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2026 FPR EDC 2 · https://firstprecedent.org/doctrines/absolute-liability
DC-0025Doctrines · Tort · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR EDC 2
FPR Editors27 October 2026 · 2,629 words
Absolute Liability
An enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to ensure that no harm results from it; if harm results, the enterprise is liable to compensate all those affected, whether or not it took reasonable care and without the exceptions available under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, and the measure of compensation is related to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise.
Abstract
The rule of absolute liability was laid down by a Constitution Bench in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1986) after a leak of oleum gas from a factory in Delhi, a year after the Bhopal disaster. This entry sets out the rule and how it differs from strict liability under Rylands v. Fletcher; traces the English rule and the exceptions that narrowed it; explains the reasoning of M.C. Mehta, including the deterrent measure of compensation; and follows the rule through the Bhopal litigation (Charan Lal Sahu, Union Carbide), its reaffirmation in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action (1996), its link with the polluter pays principle (Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum, Deepak Nitrite), its application to electricity and railways (Shail Kumari, Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar), and its statutory forms in the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 and the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.
I. The rule
1The rule of absolute liability was stated by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, in a judgment of P.N. Bhagwati C.J.:M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395, AIR 1987 SC 1086 (Bhagwati C.J.).
We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken.M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395.
2The Court continued:
The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part.M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395.
3The rule differs from the common-law rule of strict liability in four ways. It applies to hazardous or inherently dangerous activities as such, without any requirement that something escape from the defendant’s land. It protects people inside the enterprise as well as those outside. It admits none of the exceptions recognised under the common-law rule, such as act of God or the act of a stranger. And the measure of compensation is related to the size and capacity of the enterprise, so as to have a deterrent effect.
II. The English background
Rylands v. Fletcher
4The common-law rule comes from Rylands v. Fletcher. The defendants had a reservoir built on their land; water from it broke through disused mine shafts and flooded the plaintiff’s mine. Blackburn J., in the Exchequer Chamber, held that a person who for his own purposes brings onto his land and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes “must keep it in at his peril”, and is prima facie answerable for all the damage that is the natural consequence of its escape.Fletcher v. Rylands, (1866) LR 1 Ex 265; Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330 (H.L.); described in Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, [2008] 7 SCR 673. The House of Lords affirmed the decision, and Lord Cairns added that the rule applied to a “non-natural” use of land.
The narrowing of the rule
5English courts then limited the rule in several ways. They recognised exceptions for an act of God, the act of a stranger, the plaintiff’s own default or consent, and statutory authority.Nichols v. Marsland, (1876) 2 Ex D 1; Box v. Jubb, (1879) 4 Ex D 76. They treated many activities as a “natural” use of land.Rickards v. Lothian, [1913] AC 263 (P.C.). In Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd., the House of Lords held that the rule required an escape from the defendant’s premises, so that a worker injured by an explosion inside a munitions factory could not rely on it.Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd., [1947] AC 156 (H.L.). Later, in Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc, the House of Lords held that foreseeability of the type of damage is required,Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc, [1994] 2 AC 264 (H.L.). and in Transco plc v. Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council it treated the rule as a narrow species of nuisance.Transco plc v. Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council, [2003] UKHL 61, [2004] 2 AC 1.
6By the 1980s, therefore, the English rule offered little protection to the victims of an industrial accident. It did not apply to injuries inside a factory, it admitted defences that might cover sabotage or a natural calamity, and it was tied to the use of land.
III. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1986)
The case
7In December 1984, gas leaked from the Union Carbide plant at Bhopal, killing thousands of people. A year later, on 4 December 1985, oleum gas leaked from a plant of Shriram Foods and Fertiliser Industries in Delhi, affecting a number of people. A petition under Article 32, brought by M.C. Mehta in relation to the Shriram plant, was before the Court, and claims for compensation were made on behalf of those affected. A Constitution Bench was constituted to consider the principles of liability.
Reasons for a new rule
8The Court held that it was not bound by the English rule. It said:
We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialised economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any other foreign country.M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395.
9“We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order”, it added. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher had been laid down in the nineteenth century, when scientific and industrial development was at a much earlier stage. It was not adequate for an economy with industries carrying on hazardous activities.
