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2026 FPR EDC 14 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/exclusion-of-time-spent-in-a-wrong-forum
DC-0128Doctrines · Civil Procedure · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 14
FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 3,317 words
Exclusion of Time Spent in a Wrong Forum
Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 excludes from the limitation period the time during which a party has been prosecuting, with due diligence and in good faith, another civil proceeding relating to the same matter in issue against the same party in a court that, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it; the exclusion is a matter of right where the conditions are met, and the claimant bears the burden of showing them.
Abstract
A litigant who files in time but in the wrong court should not lose a claim merely because the first forum could not hear it. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 addresses that risk. This entry sets out the section and its conditions, as stated in Madhavrao Narayanrao Patwardhan, Zafar Khan and Consolidated Engineering Enterprises; the meaning of good faith and due diligence, including section 2(h) and Deena v. Bharat Singh; the phrase 'other cause of a like nature', read ejusdem generis in Zafar Khan; the difference from condonation under section 5; the section's extension to arbitration, tribunals and insolvency in Consolidated Engineering, M.P. Steel Corporation and Sesh Nath Singh, with the limit in Kotak Mahindra Bank; and its relation to withdrawal of a suit under Order XXIII.
I. The rule
The statutory text
1Limitation runs regardless of mistakes, as a rule. The Limitation Act, 1963 contains some exceptions, and section 14 is one of the most used. Sub-section (1) deals with suits:
In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.Limitation Act, 1963, s. 14(1), as set out in M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2015) 7 SCC 58.
2Sub-section (2) applies the same rule to applications, with the necessary changes. Sub-section (3) extends the benefit to a fresh suit instituted on permission under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where the permission was granted because the first suit failed for a defect of jurisdiction or other like cause. The Explanation provides that the day on which the former proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended are both counted in excluding time, that a party resisting an appeal is treated as prosecuting a proceeding, and that misjoinder of parties or causes of action is deemed a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.
The purpose
3The section recognises the difference between a litigant who slept on a right and one who pursued it in the wrong place. A plaintiff in the second position has been actively seeking relief, and the defendant has known of the claim throughout. The statute’s concern with stale claims and repose is hardly engaged in such a case. The section is not, however, a general dispensation for errors. It protects only a particular kind of error, made in a particular way, and the decisions on its conditions show how closely the courts read them.
II. The conditions
Older statements of the test
4The test has been stated in slightly different forms, as the numbers of conditions listed differ without the substance doing so. In Madhavrao Narayanrao Patwardhan v. Ramkrishna Govind Bhanu, decided under the 1908 Act, Sinha J. said the plaintiff had to show affirmatively four matters:
(1) that he had been prosecuting with due diligence the previous suit in the court of the Munsif at Miraj, (2) that the previous suit was founded upon the same cause of action, (3) that it had been prosecuted in good faith in that court, and (4) that that court was unable to entertain that suit on account of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature.Madhavrao Narayanrao Patwardhan v. Ramkrishna Govind Bhanu, AIR 1958 SC 767, (1959) 1 SCR 564 (B.P. Sinha J.).
5The word “affirmatively” is the important one. The Court there considered that the trial judge had gone wrong in asking whether mala fides had been established against the plaintiff. Under the section, the plaintiff has to prove the conditions. The plaintiff lost on that ground.
6Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P. described three conditions under section 14(1) of the 1963 Act: that the party was prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence, that the former proceeding related to the same matter in issue, and that it was being prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, was unable to entertain it.Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P., AIR 1985 SC 39, (1985) 1 SCR 287 (D.A. Desai J.), reported headnote.
Consolidated Engineering
7The most frequently cited version is that in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, a case about arbitration. A later High Court summary records the five conditions the Supreme Court identified: both proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party; the prior proceeding was prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith; its failure was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature; the earlier proceeding and the latter relate to the same matter in issue; and both proceedings are in a court.Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169, as summarised in Asian Hotels (West) Ltd. v. Jindal Photo Investment Ltd., AIRONLINE 2018 DEL 2873. Later cases adopt the same framework. In M.P. Steel Corporation, the respondent’s argument was that “five necessary ingredients must be satisfied on facts” before the section could apply.M.P. Steel Corporation, (2015) 7 SCC 58 (R.F. Nariman J.), recording the submission.
