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2026 FPR EDC 9 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/approbate-and-reprobate

DC-0124Doctrines · Civil Procedure · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 9

FPR Editors31 October 2026 · 3,181 words

Approbate and Reprobate

A person who knowingly accepts the benefit of an instrument, transaction or order cannot afterwards reject it for another advantage, but the maxim is an application of the doctrine of election confined to reliefs in respect of the same transaction and its parties; it does not prevent a party pleading inconsistent grounds for one relief, does not bar the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 136, and does not defeat a fundamental right or validate an illegality.

Abstract

The law will not let a litigant blow hot and cold. This entry sets out the doctrine of approbate and reprobate and its origin in the law of election, in Verschures Creameries and N. Murugesan; the limits fixed in Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao; its use against those who accept a conditional order, in R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir and Cauvery Coffee Traders; the correction of R.N. Gosain as regards Article 136 in P.R. Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti; and the boundaries set by fundamental rights in Olga Tellis and by illegality in public recruitment in Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar.


I. The doctrine

Accepting and rejecting the same thing

1The phrase comes from Scots law. In Union of India v. N. Murugesan, the Supreme Court said the phrases “are borrowed from the Scott’s law” and “would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold.”Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25 (M.M. Sundresh J.). It continued:

Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same.N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25.

2The idea is simple, and it rests on fairness. A person who has taken the good side of a bargain or order, and has caused others to act on the footing that it stands, cannot then deny its validity in order to escape the bad side. The Court in N. Murugesan called it a principle of equity, and said the principle behind the doctrine of election “is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate”.

The classic English statement

3The sentence most quoted in Indian judgments comes from Scrutton L.J. in Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd. A principal whose agent had delivered goods against instructions sued the purchaser for the price and obtained a decree. Unsatisfied, it then sued the agent for wrongful delivery. The first act treated the delivery as authorised, and the second as unauthorised. Scrutton L.J. said:

a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage.Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd., [1921] 2 KB 608, 612 (Scrutton L.J.), as quoted in Cauvery Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources (International) Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 420.

4The facts illustrate the two necessary features: an advantage actually obtained, and a later position that cannot stand with what made that advantage possible.

Relation to other estoppels

5The doctrine sits close to estoppel, and courts often use the word. The passage from Halsbury quoted in Nagubai Ammal describes “a species of estoppel” which “seems to be intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pais”.Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593, 1956 SCR 451, quoting Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol. XIII, para. 512. But it differs from estoppel by representation in its focus. The latter asks what one party led another to believe. Approbate and reprobate asks what the party itself took, and whether the party’s present position contradicts that taking.

II. The limits in Nagubai Ammal

The argument

6Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao remains the leading Indian authority on the doctrine’s boundaries. The argument was that the appellants could not contend that a decree and sale in an earlier suit were collusive, because of a stand taken in earlier proceedings. That was put not on the ground of res judicata or estoppel, but on the principle that a person cannot both approbate and reprobate. On that footing, it was said to be immaterial that the appellants were not parties to the earlier proceeding, and the observations of Scrutton L.J. were relied on.

The answer

7The Court rejected the use of the maxim. It read Verschures Creameries narrowly:

It is clear from the above observations that the maxim that a person cannot ‘approbate and reprobate’ is only one application of the doctrine of election, and that its operation must be confined to reliefs claimed in respect of the same transaction and to the persons who are parties thereto.Nagubai Ammal, AIR 1956 SC 593 (Venkatarama Ayyar J.).

8The reported headnote sets out the further point: where there is no question of election because the relief claimed is one and the same, although based on different and inconsistent grounds, the maxim has no application. Those two limits have lasting practical significance. First, the principle needs an election between reliefs relating to the same transaction, and it binds the persons who are parties to that transaction. Second, the rule does not stop a party from pleading alternative or inconsistent grounds for the same relief. The doctrine does not turn a change of argument, by itself, into a bar.

III. Conditional orders

R.N. Gosain

9A common modern setting is an order that gives a party time or protection on condition of an undertaking. In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, the High Court gave a tenant protection from eviction on condition of filing an undertaking to vacate. Having filed it and enjoyed the protection, the tenant came to the Supreme Court against the order of eviction. S.C. Agrawal J. held that he could not do so:

Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrumentR.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683, AIR 1993 SC 352 (S.C. Agrawal J.).

10The petitioner, the reported headnote says, “having availed the protection from eviction on the basis of the said undertaking”, could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 136 against the same order.

Contractual and commercial settings

11Cauvery Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources (International) Co. Ltd. applied the doctrine to a dispute with an arbitration clause. The Court, in the passage that follows its citation of R.N. Gosain, said that a party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold”, “fast and loose” or “approbate and reprobate”, and that “Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order.” It added a limit that is often forgotten:

This rule is applied to do equity, however, it must not be applied in a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscience.Cauvery Coffee Traders, (2011) 10 SCC 420 (B.S. Chauhan J.).

12The word “knowingly” also matters. A person who accepted a benefit without knowing the true position has not elected. The doctrine rests on a choice, and a choice implies knowledge of the alternatives.

