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2026 FPR EDC 10 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/clog-on-redemption

DC-0149Doctrines · Property · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 10

FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 4,668 words

Clog on Redemption

A mortgagor's right to redeem under section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 cannot be defeated by a term in the mortgage converting it into a sale on default, because such a term is a clog on the equity of redemption and is invalid; a term that merely restricts redemption is invalid only if the bargain is unconscionable, so that a long period of mortgage is not by itself a clog, but the court may treat it as one on the facts.

Abstract

The right of redemption is what separates a mortgage from a sale. This entry sets out section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the equitable maxim behind it; the two kinds of clog identified in Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal, one absolute and the other turning on whether the bargain is unconscionable; the Constitution Bench's treatment of a stipulation for conversion into a sale in Murarilal v. Dev Karan; the application to a 99-year term in Shivdev Singh v. Sucha Singh; the English background in Noakes v. Rice and Kreglinger; and the distinct question of when the right is extinguished, in Mhadagonda Ramgonda Patil v. Shripal Balwant Rainade.


I. The doctrine

The right to redeem

1Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines a mortgage as the transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing a loan or other engagement. The mortgagee has an interest in the land as security, not as ownership. Section 60 gives the matching right. At any time after the principal money has become due, the mortgagor has a right, on payment or tender of the mortgage-money at a proper time and place, to require the mortgagee to deliver up the mortgage-deed and related documents, to deliver possession if the mortgagee holds it, and to retransfer the property or acknowledge that the mortgage is at an end. The proviso preserves one limit: the right must not have been extinguished by the act of the parties or by decree of a court.

2The right has an equitable history. Equity treated the money as the real point of the transaction and the land as only security, so a mortgagor who offered the money should get the land back, whatever the deed said about time. The usual statement is that “once a mortgage, always a mortgage”. A mortgage cannot be turned into something else by a term that was part of the original bargain.

Why it exists

3The doctrine assumes an imbalance. A person who pledges land for a loan is often in urgent need of money, and the lender may require almost any term. The law therefore does not treat the mortgagor’s agreement to a harsh term as necessarily final. The English authority most often cited for this, Noakes & Co. Ltd. v. Rice, [1902] AC 24, describes redemption as of the very essence of a mortgage, and treats any stipulation preventing a mortgagor getting back the property on discharging the debt as bad. That decision and the other English cases mentioned below could not be consulted in the original for this entry, and they are described in general terms.

II. Two kinds of clog

Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal

4The leading Indian statement is Seth Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal. The mortgage deed had two distinct terms. It said the mortgage would not be redeemed for 85 years. And it said that it could be redeemed only after that period and within six months thereafter, failing which the mortgagor would lose any claim and the deed would be deemed a deed of sale. The Court said:

The rule against clogs on the equity of redemption embodied in s. 60 of the Transfer of-Property Act empowers the Court not only to relieve a mortgagor of a bargain whereby in certain circumstances his right to redeem the mortgage is wholly taken away, but also where that right is restricted. The extent of this latter power is, however, limited by the reason that gave rise to it, namely, the unconscionable nature of the bargainSeth Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal, AIR 1958 SC 770, 1959 SCR 509, reported headnote.

5This distinguishes two cases. Where a term takes the right away altogether, the Court acts without needing more. Where a term only restricts the right, as a long term of years does, the Court acts only where the bargain is unconscionable.

Applying the two rules

6The Court applied each rule to its own term. On the 85-year term, on the facts and circumstances, the bargain was “quite fair and one as between parties dealing with each other on an equal footing”. It held “that the term providing for a period of eightyfive years was not a clog on the equity of redemption, and the mere length of the period could not by itself lead to an inference that the bar. gain was in any way oppressive or unreasonable.” The suit for redemption, filed before that period ended, was therefore premature.

7The other term was treated quite differently. A provision that on failure to redeem within six months the mortgagor “would lose his right to do so and the mortgage deed was to be deemed to be a deed of sale in favour of the mortgagee, was clearly a clog on the equity of redemption and as such invalid”. But its invalidity “could not in any way affect the validity of the other term as to the period of the mortgage, that stood clearly apart”.