8The practical advice is to plead each condition specifically, with dates, and to support each with evidence. The burden is on the party seeking exclusion.
III. Good faith and due diligence
Section 2(h)
9The statute defines good faith: under section 2(h), nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. That definition prevents a claimant from relying on honesty alone. A party can sincerely believe the first forum is right and still fail the test, if a person taking due care would have known better.
Deena v. Bharat Singh
10Deena v. Bharat Singh concerned plaintiffs who had filed a suit, obtained a decree, and on the defendant’s appeal were allowed to withdraw it with permission to file afresh. They then claimed exclusion of the time spent. The Court stated the following principle:
The expression ‘good faith’ as used in section 14 means “exercise of due care and attention’. In the context of section 14 expression ‘good faith’ qualifies prosecuting the proceeding in the Court which ultimately is found to have no jurisdiction. The finding as to good faith or the absence of it is a finding of fact.Deena v. Bharat Singh, (2002) 6 SCC 336 (D.P. Mohapatra J.).
11The defendant had specifically objected in the written statement that the first suit was bad for non-joinder. The first appellate court found that in the circumstances the plaintiffs could not be said to have been prosecuting the earlier suit in good faith or with due diligence. The High Court reversed on second appeal, and the Supreme Court considered the point in light of the statutory meaning of good faith and the character of that question as one of fact. It also said that “section 14 will have no application in a case where the suit is dismissed after adjudication on its merits and not because the Court was unable to entertain it.” The lesson is that persisting in a forum after the defect has been pointed out is a serious difficulty for a later claim under section 14. Advice from counsel may be relevant, but it does not replace the requirement of due care.
Due diligence
12Due diligence looks at how the earlier case was pursued. A party who pursued a proceeding sluggishly, or left it dormant for long periods, cannot have all of that time excluded merely because the forum ultimately proved incompetent. Good faith and due diligence are therefore both directed to the conduct of the party, and they are questions of fact to be decided on the evidence of each case.
IV. Other cause of a like nature
Zafar Khan
13The phrase “defect of jurisdiction” is reasonably clear. The harder words are “or other cause of a like nature”. Zafar Khan holds that they are limited by their context:
The expression ‘other cause of a like nature’ will have to be read ejusdem generis with the expression ‘defect of jurisdiction’. So construed the expression other cause of a like nature must be so interpreted as to convey something analogous to the preceding words from defect of jurisdictionZafar Khan, AIR 1985 SC 39, reported headnote.
14A proceeding may fail for many reasons, the Court pointed out, and not all such defects can be said to be analogous to defect of jurisdiction. The Explanation, which treats misjoinder as such a cause, sheds some light on what is meant. The appeal in that case was dismissed. The defect the section addresses is one that keeps the court from entertaining the claim, as opposed to a weakness that the claim itself suffers from. A party who loses on the merits has no claim under section 14. The party’s next step is an appeal.
The first proceeding need not have ended in a formal finding
15The section requires that the former court was “unable to entertain” the claim. This is about the court’s competence in substance. It does not depend on the form of order in which the failure was recorded. The return of a plaint for presentation to a proper court is a common case, and withdrawal may also be one under sub-section (3), which is discussed below.
V. Exclusion and condonation
Section 5 and section 14
16The Limitation Act has another provision for lateness. Section 5 lets a court admit an appeal or certain applications after the prescribed period if sufficient cause is shown. But the two work differently. Under section 5, the court has a discretion and grants indulgence. Under section 14, the time is simply not counted, and a claim otherwise out of time is treated as in time. Section 5 does not apply to suits at all, so a plaintiff has only section 14 in such cases.
