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2026 FPR RDS 2 · https://firstprecedent.org/dissents/khanna-in-adm-jabalpur
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FPR Editors1 November 2026 · 5,828 words
Khanna J. in ADM Jabalpur
Khanna J.'s dissent in ADM Jabalpur rests on one proposition: a Presidential Order under Article 359(1) can suspend the remedy for a fundamental right, but it cannot give the executive a power over life and liberty that the law has not given it, so a High Court could still ask whether a detention was authorised by the statute under which it was made.
Abstract
In Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976), four judges of a five-judge Bench held that the Presidential Order of 27 June 1975 left no person with locus standi to challenge a detention in a High Court, even on the ground that it was illegal or made in bad faith. Khanna J. dissented alone, and would have upheld the nine High Courts that had rejected the State's preliminary objection. This entry reads the dissent closely: its argument that Article 21 is not the sole repository of the right to life and liberty, the distinction between suspending a remedy and creating a power, the survival of rights and duties founded on statute, and the place of Article 226. It also records what the dissent did not decide, including the validity of section 16A(9) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, and separates what the judgment itself says from the stories later told about the hearing. It then traces the cost to Khanna J., who was superseded and resigned in January 1977; the Forty-fourth Amendment; the express overruling of the majority in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017); and the unfinished business of preventive detention, which the Constitution still permits in peacetime.
I. The Question Before the Court
1A Proclamation of Emergency made on 3 December 1971 was still in force when, on 25 June 1975, the President issued a second Proclamation, on the ground that the security of India was threatened by internal disturbance. On 27 June 1975 the President made an order under Article 359(1) of the Constitution:
“the right of any person (including a foreigner) to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the above mentioned rights shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency made under Clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on the 3rd December, 1971 and on the 25th June, 1975 are both in force.”Presidential Order of 27 June 1975, reproduced in Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521 : AIR 1976 SC 1207 : [1976] Supp. SCR 172.
2Detentions under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (MISA) followed. Parliament then changed the Act. Act 39 of 1975 inserted section 16A with effect from 29 June 1975. Where a detention was declared necessary for dealing effectively with the emergency, section 16A switched off sections 8 to 12, the provisions on grounds, representations and Advisory Boards, and it allowed the authority to act without disclosing facts or hearing the person concerned. The same Act inserted section 18, which provided: “No person (including a foreigner) detained under this Act shall have any right to personal liberty by virtue of natural law or common law, if any.”Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, ss. 16A and 18, as inserted by Act 39 of 1975, reproduced in ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172. Act 14 of 1976 later amended section 16A(9), which dealt with the disclosure of the grounds and material behind a detention.
3Detenus went to the High Courts for habeas corpus. The State answered with a preliminary objection: the Presidential Order barred the petitions at the threshold. The objection failed everywhere it was decided. As Khanna J. recorded, the nine High Courts were Delhi, Karnataka, Bombay (Nagpur Bench), Allahabad, Madras, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and Punjab and Haryana, and all of them concluded “that the Presidential order did not create an absolute bar to the judicial scrutiny of the validity of the detention.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172 (Khanna, J., dissenting). They differed on how far that scrutiny could go, but none accepted that it was shut out altogether.
4The State appealed. A Bench of A.N. Ray C.J. and H.R. Khanna, M.H. Beg, Y.V. Chandrachud and P.N. Bhagwati JJ. heard the appeals, and on 28 April 1976 it allowed them by four to one.
II. What the Majority Held
5The order of the Court, “By majority”, read:
“In view of the Presidential order dated 27 June 1975 no person has any locus standi to move any writ petition under Article 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or direction to challenge the legality of an order of detention on the ground that the order is not under or in compliance with the Act or is illegal or is vitiated by malafides factual or legal or is based on extraneous consideration.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 477–478 (order of the Court).
6The order also held section 16A(9) constitutionally valid. It is often said that the four majority judges reached this result on a single theory, that Article 21 is the sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty. That is too neat. The headnote does record the proposition for the majority, and two of the judges said it plainly, but the opinions took different routes.
7Ray C.J. took the most direct one. Article 21, he wrote, “is our Rule of Law regarding life and liberty. No other rule of law can have separate existence as a distinct right.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172 (Ray, C.J.). After drawing on the English wartime cases he added that “Liberty is itself the gift of the law and may by the law be forfeited or abridged.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172 (Ray, C.J.). He held that the emergency provisions in Part XVIII were themselves the rule of law during an emergency.
