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2026 FPR ECN 4 · https://firstprecedent.org/concepts/ratio-decidendi

CN-0034Concepts · Jurisprudence · Editorial draft · 2026 FPR ECN 4

FPR Editors27 October 2026 · 5,089 words

Ratio Decidendi

What binds under Article 141 is the law declared by the Supreme Court, and the law declared is the ratio decidendi of a decision, the principle on which the case was decided on its facts; it does not include findings of fact, observations made by the way, points decided without consideration, or directions given under Article 142 to do complete justice in a particular case.

Abstract

Article 141 makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts in India. This entry explains what that law is. It distinguishes the decision between the parties from the principle that binds others; sets out the classical tests for finding the ratio (Wambaugh's inversion test, Goodhart's material facts, and Julius Stone's critique) and their reception in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi and State of Gujarat v. Utility Users' Welfare Association; and examines the status of obiter dicta (Mohandas Issardas, Hazara Singh, Meena Variyal). It then turns to the problems of a large, multi-Bench court: finding the ratio of divided Benches (Kesavananda Bharati, Shayara Bano), the line between Article 141 and Article 142 (Rafiq Masih, High Court Bar Association, Allahabad), the effect of dismissing a special leave petition (Kunhayammed), decisions per incuriam and sub silentio (A.R. Antulay, Gurnam Kaur), and the rules on Bench strength (Dawoodi Bohra, Pranay Sethi). It closes with the criticisms of the system and the propositions that state the law today.


I. The concept

Decision and principle

1A judgment does two things. It decides a dispute between the parties, and it states, or implies, a rule that will be applied to like cases in future. The first is binding on the parties as res judicata. The second is binding on other courts under the doctrine of precedent, stare decisis. The part of a judgment that binds in the second sense is its ratio decidendi, the reason for the decision.

2Not everything a judge writes has that force. A judgment sets out the pleadings, the evidence, the arguments, earlier authorities, comparisons with other systems and observations on policy before it reaches its conclusion. Treating every sentence as law would turn the reading of precedent into a hunt for quotations. The common law therefore divides what a court says into two parts: the ratio decidendi, the principle on which the case is decided, which binds; and obiter dicta, things said by the way, which may persuade but do not bind.

Article 141

3In India the doctrine has a constitutional basis. Article 141 provides that “The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.” The words follow section 212 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which gave binding force to the law declared by the Federal Court and the Privy Council.

4Article 141 does not say that every order or every sentence of the Supreme Court binds. It says that the law declared binds, and the Court has consistently equated that with the ratio decidendi. In State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., R.M. Sahai J., concurring, put the point in terms that are often repeated: a decision that is not express, and is neither founded on reasons nor proceeds on consideration of the issue, cannot be deemed to be a law declared having binding effect under Article 141.State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139 (Sahai J., concurring). In Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao, the Court said that what is binding “is the ratio of the decision and not any finding of facts”, and that it is the principle found on a reading of the judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court, that forms the ratio, “and not any particular word or sentence”.Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao, (2002) 4 SCC 638, AIR 2002 SC 1598.

Res judicata and stare decisis

5The distinction between the decision and the principle has practical consequences. The decision between the parties, the decree allowing or dismissing the claim, binds them under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the general principle of res judicata.Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457, (1962) 1 SCR 574. It continues to bind them even if the principle on which it rests is later overruled. The ratio, by contrast, binds people who were not parties at all, because other courts must apply it to similar cases.

Is the Supreme Court bound by its own decisions?

6Article 141 binds “all courts”. The Supreme Court has held that this means courts other than itself. In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, a Bench of seven judges reconsidered the Court’s decision in State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd.Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661, (1955) 2 SCR 603; State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 252. S.R. Das, Acting C.J., said:

Article 141 which lays down that the law declared by this Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India quite obviously refers to Courts other than this Court.Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 (Das, Actg. C.J.).

7and added that “There is nothing in our Constitution which prevents us from departing from a previous decision if we are convinced of its error and its baneful effect on the general interests of the public”.