10The Court gave two reasons for placing the risk on the enterprise. The first was that an enterprise that carries on a hazardous activity for profit must bear the cost of accidents arising from it as part of the cost of its business. The second was that the enterprise is best placed to know of and guard against the risks:
The enterprise alone has the resource to discover and guard against hazards or dangers and to provide warning against potential hazards.M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395.
The measure of compensation
11The Court also stated how compensation was to be measured:
We would also like to point out that the measure of compensation in the kind of cases referred to in the preceding paragraph must be co-related to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise.M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395.
12The Court did not decide whether Shriram was “the State” under Article 12, and so did not itself award compensation in the Article 32 proceedings; it left the claims to be pursued in the ordinary courts.
IV. The Bhopal litigation
Charan Lal Sahu (1989)
13The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 authorised the Union of India to represent the victims in claims arising from the disaster. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench upheld the Act.Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613, AIR 1990 SC 1480. The Court noted the Union’s case that the company was “strictly and absolutely liable for the entire damages”, and set out the rule from M.C. Mehta: where an enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity causes harm by an accident, “the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher”.
Union Carbide (1989–1991)
14The claims against Union Carbide were settled in 1989 for 470 million US dollars, by orders of the Supreme Court.Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 674; (1989) 3 SCC 38. In the review proceedings, Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, a Bench of Ranganath Misra C.J., K.N. Singh and A.M. Ahmadi JJ. upheld the settlement but restored the criminal proceedings that the settlement orders had quashed.Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584, AIR 1992 SC 248. Ranganath Misra C.J. observed that in M.C. Mehta no compensation had been awarded, because the Court had not decided whether Shriram was within Article 12, and said: “Thus what was said essentially obiter.”
15In 2023 a Constitution Bench dismissed the Union’s curative petitions seeking additional compensation from the successors of Union Carbide.Union of India v. Union Carbide Corporation (Supreme Court, 14 March 2023) (Kaul J.).
V. Reaffirmation: Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action (1996)
16In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, chemical factories at Bichhri in Rajasthan producing H-acid had discharged toxic sludge, contaminating the soil and groundwater of the surrounding villages.Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (1996) 3 SCC 212, AIR 1996 SC 1446 (Jeevan Reddy J.). The companies argued for the English rule and its exceptions. B.P. Jeevan Reddy J., for the Court, rejected the argument, and rejected also the suggestion that the rule in M.C. Mehta was obiter:
We are convinced that the law stated by this Court in Oleum Gas Leak Case is by far the more appropriate one - apart from the fact that it is binding upon us. [We have disagreed with the view that the law stated in the said decision is obiter.]Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (1996) 3 SCC 212.
17Under that rule, he explained, once the activity is hazardous or inherently dangerous, the person carrying it on is liable to make good the loss caused to any other person by the activity, irrespective of whether he took reasonable care. The Court also applied the polluter pays principle, holding the companies liable for the cost of remedying the damage to the environment:
The Polluter Pays principle demands that the financial costs of preventing or remedying damage caused by pollution should lie with the undertakings which cause the pollution, or produce the goods which cause the pollution.Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (1996) 3 SCC 212.
18The Court’s directions were enforced in later proceedings, in which it rejected the companies’ attempts to reopen them.Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 161.
VI. Polluter pays
19In Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India, tanneries in Tamil Nadu had discharged untreated effluent into the Palar river and the surrounding land.Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647, AIR 1996 SC 2715 (Kuldip Singh J.). Kuldip Singh J. held that the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle are part of the law of the land, and explained the second:
The “Polluter Pays” principle as interpreted by this Court means that the absolute liability for harm to the environment extends not only to compensate the victims of pollution but also the cost of restoring the environmental degradation.Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647.
20Absolute liability and polluter pays thus work together: the first fixes liability on the enterprise, the second extends the compensation to restoring the environment. The principle requires proof that damage has been caused. In Deepak Nitrite Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, the Court set aside an order of the High Court directing industrial units to pay a percentage of their turnover as compensation, without any finding of the damage each had caused.Deepak Nitrite Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 6 SCC 402, AIR 2004 SC 3407.