8Bhagwati J. gave the fullest argument for merger. He accepted that the rule against executive interference with liberty without authority of law had been part of Indian law before 1950. But the Constitution had taken it up: Article 21 “enacted one aspect of the principle of rule of law”, and once it was so enacted he could not see how it could have a distinct existence under Article 372. His conclusion was:
“the only way in which meaning and effect can be given to the Presidential order suspending the enforcement of the right of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 is by holding that the principle of rule of law, that the executive cannot interfere with the personal liberty of any person except by authority of law, is enacted in Article 21 and it does not exist as a distinct and separate principle conferring a right of personal liberty, independently and apart from that Article.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172 (Bhagwati, J.).
9The structure of that reasoning explains its appeal. A Presidential Order that mentioned Article 21 had to do something, and if detenus could simply reframe their claim as one under the older law, the Order would achieve nothing.
10Chandrachud J. did not need the premise. He held that the sole repository question did not matter, because the right sought to be enforced was the same whatever its origin: “whatever may be the source of the right and whatever may be its justification, the right in essence and substance is the right to personal liberty.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172 (Chandrachud, J.). Since that right was included in Part III and named in the Order, its enforcement stood suspended. His reading of Article 359(1), he wrote, was a complete answer to the argument that a right existed outside Article 21. Beg J. similarly reasoned that even if Article 21 was not the sole repository of personal freedom, all aspects of that freedom were meant to be covered by Articles 19, 21 and 22, whose enforcement was suspended.
11Two passages have stayed attached to the case more than any of its reasoning. Beg J. wrote that “the care and concern bestowed by the State authorities upon the welfare of detenus who are well housed, well fed, and well treated, is almost maternal. Even parents have to take appropriate preventive action against those children who may threaten to burn down the house they live in.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 370–371 (Beg, J.). Chandrachud J. closed his opinion with an answer to the fears of counsel:
“Counsel after counsel expressed the fear that during the emergency, the executive may whip and strip and starve the detenu and if this be our judgment, even shoot him down. Such misdeeds have not tarnished the record of Free India and I have a diamond-bright, diamond-hard hope that such things will never come to pass.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 414 (Chandrachud, J.).
12It should also be recorded that Chandrachud J. did not leave quite nothing open. In the sentences just before that passage he indicated that a court could look at a narrow class of questions on the face of the order, such as whether the authority was duly empowered and whether the detenu was properly identified. The formal order of the Court, however, was in the unqualified terms set out above.
III. The Dissent Read Closely
13Khanna J. opened by acknowledging both sides of the dilemma. Preventive detention, he wrote, “is an anathema to all those who love personal liberty”, yet the administrator’s case had force as well, and the framers had tried to balance the two by providing for the power and for safeguards against its abuse.ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 246–247 (Khanna, J., dissenting). He repeated the point later in the opinion. He did not doubt the State’s power to assume vast powers of detention in the interest of security, and he accepted that a court can neither sit in appeal over the detaining authority nor substitute its own opinion on the need for detention. Then he said: “There is no antithesis between the power of the State to detain a person without trial under a law of preventive detention and the power of the court to examine the legality of such detention.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 291–292 (Khanna, J., dissenting). The dissent is not an argument against preventive detention. It is an argument about who decides whether a detention is lawful.
Article 21 is not the sole repository
14He stated the first step directly: “article 21 cannot be considered to be the sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 266 (Khanna, J., dissenting). The reasoning was historical.
“Sanctity of life and liberty was not something new when the Constitution was drafted. It represented a facet of higher values which mankind began to cherish in its evolution from a state of tooth and claw to a civilized existence. Likewise, the principle that no one shall be deprived of his life and liberty without the authority of law was not the gift of the Constitution. It was a necessary corollary of the concept relating to the sanctity of life and liberty; it existed and was in force before the coming into force of the Constitution.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 268 (Khanna, J., dissenting).
15He supported this from the common law and from Indian practice before 1950: Sommersett’s Case, Fabrigas v. Mostyn, Ameer Khan’s Case, and Lord Atkin’s statement in Eshugbayi Eleko that no member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his action before a court of justice. That rule, he noted, had been followed by Indian High Courts before the Constitution and by Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court after it.ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 270–271 (Khanna, J., dissenting), citing Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria, [1931] AC 662 (P.C.). He added a textual point: under Article 372, the law in force immediately before the Constitution continued afterwards.