8That final point is significant in practice. A court may sever a bad clause, and the rest of the deed can stand. A mortgagor challenging a long term must therefore prove an unconscionable bargain on its own terms.

III. Conversion into a sale

Murarilal v. Dev Karan

9Murarilal v. Dev Karan gives the rule on conversion a firm footing. A mortgage of a shop in 1919 provided for repayment within 15 years, and the terms of the deed would on default have made the mortgagee the owner of the property. The heir of the mortgagor sued for redemption long after that time. Gajendragadkar C.J., for a five-judge Bench, said:

The fact that a stipulation of the kind with which we are concerned in the present case amounts to a clog on the equity of redemption, is not and cannot be disputed.Murarilal v. Dev Karan, AIR 1965 SC 225, (1964) 8 SCR 239 (P.B. Gajendragadkar C.J.).

10The main question was whether the doctrine could be applied in Alwar, since the Transfer of Property Act did not apply there when the mortgage was executed or when the 15 years expired. The appellant argued that the equitable principle could not be invoked where the Act did not apply. The Court rejected this and held the doctrine applicable. The mortgagee could not plead the stipulation as a bar to the claim for redemption.

The significance of the point

11Thus the rule is not a technical aspect of a particular statute. It is the expression of a general principle. Whatever a mortgage deed may say about default, it cannot make the mortgagee an owner by reason of the mortgagor’s lateness alone. A mortgagee who wants to end the right to redeem must take the steps the law provides, such as a decree for foreclosure or sale, or must acquire the equity of redemption in a separate later transaction.

IV. Long periods

Shivdev Singh v. Sucha Singh

12Shivdev Singh v. Sucha Singh took up the long-term question again. A mortgage of agricultural land for Rs. 7,000 was for 99 years. The plaintiff, who had bought part of the land from the mortgagor, offered the whole of the mortgage money and sued for redemption, alleging that the term had been exacted by taking advantage of the mortgagor’s financial condition and helplessness. He also pleaded that the mortgagees had been enjoying the usufruct for more than 20 years. The defendants argued that the suit was premature under section 60 and relied on Ganga Dhar. The High Court, for its part, had relied on Pomal Kanji Govindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit, AIR 1989 SC 436.

13The trial court framed an issue on whether the 99-year period was a clog, and the courts below held against the mortgagees. The Supreme Court observed that those findings were not said to be perverse or against the evidence, and it said: “There is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed”.Shivdev Singh v. Sucha Singh, (2000) 4 SCC 326, AIR 2000 SC 1935 (Bench: S. Saghir Ahmad and R.P. Sethi JJ.).

Reconciling the two decisions

14Ganga Dhar and Shivdev Singh can stand together because each turned on the facts. In the first, the court found a fair bargain between equals, and an 85-year term stood. In the second, the concurrent findings established a term extracted from a person in distress, with the mortgagees already long in possession and enjoying the usufruct. The law does not name a number of years at which a mortgage becomes a clog.

15The relevant factors include the relative position of the parties, the mortgagor’s need at the time, the amount advanced as against the land’s value, who holds possession and who benefits from the usufruct, and whether a long term serves any legitimate purpose of the lender. A mortgagor should plead and prove those facts specifically, as the plaintiff in Shivdev Singh did. A bare statement that the term is long will not carry the case.

V. Collateral advantages

The English line

16A further question is whether a mortgagee can obtain some other benefit from the transaction, and keep that benefit after redemption. Noakes v. Rice concerned a covenant by a publican who had mortgaged his premises to buy the brewer’s beer, not only during the mortgage but after it. The House of Lords refused to enforce it beyond redemption. Bradley v. Carritt, [1903] AC 253, went further against the mortgagee. Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co. Ltd., [1914] AC 25, then drew a limit: a collateral bargain that is in substance independent of the mortgage, and is not a clog on the property itself, may survive. Those are the usual descriptions of the cases. Indian courts have considered them, particularly in the context of what is unconscionable.