VII. Other applications
Electricity: Shail Kumari (2002)
21In M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, a man cycling home at night was electrocuted by a live wire that had snapped and fallen onto the road.M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, (2002) 2 SCC 162, (2002) 1 SCR 164. The Board argued that the wire had come down because a third person had tapped the line to steal electricity. A Bench of K.T. Thomas and S.N. Phukan JJ. held the Board liable. A person undertaking a hazardous activity such as the supply of electricity is liable for the harm it causes, irrespective of negligence, on the basis of “the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity”. The pilferage by a stranger was no answer: the Board was responsible for ensuring that the line, if it snapped, did not remain charged on the road.
Railways: Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (2008)
22In Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, a woman fell from a moving train while trying to board it, and died.Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, [2008] 7 SCR 673 (Katju J.). The question was whether her death was an “untoward incident” under section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989. Markandey Katju J., for the Court, traced the history of strict liability from Rylands v. Fletcher, and held that section 124A “lays down strict liability or no fault liability in case of railway accidents”. As a beneficial provision, it was to be read liberally, and the accidental fall of a passenger from a train was within it.
VIII. Statutes
Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991
23Parliament gave the rule a statutory form for immediate relief. Section 3(1) of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 makes the owner of an undertaking handling hazardous substances liable to give the relief specified in the Schedule for death, injury or damage caused by an accident in handling them. Section 3(2) provides:
In any claim for relief under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death, injury or damage in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of any person.
24The owner must take out insurance to cover the liability. The relief under the Act is in addition to any other right to compensation, but is set off against any compensation later awarded.
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010
25Section 17(3) of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 directs that the Tribunal “shall, in case of an accident, apply the principle of no fault”. Section 20 requires it to apply the principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle. The Tribunal has applied these provisions in industrial accidents, including the leak of styrene gas from the LG Polymers plant near Visakhapatnam in May 2020, where it directed an interim deposit by the company and appointed a committee to assess the damage.In re: Gas Leak at LG Polymers Chemical Plant, Visakhapatnam, O.A. No. 73 of 2020 (NGT).
IX. Criticisms
26The rule has been criticised on several grounds.
27The first concerns its status. M.C. Mehta did not award compensation, and in Union Carbide Ranganath Misra C.J. described what it said as obiter. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action rejected that view, and the rule has been applied consistently since. But the uncertainty mattered at the time of the Bhopal settlement.
28The second concerns the measure of compensation. Relating compensation to the size and wealth of the enterprise is unusual in the law of torts, which ordinarily compensates the loss suffered. It gives the remedy a punitive and deterrent character, and the Court has not worked out in detail how it is to be applied.
29The third concerns scope. The rule applies to “hazardous or inherently dangerous” activities, a phrase without a fixed definition. The courts have applied it to chemical plants, electricity supply and, in its statutory form, railways; how far it reaches beyond such activities is not settled.
30The fourth is practical. The rule was announced in the shadow of Bhopal, but the Bhopal claims were settled on other terms, and the victims’ long struggle for compensation is often cited as showing the limits of a liability rule without effective procedures for enforcing it. The Public Liability Insurance Act and the National Green Tribunal Act are in part responses to that problem.
X. The position today
31The law on absolute liability in India may be stated in seven propositions.
321. An enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results from the activity (M.C. Mehta).
332. If harm results, the enterprise is absolutely liable to compensate all those affected. It is no answer that it took all reasonable care, and the exceptions recognised under Rylands v. Fletcher do not apply (M.C. Mehta; Charan Lal Sahu; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action).
343. The duty is owed to those working in the enterprise as well as to those living around it; no escape from the defendant’s premises is required (M.C. Mehta).
354. The measure of compensation is related to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise, so as to have a deterrent effect (M.C. Mehta).
365. The rule is binding law, not obiter (Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action).
376. Under the polluter pays principle, liability extends to the cost of restoring the environment as well as compensating victims; but the principle requires a finding that damage has been caused (Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum; Deepak Nitrite).
387. The rule has statutory counterparts: no-fault relief under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991, the principle of no fault applied by the National Green Tribunal under section 17(3) of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, and strict liability for railway accidents under section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 (Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar).
History
- Published · 27 October 2026
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