16What then did Article 21 do? It secured an aspect of the older right against the legislature, requiring that a law depriving a person of liberty prescribe a procedure and be a valid law. It did not swallow what came before. He put the consequence in a sentence that Nariman J. would reproduce in full forty-one years later:
“The fact that the framers of the Constitution made an aspect of such right a part of the fundamental rights did not have the effect of exterminating the independent identity of such right and of making Article 21 to be the sole repository of that right.”ADM Jabalpur, (1976) 2 SCC 521, 751 (Khanna, J., dissenting), reproduced in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Nariman, J.).
17The sentence that follows it answers Bhagwati J.’s merger argument on its own terms. Recognising a right as fundamental “cannot have the effect of making things less favourable so far as the sanctity of life and personal liberty is concerned compared to the position if an aspect of such right had not been recognised as fundamental right because of the vulnerability of fundamental rights accruing from Article 359.”ADM Jabalpur, (1976) 2 SCC 521, 751 (Khanna, J., dissenting), reproduced in Puttaswamy, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Nariman, J.). A guarantee added for the citizen’s protection should not leave the citizen worse off than having no guarantee.
18He made a parallel point about the penal law. The rule against deprivation of life and liberty without authority of law also flows from the fact that under the penal laws no one is empowered to do it. If those laws had merged in Article 21 because they are “law” within it, suspending the right to enforce the Article would suspend the right to enforce the penal law as well, which no one could accept.ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 272–273 (Khanna, J., dissenting).
Suspending a remedy does not create a power
19The second step concerns what Article 359 actually does. The effect of the Order, he held, was that a court “would have to proceed upon the basis that no reliance can be placed upon that article for obtaining relief from the court during the period of emergency.”ADM Jabalpur, (1976) 2 SCC 521, 747 (Khanna, J., dissenting), reproduced in Puttaswamy, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Nariman, J.). Article 21 was out of the case. Nothing more followed.
20The most precise form of this argument is his analysis of substantive power and procedure. Article 21 speaks only of procedure, but procedure presupposes a substantive power to deprive. It was argued that the two stood together, so that suspending the Article removed the need for both. He rejected the inference: “What is true of a proposition need not be true of the converse of that proposition.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 284–285 (Khanna, J., dissenting). His conclusion, restated at the end of the opinion:
“When right to move any Court for enforcement of right guaranteed by article 21 is suspended, it would have the effect of dispensing with the necessity of prescribing procedure for the exercise of substantive power to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty, it cannot have the effect of permitting an authority to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty without the existence of such substantive power.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 303 (Khanna, J., dissenting).
21The State’s reliance on clause (1A) of Article 359 failed on the same reasoning. That clause protects law and executive action which the State would, but for Part III, be competent to make or take. The language, he observed, was substantially the same as that of Article 358. “The word ‘competent’ has a significance”: the State must still show its competence, judged without regard to the fundamental rights.ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 283 (Khanna, J., dissenting). Clause (1A) lifted the fetter of Part III. It supplied no authority where none existed.
Statutes bind the executive
22The third step does not depend on the first. Even if Article 21 had been the sole repository, MISA was an Act of Parliament that the Presidential Order had not repealed. An order under Article 359(1) “can suspend during the period of emergency only the right to move any court for enforcement of the fundamental rights mentioned in the order. Rights created by statutes being not fundamental rights can be enforced during the period of emergency despite the Presidential order.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 303 (Khanna, J., dissenting). He pressed the point in terms that remain the clearest statement in the opinion of what legality means:
“Statutory provisions are enacted to be complied with and it is not permissible to contravene them. Statutory provisions cannot be treated as mere pious exhortations or words of advice which may be abjured or disobeyed with impunity. Nor is compliance with statutory provisions optional or at the sufferance of the official concerned.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 286 (Khanna, J., dissenting).
23Here he had the Court’s own authority. In Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, Gajendragadkar J., speaking for six of seven judges, had said of the 1962 Order that a plea that the mandatory provisions of the Act had been contravened, and a plea of mala fides, both lay outside Article 359(1). The exercise of a power mala fide “is wholly outside the scope of the Act conferring the power and can always be successfully challenged.”Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381 : [1964] 4 SCR 797, quoted in ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 260–261 (Khanna, J., dissenting). Makhan Singh added a third example, a challenge to the law for excessive delegation, and said the categories were illustrations only.Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381.