13N. Murugesan, the source of the description given at the start of this entry, concerned persons who had taken up the benefit of a rule or instrument and, near the end of enjoying it, questioned it. The Court said that the principle “has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully” and then questions the rest. Delay and acquiescence often appear in such cases alongside the maxim, and the Court considered them too, describing the concept of acquiescence as one to be seen “on a case-to-case basis”.

IV. Article 136 and the correction of R.N. Gosain

P.R. Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti

14R.N. Gosain went too far in one respect, and a Bench of the Supreme Court said so. In P.R. Deshpande, the reference order had taken a different view of the application of the doctrine to the Court’s own jurisdiction:

The principle of ‘approbate and reprobate’ or the law of election which is the basis of the decision in R. N. Gosain’s case (supra) cannot, in our opinion, be applied appropriately to preclude this Court from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136.P.R. Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti, (1998) 6 SCC 507, AIR 1998 SC 2979 (K.T. Thomas J.), quoting the order of reference.

15K.T. Thomas J. adopted that view. He said that “remedy under Article 136 is a Constitutional right which cannot be taken away by legislation, much less by invoking the principles of election or estoppel” (quoting from the reference), and concluded:

We are, therefore, in agreement with the view of Sahai and Venkatachala, JJ, that the appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution by special leave cannot be dismissed as not maintainable on the more ground that appellant has given an undertaking to the High Court on being so directed, in order to keep the High Court’s order in abeyance for some time.P.R. Deshpande, (1998) 6 SCC 507. The word “more” appears thus in the online text, for “mere”.

16The appeal itself was dismissed on its merits. The significance of the decision is about maintainability: a person who has given an undertaking in order to gain some breathing space has not elected to give up all further remedy. The undertaking remains an undertaking, and a court may well weigh it in deciding whether to exercise discretion. But it is not a jurisdictional bar under Article 136.

17P.R. Deshpande therefore narrows R.N. Gosain. A practitioner relying on the latter should read the two together. Gosain still reflects the principle, but its specific application to an Article 136 petition does not stand as an automatic rule of maintainability.

V. Other limits

Fundamental rights

18The doctrine yields to the Constitution. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation dealt with pavement dwellers who had conceded before the High Court that they did not claim a fundamental right to put up dwellings on public footpaths, and later did not honour that concession. The reported catchwords state the Court’s conclusion in plain terms: “No estoppel can be claimed against enforcement of Fundamental Rights.”Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545, AIR 1986 SC 180 (Y.V. Chandrachud C.J.), reported headnote. A person’s earlier position cannot waive what the Constitution secures on public grounds. Similar reasoning extends to the Article 136 discussion in P.R. Deshpande, in which the constitutional character of the remedy was central.

Illegality in public recruitment

19Service law gives the clearest modern example of the doctrine and its limit working together. Candidates who take part in a selection and lose, and then attack its procedure, are met by a form of estoppel. Dr. (Major) Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar restates that rule. It is “well settled that the principle of estoppel prevents a candidate from challenging the selection process after having failed in it”. But it draws the boundary:

In a situation where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences arising therefrom, the same cannot be condoned merely because a candidate has partaken in it. The constitutional scheme is sacrosanct and its violation in any manner is impermissible.Dr. (Major) Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar, (2019) 20 SCC 17 (Surya Kant J.).

20A person who takes part in a selection, the Court reasoned, accepts the prescribed procedure and not the illegality in it. Meeta Sahai adds a further reason: a candidate may not have standing to challenge the illegality at all without having participated.

Statutes and public policy

21In general, the principle operates on matters within a party’s power of election. Parties cannot, by accepting a benefit, confer a jurisdiction that the law withholds or validate a transaction that the law declares void. Cauvery Coffee Traders expressly reserves the principles of right and good conscience. This is why courts inquire first into what kind of right is being given up. A private right under a contract can be surrendered by conduct. A public prohibition cannot.

VI. Applying the doctrine

A checklist of questions

22Drawing these authorities together, a court considering the plea will ask the following questions, and each of them has been drawn directly from the decisions. Was there the same transaction or instrument, as Nagubai Ammal requires? Was the person against whom the plea is raised a party to it? Did that person take an actual benefit under it, and do so knowingly, as Cauvery Coffee Traders requires? Is the later position truly inconsistent with that benefit, or is it merely an alternative ground for the same relief? Is what is being given up a right that can be given up, or is it protected by the Constitution or a mandatory statute? And would applying the rule accord with right and good conscience?

Practical use

23For a party facing a conditional order, the safest course is to state on the record that any compliance is without prejudice to the right to challenge the order, and to challenge it promptly. After P.R. Deshpande, an undertaking does not make a special leave petition incompetent, but it may still count against the petitioner when the Court decides how to exercise its discretion.

24For a party relying on the doctrine, the first task is to identify the benefit. A general charge of inconsistency is not enough. The plea should say exactly what the opponent has obtained, when, and from what instrument, and how the present position contradicts it.