Application in India

17In India, the question is framed by section 60 and by the principle in Ganga Dhar. A collateral term may be enforceable if it does not restrict redemption and is not unconscionable. A collateral term whose effect is to make redemption illusory, for example by imposing such burdens as to prevent the mortgagor from getting the property back free of them, will be bad. A term that gives the mortgagee a right of pre-emption or a lease after redemption raises the same questions, and the answer depends on whether it was truly a separate and fair bargain or a means of keeping the property in the lender’s hands.

VI. When the right ends

Extinction under section 60

18The proviso to section 60 acknowledges that the right can come to an end, by the act of the parties or by decree of a court. A clog must be distinguished from these. A later agreement in which the mortgagor sells the equity of redemption to the mortgagee, as a real and separate transaction, may be valid. The rule concerns what was bargained for in or as part of the mortgage. Courts look to substance, and a later document that merely carries out the original plan may be treated as part of it.

Mhadagonda Ramgonda Patil

19The second route is by decree. Mhadagonda Ramgonda Patil v. Shripal Balwant Rainade, decided by three judges, concerned the right of mortgagors under a preliminary decree for redemption, and when the right is extinguished under Order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.Mhadagonda Ramgonda Patil v. Shripal Balwant Rainade, (1988) 3 SCC 298, AIR 1988 SC 1200 (M.M. Dutt J.). It should be consulted on that aspect. In general, the mortgagor’s right to redeem does not cease just because time has passed under a preliminary decree. The proper procedure must be followed to its conclusion before the right ends.

Limitation

20The Limitation Act, 1963 also matters. Article 61(a) gives a mortgagor thirty years from when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues. The accrual of that right depends partly on the term of the mortgage. A valid long term can therefore have an unexpected effect, since time may not begin until the term ends, and this also affects the case for treating a term as unconscionable.

VII. Practice

For the mortgagor

21Plead the facts that show what the mortgage actually provides and how it operated. If relying on a clause that takes the right away, identify it and say that it is invalid as such. If relying on a long term, plead the circumstances that make it unconscionable, and prove them. Offer the mortgage money. A court is more receptive to a mortgagor who is ready to pay.

For the mortgagee

22Do not rely on a conversion clause. It is unlikely to survive. If the debt is unpaid, the remedy is by the Code’s procedures on mortgage suits. If the deed has a long term, be ready to show its commercial reason and the fairness of the bargain, as in Ganga Dhar. If the transaction is later than the mortgage, show that it is separate and real.

VIII. The reasoning in Murarilal

The opposing authorities

23Murarilal v. Dev Karan is more interesting than its result suggests, because the Court had to deal with a line of Privy Council authority that seemed to be against it. The mortgage was of a shop in Alwar in 1919, and the Transfer of Property Act did not apply there when it was made or when the fifteen years ended. The appellant relied on the Privy Council’s decision in Thumbusawmy Moodelly v. Hossain Rowthen. The Court described that decision:

In that case, the Privy Council held that the contract of mortgage by conditional sale is a form of security known throughout India, and by the ancient law of India, it must be taken to prevail in every part of India, where it has not been modified by actual legislation or established practice, and so, must be enforced according to its letter.Murarilal v. Dev Karan, AIR 1965 SC 225, (1964) 8 SCR 239, describing Thumbusawmy Moodelly v. Hossain Rowthen, ILR 1 Mad 1.

24The Board had gone so far as to say, as Gajendragadkar C.J. put it, that “in trying to enforce principles of equity in dealing with stipulations contained in mortgage documents, the High Courts were really assuming the functions of Legislature.” So the Indian courts were enforcing an equitable rule in the teeth of what the Privy Council had said, and the Supreme Court had to decide what remained of the older view.