24The Attorney-General’s answer was that the 1975 Order was different in form. The 1962 Order was limited to persons deprived of rights under the Defence of India Act or rules made under it, while the 1975 Order was unconditional, and the earlier observations rested on that limit. Khanna J. did not dismiss this. He accepted that observations tied to the language of the earlier Orders could no longer be relied upon. But reliance could still be placed on what was not so tied, and the change in wording did not justify the conclusion that a detention order need not comply with the law of preventive detention.ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 263 (Khanna, J., dissenting). That is a more careful position than the one sometimes attributed to him, that Makhan Singh simply controlled the case.
25He also answered section 18. It did not enlarge the power of detention, because section 3 had not been amended, and an order on grounds not warranted by section 3 was not made an order under section 3 by section 18. If it had that effect, it would itself be open to attack as excessive delegation, since it would let the authority detain “on any ground whatsoever”.ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 274–275 (Khanna, J., dissenting).
The High Courts and Article 226
26The fourth step concerned the courts. He noted that the framers knew the United States Constitution allowed the privilege of habeas corpus to be suspended in cases of rebellion or invasion, and that they nevertheless made no provision for suspending the High Courts’ power under Article 226. His conclusion: “No power has been conferred upon any authority in the Constitution for suspending the power of the High Court to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus during the period of emergency.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 304 (Khanna, J., dissenting). Such a result, he added, could not be brought about by construing the Presidential Order in a particular way.
27The constitutional balance was at stake as well. The State’s construction would reduce the courts “to the position of being helpless spectators even if glaring and blatant instances of deprivation of life and personal liberty in contravention of the statute are brought to their notice”, and it would “result in a kind of supremacy of the executive over the legislative and judicial organs of the State”.ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 290–291 (Khanna, J., dissenting). The executive was bound to carry out the legislature’s will as expressed in statutes, and the Constitution gave the courts the function of deciding whether it had.
28A correction to common retellings belongs here. Article 226’s words “for any other purpose” are often presented as the centre of this dissent. They were argued before the Court and discussed by the majority judges, who rejected them on the footing that a detenu’s real purpose was still to enforce a suspended right. Khanna J.’s own opinion does not rest on them. His argument is that Article 226 is an integral part of the Constitution and that no authority has been given the power to suspend it.
The consequences and the rule of law
29The Attorney-General had accepted that the argument could not be applied by halves. Khanna J. took him at his word: “if we are to accept his argument about the scope of the Presidential order of June 27, 1975, in that event we have to accept it in its entirety and go the whole hog; there is no half way house in between.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 275 (Khanna, J., dissenting). He then spelt out what the whole hog meant.
“This would mean that if any official, even a head constable of police, capriciously or maliciously, arrests a person and detains him indefinitely without any authority of law, the aggrieved person would not be able to seek any relief from the courts against such detention during the period of emergency.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 275 (Khanna, J., dissenting).
30The same, he went on, “would be the position in case of threat of deprivation or even actual deprivation of life of a person because article 21 refers to both deprivation of life as well as personal liberty.” Whether such things would actually happen was not the question. These were the permissible consequences of the contention, and under it, executive officers “would be wielding more or less despotic powers”.ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 275 (Khanna, J., dissenting). From this he drew a rule of construction. If two readings of the Order were possible, the Court should prefer the one that did not lead there, and that reading was “not only possible, it is also preeminently reasonable.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 303 (Khanna, J., dissenting). He applied the same preference to international obligations, reading the Order so as not to conflict with Articles 8 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
31The State had one more answer: the suspension itself was done under the Constitution, so the rule of law had been observed. This, he said, “tries to equate illusion of the rule of law with the reality of rule of law.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 277 (Khanna, J., dissenting). Drawing on Friedmann, he observed that in a purely formal sense any system of norms based on a hierarchy of orders, “even the organised mass murders of Nazi regime qualify as law”, and he concluded: “A state of negation of rule of law would not cease to be such a state because of the fact that such a state of negation of rule of law has been brought about by a statute.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 277–278 (Khanna, J., dissenting).
