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2026 FPR EDC 4 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/eclipse
DC-0002Doctrines · Constitutional · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 4
FPR Editors27 October 2026 · 2,738 words
Eclipse
A law in force before the Constitution that is inconsistent with a fundamental right is not wiped out but overshadowed: it remains valid for things done before the Constitution and as against those who do not hold the right, and it revives if the inconsistency is later removed by constitutional amendment; a law made after the Constitution in breach of a fundamental right is, by contrast, void from its inception, though only to the extent of the contravention, so that it may still operate against persons whose rights it does not infringe.
Abstract
The doctrine of eclipse explains what happens to a law that conflicts with a fundamental right. This entry sets out the problem in comparative terms (the American view that an unconstitutional statute is no law at all, and its later qualification), and then the text of Article 13, which treats pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws differently. It traces the Indian doctrine through Keshavan Madhava Menon (1951), Bhikaji Narain Dhakras (1955), where the Court first used the image of an eclipse, Saghir Ahmad (1954) and Deep Chand (1959), which held that a post-Constitution law in breach of Part III is stillborn, and Mahendra Lal Jaini (1962), which explained why the two clauses of Article 13 differ. It then examines the qualification introduced by State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills (1974), that a post-Constitution law infringing a right of citizens only remains operative against non-citizens; the retrospective effect of a declaration of unconstitutionality in CBI v. R.R. Kishore (2023); the survival of Article 31C after Minerva Mills in Property Owners Association (2024); and the criticisms of the doctrine.
I. The doctrine
1When the Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950, a large body of existing law, made by colonial and provincial legislatures, continued in force. Some of it was inconsistent with the fundamental rights in Part III. The doctrine of eclipse answers the question what became of such laws.
2The answer is that an existing law inconsistent with a fundamental right was not wiped off the statute book. It was overshadowed by the right, so that it could not be enforced against those who held it, while remaining valid for other purposes. The Supreme Court put it in a phrase that gave the doctrine its name:
The true position is that the impugned law became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being, by the fundamental right.Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P., AIR 1955 SC 781, (1955) 2 SCR 589 (Das, Actg. C.J.).
3If the fundamental right is later amended so that the inconsistency disappears, the eclipse passes and the law operates again without being re-enacted.
4The doctrine applies, on the orthodox view, only to laws made before the Constitution. A law made after the Constitution in breach of Part III is treated differently: it is void from the start, because the legislature had no power to make it. But even such a law is void only “to the extent of the contravention”, and the Court has held that a post-Constitution law infringing a right that belongs only to citizens may still operate against non-citizens (Part IV).
II. The problem in comparative perspective
The American view
5In the United States, the classic statement was that of Field J. in Norton v. Shelby County: an unconstitutional act is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties and is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886). The Supreme Court later qualified the rule. In Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, it held that an Act is an operative fact before it is declared unconstitutional, and that the effect of the earlier existence of the statute cannot always be erased.Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). The American cases concern laws made under a constitution that already existed. They do not address laws made before a constitution came into force.
The Indian text
6Article 13 of the Indian Constitution deals with both kinds of law, in separate clauses:
(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.
7Article 372(1) continues existing law in force “subject to the other provisions of this Constitution”. The difference in wording between the two clauses of Article 13, and the qualifying words “to the extent of” in both, are the textual basis of the doctrine.
III. Pre-Constitution laws
Keshavan Madhava Menon (1951)
8The first question was whether Article 13(1) affected things done before 26 January 1950. In Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, the appellant had been prosecuted before the Constitution for publishing a pamphlet without the authorisation required by the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, and the prosecution was pending when the Constitution came into force.Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128, (1951) SCR 228. He argued that the Act, being inconsistent with the freedom of speech, had become void and the prosecution could not continue.
9The majority, in a judgment of S.R. Das J., rejected the argument. Article 13(1) does not make existing laws void from their inception; it has no retrospective effect, and an inconsistent law “is not wiped out so far as the past act is concerned, for to say that it is will be to give the law retrospective effect”. Das J. continued:
There is no fundamental right that a person shall not be prosecuted and punished for an offence committed before the Constitution came into force. So far as the past acts ... are concerned the law exists, notwithstanding that it does not exist with respect to the future exercise of fundamental rights.Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128 (Das J.).
10S. Fazl Ali and B.K. Mukherjea JJ. dissented.
Bhikaji Narain Dhakras (1955)
11The doctrine was stated in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh.Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P., AIR 1955 SC 781, (1955) 2 SCR 589. The C.P. and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 conferred wide powers on the provincial Government, including power to take over motor transport services to the exclusion of private operators. After 1950, the law was inconsistent with the right in Article 19(1)(g) to carry on a business, as that right then stood. The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 then amended Article 19(6) to permit laws providing for State trading to the exclusion of citizens. The question was whether the 1947 law, void after 1950, revived on the amendment, or had to be re-enacted.