The answer

25The Court’s answer relied on the duty of the courts to act on justice, equity and good conscience where there is no statute, and on Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai, in which it had said that this was axiomatic even if the Transfer of Property Act did not apply. It described those observations as “the same traditional judicial approach in dealing with oppressive, unjust and unreasonable restrictions imposed by the mortgagees on needy mortgagors”. It relied too on decisions in Rajasthan and elsewhere, and concluded:

Thus, it is clear that the equitable principle of justice, equity and good conscience has been consistently applied by Civil Courts in dealing with mortgages in a substantial part of Rajasthan and that lends support to the contention of the respondent that it was recognised even in Alwar that if a mortgage deed contains a stipulation which unreasonably restrains or restricts the mortgagor’s equity of redemption, courts were empowered to ignore that stipulation and enforce the mortgagor’s right to redeem, subject, of course, to the general law of limitation prescribed in that behalf.Murarilal v. Dev Karan, AIR 1965 SC 225.

26The closing words are worth attention. The mortgagor’s right remains subject to limitation, and the rule against clogs does not keep a right alive beyond that period.

27It also deserves notice that the Court treated the principle as one with a wide reach, while taking some care to rest its conclusion on the absence of any material showing that Alwar’s law was different. As the Court noted: “In the absence of any material on the record on the point, we are reluctant to accept Mr. Sarjoo Prasad’s argument that the doctrine of equity and justice should be treated as irrelevant in dealing with the present dispute.” So it was not necessary for the Bench to say that the older Privy Council decisions were wholly wrong.

IX. Ganga Dhar on its facts

The clause and the bargain

28The actual clause in Ganga Dhar deserves to be read, because it shows how such terms are drafted:

“ I or my heirs will not be entitled to redeem the property for a period of 85 years. After the expiry of 85 years we shall redeem it within a period of six months. In case we do not redeem within a period of six months, then after the expiry of the stipulated period, I, my heirs, and legal representatives shall have no claim over the mortgaged property, and the mortgagee shall have no claim to get the mortgage money and the lagat (i. e., repairs) expenses that may be due at the time of default. In such a case this very deed will be deemed to be a sale deed. There will be no need of executing a fresh sale deed. The expenses spent in repairs and new constructions will be paid along with the mortgage money at the time of redemption according to account produced by the mortgagee.”Seth Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal, AIR 1958 SC 770, 1959 SCR 509.

29The clause contains three distinct promises. The first postpones redemption for eighty-five years. The second limits redemption to a window of six months after that period. The third provides that on failure to redeem in the window the deed becomes a sale. These are treated very differently under the law. The Court upheld the first on the facts, struck down the third, and treated it as separable. The headnote also records the reason for the power to intervene, and for its limit:

The extent of this latter power is, however, limited by the reason that gave rise to it, namely, the unconscionable nature of the bargain, which, to a court of equity, would afford sufficient ground for relieving the mortgagor of his burden, and its exercise must, therefore, depend on whether the bargain, in the facts and circumstances of any particular case, was one imposed on the mortgagor by taking advantage of his difficult and impecunious position.Seth Ganga Dhar, AIR 1958 SC 770, reported headnote.

30The Court’s concern was thus with how the bargain came about. It looked at whether the mortgagor’s difficult position was exploited, and not only at the length of the period as such.

31The later window of six months is also instructive. A term that gives a right of redemption but closes it after a short period is itself a restriction, and in Ganga Dhar it went together with the conversion clause. Since it is the combination that leads to the loss of the property, a court is likely to treat the two as one when considering whether the mortgagor can be shut out.