8The power is used with restraint. In Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, P.B. Gajendragadkar C.J., for a Bench of seven judges, said that in reviewing and revising its earlier decision the Court “should ask itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision should be revised”.Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1965 SC 1636, (1965) 2 SCR 908 (Gajendragadkar C.J.). Because its decisions bind every court in the country, the Court must try to keep the law certain and continuous; frequent revision merely because a later view seems more reasonable would make the law uncertain. But if the Court is satisfied that an earlier decision was clearly wrong, it should not hesitate to correct it.

9The practical safeguard is the rule on Bench strength, discussed in Part V: a Bench cannot overrule a decision of a larger Bench, and a Bench of equal strength that doubts an earlier decision must refer the question to a larger one.

II. Finding the ratio

10The outcome of a case is usually easy to identify. The principle behind it often is not. A judge may state a rule more widely than the facts required, give several reasons, or give none that is clearly expressed. Three classical approaches have shaped how the ratio is found.

Wambaugh’s inversion test

11Eugene Wambaugh, writing in The Study of Cases at the end of the nineteenth century, proposed a test that the Supreme Court has adopted. In State of Gujarat v. Utility Users’ Welfare Association, which concerned whether a State Electricity Regulatory Commission must include a judicial member, Sanjay Kishan Kaul J. quoted it:

In order to make the test, let him first frame carefully the supposed proposition of law. Let him then insert in the proposition a word reversing its meaning. Let him then inquire whether, if the court had conceived this new proposition to be good, and had had it in mind, the decision could have been the same. If the answer be affirmative, then, however excellent the original proposition may be, the case is not a precedent for that proposition, but if the answer be negative the case is a precedent for the original proposition and possibly for other propositions also.State of Gujarat v. Utility Users’ Welfare Assn., (2018) 6 SCC 21 (Kaul J.), quoting Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases.

12He then restated it:

In order to test whether a particular proposition of law is to be treated as the ratio decidendi of the case, the proposition is to be inversed, i.e., to remove from the text of the judgment as if it did not exist.State of Gujarat v. Utility Users’ Welfare Assn., (2018) 6 SCC 21, ¶ 103.

13If the conclusion would have been the same without the proposition, it is not the ratio. A Bench of Sanjiv Khanna and M.M. Sundresh JJ. applied the same test in Career Institute Educational Society v. Om Shree Thakurji Educational Society.Career Institute Educational Society v. Om Shree Thakurji Educational Society (Supreme Court, order of 24 April 2023).

14The test has two well-known weaknesses. Where a court rests its decision on two independent grounds, inverting either leaves the decision standing on the other, so that the test, applied mechanically, would leave the case with no ratio at all. The accepted answer is that each of two grounds deliberately decided is part of the ratio.Jacobs v. London County Council, [1950] AC 361 (H.L.). And where several judges reach the same result by different routes, inverting the reasoning of any one of them does not change the outcome. The test cannot, on its own, find the ratio of a divided Bench.

Goodhart’s material facts

15Arthur Goodhart argued in 1930 that the ratio is not found in the reasons the judge gives, which may be wrong or incomplete, nor in the rule the judge states, which may be wider than the case required. It is found in the facts the court treated as material and the decision it reached on them.Arthur L. Goodhart, “Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case” (1930) 40 Yale L.J. 161. The work of analysis lies in separating material facts from immaterial ones: facts of person, time, place, kind and amount are presumed immaterial unless the court treated them as material. The fewer the facts treated as material, the wider the principle; the more, the narrower.

Stone’s critique

16Julius Stone replied that facts can be described at many levels of generality.Julius Stone, “The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi” (1959) 22 M.L.R. 597. The facts of Donoghue v. Stevenson may be stated as a snail in a bottle of ginger beer made in Paisley; as a harmful substance in food sold in a container that prevents inspection; or as any product made carelessly so as to injure a foreseeable user.Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] AC 562 (H.L.). Each description yields a different principle. A precedent therefore offers a range of possible rationes, and it is the later court, deciding how widely to read the earlier one, that chooses among them. Stone’s point is not that precedent is meaningless, but that following it is a matter of judgment rather than mechanical extraction. A later court that wishes to extend a decision describes its facts generally; one that wishes to confine it describes them narrowly.