12S.R. Das, Acting C.J., for a Constitution Bench, distinguished the American authorities:
The American authorities refer only to post-Constitution laws which were inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. Such laws never came to life but were still born as it were.Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P., AIR 1955 SC 781 (Das, Actg. C.J.).
13Existing laws were different. They had been valid when made:
Such laws were not dead for all purposes. They existed for the purposes of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and they remained operative even after the Constitution as against non-citizens. It is only as against the citizens that they remained in a dormant or moribund condition.Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P., AIR 1955 SC 781 (Das, Actg. C.J.).
14The law had been eclipsed by the fundamental right; the First Amendment removed the shadow. The Court upheld the law without re-enactment.
IV. Post-Constitution laws
Saghir Ahmad (1954) and Deep Chand (1959)
15A law made after 1950 in breach of a fundamental right stands on a different footing. In Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P., the U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951, enacted before the First Amendment, provided for State transport services that excluded private operators.Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728, (1955) 1 SCR 707. B.K. Mukherjea J., for the Court, held that the later amendment of Article 19(6) could not save it:
The amendment of the Constitution which came later cannot be invoked to validate an earlier legislation which must be regarded as unconstitutional when it was passed.Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728 (Mukherjea J.).
16Quoting Cooley, he said that “a statute void for unconstitutionality is dead and cannot be vitalised by a subsequent amendment of the Constitution removing the constitutional objection but must be re-enacted”.
17In Deep Chand v. State of U.P., the Court explained the difference between the two clauses of Article 13.Deep Chand v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 648, (1959) Supp (2) SCR 8. K. Subba Rao J., for the majority, said:
There is a clear distinction between the two clauses.Deep Chand v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 648 (Subba Rao J.).
18Under clause (1), a pre-Constitution law subsists except to the extent of its inconsistency with Part III; under clause (2), “no post-Constitution law ... can be made contravening the provisions of Part III, and therefore the law, to that extent, though made, is a nullity from its inception”. Clause (2) is a limit on legislative power, and a law made beyond the power is void when made. The doctrine of eclipse has no application to it.
Mahendra Lal Jaini (1962)
19In Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P., a Constitution Bench in a judgment of K.N. Wanchoo J. considered whether the different results for the two clauses meant that “void” had different meanings in each.Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1019, (1963) Supp (1) SCR 912 (Wanchoo J.). It held that it did not:
the meaning of the word void for all practical purposes is the same in art. 13(1) as in art. 13(2), namely that the laws which were void were ineffectual and nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect.Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1019.
20The difference arose instead from the fact that one clause deals with pre-Constitution laws and the other with post-Constitution laws, “with the result that in one case the laws being not still born the doctrine of eclipse will apply while in the other case the laws being still born there will be no scope for the application of the doctrine of eclipse”.
V. The qualification: Ambica Mills (1974)
The problem of non-citizens
21Some fundamental rights, including the freedoms in Article 19, belong only to citizens. Bhikaji Narain had said that a pre-Constitution law inconsistent with such a right remained operative against non-citizens. If a post-Constitution law were wholly void from its inception, it could not operate against anyone, citizen or not. The result would be that a pre-Constitution law could be enforced against a non-citizen, but an identical post-Constitution law could not.
The decision
22In State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., a company challenged provisions of the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1953 that transferred unpaid wages and similar sums to a welfare fund.State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656, AIR 1974 SC 1300 (Mathew J.). A company is not a citizen and cannot claim the rights in Article 19. The question was whether the company could rely on the invalidity of the provisions as against citizens.
23K.K. Mathew J., for a Constitution Bench, held that it could not. He began from the general rule that a statute declared unconstitutional is void, but noted that the rule “requires qualifications in certain situations”. He then turned to the words of Article 13(2):
We think that the expression ‘any law’ occurring in the latter part of the sub-article must necessarily refer to the same expression in the former part and therefore, the Constitution-makers, have already made it clear that the law that would be void is only the law that contravenes the fundamental rights conferred by Part ... and so, the phrase ‘to the extent of the contravention’ can mean only to the extent of the contravention of the rights conferred.State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656 (Mathew J.).
24A post-Constitution law that infringes a right belonging only to citizens contravenes nothing as regards non-citizens, and so is not void as against them. The provisions were valid as against the company, and the appeals were allowed.
The effect
25Ambica Mills does not apply the doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution laws in the sense of reviving them on amendment; Deep Chand and Saghir Ahmad still govern that question. But it does show that “void” in Article 13(2) means void to the extent of the contravention, and that a post-Constitution law may be void as to some persons and valid as to others. The image of a law “still born” for all purposes cannot be taken literally.