What the dissent did not decide
32The dissent was narrower than its reputation. It decided a preliminary objection. On the validity of section 16A(9), Khanna J. expressed no opinion, on the ground that the Court should not short-circuit the High Courts seized of the matter or, in the State’s own appeal, make its position worse; the right occasion would be an appeal from a final judgment.ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 301–302, 304 (Khanna, J., dissenting). He accepted that subjective satisfaction governed detention and that courts could not go behind the truth of alleged facts if the material was germane. He accepted that, with Article 22(5) suspended, it might plausibly be argued that vague grounds could not be attacked under that Article, while holding that the same vagueness could be challenged as a breach of the statute.ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 294–295, 297 (Khanna, J., dissenting).
33Nor is it a natural law judgment in the strict sense. He accepted that “law” in Article 21 means State-made law and not law in the abstract, and his principal argument rests on positive sources: the pre-1950 law continued by Article 372, the penal law and MISA itself. Its language about higher values is real, but the argument would stand without it.
34He closed by explaining why he wrote at all. Unanimity which is merely formal, he said, “is not desirable in a court of last resort.” He then turned to Chief Justice Hughes, quoted in Alan Barth’s Prophets with Honor:
“A dissent in a court of last resort ... is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.”ADM Jabalpur, [1976] Supp. SCR 172, 304 (Khanna, J., dissenting), citing Alan Barth, Prophets with Honor 3–6 (1974).
The exchange at the hearing
35The best-known moment of the case is not in the judgment. Khanna J. is reported to have asked Attorney-General Niren De whether, since life too is mentioned in Article 21, the Government’s argument would extend to it, and the Attorney-General is reported to have answered that it would, even if life were taken away illegally. The wording differs between accounts. Justice Yatindra Singh’s recollection of the case has the answer as: “There is no halfway house. Even if life was taken away illegally, courts are helpless”.Yatindra Singh, ADM Jabalpur at Fifty: Reminiscences from the Case that Closed the Doors of Liberty, The Leaflet. Other retellings put longer speeches into the Attorney-General’s mouth, and we have not been able to check those against the memoir in which Khanna J. is said to have told the story, so we do not reproduce them.
36The published opinion supports the substance without supplying the drama. It records the Attorney-General’s acceptance that there was no half-way house, and it sets out the consequence for life as well as liberty in the words quoted above.
IV. The Cost
37Khanna J. was the senior-most puisne judge, and Ray C.J. was due to retire in January 1977. Passing over seniority was not unthinkable: Ray C.J. had himself been appointed in 1973 over three more senior judges. Khanna J. expected what followed. His memoir recounts telling his younger sister: “Santosh, I have prepared a judgment which is going to cost me the Chief Justiceship of India.”H.R. Khanna, Neither Roses Nor Thorns 86, as reproduced in A Judgment That Is Going To Cost Me The Chief Justiceship, LiveLaw. In January 1977 the Government appointed Beg J., the judge next junior to him, as Chief Justice. Khanna J. learnt of it on 28 January 1977 from the radio and wrote out his resignation to the President at once; it took effect in March 1977.H.R. Khanna, Neither Roses Nor Thorns 91, as reproduced in LiveLaw, above.
38Much of the contemporary praise is well attested. A New York Times editorial, “Fading Hope in India”, published on 30 April 1976, said that if India found its way back to freedom and democracy “someone will surely erect a monument to Justice H.R. Khanna of the Supreme Court.”Fading Hope in India, N.Y. Times, 30 April 1976, as quoted in Remembering Justice H.R. Khanna, LiveLaw. We have read this passage only in quotation. A portrait of him hangs in Court No. 2 of the Supreme Court.LiveLaw, above. Nani Palkhivala wrote of his supersession: “To the stature of such a man, the Chief Justiceship of India can add nothing.”Quoted in Puttaswamy, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Nariman, J., footnote).
39The pressure on the High Courts during these months is also on the record. In Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth, a Constitution Bench considered the transfer of Justice Sheth from the Gujarat High Court to the Andhra Pradesh High Court, one of sixteen transfers made together, which were described in the case as “mass transfers”. After the Emergency, the Government told the Court that it saw no justification for the transfer and proposed to send him back, and the appeal was disposed of on that settlement. The Court still recorded its view. By majority, with Bhagwati and Untwalia JJ. contra, it held that a judge’s consent was not required, that the power could be exercised in the public interest only, and that consultation with the Chief Justice of India under Article 222(1) meant full and effective consultation.Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth, (1977) 4 SCC 193 : AIR 1977 SC 2328 : [1978] 1 SCR 423. Nothing in that judgment attributes the transfers to the habeas corpus decisions, and we do not attribute them either.