Sudhansu Sekhar Misra (1967)

17The Supreme Court’s standard statement of the limits of precedent comes from State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, a decision of a Constitution Bench in which K.S. Hegde J. wrote for the Court.State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647, (1968) 2 SCR 154. He said:

A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it.State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647 (Hegde J.).

18He then adopted the speech of the Earl of Halsbury L.C. in Quinn v. Leathem:

every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found.Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] AC 495 (H.L.), quoted in Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647.

19The other point Lord Halsbury made was that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and cannot be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it, because the law is not always logical at all. Hegde J. concluded: “It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it.”

III. Dhanwanti Devi and after

Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi (1996)

20The fullest Indian statement of the anatomy of a decision is in Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, a judgment of K. Ramaswamy J.Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44. Land in Jammu and Kashmir had been requisitioned and then acquired for defence purposes under the Jammu and Kashmir Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1968. The arbitrator enhanced the compensation and also awarded solatium and interest, and the High Court upheld the award, holding that owners whose land was acquired under the Act could not be treated differently from owners under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The respondents relied on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Krishan Khosla as authority for the award.

21Ramaswamy J. held that that decision was not a binding precedent on the point. He explained:

It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi.Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44 (Ramaswamy J.).

22Every decision, he said, contains three basic postulates: findings of material facts, direct and inferential; statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and judgment based on the combined effect of the two. The concrete decision binds the parties; it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to its subject-matter, that alone has the force of law. And he warned that “No judgment can be read as if it is a statute.” The Court held that the Act made no provision for solatium or interest, set aside that part of the award, and upheld the compensation.

Reading judgments in context

23The same discipline runs through the later cases. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, the Court said: “The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. A case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it.”Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1 SCC 213, AIR 1987 SC 1073. In Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oil Mills, Arijit Pasayat J. added:

Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oil Mills, (2002) 3 SCC 496, AIR 2002 SC 834 (Pasayat J.).

24Observations of courts, he continued, are not to be read as Euclid’s theorems or as provisions of a statute; the discussion in a judgment is meant to explain and not to define, and judges interpret statutes, not judgments.

IV. Ratio and obiter

The categories

25Indian courts distinguish three kinds of statement outside the strict ratio. A considered dictum is a pronouncement on a point that arose, was argued and was deliberately decided, but was not necessary for the outcome. An obiter dictum in the ordinary sense is an expression of opinion on a point not necessary for the decision. A casual observation is a remark on a point that did not arise at all. The weight given to each decreases in that order.

Mohandas Issardas (1954)

26The distinction between an obiter dictum and a casual observation was drawn by M.C. Chagla C.J. in the Bombay High Court in Mohandas Issardas v. A.N. Sattanathan, where the revenue relied on remarks of the Supreme Court about the scheme of the Sea Customs Act, 1878.Mohandas Issardas v. A.N. Sattanathan, AIR 1955 Bom 113, (1954) 56 Bom LR 1156. He said:

An obiter dictum is an expression of opinion on a point which is not necessary for the decision of a case.Mohandas Issardas v. A.N. Sattanathan, AIR 1955 Bom 113 (Chagla C.J.).

27That definition, he explained, distinguishes a point necessary for the determination of the case from one that is not, but in both cases the point must arise for the court’s determination. A statement on a point that did not arise at all is not even an obiter dictum. He characterised the remark relied on as “a casual observation made in considering the whole scheme of the Sea Customs Act”, and declined to treat it as binding.

Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh (1975)

28In Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh, a Sessions Court had relied on an observation in an earlier decision of the Supreme Court to acquit in a food adulteration case.Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1083. V.R. Krishna Iyer J., for the Court, approved the High Court’s statement of the right approach to the Supreme Court’s decisions:

Judicial propriety, dignity and decorum demand that being the highest judicial tribunal in the country even obiter dictum of the Supreme Court should be accepted as binding. Declaration of law by that Court even if it be only by the way has to be respected. But all that does not mean that every statement contained in a judgment of that Court would be attracted by Art. 141. Statements on matters other than law have no binding force.Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1083 (Krishna Iyer J., approving the High Court).

29Many decisions of the Court, he added, are on their own facts, and a finding on the facts of one case cannot be treated as a rule for another.

Oriental Insurance Co. v. Meena Variyal (2007)

30The limits of obiter dicta were stated in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal, a judgment of P.K. Balasubramanyan J.Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal, (2007) 5 SCC 428, AIR 2007 SC 1609. The question was the liability of an insurer under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and reliance was placed on observations in an earlier decision of two judges, as against a decision of three judges in Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan. He said:

An obiter dictum of this Court may be binding only on the High Courts in the absence of a direct pronouncement on that question elsewhere by this Court. But as far as this Court is concerned, though not binding, it does have clear persuasive authority.Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal, (2007) 5 SCC 428.

31The rules may be summarised. An obiter dictum of the Supreme Court does not bind the Supreme Court itself, though it carries persuasive weight there. A considered dictum is ordinarily followed by the High Courts where there is no direct decision of the Supreme Court on the point. A dictum cannot prevail over the ratio of a decision of the Court. And a casual observation on a point that did not arise has no binding force.

V. A court of many Benches

32The Supreme Court sits in Benches of two, three, five, seven, nine and, once, thirteen judges. Several features of its practice complicate the search for the ratio.

Divided Benches

33When a Bench is divided, a proposition is part of the ratio only if a majority of the judges hearing the case accept it. A judge who agrees with the result for different reasons does not add to the majority for anyone else’s reasoning.

34Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala is the classic example.Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, AIR 1973 SC 1461. Thirteen judges delivered eleven opinions. Six (Sikri C.J., Shelat, Grover, Hegde, Mukherjea and Jaganmohan Reddy JJ.) held that the amending power under Article 368 was subject to implied limitations. Six (Ray, Palekar, Mathew, Beg, Dwivedi and Chandrachud JJ.) held that it was not. H.R. Khanna J. rejected implied limitations but held that the power of amendment did not extend to destroying the Constitution’s basic structure:

Subject to the retention of the basic structure or framework of the Constitution, I have no doubt that the power of amendment is plenary and would include within itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles including those relating to fundamental rights.Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (Khanna J.).

35Seven judges thus agreed that the amending power was limited, and a summary statement of the view of the majority, signed by nine of the judges, recorded that Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. The basic structure doctrine is the common ground between the six and Khanna J., stated in his terms, because his was the narrowest view on which a majority could be formed.

36Shayara Bano v. Union of India shows how difficult the exercise can be.Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1, AIR 2017 SC 4609. By three to two, a Constitution Bench held the practice of instant triple talaq invalid. R.F. Nariman J., for himself and U.U. Lalit J., held it manifestly arbitrary and therefore void under Article 14. Kurian Joseph J. agreed in the result on a different ground: that what was contrary to the Quran could not be valid as Shariat, opening his judgment with the words “What is bad in theology was once good in law”. J.S. Khehar C.J. and S. Abdul Nazeer J. dissented. On a strict count, the proposition that legislation can be struck down for manifest arbitrariness had the support of only two of the five judges. The Court has since applied that doctrine in other Constitution Bench decisions, including Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India and Joseph Shine v. Union of India, which have given it a firmer footing than Shayara Bano alone could.Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1; Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39.

37In the United States, Marks v. United States holds that where no single rationale commands a majority, the holding is the position taken by the members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). The Supreme Court of India has not adopted Marks by name, but the approach to Kesavananda reflects the same idea.

Article 141 and Article 142

38Article 142 empowers the Supreme Court to make any order necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter before it. Orders under it often relax rules in the circumstances of a particular case. The Court has held that such directions are not law declared under Article 141.