17The difference has mattered most where a special statute excludes section 5. Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. held that section 5 did not apply to an application to set aside an award under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, in view of the terms of that provision.Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470 (Ruma Pal J.). It might have been thought that the same exclusion would remove section 14. The later cases do not treat it so, as the Supreme Court recorded in P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar: it has “in several pronouncements” extended section 14 to section 34 of the Arbitration Act, excluding time “spent in bonafide pursuing proceedings in a Court which lacks jurisdiction”.P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445 (N.V. Ramana J.), citing among others Consolidated Engineering.
VI. Beyond the civil courts
Tribunals
18Section 14 speaks of “a court”, and it is ordinarily limited by that word. M.P. Steel Corporation considered whether a person who had gone to the wrong statutory forum, under the customs legislation, could claim the same protection. An abortive appeal had taken years to fail, and the party argued for the exclusion of that time, relying in the alternative on the “principle of Section 14”. The Court stated that principle in general terms: “whenever a person bonafide prosecutes with due diligence another proceeding which proves to be abortive because it is without jurisdiction, or otherwise no decision could be rendered on merits, the time taken in such proceeding ought to be excluded”. It added that the principle would apply not merely in condoning delay within an outer period prescribed for condonation, but beyond such a period, because excluding time is different from condoning delay. The decision is the starting point for the application of the principle to quasi-judicial appellate bodies, and it notes that the section’s own reference to revision can reach a quasi-judicial tribunal under a particular statute.
Insolvency
19Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 provides that the provisions of the Limitation Act shall, as far as may be, apply to proceedings under the Code. In Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd., a financial creditor had pursued recovery under the SARFAESI Act before its application under section 7 of the Code. The issues before the Court included “Whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to applications under Section 7 of the IBC? If so, is the exclusion of time under Section 14 is available, only after the proceedings before the wrong forum terminate?”Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 313 (Indira Banerjee J.). The NCLAT had excluded the period of about three years and six months spent under the SARFAESI Act. The Supreme Court said there was “no reason why Section 14 or 18 of the Limitation Act would not apply” to the computation of limitation under the Code. It rejected the argument that the SARFAESI proceedings had to have ended first, noting that the High Court had stayed them on the prima facie view that they were without jurisdiction. It also said that the expression “Court” in section 14(2) would be deemed to be any forum for a civil proceeding, including any tribunal or any forum under the SARFAESI Act, and that sections 5 and 14 “are not mutually exclusive”.
20The later decision in Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Kew Precision Parts (P) Ltd. contains a caution. It says that in computing the period for initiating insolvency proceedings, “the time spent in pursuing remedy under the SARFAESI Act or any other recovery law cannot be excluded”.Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Kew Precision Parts (P) Ltd., (2022) 9 SCC 364 (Indira Banerjee J.). The two statements must be read together, and each on its facts. Sesh Nath Singh concerned SARFAESI proceedings taken before a forum that prima facie lacked jurisdiction. A remedy that was actually available is not a wrong forum in the sense section 14 requires. A creditor should not assume that a recovery action automatically stops time for insolvency proceedings.
VII. Withdrawal of a suit
Order XXIII
21The relation between section 14 and Order XXIII Rule 2 of the Code is a common trap. A plaintiff who withdraws a suit with liberty to file afresh, under Rule 1(3), is bound by the law of limitation under Rule 2 as if the first suit had not been instituted. The time spent on the first suit does not count in the plaintiff’s favour under that rule. Section 14(3) qualifies this: the exclusion remains available if the permission was granted because the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature.
22A plaintiff who applies for permission to withdraw should therefore ensure that the application and the order say why, and should frame the grounds as those that the sub-section contemplates. A bare permission to withdraw and re-file because of a formal defect, without those grounds, may later leave the plaintiff unable to invoke the section.
VIII. The working of the section
Deena on defect of jurisdiction
23Deena v. Bharat Singh also explains the expressions that the section uses for the defect itself:
The expression good faith qualifies prosecuting the proceeding in the Court which ultimately is found to have no jurisdiction. Failure to pay the requisite court fee found deficient on a contention being raised or the error of judgment in valuing a suit filed before a Court which was ultimately found to have no jurisdiction has absolutely nothing to do with the question of good faith in prosecuting the suit as provided in section 14 of the Limitation Act.”Vijay Kumar Rampal v. Diwan Devi, AIR 1985 SC 1669, as quoted in Deena v. Bharat Singh, (2002) 6 SCC 336.