V. Vindication
The Forty-fourth Amendment
40The Emergency ended in March 1977, and the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 rebuilt the provisions that had made the case possible. Section 40 changed Article 359(1) and (1A) so that they refer to “the rights conferred by Part III (except articles 20 and 21)”. The enforcement of those two Articles can no longer be suspended. It also inserted clause (1B), under which clause (1A) protects only a law containing a recital that it is in relation to the Proclamation, and executive action under such a law. Section 39 made a matching change to Article 358. Section 37 replaced “internal disturbance” in Article 352(1) with “armed rebellion”, and provided that the President shall not issue a Proclamation “unless the decision of the Union Cabinet” that one may be issued “has been communicated to him in writing.”Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, ss. 37, 39, 40; s. 40 in force from 20 June 1979.
41The amendment did not make the dissent law as a matter of reasoning. It closed the result by a different route, by narrowing the power to suspend. It also left that power in place for other rights: the enforcement of Articles 14 and 22 can still be suspended during an emergency.
Later words from the bench and the majority
42The Supreme Court followed the majority in Union of India v. Bhanudas Krishna Gawde in 1977, on detention under COFEPOSA. But opinion turned. In I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Court said that the decision in ADM Jabalpur, “about the restrictive reading of the right to life and liberty stood impliedly overruled by various subsequent decisions.”I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1, quoted in Puttaswamy, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Nariman, J.). In 2010, in Ramdeo Chauhan v. Bani Kant Das, Ganguly J., sitting with Aftab Alam J., used the case to show that a judgment of the Court could itself breach rights: “There is no doubt that the majority judgment of this court in the ADM Jabalpur case (supra) violated the fundamental rights of a large number of people in this country.”Ramdeo Chauhan v. Bani Kant Das, (2010) 14 SCC 209 : AIR 2011 SC 615, ¶ 62. He added: “In fact the dissent of Justice Khanna became the law of the land when, by virtue of the Forty Fourth Constitutional Amendment, Articles 20 and 21 were excluded from the purview of suspension during emergency.”Ramdeo Chauhan, ¶ 63.
43One member of the majority said so himself. In 2011 Bhagwati J., by then long retired as Chief Justice, told The Indian Express: “I was wrong. The majority judgment was not the correct judgment. If it was open to me to come to a fresh decision in that case, I would agree with what Justice (H R) Khanna did. I am sorry (for the judgment).” He also said: “it was an act of weakness on my part.”35 Yrs Later, a Former Chief Justice of India Pleads Guilty, The Indian Express, 16 September 2011 (as reprinted). Y.V. Chandrachud is also said to have apologised publicly, and that account appears in Justice Yatindra Singh’s recollection.Yatindra Singh, The Leaflet, above. We have not found a primary record of his words, so we do not quote any.
Puttaswamy
44The overruling came in a case about something else. In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, a nine-judge Bench recognised a fundamental right to privacy, and the status of rights outside the constitutional text brought it to ADM Jabalpur. Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud J., writing for himself, J.S. Khehar C.J., R.K. Agrawal and S. Abdul Nazeer JJ., and whose father had been in the majority of 1976, said:
“The judgments rendered by all the four judges constituting the majority in ADM Jabalpur are seriously flawed. Life and personal liberty are inalienable to human existence. These rights are, as recognised in Kesavananda Bharati, primordial rights. They constitute rights under natural law.”K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 : AIR 2017 SC 4161, ¶ 119 (Chandrachud, J.).
45He went on: “Neither life nor liberty are bounties conferred by the state nor does the Constitution create these rights.” On the dissent: “The view taken by Justice Khanna must be accepted, and accepted in reverence for the strength of its thoughts and the courage of its convictions.”Puttaswamy, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Chandrachud, J.). And then, after placing the case beside Buck v. Bell and Korematsu: “ADM Jabalpur must be and is accordingly overruled. We also overrule the decision in Union of India v Bhanudas Krishna Gawde, which followed ADM Jabalpur.”Puttaswamy, (2017) 10 SCC 1, ¶ 121 (Chandrachud, J.).
46Nariman J. quoted the heart of the dissent and said, “We, therefore, expressly overrule the majority judgments in ADM Jabalpur”.Puttaswamy, (2017) 10 SCC 1, ¶ 92 (Nariman, J.). Kaul J. agreed with “the view expressly overruling the ADM Jabalpur case which was an aberration in the constitutional jurisprudence of our country and the desirability of burying the majority opinion ten fathom deep, with no chance of resurrection.”Puttaswamy, (2017) 10 SCC 1, ¶ 82 (Kaul, J.).