VII. Further applications

What must be shown: advantage

25Nagubai Ammal did not stop at the general limit. It went on to apply it by asking whether the party had in fact gained. “The plaintiff obtained no advantage against the appellants by pleading” in the earlier suit that the proceedings were collusive, the Court observed.Nagubai Ammal, AIR 1956 SC 593. The doctrine does not punish inconsistency for its own sake. A party who took one position in earlier litigation and got nothing from it is in a different position from a party who obtained a decree, a payment or a period of protection.

26The passage from Halsbury that the Court adopted gives examples: “a party cannot, after taking advantage under an order (e.g. payment of costs), be heard to say that it is invalid and ask to set it aside, or to set up to the prejudice of persons who have relied upon it a case inconsistent with that upon which it was founded”.Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol. XIII, para. 512, as quoted in Nagubai Ammal, AIR 1956 SC 593. The example of costs is a useful one. A party who has received the costs awarded by an order, and then appeals against that order, may find the point taken against that party. The prudent course is to accept nothing under an order that a party intends to challenge, or to make clear on the record that it is done without prejudice.

The basis of election

27The order of reference quoted in P.R. Deshpande gives a concise account of the equitable basis:

The doctrine of election is founded on equitable principle that where a person persuades another one to act in a manner to his prejudice and derives any advantage from that then he cannot turn around the claim that he was not liable to perform his part as it was void. It applies where a vendor or a transferor of property tries to take advantage of his own wrong.P.R. Deshpande, (1998) 6 SCC 507, quoting the order of reference.

28The same passage says “The law that there is no estoppel against statute is well settled.” It therefore links the doctrine to prejudice to another. This does not mean that a claimant must always prove detriment in the strict sense. It does suggest what a court should ask in a marginal case: has the other party been led to act in reliance, and would it be unjust to allow the change of position?

Delay, laches and acquiescence

29N. Murugesan discusses related concepts in a way that helps to keep them apart. Delay, laches and acquiescence, it said, “are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions” but “have their distinct characters and distinct elements”. It described delay as “the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species”. On laches, it said: “Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval.”N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25. A person who has stood by while the other party changed position may meet several of these objections at once, but they are different. Delay looks to time, acquiescence to assent by conduct, and approbation and reprobation to having taken a benefit. A plea should say which is relied on and on what facts.

30The Court also said that a defence of laches “can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar”, and that the principle “may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side”. The same limit naturally applies to approbate and reprobate: a person who took a benefit under an instrument because of the other party’s fraud has not made a true election, since election assumes knowledge.

Knowledge

31Knowledge is central. Cauvery Coffee Traders speaks of a person who “knowingly accepts the benefits”. A shareholder or tenant who accepts money under an arrangement without knowing about a defect cannot be said to have chosen to waive it. Conversely, a person who knows of a possible objection and takes the benefit anyway is the clearest case. Evidence of what the person knew at the time will therefore often be decisive. Where that knowledge is doubtful, a court should be slow to find an election.

Contracts and tenders

32The doctrine is regularly invoked in contract disputes where a party has accepted part of a contract and rejected the rest. A contractor who has taken payment under a final bill, or a bidder who took part in a tender on the stated terms, may be told that it cannot now attack those terms. Cauvery Coffee Traders shows the rule at work in a dispute on an arbitration clause. Yet the rule depends on the same conditions in commercial cases as elsewhere: the same transaction, a benefit taken and real inconsistency. A contractor who accepted a final payment under protest, or under economic compulsion, will argue that the acceptance was not a free election. A court will look at what actually happened and at what the contract and the law provide on such payments.

Compromises

33Consent decrees and compromises are frequent settings. A party who has taken money under a compromise should not then challenge its validity while keeping the money. The usual response of courts is to require restitution as a condition of any such challenge. A party who says that the compromise was obtained by fraud has a different case, and the doctrine would not stand in the way of an honest and prompt challenge. Again, the principle turns on the equity of the case and not on form.

The doctrine in criminal and public law

34The rule is mainly civil, and it finds limited use in criminal matters. In public law it has to be applied with special care, since the public interest may not be bound by the conduct of an individual and a statutory condition cannot generally be waived. Meeta Sahai shows how a court can apply the rule to a candidate’s challenge to the procedure while preserving a challenge to illegality. Similar reasoning would apply to a licence holder or a contractor with the State who accepted benefits under an order but later says that the order was outside the authority’s powers. An order wholly beyond power is not made valid by the holder’s acceptance, although the holder’s conduct may still matter when the court decides what relief to give.

VIII. The position today

35A person who knowingly takes a benefit under an instrument, transaction or order cannot afterwards deny its validity for the purpose of gaining a further advantage. The doctrine is an application of the principle of election. Its operation is limited to reliefs in respect of the same transaction and to the parties to it, and it does not stop a party from relying on different grounds for the same relief. It is applied to do equity and must not violate right and good conscience. An undertaking given to obtain time does not, by itself, make an appeal under Article 136 not maintainable. There can be no estoppel against the enforcement of fundamental rights. A candidate who has taken part in a selection may be barred from challenging its procedure, but not from challenging the misconstruction of statutory rules or a constitutional violation.


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  • Published · 31 October 2026

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