahadevasa Habib and section 21A

48The bar in section 21 applies to appellate and revisional courts. A reader may ask whether the same objection can be raised in a fresh suit. Section 21A, added in 1976, answers that for one kind of defect. It bars a suit challenging the validity of a decree passed in a former suit between the same parties on any ground based on an objection as to the place of suing. Subhash Mahadevasa Habib v. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas explains the general distinction:

Whereas, an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make a decree passed by that court one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void. At best it is voidable in the sense that it could be challenged in appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied.Subhash Mahadevasa Habib v. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas, AIR 2007 SC 1828 (P.K. Balasubramanyan J.).

49That description of a territorial or pecuniary defect, as voidable and not void, states what the objector faces. A decree tainted by a defect of that kind can be attacked in the appeal, on the conditions in section 21, and otherwise it has to be obeyed.

XI. Sunder Dass in more depth

50Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash deserves fuller treatment, because it is the most striking application of the nullity exception. The building was evacuee property, sold at auction and confirmed in favour of the appellant in 1955, with possession handed over on 30 August 1956, though no sale certificate was issued. The appellant let a shop to the respondent. In 1959 the appellant sued in the civil court for eviction. The respondent argued that the Delhi Rent Control Act applied and that the civil court had no jurisdiction under section 50. The trial court decided that the premises still belonged to the Government, because no certificate had been issued, so that section 3 excluded the Act. A decree was passed and upheld at each stage.

51Before it was executed, a proviso was added to section 3 with retrospective effect. It provided that where premises belonging to Government have been lawfully let out by any person, then notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, the Act would apply to the tenancy. Bhagwati J. held:

An executing court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness but where a decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an execution proceeding.Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash, (1977) 2 SCC 662, AIR 1977 SC 1201, reported headnote.

52And on the fiction:

As a result of the fiction the proviso must be deemed to be part of section 3 from the date of enactment of the Act. The logical and inevitable consequence of the introduction of the proviso in section 3 with retrospective effect would be to read the proviso as if it were part of the section at the date when the Act was enacted, and the legal fiction created by the retrospective operation must be carried to its logical extent and all the consequences and incidents must be worked out as if the proviso forms part of the section right from the beginning.Sunder Dass, reported headnote.

53The Act’s section 50 barred the civil court’s jurisdiction. If the Act is deemed to have applied throughout, the civil court had been without power from the start. Nothing needed to be found in execution. The dates, the proviso and the fact of letting were all clear from the record. That is why this case fits the test in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi, and it is a helpful counterweight to the view that the nullity exception is theoretical.

XII. Limits of section 47 in practice

54The practical distinction that emerges from these cases can be set out as a set of questions for the executing court.

55The first question is whether the point goes to the decree or to its enforcement. A plea that the decree has been paid, or compromised, or that a statute has since taken away the right, goes to enforcement and is within section 47. A plea that the decree ought not to have been made goes to the decree and is not.

56The second question, for a plea going to the decree, is whether it is an allegation of nullity at all. A wrong decision on limitation, on evidence, on interpretation of a contract, or as to who represented the estate is not. Ittyavira Mathai, Bhawarlal and Malkarjun all stand in the way.

57The third question, for a true plea of nullity, is whether the defect appears on the record. In Jnanendra Mohan Bhaduri and Sunder Dass it did. In Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi it did not.

58The fourth question is whether the defect relates to place or value. If it does, section 21 and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act apply, and they exclude any attack in execution, as Hira Lal Patni and the later cases discussed in the companion entry on nullity show.

59The fifth question, if the objector claims fraud, is whether what is alleged is a deception practised on the court, with particulars. If what is alleged is only that the trial reached the wrong conclusion on the evidence, that is the merits under another name.

60The sixth question is whether the point has already been decided at the execution stage. Pradeep Mehra is a warning against raising under section 47 an objection to an earlier order in the execution itself, where that order was not appealed or challenged and has become final.

XIII. The position today

61A court executing a decree must take it according to its tenor. It cannot entertain an objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on the facts, and until it is set aside the decree binds the parties. A decree that is a nullity may be objected to in execution. Where the objection is want of inherent jurisdiction, it must appear on the face of the record. If it requires examination of questions decided or capable of being raised at the trial, the executing court cannot entertain it. Objections to place and valuation stand on a different footing and must be taken early. A court may find the true effect of an ambiguous decree by looking at the pleadings and proceedings, and it can consider discharge, satisfaction and a supervening statute, none of which question the decree itself. A decree procured by fraud on the court is treated as a nullity.


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  • Published · 31 October 2026

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