47A difference in reasoning should be noticed. Puttaswamy speaks the language of natural and inalienable rights, and Nariman J. relied partly on international covenants. Khanna J. spoke of higher values but built on positive law and read “law” in Article 21 as State-made. Seervai, in the passage Nariman J. set out, admired the dissent and agreed with its conclusion, but said his own analysis confirmed that conclusion “though on different grounds from those which he has given.”H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th ed.), Appendix, quoted in Puttaswamy, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Nariman, J., footnote). The Court accepted the dissent’s conclusion and its central claim that Article 21 is not the sole repository. It did not adopt each step of its reasoning, and the legacy is the more interesting for that.
VI. What Remains
48ADM Jabalpur no longer stands, and the enforcement of Article 21 cannot be suspended. The power at the centre of the case does stand. Article 22(3)(b) permits laws for preventive detention, in peacetime and without an emergency, and such laws remain in force at both Union and State level, among them the National Security Act, 1980, the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, and State Acts such as the Telangana and Tamil Nadu statutes. In Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, as quoted in later cases, the Court said that preventive detention “is, by nature, repugnant to democratic ideas and an anathema to the Rule of law”, but that since Article 22(3)(b) permits it, the Court “must confine the power of preventive detention within very narrow limits”.Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244, ¶ 29, quoted in Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587, ¶ 22.
49Recent decisions apply that discipline. They rest on Articles 21 and 22 and on the statutes concerned, not on the dissent as authority, but their method is the one the dissent defended: statutory power is read strictly, and the court checks it.
50In Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana, Nariman J., sitting with Hrishikesh Roy J., quashed the detention of a man accused in five cases of cheating. Applying the three concentric circles of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, the Court said: “Mere contravention of law such as indulging in cheating or criminal breach of trust certainly affects ‘law and order’ but before it can be said to affect ‘public order’, it must affect the community or the public at large.”Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 415 : AIR 2021 SC 3656, ¶ 13. The real reason for the detention was that he had obtained bail. If bail was wrongly granted, “there are well-known remedies in the ordinary law to take care of the situation.”Banka Sneha Sheela, ¶ 14.
51In Pramod Singla v. Union of India, Krishna Murari and V. Ramasubramanian JJ. called preventive detention laws “a colonial legacy” with “a great potential to be abused and misused”, and said that “the Courts must always give every benefit of doubt in favour of the detenue, and even the slightest of errors in procedural compliances must result in favour of the detenue.”Pramod Singla v. Union of India, decided 10 April 2023, ¶ 21 (Krishna Murari, J.). The Court there rejected the argument based on delay in considering the representation, but it decided the issue of illegible documents in a foreign language for the detenu, treating their supply as a grave prejudice to the right under Article 22(5). He had by then been released on the expiry of the detention period, and the Court decided the point for clarity of the law.Pramod Singla, ¶¶ 36–45.
52In Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, Dipankar Datta J., sitting with Surya Kant J., traced the shift from the early argument that the production of an order good on its face ended the enquiry, and held: “it is no longer the law that a preventive detention action, howsoever lawful it might appear on its face, cannot be invalidated by the Constitutional Courts.”Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587, ¶ 20. That sentence reverses the world of 1976 without mentioning it. The Court quashed the order, and it observed that it had seldom found detention continued, after the Advisory Board’s advice, for less than the maximum period the law permits.Ameena Begum.
53In Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, a Bench of Chandrachud C.J. and J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra JJ., in a judgment by Pardiwala J., quashed a detention for chain-snatching. It said that where orders are being passed “in a routine and mechanical manner”, the Advisory Board’s duty becomes all the more important, and it remarked: “We hope that the State of Telangana does not give any good reason once again to this Court to observe anything further.”Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 INSC 239, ¶¶ 48–49.
54The enduring value of the dissent lies less in any one proposition than in the question it would not let go. When the State says a person may be held without trial, a court may ask: under what law, by whom, and was that law obeyed? Khanna J.’s answer in 1976 was that no Emergency could remove that question. The Constitution now agrees as far as Articles 20 and 21 are concerned. The rest depends on courts continuing to ask it.
History
- Published · 1 November 2026
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