X. Pomal Kanji

The principle restated

32Pomal Kanji Govindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit is the fullest modern statement of the doctrine by the Supreme Court. A mortgage of 1943 of two delis with houses and shops, in the former State of Kutch, was for 99 years for 30,000 koris. The mortgagees could spend any amount on improvements and could rebuild the entire property. They inducted tenants. The plaintiffs alleged that their father was then in a weak economic condition and heavily indebted, and they sued to redeem. The mortgagees answered that a term of 99 years was a local custom, that the term had a reason, and that the plaintiff, who later became a judge, had not complained for 29 years. The trial court decreed the suit, holding that the terms were harsh and oppressive, and the High Court and the Supreme Court upheld this. The reported headnote states these propositions:

The Court will ignore any contract the effect of which is to deprive the mortgagor of his right to redeem the mortgage.
Any provision inserted to prevent, evade or hamper redemption is void.
The doctrine “clog on the equity of redemption” is a rule of justice, equity and good conscience. It must be adopted in each case to the reality of the situation and the individuality of the transaction
Freedom of contract is permissible provided it does not lead to taking advantage of the oppressed or depressed people. The law must transform itself to the social awareness. Poverty should not be unduly permitted to curtail one’s right to borrow money on the ground of justice, equity and good conscience on just terms. If it does, it is bad. Whether it does or does not, however, depends upon the facts and the circumstances of each case.Pomal Kanji Govindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit, (1989) 1 SCC 458, AIR 1989 SC 436, 1988 Supp (3) SCR 826 (Sabyasachi Mukharji J.), reported headnote.

33It added that “Whether in the facts and the circumstances of these cases, the mortgage transaction amounted to clog on the equity of redemption, is a mixed question of law and fact.”

What it adds to Ganga Dhar

34Ganga Dhar speaks of a fair bargain between equals. Pomal Kanji puts the matter in social terms. Two effects follow in practice.

35First, the question is treated as a mixed question of law and fact. That helps explain why Shivdev Singh could end with a short statement that the findings were not perverse. The finding of a clog on a long-term mortgage will usually be left undisturbed if it is reasoned.

36Second, it allows the combined effect of several terms to be considered. In Pomal Kanji, the length of the term came with a freedom to rebuild at the mortgagor’s eventual cost. If a mortgagor would have to repay large sums spent by the mortgagee at the mortgagee’s choice, before getting the property back, the term may make redemption illusory even though it does not formally prevent it. That is why a court must look at the whole of the bargain.

37The case also dealt with tenants inducted by the mortgagee. A tenant let in by a mortgagee in possession may have to give way on the redemption of the mortgage, depending on the rent legislation. That aspect of the decision goes beyond this entry, but mortgagors should note that a tenant in possession is a separate obstacle to redemption, and tenants should be made parties.

XI. The right ended by decree

What Mhadagonda decided

38Mhadagonda Ramgonda Patil gives the clearest statement of how the right of redemption comes to an end by decree. A preliminary decree for redemption had been passed in an earlier suit, requiring payment within six months, failing which the mortgagee could apply for a final decree for sale. The mortgagors did not pay, and a final decree for sale was passed. But the mortgagee did not execute that decree, which became time-barred. The mortgagee and heirs remained in possession. The mortgagors brought a second suit for redemption, and the question was whether the right had survived. The Court said:

Sec. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act confers a right of redemption on the mortgagor. The right of redemption will be extinguished (1) by the act of the parties or (2) by the decree of a Court. The Court was concerned in this case with the question whether by the preliminary decree or final decree passed in the earlier suit, the right of the respondents to redeem the mortgages had been extinguished. The decree referred to in the proviso to section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act is a final decree in a suit for foreclosure, as provided in sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of Order XXXIV and a final decree in a redemption suit as provided in Order XXXIV, Rule 8(3)(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-rule (2) of rule 3 inter alia provides that where payment in accordance with Sub-rule (1) has not been made, the Court shall on an application made by the plaintiff in this behalf, pass a final decree declaring that the defendant and all persons claiming through or under him are debarred from all right to redeem the mortgaged property and also, if necessary, ordering the defendant to put the plaintiff in possession of the property. Thus, in a final decree in a suit for foreclosure on the failure of the defendant to pay all amounts due, the extinguishment of the right of redemption has to be specifically declared.Mhadagonda Ramgonda Patil v. Shripal Balwant Rainade, (1988) 3 SCC 298, AIR 1988 SC 1200, 1988 SCR (3) 689 (M.M. Dutt J., for three judges), reported headnote.