39In State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), a Bench of three judges said that directions under Article 142 are issued to do proper justice, and that the exercise of that power “cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India”.State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), (2014) 8 SCC 883. It also described Article 142 as “supplementary in nature” and said that it “cannot supplant the substantive provisions, though they are not limited by the substantive provisions in the statute”.

40In High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P., a Constitution Bench, in the leading judgment of Abhay S. Oka J., considered directions given in Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency (P) Ltd. v. CBI, under which interim orders of the High Courts staying civil and criminal proceedings would lapse automatically after six months.High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P., (2024) 6 SCC 267; Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency (P) Ltd. v. CBI, (2018) 16 SCC 299. The Court held that those directions had been issued under Article 142 and could not stand:

The jurisdiction under Article 142 cannot be invoked to pass blanket orders setting at naught a very large number of interim orders lawfully passed by all the High Courts, and that too, without hearing the contesting parties.High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P., (2024) 6 SCC 267 (Oka J.).

41The jurisdiction, it said, “can be invoked only to deal with extraordinary situations for doing complete justice between the parties before the Court”.

Dismissal of special leave petitions

42Most matters reach the Supreme Court as petitions for special leave to appeal under Article 136, and many are dismissed at the outset. Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, decided by a Bench of three judges in a judgment of R.C. Lahoti J., settled the effect of such a dismissal.Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359, AIR 2000 SC 2587. The jurisdiction under Article 136 is divisible into two stages: the first, up to the disposal of the prayer for special leave; the second, which begins when leave is granted and the petition is converted into an appeal. The doctrine of merger applies only at the second stage. On the first, the Court said:

An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non- speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge.Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 (Lahoti J.).

43If the order refusing leave gives reasons, the statement of law in it is a declaration of law under Article 141, and its other findings bind the parties; but the order of the lower court still does not merge in it. Once leave is granted, the decision of the Supreme Court in the appeal, whether it reverses, modifies or affirms, replaces the decision below. A Bench of three judges confirmed these principles in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd.Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376.

Per incuriam

44A decision is per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of a statutory provision or of a binding authority. Such a decision does not bind. The leading Indian authority is A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, in which a Bench of seven judges, in the majority judgment of Sabyasachi Mukharji J., held that earlier directions of a Constitution Bench transferring a criminal case to the High Court had been given without regard to section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, which required such offences to be tried by special judges.A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, AIR 1988 SC 1531. The Court described decisions per incuriam as those given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or some authority binding on the Court, so that some step in the reasoning is demonstrably wrong, and held that the directions were per incuriam and could be corrected.

45The doctrine is narrow. A decision is not per incuriam merely because a later court thinks it wrongly reasoned. In Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, Vikramajit Sen J. stated its two forms:

A decision or judgment can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or regulation, which was not brought to the notice of the Court. A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a Co-equal or Larger Bench; or if the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the views of this Court.Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 623, AIR 2014 SC 1745 (Sen J.).

Sub silentio

46A decision passes sub silentio on a point of law that was involved but was neither argued nor considered. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, the Court adopted Salmond’s definition:

A decision passes sub silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind.Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101, AIR 1989 SC 38.

47Such a decision is not an authority on the point it did not consider. The rule is a corollary of the definition of the ratio: a court cannot lay down a reason for deciding a question it never reasoned about.

Bench strength

48The ordering of precedents within the Supreme Court is governed by rules settled in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, a decision of a Constitution Bench in a judgment of R.C. Lahoti C.J.Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673, AIR 2005 SC 752. The Court said:

(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength. (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot doubt the correctness of the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration.Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673 (Lahoti C.J.).

49A Bench of equal strength may express doubt about an earlier decision of equal strength, and the matter may then be placed before a larger Bench. These rules are subject to the Chief Justice’s power over the roster. The first rule is framed in terms of the strength of the Bench, not the number of judges in the majority: a decision of five judges by three to two is a decision of a Bench of five.