24The passage makes a useful point. Good faith is concerned with the prosecution of the earlier proceeding. An error in valuing a suit or a failure to pay court fee may have caused the problem, but that does not by itself show an absence of good faith. Yet a party who has been told plainly that the forum is wrong, and who persists, is in a different position. The Court added: “The finding as to good faith or the absence of it is a finding of fact.” So the question is usually settled by the courts of fact.
M.P. Steel on what the phrases require
25M.P. Steel Corporation gives a short description of what is needed:
These phrases only mean that the party who invokes Section 14 should not be guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction. Further, there should be no pretended mistake intentionally made with a view to delaying the proceedings or harassing the opposite party.M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2015) 7 SCC 58.
26That Court also said, on the question of tribunals, that “despite the fact that Section 14 of the Limitation Act may not apply, yet the principles of Section 14 will get attracted to the facts of the present case.” The distinction is important. A special statute may not attract the section by its own force, since the Act applies to courts, but the principle on which it rests may still be applied.
The Explanation
27The Explanation to section 14 gives three further rules, and they settle points on which litigants often make mistakes.
28In excluding the time, both the day on which the earlier proceeding was instituted or begun and the day on which it ended are to be counted. So the excluded period runs from and includes both days.
29A plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal is deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding. A party who won in the wrong forum, and who is then defending that decree on appeal, can therefore claim the time spent in the appeal.
30Misjoinder of parties or of causes of action is deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction. This is the only express extension in the section, and it was added because the point had caused difficulty under the earlier Act. It makes clear that the phrase is not confined to jurisdiction in the strict sense.
Time that runs before and after
31The section does not stop time altogether. Time runs up to the filing of the wrong proceeding, and it runs again from the day after that proceeding ends. A party should therefore calculate precisely. If two of the three years had passed when the first suit was filed, and the first suit ended some years later, the party has about one year from the end of the first suit. The litigant does not get a fresh period, and a party who waits for that year to run out will have no claim, however good the earlier reasons were. Since a return of the plaint or an order declining jurisdiction starts time running again from that point, the new proceeding should be started quickly.
32The rule on the earlier proceeding’s end date also calls for attention. Where the plaint in the first suit is returned for presentation to the proper court, the time ordinarily ends when the order of return is passed, or in some cases when the plaint is taken back by the party. Where there is an appeal from the order, the party must show that the appeal was also prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith. A party who simply let an appeal lie in the wrong forum may lose the benefit of that time.
The fresh suit and the old cause
33Finally, section 14 does not make the second suit a continuation of the first. A new suit must be filed in the proper court. Fresh court fee may be due, and the pleadings should state the facts on which the exclusion is claimed. Order VII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires a plaint in a suit filed after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation to show the ground on which exemption from that law is claimed. A plaintiff who relies on section 14 should plead the dates of the first proceeding, its result, the reason why the first court could not entertain it, and the facts showing good faith and due diligence.
IX. The position today
34Section 14 removes from the limitation count the time spent pursuing another civil proceeding, relating to the same matter in issue and against the same party, in a court unable to entertain it because of a defect of jurisdiction or a like cause. The proceeding must have been pursued with due diligence and in good faith, and good faith under section 2(h) requires due care and attention. The party claiming the exclusion must prove these matters. The phrase “cause of a like nature” is read ejusdem generis, and a claim that failed on its merits is outside it. Section 14 is distinct from section 5 and may be available even where section 5 is excluded by a special law. It has been applied beyond ordinary suits, including to section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and its principle has been relied on before statutory bodies and in insolvency. A party should, however, not assume its application to a remedy chosen in parallel, since the Supreme Court has said in Kotak Mahindra that time spent on recovery law remedies cannot be excluded from insolvency limitation.
35Whoever chooses a forum in a doubtful case should keep a record of why the choice seemed reasonable when made. That record may be the best evidence of due care if the forum later proves to be the wrong one.
History
- Published · 31 October 2026
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