39The appeal was dismissed, and the second suit for redemption was therefore held to be maintainable. The important practical lesson is about the kind of decree required. A preliminary decree, or a final decree for sale which was never executed, does not of itself extinguish the right. What ends it is a final decree in a foreclosure suit, or in the redemption suits in question, that specifically declares the mortgagor debarred. Until then, the principle of “once a mortgage, always a mortgage” continues to apply.

XII. Categories of clog

40The cases allow a working list of the kinds of stipulation that may be challenged.

41The first is the outright conversion clause, the kind in Ganga Dhar and Murarilal. It is invalid without proof of oppression.

42The second is the very long term. It is judged by the fairness of the bargain, and the courts have reached both results on the facts: in favour of the mortgagee in Ganga Dhar, and against the mortgagee in Pomal Kanji and Shivdev Singh.

43The third is the narrow window, a term confining redemption to a short period on a particular date, as in the six-month period in Ganga Dhar. Such a term has the effect of ending the right after a brief moment, and it is hard to defend.

44The fourth is the provision that makes redemption so expensive that it is illusory, for example one requiring the mortgagor to pay for improvements that the mortgagee can make at will. Whether this is a clog depends on the detail, and Pomal Kanji considered such a term. A term about the cost of ordinary repairs would not usually be objectionable.

45The fifth is a collateral advantage that survives redemption, such as a perpetual right to buy at a low price or an option to purchase in the mortgage itself. These are the terms that the English line deals with most fully, and they should be examined with care.

46The sixth is an option for the mortgagee to buy the mortgaged land, included in the mortgage. English law generally treats such a term as a clog when it is part of the mortgage, as Samuel v. Jarrah Timber and Wood Paving Corporation Ltd., [1904] AC 323, is usually said to show, though an option later given as a separate transaction is on a different footing. That English decision is referred to here in general terms only. A similar question would arise in India under the principle of section 60.

XIII. Evidence on a claim of unconscionable bargain

47A party relying on oppression has to prove it, and the kinds of evidence that matter are fairly clear from the reported cases.

48Evidence of the mortgagor’s circumstances at the time of the deed is central. In Pomal Kanji, the plaintiffs alleged a weak economic condition and heavy debt. In Shivdev Singh, they alleged financial condition and helplessness. These allegations should be pleaded in detail and supported by whatever contemporaneous evidence survives. A long time often passes before these cases are brought, and the people who could give evidence may have died.

49Evidence of the terms themselves is equally important. The ratio of the amount advanced to the land’s value, the rate of interest or the absence of it, and whether possession and usufruct were given, can each show whether the bargain was fair.

50Evidence about usage is admissible but not conclusive. The mortgagees in Pomal Kanji relied on a local custom of long-term mortgages, and they did not succeed. A custom does not make an oppressive bargain fair.

51Delay in making the claim will be used against the mortgagor, as in Pomal Kanji, where it was argued that a plaintiff who later became a judge had sat idle for 29 years. But a suit for redemption is subject to its own limitation period, and it is not necessarily stale in the ordinary sense because a long time has passed. A mortgagor is entitled to wait, unless the law says otherwise.

XIV. The position today

52The mortgagor’s right to redeem cannot be taken away by a term in the mortgage. A stipulation that on default the mortgage becomes a sale is a clog on the equity of redemption and is invalid, and a court can sever it and give effect to the rest of the deed. A term that merely restricts redemption, such as a long period, is invalid only if the bargain is unconscionable. Length alone does not establish that, as Ganga Dhar shows with an 85-year term, but the facts may do so, as Shivdev Singh shows with a 99-year term. The rule rests on an equitable principle and so applies beyond the terms of the Act. The right to redeem can end by the act of the parties in a real and separate transaction, or by decree, but not by a term of the original bargain.


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  • Published · 31 October 2026

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