50The same discipline applies between Benches of equal size. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, a Constitution Bench in a judgment of Dipak Misra C.J. held that a two-judge Bench in Santosh Devi “should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been stated in Sarla Verma, a judgment by a coordinate Bench”, because “a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench”.National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, AIR 2017 SC 5157.

VI. Criticisms

A court of many voices

51The Supreme Court of India does not sit as a single body. It works through many Benches of two and three judges at the same time, deciding very large numbers of cases. Commentators have described the result as a court that speaks with many voices, in which coordinate Benches sometimes reach conflicting conclusions without noticing each other.Nick Robinson, “Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts” (2013) 61 Am. J. Comp. L. 173. The rules in Dawoodi Bohra and Pranay Sethi are meant to prevent such conflicts, but they depend on Benches knowing of the earlier decisions.

The problem for the High Courts

52Where two decisions of Supreme Court Benches of equal strength conflict and no larger Bench has resolved the conflict, a High Court must decide which to follow. Different High Courts have answered differently: some follow the earlier decision, treating the later as per incuriam for failing to follow it; others follow the later; and the Allahabad High Court in Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge, Hapur held that a High Court may follow the decision that appears to it to state the law more elaborately and accurately.Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge, Hapur, AIR 1991 All 114. The last approach is flexible but gives each High Court a choice between decisions of the Supreme Court, which sits uneasily with the uniformity Article 141 is meant to secure. Sundeep Kumar Bafna supports the first: a later decision that cannot be reconciled with the ratio of an earlier decision of a co-equal Bench is itself per incuriam.

Precedent as judgment

53The deepest criticism is Stone’s. If the ratio of a case depends on how a later court chooses to describe its facts, precedent constrains less than the doctrine suggests. The Indian cases accept the point in part. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, Dhanwanti Devi and Haryana Financial Corporation all insist that judgments be read in the light of their facts, which is another way of saying that the later court must judge how far an earlier decision reaches. What the doctrine of precedent requires is not mechanical application but honest reasoning about what an earlier court actually decided.

VII. The position today

54The law on the ratio decidendi in India may be stated in eight propositions.

551. Only the law declared by the Supreme Court binds under Article 141, and the law declared is the ratio decidendi: the principle on which the case was decided, read in the light of its facts and the questions before the Court. Findings of fact and isolated words or sentences are not the ratio (Apparao; Dhanwanti Devi).

562. A decision is an authority only for what it actually decides, not for what may seem to follow logically from it (Sudhansu Sekhar Misra; Ambica Quarry Works).

573. To test whether a proposition is the ratio, the court may invert it; if the decision would have been the same without it, it is not the ratio (Utility Users’ Welfare Association).

584. An obiter dictum of the Supreme Court is ordinarily followed by the High Courts in the absence of a direct decision of the Supreme Court on the point, but it does not bind the Supreme Court and cannot prevail over a ratio; a casual observation on a point that did not arise has no binding force (Mohandas Issardas; Hazara Singh; Meena Variyal).

595. Where a Bench is divided, the ratio is the proposition accepted by a majority of the judges, which may be the narrowest ground on which a majority agreed (Kesavananda Bharati).

606. Directions given under Article 142 to do complete justice in a particular case are not law declared under Article 141, and Article 142 cannot be used to make blanket orders overriding the lawful orders of other courts (Rafiq Masih; High Court Bar Association, Allahabad).

617. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not attract the doctrine of merger; if it gives reasons, the statement of law in it is a declaration of law under Article 141 (Kunhayammed).

628. A decision given per incuriam, in ignorance of a statute or a binding decision, or sub silentio on a point not considered, is not binding on that point (A.R. Antulay; Sundeep Kumar Bafna; Gurnam Kaur). A Bench is bound by a decision of a larger Bench and must refer to a larger Bench if it doubts a decision of a Bench of equal strength (Dawoodi Bohra; Pranay Sethi).


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  • Published · 27 October 2026

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