VI. Later developments
Retrospective effect of a declaration: R.R. Kishore (2023)
26The orthodox view that a post-Constitution law in breach of Part III is void from its inception was applied in CBI v. Dr. R.R. Kishore.CBI v. Dr. R.R. Kishore, 2023 INSC 817 (Vikram Nath J.). In Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI, a Constitution Bench had held section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, which required prior Government approval before certain officers could be investigated, to be void for violating Article 14.Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682. The question in R.R. Kishore was whether that declaration operated retrospectively, so as to affect investigations begun while the section stood on the statute book. A Constitution Bench held that it did:
once a law is declared to be unconstitutional, being violative of Part-III of the Constitution, then it would be held to be void ab initio, still born, unenforceable and non est in view of Article 13(2) of the Constitution and its interpretation by authoritative pronouncements.CBI v. Dr. R.R. Kishore, 2023 INSC 817, ¶ 43.
27Section 6A was therefore held not to have been in force from the date of its insertion, 11 September 2003. The Court relied on Deep Chand and on the line of authority holding that a statute declared unconstitutional is non est for all purposes, subject to the Court’s power to apply prospective overruling and to mould relief under Article 142.
Revival after a struck-down amendment: Property Owners Association (2024)
28A related question arises when a constitutional amendment that replaced an earlier provision is struck down. The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 had widened Article 31C; in Minerva Mills the Court struck the widening down.Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625. It was later argued that Article 31C had then disappeared altogether, because the original provision had been replaced and the replacement had failed. In Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, a Bench of nine judges rejected the argument and held that Article 31C, to the extent that it had been upheld in Kesavananda Bharati, remains in force.Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 INSC 836. The decision rests on the view that an amendment struck down as unconstitutional is void from the start, so that the provision it purported to replace was never displaced.
Laws in the Ninth Schedule
29Article 31B provides that none of the Acts in the Ninth Schedule “shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void”, on the ground of inconsistency with Part III. Its effect is to protect even laws that would otherwise have been stillborn, which is a further indication that the voidness of an unconstitutional law is not absolute in every sense.Jagannath v. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, AIR 1972 SC 425, (1972) 1 SCR 1055. Since I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, laws added to the Schedule after 24 April 1973 remain open to challenge on the ground that they damage the basic structure.I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1.
VII. Criticisms
30H.M. Seervai was a sharp critic of the Court’s reasoning.H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th edn, N.M. Tripathi 1991), vol. 1. The criticisms fall under three heads.
31The first is conceptual. If a post-Constitution law in breach of Part III is “still born”, it is hard to see how it can operate against anyone. Yet Ambica Mills holds that it may operate against non-citizens. A law cannot sensibly be dead as to one person and alive as to another unless “void” means something less than nullity. The better description, on this view, is that an unconstitutional law is unenforceable to the extent of the contravention, rather than non-existent.
32The second concerns the difference between the clauses. The distinction drawn in Deep Chand and Mahendra Lal Jaini means that an amendment removing an inconsistency revives a pre-Constitution law but not a post-Constitution one. The reason given is that the post-Constitution legislature lacked power; but the result is that two identical laws are treated differently because of the date of their enactment.
33The third is practical. The image of an eclipse suggests that a law hidden by a fundamental right is unaffected and returns intact when the shadow passes. In practice, the courts have had to decide in each case how far the law operated in the meantime, for past transactions, for non-citizens, and for proceedings begun before a declaration of invalidity. R.R. Kishore shows that these questions remain live.
34Other legal systems have dealt with the problem by giving courts express powers. The Constitution of South Africa permits a court that declares a law invalid to limit the retrospective effect of its order or to suspend the declaration,Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s. 172(1)(b). and the Supreme Court of Canada has developed principles for suspended declarations of invalidity.Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 SCR 679. In India, the equivalent tools are the doctrine of prospective overruling and the power under Article 142, both mentioned in R.R. Kishore.
VIII. The position today
35The law on the doctrine of eclipse in India may be stated in six propositions.
361. A pre-Constitution law inconsistent with a fundamental right is void under Article 13(1) only to the extent of the inconsistency, and only from 26 January 1950. It continues to govern things done and rights and liabilities that arose before that date (Keshavan Madhava Menon).
372. Such a law is not wiped out but eclipsed. It remains operative against persons who do not hold the fundamental right in question, and it revives without re-enactment if the inconsistency is removed by constitutional amendment (Bhikaji Narain Dhakras).
383. A post-Constitution law that takes away or abridges a fundamental right is made without legislative power and is void from its inception to the extent of the contravention. It is not revived by a later amendment removing the inconsistency, and must be re-enacted (Saghir Ahmad; Deep Chand; Mahendra Lal Jaini).
394. “Void” has the same meaning in both clauses of Article 13; the difference in result follows from the different nature of pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws (Mahendra Lal Jaini).
405. A post-Constitution law that infringes a fundamental right belonging only to citizens is void only as against citizens, and remains operative against non-citizens (Ambica Mills).
416. A declaration that a post-Constitution law is unconstitutional ordinarily operates from the date of the law, subject to the Court’s power to apply prospective overruling or to mould relief under Article 142 (R.R. Kishore). An amendment struck down as unconstitutional does not displace the provision it purported to replace (Property Owners Association).
History
- Published · 27 October 2026
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